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Univ. of Toronto

A Fusion of Horizons: Gadamer and Schleiermacher

Ron Bontekoe

HANS-GEORG GADAMER establishes his theory of phenomenological hermeneutics in *Truth and Method* in part by expressly repudiating the hermeneutics of Friedrich Schleiermacher. In the course of this paper I intend to examine the precise nature of the differences between phenomenological and romantic hermeneutics, at least insofar as these two figures are taken as their leading spokesmen, and to suggest that Gadamer would have left himself less open to misunderstanding had he stressed the important similarities between his position and that of Schleiermacher rather than overemphasizing the significance of their differences. Among those theorists who, I would suggest, have misunderstood Gadamer at least in part because of the way in which he deals with the founder of romantic hermeneutics are Emilio Betti and E.D. Hirsch Jr. One of the things I hope this paper will accomplish is to lay to rest the notion, fostered by Betti, Hirsch and Gadamer himself, that we must make a *choice* between Schleiermacher and Gadamer. A second is to demonstrate that, if in fact Gadamer and Schleiermacher are presenting compatible theories on the nature of interpretation, there is a question, left unasked in *Truth and Method*, which must be decisively answered in the affirmative, namely, "Is the fusion of horizons to be taken as normative?"

1

Hermeneutics, according to Schleiermacher, is concerned with the reconstruction of the author's intended meaning. This reconstruction of meaning results from the interplay of two distinct hermeneutical activities: (1) the clarification of linguistic usage in the text through a consideration of such things as genre and the state of the language at the time of the author's writing, and (2) the accumulation of insights into the character of the author by means of research concerning the details of his life and of the period in which he lived. The first of these activities Schleiermacher calls the grammatical side of the interpretation, the second the technical or psychological side. In order to complete either side of interpretation, Schleiermacher argues,[1] it would be necessary to have a complete knowledge either of the language or of the author as a person. Since in both cases this is impossible, given the human limitations of the interpreter, it is necessary to move back and forth between the grammatical and psychological sides, enriching our understanding of what is involved on the grammatical side by means of insights gleaned through research on the psychological side, and *vice versa*. Significantly, Schleiermacher concludes by observing that no rules can stipulate exactly how to do this.

[1]Friedrich Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts*, ed. Heinz Kimmerle, trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1977), p. 100.

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Gadamer, on the other hand, argues that while the activities which Schleiermacher describes serve as important preliminary aids to understanding, they do not suffice to provide what we look for as the meaning of a text.[2] The author's intended meaning is *not*, according to Gadamer, that with which an interpreter should concern himself. Even if such a meaning could be accurately reconstructed, (something that is impossible, Gadamer contends, given the historical limitations of our existence as human beings) what we would then have is a dead meaning—a meaning which was appropriate to, and arose out of, the circumstances of another place and time—a meaning with which, for this very reason, it is impossible for us to enter into a living relationship. As Gadamer sees it, the point which Schleiermacher has overlooked is that understanding— which is primarily a matter of arriving at agreement with another person, and which thus requires that one never lose sight of one's own capacity (and right) to make a contribution and so to put things in a new light—"is always understanding *about something*"[3] [my emphasis]. Insofar as hermeneutics is directed at the promotion of understanding, then, what matters is that we come to understand whatever it is that the text is speaking about to us.

The disagreement between Schleiermacher and Gadamer concerning the purpose of hermeneutics can be clarified further if we consider what meaning each of them gives to the claim that the interpreter must aspire to understand the author better than the author understood himself. According to Schleiermacher, what is involved in recapturing the author's intended meaning is a reenactment in the interpreter's mind of all the processes which originally went into the production of the literary work. Thus the interpreter, in a sense, reconstructs the text, and in so doing becomes consciously aware of things which the author did, or was influenced by, unconsciously. It is this conscious awareness of what was involved in the production of the text which constitutes, for Schleiermacher, the "better understanding" of the interpreter. Schleiermacher may have been the first to suggest that understanding the author better than he understood himself should be a general aim of all textual interpretation, but he was not the first to suggest that this superior understanding was in fact a possibility for the interpreter. Here he was anticipated by Kant, who claimed to have such an understanding of Plato (at least with respect to his doctrine of Ideas), and by Fichte, who, in turn, claimed to have such an understanding of Kant. As Gadamer points out, however, neither Kant nor Fichte, when they spoke of understanding an author better than he understood himself, meant quite the same thing by this as Schleiermacher did.

> It is not, with them, a principle of criticism, but a philosophical claim to move, through greater conceptual clarity, beyond the contradictions of a given theory. Thus it is a principle that, entirely in the spirit of rationalism, claims, solely through thought, through the development of the implications of an author's ideas, to achieve insights that correspond to the real intention of the author—insights that he would have to share if his thinking had been clear enough.[4]

Gadamer does not advocate adopting entirely without reservations the attitude attributed here to Kant and Fichte (since he considers it impossible to recapture the exact intention of the author), but nevertheless he considers their approach to have at least one clear advantage over that of Schleiermacher: it maintains the object under discussion in the text as the

[2]Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co., 1982), p. 148.
[3]*Ibid.*, p. 158.
[4]*Ibid.*, pp. 171-2.

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focus of the interpreter's attention. Our interest in literary texts and in works of art in general, according to Gadamer, does not derive from an urge to escape into the realm of free aesthetic play,[5] but from a desire more firmly to take hold of the world in which we find ourselves and to make sense of it. Thus Gadamer frowns on what he takes to be Scheiermacher's treatment of the text "as a free production, independent of its knowledge content."[6]

We read a text, if it is worth approaching thoughtfully, for the sake of the insight which we hope to glean from it. And yet, Gadamer informs us, it is not entirely correct to say that the insight is contained *within* the text. If it were, and if it had been placed there by the author, then Schleiermacher's concern with recovering the intended meaning of the author would be perfectly justified. As Gadamer sees it, however, the meaning of a text is realized only when it is understood. And this because it is only in the act of being understood that the text acquires a context. There is no denying, of course, that the text says something specific. In the absence of a context, however, what is said can never entirely determine what is meant. The literary work lacks a context, and thus lacks a definitive meaning, in that there is always a gap between the experienced world within which the author of the text made his statement and the experienced world within which his reader receives that statement. The text, as a thing which perpetually offers itself to be read, exists within this gap. Its future possibilities of meaning are no longer determined at this stage by the context of the author's own experience. That experience has already played its part by helping to determine what the text, as a finished work, now says. Its *future* possibilities are determined rather by the contexts which its future readers will impose upon it in their efforts to come to grips with the text.

According to Gadamer, then, the literary work has no definitive context which determines its meaning for all readers. Rather it has the capacity to adapt itself more or less successfully to whatever context a given reader brings to it. (As a general rule of thumb, the broader the range of contexts to which it can successfully adapt, the greater the likelihood that the text will eventually be recognized as a "classic.") To modern proponents of romantic hermeneutics, like Hirsch and Betti, these claims seem nothing short of heretical. Following the lead of Schleiermacher, they argue that the context which determines the meaning of a text is clearly the author's own: what the author meant then, what it means now, and what it always will mean. What a given reader *makes* of that meaning is an altogether different question. In the final analysis, the entire dispute between romantic and phenomenological hermeneutics comes down to this difference of opinion over what is to count as the context of a literary work.

And quite a significant difference it would appear to be, until we ask how it affects, on a practical level, the way we approach a particular work of literature. Here, surprisingly, the differences between the rival schools of hermeneutics—at least insofar as Gadamer and Schleiermacher are taken as their primary spokesmen—seem to evaporate. Although certain of Gadamer's critics would have it that his position implies that a text can mean anything, because in fact it means nothing at all, Gadamer himself makes a firm distinction between true and false interpretations. Moreover, the criterion he advances for determining whether an interpretation is true bears a remarkable similarity to

[5]Gadamer explicitly rejects Schiller's aesthetics of genius in which the production of art is viewed as a practising of freedom and the aesthetic is equated with the purely formal. See *Truth and Method*, pp. 73-80.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 172.

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that put forward by Schleiermacher for the same purpose. An interpretation is correct, according to Gadamer, if it "disappears" into the text for us.[7] Another way of putting this is that an interpretation is correct if there is no conflict between what the text actually says and what we take it to mean. Schleiermacher says essentially the same thing, although he expresses his idea in terms of the hermeneutic circle. An interpretation is correct if the to-and-fro examination of part and whole on one level, and on another, the to-and-fro examination of language and biography, yield no new incongruities which need to be accounted for. When this stage has been reached, the text is transparent; nowhere is there a break between what it says and what we take it to mean. Both Gadamer and Schleiermacher conclude, however, that no *finally* correct interpretation—no interpretation that exhausts the potential meaning of the text—can ever be reached.

How is it possible that, in spite of their radically different positions on the question of what is to count as the meaning of a text, Gadamer and Schleiermacher should choose substantially the same means for determining whether an interpretation is true? The explanation, as I have already suggested, is that their theories of interpretation are not really incompatible. In fact, seen in a certain light, the two theories complement one another: each possesses strengths which the other lacks and of which it has need, if it is to provide an adequate account of interpretation. That Gadamer himself failed to recognize this at the time of writing *Truth and Method*, it seems to me, is a result of his having committed two errors. First, he overemphasized the importance for Schleiermacher of the psychological aspect of interpretation.[8] Second, he disclaimed any interest in prescribing how the art of interpretation should be conducted, contending instead that he was merely describing how understanding in fact takes place. Let us examine in what sense these are errors.

2

Gadamer recognizes that throughout Schleiermacher's writings grammatical and psychological interpretation are spoken of as being interdependent, but, following Heinz Kimmerle, he suggests that nonetheless the psychological aspect of interpretation gradually came to dominate Schleiermacher's thinking. As Gadamer puts it,[9] his observations on this aspect of interpretation represent Schleiermacher's "particular contribution" to hermeneutics and came to exert far more influence on other hermeneutical theorists of the nineteenth century than did his comments on grammatical interpretation. Gadamer seems to feel that, because of this, he can pass over the questions posed by the interdependence of these two aspects of interpretation and focus on the implications of Schleiermacher's exposition of psychological interpretation in isolation. It is only because he chooses to deal with no more than half of what Schleiermacher understands to be the hermeneutical enterprise, however, that Gadamer can speak as if the final goal of interpretation for Schleiermacher were the "transforming" of the inter-

[7] *Ibid.*, p. 359.

[8] In "The Heritage of Hegel" published nineteen years after *Truth and Method* first appeared, Gadamer acknowledges that his earlier treatment of Schleiermacher was somewhat onesided. See *Reason in the Age of Science*, p. 63.

[9] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 164.

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preter into the author.[10] Thus when he argues, quite rightly, that the identification of an interpreter with an author is impossible, Gadamer means this to be taken as a criticism of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics, even though Schleiermacher himself has made the same point.

It is true, of course, that in his *Handwritten Manuscripts*[11] Schleiermacher provides a more thorough analysis of the psychological aspect of interpretation. We need not conclude, however, that this represents any turning away from his firmly stated, and often repeated,[12] position that the two aspects are equal in importance and interdependent. After all, the finer points of grammatical interpretation had been examined by many other thinkers before Schleiermacher took up the problem of hermeneutics. Since what we have before us are only brief summaries of his position and random notes toward an intended book, it should not surprise us that Schleiermacher would concentrate his attention on that part of the subject concerning which he has novel insights to offer.

What needs to be borne in mind is that psychological interpretation, in Schleiermacher's opinion, is only one side of a larger activity which has as its goal, not the recreation of an author's mind, but the understanding of a given text. If we remember that as a practising hermeneutist Schleiermacher's main concern was with the interpretation of the Bible, we should not be inclined to lose sight of the priority for him of the text over the author. (It is not primarily John or Matthew or Luke whom we are interested in understanding, but their gospels—and *these* are understood in the fullest possible way by considering, among other things, the individual characters of their authors.) Thus in the "Second Academy Address of 1829," which contains the first systematic presentation of his position, Schleiermacher declares that:

> a knowledge of a given person as such is not the aim of this side [i.e., the psychological] of our task, but a means of enabling us to master the author's activities and so of leading us to an objective consideration of his way of thinking.[13]

Our understanding of the author's way of thinking, however, is not something which occurs independently of our understanding of the text. The text, after all, is the permanent expression of the author's way of thinking.

The whole point of the psychological side of interpretation, as Schleiermacher lays it out, is to guarantee a respect for the otherness of the author. Gadamer manages to see in this approach, however, an assault on that otherness. It is possible, he observes, to cheat the Other of his recognition in an "I-Thou" relationship by anticipating what he has to say, by presuming even to "understand him better than he understands himself." "In this way the 'Thou' loses the immediacy with which it makes its claim."[14] Gadamer argues that the parallel to this cheating of the "Thou" in the hermeneutical sphere is "historical consciousness," a term he uses to cover the speculative dialectic of Hegel as

[10]See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 166, and Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts*, p. 150.

[11]i.e., *Hermeneutics: The Handwritten Manuscripts*.

[12]In *Hermeneutics*, Schleiermacher writes: "These two hermeneutical tasks are completely equal" (p. 99); "Whenever we are actually engaged in the interpretation of a particular text, we must always hold the two sides of interpretation together" (p. 116); "Each operation is to be carried out as far as possible, but we will also point out the natural points of connection that lead from one to the other" (p. 70).

[13]*Ibid.*, p. 207.

[14]Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 322.

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well as the romantic hermeneutics of Schleiermacher. "By claiming to transcend its own conditionedness completely in its knowing of the other, [historical consciousness] is involved in a false dialectical appearance, since it is actually seeking to master . . . the past."[15]

According to Gadamer, then, historical consciousness, in its eagerness definitively to "place" the past, fails to recognize the insurmountable otherness of that past. There are two things wrong, however, with this line of criticism. First, Gadamer's recommended alternative to the exploitative approach which he decries, namely, to leave the author's intended meaning out of our reckoning altogether and to engage with the text as far as possible as if it were an ahistorical entity, is no solution at all. It involves, not a recognition of the author as an Other, but a determination that, since there is no possibility of recognizing *all* that is other in the author, we will ignore him entirely. Second, Gadamer's objection is justified only if in fact Hegel and Schleiermacher do claim to transcend their own conditionedness *completely*. For Schleiermacher at least, this is clearly not the case. He repeatedly insists that the task of interpretation is unending—that our understanding of the author can *always* be improved by further research into the circumstances of his life and the language of his texts.

As Gadamer—and Heidegger before him—have argued,[16] our anticipations of meaning are absolutely indispensable to the process of understanding. The question then, is whether the fact that we inevitably approach the work of an author with preconceptions necessarily prevents us from encountering him in a genuinely open "I-Thou" relationship. This would seem to follow, however, only if we have no means of determining when our preconceptions have proven correct and when they have been mistaken. *Can* we distinguish between true and false preconceptions, then? In *Being and Time* Heidegger suggests that a genuine understanding of a thing can be reached if we simply adopt a sufficiently receptive attitude towards it and refuse to allow preconceptions that have arisen haphazardly, or as a result of popular opinion, to pass unexamined.[17] Gadamer, however, is less optimistic. He writes:

> The prejudices and fore-meanings in the mind of the interpreter are not at his free disposal. He is not able to separate in advance the productive prejudices that make understanding possible from the prejudices that hinder understanding and lead to misunderstandings.[18]

There is, as Gadamer sees it, no *method* which we can employ to separate true from false preconceptions. What will eventually bring about this separation, however, is temporal distance. Given time, the superficial relations of a text to the present will fade, so that they no longer obscure the text's genuine meaning, and "new sources of understanding, which reveal unsuspected elements of meaning,"[19] will emerge. The passage of time, then, is what finally enables us to escape errors of interpretation.

Gadamer's account of the distillative powers of time may be convincing, but it is of little use to the person who wishes to arrive at a genuine understanding of a contemporary work of literature. According to Gadamer,

[15] *Ibid.*, p. 323.

[16] See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 235-53, and Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row Publishers Inc., 1962), pp. 191-95.

[17] Heidegger, *Being and Time*, p. 195.

[18] Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 263.

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 266.

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> everyone knows that curious impotence of our judgment where the distance in time has not given us sure criteria. Thus the judgment of contemporary works of art is desperately uncertain for the scientific consciousness.[20]

But in fact not everyone is equally impotent when called upon to determine the meaning, or judge the worth, of a contemporary work. It is precisely those individuals, moreover, who have received some schooling in the relevant hermeneutical principles who are likely to make valid evaluations.

The hermeneutical method which Schleiermacher outlines, and which Gadamer dismissively refers to as "undoubtedly an important aid to understanding,"[21] is designed to do exactly what Gadamer claims only temporal distance can do—to isolate good prejudices from bad. Research into the historical background of a work[22] and into the state of the language in which it was written is intended to prevent us from imposing conceptions on the work which are suggested to us only because of the circumstances of our own lives. In this way the influence of false prejudices is curtailed. True prejudices, on the other hand, are elicited and confirmed by means of the interplay of what Schleiermacher calls "divination" and "comparison." Just as we would expect, given Heidegger's account of the role played by foreconceptions in making understanding possible, it is divination—an intuitive leap into the intentions of the author—which, according to Schleiermacher, initiates the process of interpretation. Each act of divination, however, because it is a prejudgment, a precipitate assignment of the work under consideration to some category,[23] requires subsequent confirmation through a comparison of our expectations with what is actually found in the text. The combination of these two techniques (historical and linguistic research, on the one hand, and the interplay of divination and comparison, on the other) is meant to guarantee that the text will be understood on its own terms and will not be transformed by the reader into something which suits his preconceptions.

Surely the way for a reader to encounter an author in an open "I-Thou" relationship (assuming for the moment that this is possible) is for him to respect the integrity of the author's work. Both Betti and Hirsch claim, and not without some justice, that it is on precisely this point that Gadamer's hermeneutics fail. As they see it, Gadamer's approach invites the reader to conclude prematurely that he understands what the text is saying.

> The obvious difficulty with the hermeneutical method proposed by Gadamer seems to lie . . . in that it enables a substantive agreement between text and reader—i.e., between the apparently easily accessible meaning of a text and the subjective conception of the reader—to be formed without, however, guaranteeing the correctness of understanding; for that it

[20] *Ibid.*, p. 265.

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 148.

[22] The work need not be "historical" in the sense of "old," of course. Any work, no matter how contemporary or how old, is "historical" in the sense of having a context that is determined by where and when it was written.

[23] Compare E.D. Hirsch's discussion of genres in *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1967), chapter 3.

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> would be necessary that the understanding arrived at corresponded fully to the meaning underlying the text as an objectivization of mind.[24]

Betti is perfectly justified in insisting here that an inadequate interpretation should not be tolerated merely because it appears to be coherent on a superficial reading of the text. And insofar as Gadamer considers it possible to arrive at a "true" interpretation without engaging in a study of the text's background, Betti's complaint strikes home. A certain amount, at least, of historical and linguistic research would seem to be, not merely "an important aid," but a prerequisite to understanding, if we are to avoid arriving at interpretations based upon mistaken notions concerning the text.[25] Betti overreaches, however, when he suggests that the flaw in Gadamer's hermeneutical method is that it gives rise to interpretations which do not correspond *fully* to the author's intended meaning. *All* interpretations, no matter what hermeneutical method is used to arrive at them, fall short of full correspondence to the author's intentions, and to the degree that they fall short, all interpretations can be said to be mistaken. Schleiermacher, Hirsch, and Betti himself have committed themselves to this position by arguing that the task of interpretation can never be regarded as finished. In condemning Gadamer's hermeneutical method, then, because it does not guarantee the correctness of understanding, Betti fails Gadamer on a test which he himself cannot pass.

It sometimes appears, moreover, that Betti and Hirsch are only paying lip service to the idea that the interpretation of a text is an unending process, especially when they insist that a distinction must be made between the *meaning* of a text and its *significance*. This distinction is meant to clarify the "error" underlying Gadamer's claim that the application of what a text says to one's own condition is integral to the act of understanding. According to Hirsch, "*meaning* is that which is represented by a text." It is unchanging and is determined by the author's intentions. "*Significance*, on the other hand, names a relationship between that meaning and ... anything imaginable."[26] Because significance is a relationship between two elements, one of which is the unchanging meaning of the text, when we approach a literary work we must first determine its meaning before we can establish its significance by applying that meaning to something else (such as our own lives). But this straightforward differentiation of meaning and significance runs into problems if we admit first, with Gadamer (and Schleiermacher), that understanding begins from preconceptions, and second, with Betti and Hirsch, that the process of interpretation is unending. If the meaning of a text must be known to us before we can apply it, then either we will never apply it or we must at some point arbitrarily break off the process of determining that meaning so as to be able to apply whatever incomplete understanding of it we have come to. But if we break off interpretation in order to apply to our lives a partially understood meaning, and thus establish the text's (present) significance, are we liable to rest content at that point? Or, having established its significance for our lives today, are we not liable to return to the process of interpreting the text tomorrow so as to discover yet more fully its actual

[24]Emilio Betti, "Hermeneutics as a General Methodology of the *Geisteswissenschaften*" in Josef Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 79.

[25]It will be obvious to anyone who has read his hermeneutical studies on Plato that Gadamer himself recognized this on a practical level.

[26]Hirsch, *Validity in Interpretation*, p. 8. See also Betti, "Hermeneutics as a General Methodology," pp. 68-69.

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meaning? And if we take up again the task of interpreting the text, will not the significance, which we established today, contribute to the preconceptions with which we begin our work tomorrow? If this is the case, and I fail to see how Hirsch could deny it,[27] then Gadamer is correct: the application of what a text has to say *is* bound up inextricably with the act of understanding it.

Schleiermacher, I believe, would not have been surprised at the position Gadamer takes with respect to application. For one thing, he would almost certainly have recognized that his personal experiences as a Christian had an effect upon the way in which he understood the meaning of the Bible. (An agnostic and a believer will necessarily understand in different ways Paul's conversion on the road to Damascus, for example.) But it is neither acceptable nor necessary to credit Schleiermacher with an anticipation of Gadamer's insights on the basis of speculation. The solid evidence is to be found in "The Compendium of 1819." There Schleiermacher divides the task of interpretation into four parts: the objective-historical, the objective-prophetic, the subjective-historical and the subjective-prophetic.

> 1. "Objective-historical" means to consider the statement in [its] relation to the language as a whole, and to consider the knowledge it contains as a product of the language. — "Objective-prophetic" means to sense how the statement itself will stimulate further developments in the language. . . .
> 2. "Subjective-historical" means to know how the statement, as a fact in the person's mind, has emerged. "Subjective-prophetic" means to sense how the thoughts contained in the statement will exercise further influence on and in the author. . . .
> 4. So formulated, the task is infinite, because in a statement we want to trace a past and a future which stretch into infinity. Consequently, inspiration is as much a part of this art as of any other. . . . The question of how far and in which directions interpretation will be pressed must be decided in each case on practical grounds.[28]

With very little effort one can reconstruct the whole of Gadamer's hermeneutical theory out of the elements provided here. First, the position, taken over by Gadamer from Heidegger, that to a large degree language preforms thought and that in a sense language itself speaks to us, is anticipated in Schleiermacher's observation that the task of interpretation involves, among other things, considering the knowledge which a statement contains to be a product of the language. Second, Gadamer's claim that the meaning of a text is not to be equated with the author's intentions, that for a given reader the meaning is determined rather by what that reader makes of the text through applying it to his own circumstances, can be seen as a restatement of what is implied in Schleiermacher's remarks on the two "prophetic" aspects of interpretation. Finally, Gadamer's claim that there is not one, but a multiplicity of true interpretations relating to a given text can be explained in terms of Schleiermacher's observation that, since the

[27]In a recent article, "Meaning and Significance Reinterpreted", *Critical Inquiry* 11 (December 1984), Hirsch recants his earlier claim that the "applications of meaning, each being different, must belong to the domain of significance" (p. 210). Instead, he argues that *some* applications—specifically those which are exemplifications of the author's original intentions—are properly considered aspects of the meaning of the text. This shift brings him, as he acknowledges, somewhat closer to Gadamer's position. But Hirsch still fails to appreciate the enormous impact which the subtle predispositions and preconceptions of an interpreter will have on the way in which he construes the meaning of a work—and the impossibility of screening out that impact.

[28]Schleiermacher, *Hermeneutics*, p. 112.

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task of interpretation is infinite, "the question of how far and in which directions interpretation will be pressed must be decided in each case on practical grounds." The first of these three points seems obvious enough to require no elaboration. Let us consider the second and third more closely.

According to Schleiermacher, the "subjective-prophetic" aspect of interpretation involves recognizing how the thoughts contained in the text have been applied in the author's life—how they have influenced his further thinking, for example. This comes close to suggesting Gadamer's position on the relation of application to meaning. But if, for Schleiermacher, the question of application is restricted to the author, we will have to admit that Gadamer's position is considerably more radical. When we consider the "objective-prophetic" side of interpretation, however, we find that for Schleiermacher the question of application is *not* restricted to the author. Here we are told that part of the task of interpretation is to recognize how the text will stimulate further developments in the language—developments which stretch indefinitely into the future. It may sound as if this is merely a matter of grammar, but changes in language occur because of corresponding changes in the way at least some of the speakers of that language think. To recognize how a text stimulates further developments in the language, then, is in fact to recognize how that text changes the ways of thinking of the people exposed to it—in other words, to recognize how the text is applied in the lives of its readers. Nor does Schleiermacher consider this examination of how the text changes language to be a matter of determining its "significance." He stresses that only by taking into account the "prophetic" as well as the "historical" aspects of interpretation can we avoid misunderstanding the *meaning* of a text. For Schleiermacher as well as for Gadamer, then, the way in which the readers of a text apply what it says to their own lives is constitutive of the text's meaning.

According to Schleiermacher, however, the meaning of a text is one infinitely complex thing, while Gadamer contends that the meaning of a text will differ for every one of its readers. In spite of appearances, this is not a point of genuine disagreement between their positions. Schleiermacher and Gadamer are merely presenting two different perspectives on the same unending process of coming to understand a text. Schleiermacher's single infinitely subtle meaning of the text is what would be arrived at if we could somehow finish the, in principle unfinishable, task of interpretation. Gadamer's indefinite number of unique meanings of a text is what actually results when flesh-and-blood readers begin the task of interpretation, carry it through for a time, arrive at a degree of understanding, and then leave off because of other demands on their time. The differences between these various meanings of the text are determined in large measure by the personal interests, preconceptions, and predispositions of the individual readers—and these in turn are established by the circumstances of their lives. Or, to put it in Schleiermacher's terms, the differences are determined by how far and in which directions interpretation is pressed as a result of the practical grounds underlying the particular instances of interpretation.

The point of the preceding few paragraphs is not that Schleiermacher and Gadamer are presenting the very same theory of interpretation. Clearly they are not. On the other hand, I do mean to suggest that their positions are compatible—that the differences which exist between them are primarily differences of emphasis. Given this compatibil-

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ity of their positions, (which I admit has not yet been fully demonstrated[29]) no purpose is served by arguing, as Hirsch does, for Schleiermacher against Gadamer, or *vice versa*. What is needed is a fusion of their horizons—a recognition of how their theories are related as two perspectives on the same thing. Such a fusion would provide a fuller and deeper understanding of the nature of interpretation than is to be found in either of their positions in isolation.

The idea of "fusing horizons" is, of course, Gadamer's. Thus in a sense we have Gadamer's own blessing in moving beyond a dogmatic commitment to his position. It is Schleiermacher, however, who implies, not only that we *can* move beyond the limitations imposed by a particular perspective, but that if we are genuinely dedicated to understanding, we always *must* move beyond such limitations. The significance of the unending nature of interpretation, as Schleiermacher sees it, is that we must accept the unfinished stages of interpretation as steps *en route* to our goal, but we must never rest satisfied with the insights gained at any given stage. To declare at some point that our interpretation is complete is to put an end to the approach towards full understanding. If we were to put this in Gadamerian terms, we would say that the fusion of horizons must be taken as normative—that whenever different interpretations arise we must look for a way of reconciling the truths contained in each.

There are many places in *Truth and Method* where Gadamer seems prepared to say precisely this. He argues, for example, that the "experienced" person is one who is "radically undogmatic," one who, "because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well-equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them."[30] If anything is advanced as the goal of hermeneutics, moreover, it is the idea of *Bildung*, a process of coming into the fulness of one's possibilities through exposure to a broad range of experiences—a process which has no necessary limits short of death. In spite of this, however, Gadamer never seems able to declare unequivocally that the broader understanding of a thing which arises from such exposure is superior to the narrow understanding.

> Understanding is not, in fact, superior understanding . . . in the sense of superior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas. . . . It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all.[31]

In his article, "Hermeneutics and Truth," David Ingram has suggested that Gadamer's reluctance to make a normative principle of the fusion of horizons is related to his repudiation in the *Kleine Schriften* of "the possibility of any transcendentally justified ethic."[32] This may well be the correct explanation, and if it is, Gadamer's reluctance would appear to be based upon a misapprehension. To take the fusion of horizons as normative is not to put forward an ethical principle after all, but an epistemological one.

[29]There remains to be asked the question of whether the differences in their conceptions of interpretation have any practical consequences. Whether, for example, we will finally arrive at the same understanding of what a given text means regardless of which of their hermeneutical theories we take as the basis for our interpretative practice. See pp. 22-3 above.

[30]Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 319.

[31]*Ibid.*, p. 264.

[32]David Ingram, "Hermeneutics and Truth," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 15 (January 1984), 72.

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It is a matter of indifference to hermeneutics whether or not the fusion of horizons contributes to the realization of the good life. (That is a question for ethicists to decide.) What counts is whether or not it leads to a fuller recognition of the truth—for what hermeneutics invariably assumes as its starting point is a desire to understand.

Insofar as hereneutics tells us how understanding *does* occur, it also tells us what we must do *in order* to understand. When Gadamer claims then, that he is not proposing a method, but is rather describing what is the case, what always happens when we understand,[33] he makes an untenable distinction.[34] It is as if he wished to avoid the responsibility of instructing us. (I didn't teach the boy how to shoot. I only showed him how the gun works.) We are interested in hermeneutics, however, because we wish to understand. Thus when Gadamer implies that we need not fuse horizons he leaves us in doubt. Does this mean that, after all, we are not obliged to understand? Or that, given our desire, the fusion of horizons is not a requirement for understanding? The first possibility seems like an unnecessary scruple. Of course, we are not *obliged* to understand. The second runs counter to the general thrust of Gadamer's position. How can he seriously contend that "understanding is not, in fact, superior understanding . . . in the sense of superior knowledge of the subject because of clearer ideas" and at the same time hold that the reason for taking up a text in the first place is to understand better than we did before the things about which the text speaks? There is a contradiction here which can only be resolved if we refuse to take the quotation above at face value.

Gadamer's critics, Hirsch and Betti, as well as some thinkers, like Richard Rorty,[35] who see him as an ally, have presumed that such statements as "It is enough to say that we understand in a different way, if we understand at all" are to be taken straightforwardly, and they have drawn the logical conclusion from this—that Gadamer is essentially a relativist. (Indeed, this is the very heart of their objection against Gadamer as far as Betti and Hirsch are concerned. A relativist cannot help us to identify correct interpretations.) But Gadamer clearly does not mean to be a relativist. Consider, for example, the concluding sentence of *Truth and Method*: "Rather, what the tool of method does not achieve must—and effectively can—be achieved by a discipline of questioning and research, a discipline that guarantees truth."[36] How could a relativist speak of guaranteeing truth? No, to accept at face value Gadamer's claim that no understanding is superior to another is to make of *Truth and Method* a grossly inconsistent work and to lose the benefit of its genuine insights. Because of this, I am convinced that we must interpret this claim as a rhetorically forceful expression of one of the consequences of the historical conditionedness of human understanding. All understanding, according to Gadamer, is incomplete and contains within itself the seeds of error. In this sense, then, all interpretations are on an equal footing. There are none which are self-evidently "superior" and which can be used as the standards for determining the correctness of others. There are no privileged positions from which to approach a text.

Gadamer's observations on ethics may be relevant here. In "*Über die Möglichkeit*

[33]Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 465-6.

[34]For a fuller treatment of the problems involved in Gadamer's attempt to avoid the *quaestio juris*, see Lawrence M. Hinman, "*Quid Facti* or *Quid Juris*? The Fundamental Ambiguity of Gadamer's Understanding of Hermeneutics," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 40 (June 1980).

[35]See Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979), pp. 357-65.

[36]Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 447.

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einer philosophischen Ethik" he remarks upon Kant's harshness in failing to make a distinction between the judgment of conscience concerning oneself and the moral judgment concerning others.[37] We cannot demand even of ourselves a finally complete understanding of a thing. Our own mortality, if nothing else, will eventually terminate the process of coming to understand. From others, however, we cannot *demand* understanding at all. We can no more establish a duty for others to expand their horizons than we can establish a duty for them to love.[38] Understanding, like love, is and must be a private concern. Seen in this light, Gadamer's claim that "It is enough to say we understand in a different way" is less a declaration of relativism than it is an attempt to engender a respect for the degree of understanding others have attained coupled with a recognition of the limitations inherent in one's own understanding.

There is no duty to understand, but Gadamer observes in *Reason in the Age of Science* that there is nonetheless a "natural inclination of human beings . . . toward the desire to know."[39] Not to know a mere aggregation of facts, however, but to know how facts are interrelated. As Gadamer puts it in another essay in the same volume, "the exigence of reason for unity remains inexorable."[40] For those who possess this desire to know there is no avoiding the fusion of horizons, since it is the fusion of horizons which carries the multiplicity of unfinished and partial interpretations towards the unity of full understanding. For those who desire to know, then, the fusion of horizons is normative.

If we are justified in taking this to be Gadamer's true meaning in *Truth and Method*, his position comes that much more closely into line with Schleiermacher's. Each sees the approach towards full understanding as an infinite process, a process in which the individual continually struggles to overcome the limitations of a present perspective by challenging the expectations arising from that perspective against the reality of the text (or, since Gadamer does not restrict his hermeneutics to textual interpretation, the reality of the thing that is being understood). But given Schleiermacher's emphasis on establishing that reality by means of research (linguistic and historical) and Gadamer's emphasis on the colliding and eventual melding of perspectives through dialogue, can we assume that the full understanding which their techniques are meant to carry us towards is the same in each case? Schleiermacher's procedure of alternating divination and comparison, much like the experimental method of modern science, is meant to lead us step by step towards an understanding from which all distortions have been filtered out. Can Gadamer's melding of perspectives, each of which is instrinsically and uniquely distorted, lead us in the same direction? Clearly, if each original perspective's distortions were preserved in the larger perspective which resulted from their melding, this could not be the case. Gadamer, however, does not see the fusion of horizons working in that way.[41] When one perspective is exposed to another through dialogue, the preconceptions underlying each are placed at risk. Some of what is contained in each perspective is confirmed, because it is found as well in the other. Some of what is contained in each perspective is rendered doubtful, because there is nothing in the other to substantiate it. And some of the ideas which are lacking in one perspective may appear to

[37]Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Kleine Schriften* I (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1967, 1967), p. 184.

[38]Gadamer explains why love cannot be seen as a duty in *Kleine Schriften* I, p. 185.

[39]Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge: The M.I.T. Press, 1983), p. 149.

[40]*Ibid.*, p. 19.

[41]See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, pp. 310-18.

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the original holder of that perspective to be worth incorporating into his understanding because the perspective to which he has been exposed has revealed to him a new aspect of the thing under consideration, an aspect which he recognizes to be genuine. The fusion of horizons involves, in other words, not a simple accumulation of disparate ideas, but a testing of them and a rejection of those that fail to harmonize into the emergent understanding. The genuineness of the individual perspectives, the fact that they do present a way, which is distorted but not entirely unfounded, of understanding the thing under consideration, is what finally guarantees that the understanding which arises from their melding brings us a step closer to truth.

In coming to understand a text (or any other thing, for that matter) there is no substitute for careful observation and a systematic approach towards the confirming (or disconfirming) of our hypotheses. This is the method which Schleiermacher recommends, and its prime virtue is that it ensures that the understanding we arrive at will have some foundation in the reality of the thing itself. The greatest drawback of the method, however, is that it is time-consuming. No individual could push the bounds of his understanding very far if all of his insights had to be gained in this way. Fortunately, human beings can engage in conversation, can pool the results of their investigations and so increase exponentially the range of things they understand. An analysis of how conversation contributes to understanding is Gadamer's main contribution to hermeneutics. Schleiermacher lays the foundation; Gadamer completes the superstructure.

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Georgetown Univ.

Gadamer, Plato, and the Discipline of Dialogue

Francis J. Ambrosio

> Just as there certainly is no understanding which would be free of all prejudices, so also to the same extent must the will of our knowledge always be directed toward escaping their thrall. It has emerged throughout our investigation that the security which the employment of scientific methods affords does not suffice to guarantee truth. This applies especially to the human sciences; it does not mean, however, a lessening of their scientific character, but rather, on the contrary, the legitimation of the claim to a particular humane significance which they have long made. The fact that the knower's own being comes into play in their way of knowing demarcates, to be sure, the boundary of "method," but not that of science. What the tool of method does not accomplish must rather, and what is more, really can be achieved through a discipline of questioning and searching, a discipline which warrants the truth.[1]

THE TEXT quoted above, which concludes *Wahrheit und Methode*, focuses our attention on the central claim of that work and upon the issue which has been most hotly contested by its critics since its appearance just over twenty-five years ago. I understand that claim to be as follows: because science is but one mode of the universal hermeneutic experience of human understanding, the attainment of truth by science cannot be wholly reduced to the assurance provided by methodological objectivity. There is a more fundamental and universal criterion of truth, a "discipline of questioning and searching," upon which methodological objectivity and every other more particular criterion of truth depends for its binding power.

Science is *reflective* understanding; it claims not merely to yield true knowledge, but to have examined reflectively the foundational conditions of the truth-claims it makes, to have made explicit the procedural implications of these conditions in terms of metho-dological canons of investigation, and finally, to have established normative criteria against which to judge the objective validity of the claims which method enables it to make.

Gadamer by no means rejects the centrality and legitimacy of methodological objectivity as the criterion of truth in science, let alone the importance of science as a form of understanding. His point is that reflective science is but *one form* of human understanding, and that methodological objectivity is the criterion of truth specifically appro-

[1]H.-G. Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik* (Tübingen, J.C.B. Mohr, 1960); 4. Auflage (1975), p. 465. English translation: *Truth and Method*, Garrett Barden and John Cumming (N.Y.: Seabury, 1975).

All references will be to the German text of the fourth edition with the reference to the English translation given in parentheses. For ease of reference, I have used this translation wherever possible. Where clarity or philosophical accuracy seemed to require a departure from that rendering, however, I have given my own translation and identify it as such. The present quotation is one such case.

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priate to science's particular way of understanding. He does assert, however, that reflective science, as one mode of understanding among others, e.g. aesthetic, historical, moral, religious and philosophical, cannot be taken as uniquely paradigmatic for the nature of understanding in general. Most pointedly, he argues that methodological objectivity cannot be elevated to the status of a universal criterion of truth.

Gadamer contends that the "universal aspect" of philosophical hermeneutics comes to light in the recognition that human understanding in all its forms is "centered" in language. This recognition carries with it the implication that science, as reflective knowledge, rests upon a pre-reflective capacity for understanding which it and every other particular mode of understanding possesses precisely in virtue of the way it is open to the power of language at work in it. Although Gadamer, like the later Heidegger, eschews any appeal to transcendental "conditions of possibility," and all forms of "foundationalism" as a way of thinking about human understanding, he does insist upon the priority of an existential "discipline of questioning and searching" as the original characteristic of hermeneutic experience and as the constitutive *way* of understanding which science and every other more specific form of understanding follows. This fundamental and universal discipline supports and sustains the validity of scientific knowledge and upholds the normative quality of methodological objectivity as the scientific criterion of truth.

The priority of an existential, pre-reflective discipline to the employment of valid but derivative scientific methods is especially relevant to the *Geisteswissenschaften*. Like all reflective science, the human sciences must go beyond the level of methodological validity and objectivity to recognize their origin in a discipline of questioning and searching which directly involves the very being of the one who seeks to understand at the level of his or her existence and freedom. But because each of the human sciences also explicitly takes some aspect of human existence and freedom as its proper subject matter, the need to recognize the inadequacy of method as their most basic way of knowing and the derivative character of objectivity as their ultimate normative criterion of truth is doubly urgent for them. Thus, *Wahrheit und Methode* finally arrives at the distinction between a reflective method and an existential discipline as the crucial point upon which finally turns its claim to dissolve the dilemma between all forms of objectivism, especially historicism, on the one hand, and every species of relativism, on the other.

The question with which the reader of that work is inevitably left, however, is: Has Gadamer succeeded in establishing that distinction as genuine and effective? Has he indeed identified a criterion of truth more fundamental and universal than methodological objectivity? This issue of identifying an "original" criterion of truth amounts to more than asking whether Gadamer's hermeneutics enables us to distinguish clearly between valid and invalid interpretations, though this is the challenge which Gadamer's critics most often and most urgently pose.[2] Rather, what must be asked is whether Gad-

[2]The critiques of *Wahrheit und Methode* by Emilio Betti, especially in *Teoria Generale della Interpretazione*, 2 vols. (Milano: Dott. A. Guiffre, 1965), and *Die Hermeneutik der Geisteswissenschaften*, in the series *Philosophie und Geschichte*, nos. 78 and 79 (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1962), and by E.D. Hirsch, in "Truth and Method in Interpretation," *Review of Metaphysics*, 14 (1965), 490ff. and *Validity in Interpretation* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1967), are prime examples and have set the tone for much of the subsequent critical discussion of Gadamer's work by philosophers addressing it from a more traditional metaphysical and epistemological perspective. It is interesting to note, however, that other critics of Gadamer's hermeneutics, such as Habermas and Ricoeur, make an essentially similar point from a hermeneutical perspective which does not share to the same extent Gadamer's close ties to Husserl and, especially, to Heidegger.

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amer is right in contending that there is more to truth than the notions of validity and objectivity can bring to light. Specifically, we must consider the force with which truth makes its claim upon us: what is the binding character of the normative criterion which truth and the human experience of understanding in all its forms always essentially involve? If this issue regarding what Gadamer achieves in *Wahrheit und Methode* remains unsatisfactorily resolved today, it is in large measure because too little has been done to clarify precisely what Gadamer means by a "discipline of questioning and searching."[3]

In what follows I hope to make a specific contribution to answering this question, without claiming to provide the answer itself. The thesis put forward for consideration here is that what I shall call "the discipline of dialogue" is the effective universal criterion of truth in Gadamer's hermeneutics. I state the thesis in this precise way fully aware that Gadamer himself has said, "Hermeneutic reflection is limited to opening up occasions for knowledge which would not be perceived without it. Of itself it does not offer a criterion of truth."[4] The context of this comment, a discussion of the nature of "application" and of misunderstandings of its meaning, makes it clear that what Gadamer denies is that hermeneutic reflection can ever supply the kind of *methodological* criterion which can "objectively" legitimate one interpretation or "objectively" exclude another except at the derivative level of validity or invalidity, accuracy or mistake. But this is not the level of "truth" as contrasted with "method." As we shall see, truth for Gadamer primarily belongs together with questions and questioning, while validity is a characteristic of answers. Gadamer can be understood as upholding the view that there is more truth in the questions than in the answers, and if in what follows we attempt to understand the "discipline of dialogue" as an effective criterion of truth, it should be clear that we are using that understanding to suggest an important sense in which Gadamer might well wish to say that hermeneutics *does* offer a criterion of truth, though not a methodological one. Indeed, this seems to be the precise point of our opening quotation, and the primary burden of the argument of *Truth and Method* as a whole. Furthermore, it seems to me entirely within the spirit of Gadamer's thought, as opposed to Heidegger's for example, to avoid linguistic revisionism in favor of hermeneutic clarification of meaning.[5]

By a discipline of dialogue I mean an experiential structure in which those who seek understanding and access to the truth submit themselves to the power of language to call human existence originally into question and allow themselves to be led by that power

[3]Much important work has been done on the major elements of Gadamer's ontology of language, which is, of course, the foundation of his philosophical hermeneutics. Among the contributions that could be mentioned in this regard are: R. Palmer, *Hermeneutics* (Evanston: Northwestern Univ., 1969); D. Hoy, *The Critical Circle* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1978); J. Bleicher, *Contemporary Hermeneutics* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); R. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1983); and J. Weinsheimer, *Gadamer's Hermeneutics* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1985). It is against the backdrop of discussions such as these, and others, which a full bibliography of the subject would appropriately include, that the present essay hopes to highlight an element of Gadamer's ontology of language which has not, to the author's knowledge, been closely examined.

[4]See "*Replik zu 'Hermeneutik und Ideologiekritik'*," in *Kleine Schriften*, IV (Tübingen; J.C.B. Mohr, 1977), p. 130.

[5]Nonetheless, I recognize that some might still wish to challenge the appropriateness of retaining the word "criterion" in this context. In fairness to this view, it should be acknowledged that Gadamer does not, to my knowledge, himself use the term, "discipline of dialogue," at least in any technical sense. As will be clear, however, I find that there are solid textual grounds for identifying it as a central element of his ontology of language.

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into the play of question and answer which constitutes philosophical conversation, as exemplified in the virtue and integrity of Socrates' way of living. What the "power" of language and the "play" of question and answer specifically mean here will emerge as we proceed, but one preliminary remark is in order. By defining the discipline of dialogue in the way I have it becomes clear that a subsidiary thesis is involved in the first: namely, that Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics, centered in an ontology of language, is most fundamentally Platonic in character because his understanding of language is based on the model of Socratic dialogue. Consequently, in order to assess the claim that the discipline of dialogue is the effective universal criterion of truth in Gadamer's hermeneutics, we shall have to examine some key elements of his interpretations of Plato. In this way we shall attempt to answer three questions: 1) what is the nature of this discipline? 2) how does it function as a criterion of truth? 3) what is its significance for our understanding of Gadamer's hermeneutics as a whole, and of the question of truth itself?[6]

I

The idea of a "discipline" is essentially related to another idea, that of "praxis," that is to say, a discipline is a way of living which is concerned with some fundamental aspect of our human existence.[7] It is a way of doing one of those basic "things" which as persons we all do and which is of the highest importance to all of us, for example, understanding, acting, creating, working, loving, waiting, and even, in a sense, suffering. Furthermore, the idea of a discipline connotes a way of living which submits itself to and is guided by a "rule" which is experienced as coming from beyond oneself and making an authoritative claim upon one's freedom, yet without being either arbitrary or purely external to oneself. Consequently, if we are to inquire here into the nature of a "discipline of dialogue" on the basis of Gadamer's interpretation of Plato, we shall be asking what is the rule which governs and guides Socratic conversation insofar as it is the exemplary way of living *philosophically*, that is, a way of living which seeks to understand and which offers us a path of access to truth.

[6]Gadamer's interpretations of Plato form a continuous line of development running throughout his philosophical career. In addition to the many rich insights into Plato's thought contained in *Wahrheit und Methode* itself, one of the principal sources upon which we shall draw upon here is *Platons dialektische Ethik und andere Studien zur Platonischen Philosophie* (Hamburg: Meiner, 1968), which includes essays written at various times. Of particular importance is "Dialektik und Sophistik im siebenten platonischen Brief." This and other essays interpreting Plato have been translated in *Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Essays on Plato*, translated with an Introduction by P. C. Smith (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1980). I wish to acknowledge with gratitude my debt to Smith for first helping me to appreciate just how central a formative role Gadamer's interpretations of Plato played in the development of Gadamer's own philosophical hermeneutics. In particular I would refer the reader to Smith's essay, "Gadamer's Heideggerian Interpretation of Plato," in *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 12 (1981), pp. 211-230, where Smith lays out some of the principal lines of interpretation that I have attempted to pursue and expand upon in what follows. It should be clear that our primary concern is to understand how Gadamer's interpretation of Plato has essentially formed and shaped his own thought. It goes without saying that the validity and hermeneutic value of those interpretations and what they say about *Plato* is a separate question which deserves serious discussion in another context.

[7]In what follows I am drawing freely on material in Gadamer's essays "Hermeneutics as Practical Philosophy," and "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task." Both essays are contained in *Reason in the Age of Science*, ed. Fredrick G. Lawrence (Cambridge MA.: MIT Press, 1981). The account of the nature of a "discipline" and its relevance for hermeneutics is, however, my own view.

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(i) Gadamer sets the direction of some of his earliest interpretations of Plato by asking precisely this question. "Not that Platonic '*ethics*' is dialectical is maintained here, but whether and how Platonic dialectic is ethics is asked."[8] What this statement makes clear is that when Gadamer thinks of the process of understanding, he takes as his model *what Socrates did*, and what Socrates did was to engage his fellow citizens in dialogue aimed at fostering the "care of the soul." The subject matter of such dialogue was those questions which were concerned with the highest Good of human living. In Gadamer's view, Platonic dialectic as a philosophical method rests on the solid foundation of Socratic dialogue; in other words, dialectic is the methodological image at the level of reflection of the kind of "ethical" dialogue which Socrates practiced.[9]

Gadamer pursues the question of the ethical character of Platonic dialectic in his essay, "*Dialektik und Sophistik im siebenten platonischen Brief*," which deals with the famous and much-debated epistemological excursus in that Epistle.[10] There he reiterates a central theme of *Wahrheit und Methode*: the work of hermeneutic understanding is to restore the meaning embodied in a text to its original place in living language, in dialogue, where alone it attains the full context essential to that meaning. It is for this reason that Gadamer asserts that the so-called epistemological theory of the excursus is not a "theory of knowledge" at all, but a theory of teaching and learning, an explicit reflection on the rule that should guide the praxis of philosophical conversation in place of the empty techniques of sophistic rhetoric.[11] The problem with which the excursus deals is the "infinite difficulty" of demonstrating the validity of an insight into the truth of an idea to one who would contest it, especially one skilled at making the weaker argument appear stronger. Socrates' message to the Athenians was that the techniques of rhetoric and the politics of persuasion have a corrosive and debilitating, almost demonic power, unless they are disciplined into the service of truth. It is in the context, then, of the anomalous discrepancy between the truth of an insight and its defensibility against an opponent that the excursus, as a kind of summary of Plato's attitude toward his own oral teaching and written dialogues, deals with the "means" by which an insight may be reached and asks why it seems that the possibility of compelling someone to understand using these means does not exist for philosophy in the same way that it does for mathematics.

According to Gadamer, Plato identifies four such means: (1) the name or word (*onoma*); (2) the explanation or conceptual determination (*logos*); (3) the illustrative image, figure, or example (*eidolon*); and (4) the knowledge or insight itself (*episteme*).[12] For Plato these are four ways in which the thing known may be said to be "present" for us while obviously the reality itself, the knowledge of which is under consideration, is distinct from all of these. It is the fifth in the series. "Now Plato asserts that all four of these provide no certainty that in them the thing itself (*die Sache selbst*) will come to be known as it truly is."[13] Gadamer argues that all four of these means are afflicted by the

[8] *Platons dialektische Ethik*, p. xiii; translation my own.

[9] Gadamer expresses this view in "Dialectic and Sophism in Plato's Seventh Letter," in *Dialogue and Dialectic*, p. 93.

[10] It should be mentioned here that Gadamer assumes the authenticity of the excursus based on his evaluation of its hermeneutical context as a propaedeutic exhortation summarizing discussions which Plato himself says he had often conducted and which would be familiar to those acquainted with his oral teaching.

[11] "Dialectic and Sophism," p. 98.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 100.

[13] *Ibid.*

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"weakness" which Plato specifically examines in regard to the *logoi*, namely, their tendency to *assert themselves*, to bring to the fore a reality of their own specific sort instead of the reality of the thing that was to be displayed. They all have a reality of their own and are something besides the thing they are presenting.[14]

The excursus goes on to make it clear, however, that this negative insight into the weakness of the *logoi* is not Plato's final position.

> But Plato knows full well that this source of all *aporia* is also the source for the *euporia* which we achieve in discourse. He who does not want the one will have to do without the other. An unequivocal, precise coordination between the sign world of which we are the masters and the world of facts which are to be ordered in the former so as to be mastered, is not language. The whole basis of language and speaking, that which makes it possible, is ambiguity and that which the grammar and rhetoric of a later time will call metaphor.[15]

We shall have occasion to return later to the connection between the notion of metaphor and the euporetic power of language. For now, what must be noted is the connection Gadamer is pointing out between the sophistic willfulness which cannot tolerate the inescapable ambiguity accompanying philosophical discourse, and the ultimate source of the weakness of all four means of knowledge. In the end, it is not simply the fact that these means put forward something other than the reality in itself of what we seek to know, which causes us to fall into error, but rather our "bad upbringing" which habituates us to trafficking in opinions while at the same time fostering in us a perverse obstinacy to cling to such opinions precisely because they are *our own*. As a result, knowledge becomes for us, like justice for Thrasymachus, a matter of power.

> Only if we keep this immediate and fundamental dialectical experience [of the means of knowledge] in mind, does one understand what Plato means when he describes the ultimate possibility of knowledge as a lingering with all four of these means—a lingering which passes back and forth among them.[16]

This "lingering" (*Verweilen*) among the means of knowledge, while it does not constitute an ordered ascent of the soul over the whole system of knowledge up to the Idea of the Good itself, does in fact constitute a discipline, an attitude or way of proceeding, in which the soul must maintain itself in its search for truth. It is a contemplative attitude, a passionate detachment characterized by freedom and leisure, by which the soul holds itself open to the possibilities for meaning which might emerge from the dialectic of the means of knowledge as they present the thing itself in the course of the discussion, without jealously clinging to the means themselves as its own possession. Only the play of argument and counter-argument constrains us to get clear with one another, not just about matters of fact, but also about the most important "things" as they are in themselves, the "momentous matters of living rightly, of right decisions in life, where we have such solidarity with each other that our concern is solely with 'it itself,' i.e. with that which is really good." Gadamer sums all of this up in a strikingly appropriate way: Platonic dialectic reveals itself in the excursus to be *the disciplined ability to linger in*

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 105.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 111.
[16] *Ibid.*

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dialogue among the means of knowledge in the "neighborhood of truth." The discipline of dialogue is a way of living which allows us to dwell at home in a place where we belong and where we have familiar access to one another because all are gathered nearby in proximity to the reality which genuinely binds us together as a community of free persons.

(ii) Having recognized that Platonic dialectic is "ethical" both in the sense that it prescribes a theory of teaching and learning based on a discipline for the *praxis* of dialogue, and also in the sense that the truth at which it aims is one that has to do with the highest Good of human living, i.e., with the care of the soul, it remains to specify the precise nature of the rule that governs and guides this discipline. We shall discover that this rule is the requirement that one seeking understanding submit to the dynamic of listening and responding through which the play of question and answer makes its claim upon us in dialogue. Once again, Gadamer's insight into the uniquely Platonic character of this discipline and the rule which governs it takes as its point of reference Socrates' way of living. There Gadamer finds embodied two determinations which characterize the functioning of this rule: listening and responding.

In *Wahrheit und Methode* Gadamer offers us an insight into the first determining element of the rule which governs the experience of understanding against the backdrop of an analysis of human experience in general.[17] The truth of experience always contains within it an orientation toward new experience. The person who is called "experienced" is not the one who knows more or knows better than anyone else, but rather the one who, through breadth and quality of experience, is radically open and ready for new experiences and capable of learning from them. Experience, then, is dialectical in that it always bears a negative element. For genuine experience invariably involves a disappointment of our expectations; things turn out to be otherwise than we anticipated. Only through negative instances do we acquire new experiences which are anything more than repetitions of previous experiences and confirmations of previous insights.

One credible witness to this fundamental negativity of human experience is Aeschylus, whose apothegms, "the doer must suffer," and, "by suffering man learns," Gadamer interprets to mean,

> What man has to learn through suffering is not this or that fact, but rather insight into the limits of being human, insight into the boundary, never to be transcended, between himself and the divine.... Experience is thus the experience of human finitude. The genuinely experienced person is the one who is at home with the fact, who knows, that he is not lord of time or the future. The experienced person is just the one who knows the limits of all foresight and the uncertainty of all plans. In him is realized the truth-value of experience.[18]

It requires little imagination to recognize in Gadamer's description of the "experienced man" the figure of the Platonic Socrates. But how does the radical openness born of the essential negativity of human experience bear upon the discipline of dialogue? In two ways: first, as the capacity to learn, to open oneself to the claim that a question makes upon us as persons; second, as the willingness to respond, to place oneself and one's horizon of meaning at risk by deciding what answer one will make to such a question, and so deciding who one is, what meaning one's existence will come to have.

[17]See *Wahrheit und Methode*, pp. 340-344 (321-325).
[18]*ibid.*, p. 339; translation my own.

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It is well known that Gadamer conceives hermeneutical experience and the event of understanding on the model of dialogue between persons. To be authentic, such understanding must experience the meaning which it encounters, speaking in a text, for example, as a "Thou." This means neither a generic knowledge of human nature which seeks to discover what is typical or predictable about it, nor a reflective grasp of the other which presumes to understand that other better than he does himself. Both these partial forms of understanding impoverish the truth by forestalling and keeping at a distance the claim the other is capable of making on us. A third type of experience, alone adequate to the hermeneutical experience of understanding, is what Gadamer terms "effective historical consciousness" (*wirkungsgeschichtliche Bewusstsein*). Among its characteristics, we find here a mode of experience of the "Thou" which is genuinely open both to its otherness and to the claims and limitations on our own understanding which such an encounter entails.

> In human relations, the important thing is, as we have seen, to experience the "Thou" truly as a "Thou," i.e. not to overlook his claim and to listen to what he has to say to us. To this end, openness is necessary. But this openness exists ultimately not only for the person to whom one listens, but rather anyone who listens is fundamentally open. Belonging together (*zueinandergehören*) always also means being able to listen to one another.[19]

The experienced person, the one who is capable of dialogue in the spirit of Socrates, is radically opened by the desire to know which springs from the knowledge of not knowing. Hence that person is able *to listen*, to submit and enter into the movement of question and answer, following wherever its self-unfolding may lead, even to conclusions which are "against oneself."

The second Platonic determination of the rule which governs the discipline of dialogue is the characteristic of a willingness to respond to the claim which a fundamental human question makes upon us. This responding always takes the form of a decision and choice of meaning with which and by which one will identify oneself. In *Wahrheit und Methode* Gadamer turns to Aristotle's analysis of *phronesis* in the *Nichomachean Ethics*, particularly Book VI, to specify the character of this willingness to respond.[20] This turn to Aristotle should not hinder our recognition of the essentially Platonic origin of this analysis, which like the analysis of hermeneutic experience, fundamentally proceeds from Gadamer's insight into the nature of all human experience and its dialectical negativity. Aristotle's description of the "person of practical wisdom" can, without distortion, be read directly as a theoretical appreciation of Socrates' way of living. As Gadamer points out, this description remains essentially Platonic in that it holds on to knowledge as the central principle of moral being, while limiting the "intellectualism" of the "critical" Plato by concerning itself with reason and knowledge, not detached from a being which is becoming, but determined by and determinative of it.[21] Aristotle asks the question of the *humanly* good, just as in the excursus of the Seventh Letter Plato asks what the condition of human knowledge is in terms of the means or

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 343 (324).

[20] See "The Hermeneutical Relevance of Aristotle," in *Wahrheit und Methode*, pp. 295-307(278-289). Gadamer has elaborated on the essential common ground which Plato and Aristotle share in, "Amicus Plato Magis Amicus Veritas," in *Platons dialektische Ethik*, translated in *Dialogue and Dialectic*, pp. 194-218, and more recently in *Die Idee des Güten zwischen Plato und Aristoteles* (Heidelberg, 1978).

[21] *Wahrheit und Methode*, p. 297 (280).

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process by which actual insights and understanding of truth are attained in discourse. Aristotle does this in terms of the problem of "application," the realization that human action, like human understanding, is always a matter of the individual case, of the joining of some universal principle to a determinate situation. It is the process of application which effects the fusion of horizons and essentially constitutes hermeneutic experience. As Gadamer says, "understanding always involves the application of the meaning understood."[22]

Practical wisdom seeks to discover the point at which a person can act "well," that is, in conformity with the properly human excellence of rationality, so that both end and means in the action are properly proportioned to what is by nature best or highest in human living. Consequently, practical wisdom is always oriented toward choice which flows over directly into action. Now choice which fulfills itself in rational action is the fundamental character of what we mean here by "responding." Desire and reason come together in the discernment of that particular way of proceeding which welds together right reason and right desire in *eupraxis*, and this union, accomplished by *phronesis*, Aristotle refers to as "self-knowledge," knowledge for and with oneself, what Kant would later call autonomy. This process of integrating right reason and right desire occurs in the kind of deliberation which is not merely the technically clever and effective calculation of means to a morally indeterminate end, but rather results in *euboulia*, the achievement of insight into what is concretely "best" in a particular situation with regard to the humanly good.

> Where there is a *techne*, we must learn it and then we are able to find the right means. We see, however, that moral knowledge always requires a kind of self-deliberation. Even if we conceive this kind of knowledge in ideal perfection, it is the perfection of this kind of deliberation with the self (*euboulia*) and not knowledge in the sense of a *techne*.[23]

Gadamer's particular contribution regarding the Aristotelian analysis of *phronesis* in *Wahrheit und Methode* is to have identified its universal significance, beyond moral reasoning, for human understanding in general. The application of the "universal" meaning of a text, residing in the question at work in it which initiates interpretive dialogue, to the individual situation of the interpreter is the process which Gadamer refers to as the "fusion of horizons" (*Horizont-Verschmelzung*). This process bears an essential affinity to moral knowledge because it requires a response, in the form of a decision, to the claim that the question at issue makes on the interpreter in order for the dialogue to proceed. This response places at risk the prejudgments which constitute the interpreter's own historicality and individual identity and which "situate" the interpreter's effort to understand. This placing of oneself at risk is essentially related to the openness spoken of earlier, but carries it one step further by responding for oneself to the claim which the text, speaking as a "Thou," makes through its question on one who would understand. But the understanding is in the response, and this responding has about it the character of a weighing (*deliberatio*) of the relative claims of the horizon of meaning

[22] *ibid.*, p. 315 (p. 297). See also p. 325 (305), "The meaning of application that is involved in all forms of understanding is now clear. It is not the subsequent applying to a concrete case of a given universal that we understand first by itself, but it is the actual understanding of the universal itself that the given text constitutes for us. Understanding proves to be a kind of effect and knows itself as such."

[23] *ibid.*, p. 304 (286).

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which the text opens up and the prejudgments of meaning that situate and identify the interpreter and bring him to the encounter. As a deciding, the response demands that this risk be "proved," that is, be put to the test, by the making of a good choice (*euboulia*) as to the relative truth-value of these claims. It is the making of this decision by responding which effects the fusion of horizons and determines our understanding both of the text and of ourselves precisely in so far as we understand. The moral character of this process of understanding becomes vividly clear as soon as we recognize that it is determinative of our human relationship both to ourselves and to the truth-claim which always expresses itself as a "Thou."

In summary, we have discovered that the nature of the discipline of dialogue is a way of living which enables us to linger in the neighborhood of truth, without mastering or controlling that truth, or attempting to turn the means of access to it to our own purposes. In solidarity with those who seek the "highest" and "most important things" of living, one who wishes to understand the truth must submit to the rule of listening and responding to the questions which lay fundamental claim to us as persons and which play themselves out in all our understanding and action.

II

We said earlier that the rule to which the discipline of dialogue requires us to submit and by which it is guided in seeking understanding is experienced as coming from beyond oneself, making an authoritative claim upon one's freedom without being either arbitrary or purely external to oneself. This implies that the decision which constitutes our response to the claim truth makes upon us is not merely a subjective act which we perform relative to no standard other than itself. How then can such a decision be both genuinely *our own* and at the same time *responsive* to a ruling initiative from beyond ourselves which both empowers and judges it? Or in other words, how does it serve as a criterion of truth?

The answer to this question requires that we pursue two more particular issues directly connected with it. First, we must ask what kind of power language has over us and how that power is related to truth. This in turn leads us to consider a second question, namely, how the power of language comes to rule our understanding through the play of question and answer, thereby constituting a criterion which judges the truth-value of our experience insofar as we understand. Once again we shall find that Gadamer's interpretations of Plato offer fruitful insights into the direction this investigation should take, because they have as their point of reference Socrates' way of living, which exemplifies the discipline of language. In particular, Gadamer offers us a way of understanding that unique quality or excellence (*arete*) which Socrates' way of living exhibits, and how that excellence manifests the power of language at play in Socrates' existence.

(i) Gadamer begins the final section of *Wahrheit und Methode* by identifying the ontological foundation of the universality he ascribes to philosophical hermeneutics: "Being that can be understood is language."[24] This means that whatever can be understood presents itself, of itself, to understanding; this self-presentation occurs as language and the ontological capacity for self-presentation is the "power" of language. Gadamer goes on to describe the power of language as "speculative" in character.

[24] *Ibid.*, p. 450 (432).

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> To-come-into-language does not mean the acquisition of a second being. Something's manner of self-presentation belongs much more to its own proper being. Therefore for whatever is language, it is a matter of having a speculative unity: a distinction within itself; a distinction which, however, is not supposed to be distinguished at all.[25]

This paradoxical speculative unity means that, on the one hand, while whatever comes into language is genuinely different from the spoken word, the word is a word only because of what comes into language in it. The word, like the perfect mirror, disappears entirely into what appears in it. On the other hand, whatever comes into language and, in the word, comes to be understandable is, like the mirror-image, something which does not exist pregiven apart from language; rather it receives for the first time in the word its own original determination as understandable by being "thrown back" upon itself and thereby "intensified" in its being.[26] This intensification of being is its meaning. The argument of *Wahrheit und Methode* as a whole is directed against that particular ontological prejudice, embodied in the ideal of "scientific" objectivity, which endeavors to become certain of being-in-itself by methodologically organizing and grounding its knowledge.[27] This prejudice, while legitimate within a certain narrowly circumscribed sphere, becomes unwarranted when elevated to the status of a universal paradigm for human understanding. Although *Wahrheit und Methode* took the mode of being of art and history as its starting points, the claim it makes is not limited to these, but itself has universal significance.

> Self-presentation and being understood belong together . . . in that the one passes into the other, as the work of art is one with its effective history, the tradition is one with its present experience of being understood. Speculative language, distinguishing itself from itself, presenting itself, language which expresses meaning, is not only art and history but everything insofar as it may be understood. The speculative character of being that is the ground of hermeneutics extends as universally as does reason and language.[28]

What is most noteworthy in this claim for our immediate purpose is the way in which Gadamer substantiates it: by appealing to an insight achieved by Plato as he struggled with what Gadamer identifies as the "metaphysical crux" of Platonism, the problem of participation (*methexis*). That insight pertains to the ontological significance of the "beautiful."

The issue at stake in the doctrine of participation is, of course, the problem of the One and the Many. The aporetic tangle of logical difficulties into which the relation of the whole to its parts, the unconditioned to the conditioned, knots Plato's systematic thought is the obverse image in reflection of the euporetic resolution of those difficulties which Plato recognizes in his own experience of the integrity of Socrates' existence. Socrates' way of living makes manifest that well-ordered harmony of all the parts of virtue as they coalesce in one unified excellence which radiates from a central concern for living well—the care of the soul. This recognition on the level of experience and existence is mirrored reflectively and systematically in the close link Plato establishes between the idea of the Beautiful and the idea of the Good, both of which lie beyond all

[25] *Ibid.*, translation my own.
[26] *Ibid.*
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 451 (433).
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 452 (434).

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multiplicity and conditionedness. Yet despite this affinity, Gadamer points out that Plato also recognizes a difference between the two ideas and the way in which this difference involves the specific advantage of the Beautiful. Plato identifies this advantage with the human experience that, in the attempt to lay hold of the Good itself, the Good "takes flight" into the Beautiful.

> Thus the beautiful is distinguished from the absolutely intangible good, in that it can be laid hold of. It is part of its own nature to be something that is visibly manifest. The beautiful reveals itself in the search for the good. . . . That which manifests itself in perfect form draws toward it the longing of love. The beautiful directly disposes people toward itself, whereas models of human virtue can be descried but obscurely in the unclear medium of appearances, because they have as it were no light of their own, so that we often succumb to impure imitations and appearances of virtue. It is different in the case of the beautiful. It has its own radiance, so that we are not seduced here by distorted copies. For "beauty alone has this quality, that it is most radiant (*ekphanestaton*) and lovable."[29]

Beauty draws us and binds us to itself of itself. This is the anagogical function of the beautiful which Plato so much emphasizes in the *Symposium* and particularly in the *Phaedrus*. The lesson taught so strikingly by the Alcibiades episode at the end of the *Symposium* is precisely that the radiance of Beauty reaches powerfully into the erotic depths of the soul where the Good penetrates only as a glimmer of light, figureless and unformed, yet capable of kindling the most potent desire. By the strength of desire alone can the soul ascend to the heights where a genuine vision of the Good is possible, and it is only Beauty that is capable of calling forth such desire.

Furthermore, it is the radiance of beauty which reveals the unity not only of the Beautiful and the Good, but also of both of these with Truth. Light is the essence of the Beautiful, its shining radiance, and in this light the being of whatever is beautiful appears as what it most genuinely is. But in the Western tradition, the radiance of beauty has always been viewed in close proximity to language, to the word, especially the creative word of God, calling the world into being and *at the same time* calling forth the light of intellect by which the world's reality, value, and beauty are seen by the eyes and known by the mind. Being is self-presentation, and the essential modality of that self-presentation is language in its speculative power: in language the world of human experience reveals itself and draws human existence to itself in desire for its highest Good.

(ii) One last characteristic of the power of language must now be examined: how it establishes a criterion for the truth which understanding seeks. Language exercises its power over us and our understanding *playfully*. When something strikes us as beautiful, it "charms" us (*nimmt für sich ein*) without necessarily fitting into the ordered whole of our evaluations and judgments. Similarly, when we understand, what becomes "clear," whether it be a conjecture, proposal, argument or insight, is not, in the first or original sense of the word, something which is proven or certain. Rather, "it asserts itself by reason of its own merit within the area of the possible or probable."[30] The initiative and priority rest not with us, but with the "thing itself," the subject matter in question, and this precisely insofar as it is in question. Whenever we seek understanding or come to understand, it is never first of all a matter of following a strictly controlled metho-

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 456 (437-438); cf. *Phaedrus*, 250d.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 460 (442).

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dological procedure, though this may come later. Rather, when we *begin* to see we are caught up into the unfolding of the question as the direction of its self-movement "dawns" upon us.

> Indeed, just as the beautiful is a kind of experience that stands out like an enchantment and an adventure within the whole of our experience and presents a special task of hermeneutical integration, what is clear is always something surprising as well, like the turning on of a new light, extending the range of what is to be taken into account.[31]

Once again, Gadamer's preferred model for this process which initiates understanding is conversation, because in genuine dialogue we experience the way questions play themselves out, leading to tentative answers which in turn generate new questions, bringing us home eventually to agreement or leaving us stranded "off-base" in disagreement.

But what is most important in the "playful" character of language's power is the way it rules us once we enter onto its playing ground. That which comes into language opened up as a question always demands for itself playing room. Gadamer, like Wittgenstein, compares the process of understanding to a game in which "words play around and about what is meant."[32] This recalls Plato's insight into the strength of the means of knowledge: they allow us to linger leisurely in the neighborhood of truth, so that by passing continually back and forth among those means we may catch a glimpse of what is meant. "Language games are where we as learners—and when do we cease to be that—rise to the understanding of the world."[33]

But such playing must be distinguished from its competitive shadow, which has as its goal to control and win, to bend the power of the playing to one's own advantage. In genuine play, in the play of the drama for instance, or of the zen arts, or even in athletics where winning is not the primary goal of the participants, something very different happens.

> . . . it is rather, the game itself that plays, in that it draws the players into itself and thus itself becomes the actual *subjectum* of the playing. What corresponds to this in the present case is neither play with language nor with the contents of the experience of the world or of tradition that speaks to us, but the play of language itself, which addresses us, proposes and withdraws, asks and fulfills itself in the answer.[34]

Consequently, understanding is not playing in the sense that the participants in conversation can hold themselves back "playfully," that is, withhold a committed attitude to the claim which the subject matter of the conversation makes on them. This freedom of self-possession, with its implied superiority of viewpoint and judgment which is paradigmatically embodied in the methodological self-assurance of scientific objectivity, is not allowed to those who would enter into the play of language. To act in this way would be precisely to be a "spoil-sport" (*Spielverderber*). Rather, the playing of the game requires of those who enter upon its playing ground that they take upon themselves the

[31] *Ibid.*

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 464 (446).

[33] *Ibid.*

[34] *Ibid.*; see also pp. 97-105 (91-99) for Gadamer's fuller phenomenological exposition of this non-subjective conception of play.

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discipline which the logic of its self-movement imposes upon them. By accepting this discipline they become identified with the game which plays itself out through them. The discipline rules through the disposition of oneself to be drawn into an event over which one does not preside, and through which the radiating light of meaning asserts its control over the way things go for the participants in the conversation's play.

> When we understand a text, what is meaningful in it charms (*einnimmt*) us just as the beautiful charms us. It has asserted itself and charmed us before we can come to ourselves and be in a position to test the claim to meaning that it makes.[35]

This sheds light on the sense in which Gadamer speaks of a discipline of questioning and searching which can "warrant" the truth without guaranteeing it. The discipline is a process of deciding the outcome of an event of understanding which plays itself out in the way a game does; it is a weighing, a balancing back and forth of the weight of the "evidence," whatever becomes clear in the light of question and answer, until a determination is reached and the outcome is decided. For the outcome of a game cannot be determined beforehand, but is at risk until it decides itself by playing itself out through us.

> Whatever we encounter in the experience of the beautiful and in understanding the meaning of tradition has effectively something about it of the truth of play. In understanding we are drawn into an event of truth, and arrive, as it were, too late, if we want to know what we ought to believe.[36]

This is Gadamer's final testimony to the Platonic origin of the discipline of dialogue as the effective criterion of truth in hermeneutics. Like Socrates embarked on his mission of caring for the soul, it is only through the knowledge of not knowing that we possess the freedom to place ourselves, and the horizon of meaning within which we live, at risk. In this way we enter into the play of question and answer in the firm hope that when its outcome is decided we shall find there the truth about what is good in human living and be ruled by the beauty of what we most deeply desire.

III

We are now in a position to ask what the significance of what we have learned about the discipline of dialogue is for Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics as a whole and, beyond that, what light all of this sheds on the question of the nature of human understanding and truth. Our answer will be that the centrality of such a discipline to all our ways of knowing shows us how truth and freedom originally belong together in human existence.

We began by asking what justification Gadamer could offer for distinguishing the "warrant" which a discipline of questioning and searching provides for the truth of what we claim to understand from the "guarantee" of objectivity which the methodologies of the empirical and human sciences seem to assure. This led us to consider the reflective character of all science and to recognize the way in which every method of re-

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 465 (446).
[36] *Ibid.*

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flection rests ultimately upon a structure of experience which directly involves the very being of the knower. This pre-reflective experiential structure is formative of every particular human way of knowing in the sense that it determines the shape of what *we do* whenever we understand; it governs how we go about the business of seeking the truth. Here the foundation of Gadamer's thought of hermeneutics' claim to philosophical universality appears: it addresses itself to the way in which truth occurs as an event in human existence through the power of language.

Furthermore, because hermeneutics concerns itself with what we do whenever we understand and with the way truth occurs as an event in human existence through the power of language, it identifies what we have called the "discipline of dialogue" as its effective criterion of truth. This discipline is the rule to which understanding submits and by which it is governed and judged. Since the rule requires that we listen and respond, it takes dialogue as its model, a model which for Gadamer is embodied in Socrates' way of living—caring for the soul through philosophical conversation. Gadamer, with Plato, takes this way of living as the paradigm of human excellence (*arete*); it shows us the best way to live as persons by showing us how the power of language allows us to linger in the neighborhood of truth so as there to catch a glimpse of what we most desire, that highest Good which alone yields happiness and well-being. Finally, because the power of language rules the process of understanding playfully, it requires us to surrender control of the outcome of the "game" of seeking truth and to let it be decided by the movement of questions and answers playing themselves out in us.

Returning now to the question with which we began, we must ask, does distinguishing a pre-reflective existential discipline from a reflective scientific method justify a distinction between providing a "warrant" for a claim of truth and the claim's carrying with it a "guarantee?"[37] It does, if the difference between *verbürgen* (to warrant) and *garantieren* (to guarantee) is taken to imply the difference between an authority provided for the claim based on the integrity of the persons who stand behind it and vouch for it by their way of doing things, on the one hand, and an assuredness or certainty which the claim carries with it based on a quality which the claim possesses of itself in virtue of its "content." Must we not ask in regard to truth where the initiative and priority most originally resides, what the authentic character of its "claiming" is? Is it not truth which questions us; is it not we who must first be claimed by this questioning, listen and attend to it, before we can respond by making a claim of our own about the subject matter? And even then does the "content" of the claim which *we* make pertain primarily to a "what" or a "how?" At the reflective level, the subject matter of scientific knowledge takes the form of an answer, a determination regarding "what" is in question, arrived at in such a way that its objectivity is guaranteed methdologically, that is, in such a way as to be essentially detachable from the existential process of its being arrived at by individual persons. It is the method which provides the guarantee, not the person, except insofar as the person's technical competence allows the method to fulfill itself. But here we can see that method is but the image at the level of reflection of a pre-reflective discipline operative at the level of existence and freedom. Scientific methodology is a particular way of responding as a human being to being in question. It is a specification of a

[37]It should be noted that in the published English translation of the passage quoted at the beginning of this essay these two words are *both* translated as "to guarantee," thereby obscuring the philosophical importance of the distinction to which I am calling attention here.

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more general way which we, as persons, have of responding to all the ways in which truth questions us.

What has come to light, then, is the way that truth and freedom belong together *ontologically*, that is, at the point of origin of what we *are* as persons and as the destination toward which we are fated to be ever underway. Truth and freedom belong together as the beginning and end, the origin and destiny of human existence. Truth originates human existence by laying claim to it, by calling it into existence, calling it into question. To be human is to be-in-question. But although at this ontological level the initiative and priority rests with the calling, the calling belongs entirely to, and can only claim as its own, a listening which attends to and responds to it. Truth cannot be a calling and claiming without direction, without directing itself to a capacity to listen and respond which is directed by it. This capacity which is called into existence and claimed by truth is freedom. Freedom is the human capacity to be called into question and to allow that calling to lay claim to our existence. Freedom allows the truth to happen as an event of listening and responding to questions which originate and destine us and which are decided in human understanding.

What Plato learned from Socrates, and what Gadamer learned from Plato, is that truth occurs most originally and fatefully in human existence in conversation between persons. When in conversation we follow together the play of the questions that are most important to all of us, the questions of origin and destiny which we all share, truth and freedom appropriate themselves to one another. They come to belong together at the center of our existence, in our "souls"—that dimension of what we are as persons which is most authentically ourselves and upon which our entire well-being and happiness depends. To "care for the soul" means simply this: to allow ourselves to be ourselves by attending to the way truth claims our lives and by deciding what our response to that claim will be. In this sense, such caring takes the form of a "discipline of dialogue." It is a *discipline* because it pertains to human existence and freedom; that is, it is a way of living which is in the service of autonomy, unlike every method or technique which is always subject to an end or purpose which goes beyond itself and is not its own. It is a discipline of *dialogue* because its goal is to understand truth, for ourselves and as our own to be sure, but still a truth which is shared with all persons, the truth of being-in-question. The truth rules us all in the questioning which disciplines understanding as our way of responding and being responsible for what we decide to answer. There is literally more truth in the questions than in the answers because the questions are freeing. The "discipline of dialogue" is nothing other than the way truth and freedom belong together in human existence, ruling the way we live understandingly. It is the way we come to understand who we are.

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Habermas' Critique of Gadamer: Does it Stand Up?

Paul Giurlanda, F. S. C.

JURGEN HABERMAS, whose critique of Hans-George Gadamer we are investigating here, might at first seem to be an unlikely adversary for Gadamer. Habermas agreed with many of Gadamer's most provocative points, attacking "objectivism"—the project of achieving certainty by means of technique available in principle to any disinterested mind—with, if anything, more venom than the gentle Gadamer could muster. Habermas' work best known in this country is still *Knowledge and Human Interests*, a book in which the attempt to sunder those two realities is shown up as inauthentic. Gadamer could hardly disagree with such a conclusion. A brief look at Habermas' argument, however, will show just where he diverges from Gadamer.

In a programmatic lecture appended to the main body of the work, Habermas points to the concept of "theory" which is the source of so many problems: "The *only* knowledge that can truly orient action is knowledge that frees itself from mere human interests and is based on Ideas—in other words, knowledge that has taken a theoretical attitude."[1] But the word *theory* was not always so understood in Greek thought:

> The word "theory" has religious origins. The *theoros* was the representative sent by Greek cities to public celebrations. Through *theoria*, that is, through looking on, he abandoned himself to the sacred events. In philosophical language, *theoria* was transformed to contemplation of the cosmos. In this form, theory already presupposed the demarcation between Being and time that is the foundation of ontology . . . It reserves to *logos* a realm of Being purged of inconstancy and uncertainty and leaves to *doxa* the realm of mutable and perishable. When the philosopher views the immortal order, he cannot help bringing himself into accord with the proportions of the cosmos and reproducing them internally.[2]

Thus, the traditional understanding of theory was by no means divorced from life. Through theory, one was educated into conformity with the highest life. Nevertheless, the elevation of *theoria* from the world of everyday life, its restriction to an aristocratic class, the existence of slaves to do the work of the world, and the removal of the Greeks from a place in the political system, all helped move a distinction into a chasm. Thousands of years later, "there is a real connection between the positivistic self-understanding of the sciences and traditional ontology."[3] The reason is that both modern positivism and traditional ontology

> are committed to a theoretical attitude that frees those who take it from dogmatic association with the natural interests of life and their irritating influence; and both share the cosmological intention of describing the universe theoretically in its law-like order, just as it is.[4]

[1]Jurgen Habermas, translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro, *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971), p. 301. Hereafter KHI.
[2]Habermas, KHI, pp. 301-302.
[3]Habermas, KHI, p. 302.
[4]Habermas, KHI, p. 303.

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What the modern sciences have lost, of course, is just the *interest* which made classical ontology human: the interest in the good life to be achieved through contemplation. By sundering knowledge from interest, science can claim, ironically, a kind of purity of intention which can then be used to dominate. "Whether you like it or not, this is the way things are." This is the claim of science. The fact that the findings of science are just as "value-laden," just as much the products of human interest, as any other human enterprise, is conveniently hidden, and so kept beyond critique. This leaves "humanists" to spend their time trying to import "values" back into a world of "facts," an enterprise which is inherently impossible. "The very term 'value,' which neo-Kantianism brought into philosophical currency, and in relation to which science is supposed to preserve neutrality, renounces the connection between the two that theory originally intended."[5]

Habermas criticizes Husserl's attempt to re-found science on the ground of phenomenology because Husserl, while recognizing the interest-coupled nature of science, presumes that at least a disinterested study *of* science is possible. In the face of Nazi attempts to manipulate science, this was understandable, says Habermas, even admirable, but it still managed to miss the real point, namely, the essential relationship between knowledge and human interest.

The task of a truly critical philosophy of science, then, is precisely to demonstrate the connection between knowledge and interest in each of the three great areas of human understanding: science ("empirical-analytical science"), humanities ("historical-hermeneutical science"), and critical theory itself ("emancipatory cognitive interest"). This last might be regarded as philosophy proper,[6] and it is clear that this (the emancipatory interest) is Habermas' real concern.

Once one has gotten through unmasking the pretensions of objectivism (whether that of pure science, or that of humanists who reduce hermeneutical understanding to technique), one is face to face with the fact that, indeed, all knowledge, including our own, is conditioned by interests. This fact however need not be seen in a narrowly and selfishly utilitarian light: "An enticing natural force, present in the individual as *libido*, has detached itself from the behavioral system of self-preservation and urges toward utopian fulfillment."[7] For Habermas knowledge does transcend mere self-preservation, because, as he goes on to say, through knowledge, humans can become *aware* of their interests and of the way in which their knowledge is determined by them. True, even the critical function of knowledge is subject to the law of interest. "But the mind can always reflect back upon the interest structure that joins subject and object *a priori*: this is reserved to self-reflection. If the latter cannot cancel out self-interest it can to a certain extent make up for it."[8]

Habermas goes on to say that "the standards of self-reflection are *exempted* from the singular state of suspension in which those of all other cognitive processes require critical evaluation. *They possess theoretical certainty*" (emphasis mine).[9] This is a remarkable statement. Does it mean, finally, that knowledge *can* be separated from human interest? Not really, for in this case, the *struggle to be free of particular interests is itself an interest:*

[5]Habermas, KHI, p. 304.
[6]Habermas, KHI, p. 308.
[7]Habermas, KHI, p. 312.
[8]Habermas, KHI, p. 314.
[9]Habermas, KHI, p. 314.

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> In self-reflection knowledge for the sake of knowledge attains congruence with the interest in autonomy and responsibility. The emancipatory cognitive interest aims at the pursuit of self-reflection as such. My *fourth thesis* is thus that *in the power of self-reflection, knowledge and interest are one.*[10]

This sounds as if Habermas were having his cake and eating it too. Is it really so easy to sort out the drive for autonomy (legitimate) from the other drives, such as the will to dominate (illegitimate)? Is Habermas being naive? Actually, it is only at this point that we begin to reach the source of the disagreement between Habermas and Gadamer, and it does have to do with the accusation of naiveté, but *by* Habermas *against* Gadamer. Let us see why this is so.

Habermas readily acknowledges that his fourth thesis seems utopian; that's the point. In the present state of affairs, power and knowledge are indeed so clandestinely and completely intertwined that true self-reflection is made extremely difficult. Only in a society where the "emancipatory cognitive interest" is given a chance to breathe, can knowledge and interest really be one. The *a priori* possibility of autonomy and responsibility is present in the very fact of *language,* that incredible human invention, for in speech humans look for agreement which is unforced and lasting. But language, in the present condition of humankind, is corrupt, and therein lies the problem:

> Only in an emancipated society, whose members' autonomy and responsibility had been realized, would communication have developed into the non-authoritarian and universally practiced dialogue from which both our model of reciprocally constituted ego-identity and our idea of true consensus are always implicitly derived. To this extent the truth of statements is based on anticipating the realization of the good life. The ontological illusion of pure theory behind which knowledge-constitutive interests become invisible promotes the fiction that Socratic dialogue is possible everywhere and at any time. From the beginning philosophy has presumed that the autonomy and responsibility posited with the structure of language are not only anticipated but real. It is pure theory, wanting to derive every thing from itself, that succumbs to unacknowledged external conditions and becomes ideological. Only when philosophy discovers in the dialectical course of history the traces of violence that deform repeated attempts at dialogue and recurrently close off the path to unconstrained communication does it further the process whose suspension it otherwise legitimates: mankind's evolution toward autonomy and responsibility.[11]

It is precisely the task of critical theory, then, to seek out the inauthentic power relationships imbedded in our language. Until this is done, and done well, conversation will remain what it is now—an utopian dream. The fact that the word "conversation" is, as it were, an eschatological term, is what Habermas accuses Gadamer of overlooking. While agreeing with Gadamer wholeheartedly in the attack on objectivism, Habermas insists that Gadamer is too quick to assume that the problem is solved once objectivism is done away with. Gadamer forgets, says Habermas, that live discourse has problems of its own. The conflictual and unequal character of most discourse is a fact of life which must not be swept under the rug.

Examples of this often hidden inequity are numerous. Indeed, the very rhetorical tradition of which Gadamer speaks so highly is adversarial to the core, and an absolutely

[10]Habermas, KHI, p. 314.
[11]Habermas, KHI, pp. 314-315.

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male preserve, the presence of women altering its "agonistic" structure dramatically.[12]

We are thus faced, says Habermas, with an unpleasant possibility: What if the very language we speak, the ground on which we walk, is *itself* so corrupt that we are not aware, even as we speak, of how we are hiding (even from ourselves) our complicity in crime? As he says:

> we would only be justified in equating the supporting consensus, which is, according to Gadamer, at any given time prior to a successful agreement, with the factual having come to an agreement in any particular situation *if* we are certain that each consensus which has already become customary within the medium of a linguistic tradition had come into existence *without pressure* and in an undistorted way. But the depth-hermeneutical experience teaches us that, in the dogmatics of the traditional context, not only the objectivity of language in general prevails, but also the oppressivity of a relationship of force which deforms the intersubjectivity of an agreement as such and systematically distorts colloquial communication.[13]

Thus, on Habermas's account, Gadamer is indeed guilty of naiveté. To say that the truth must emerge in the actual doing of the activity of the conversation and not before or after, as Gadamer does, ignores the fact that the conversation itself could be corrupt, and that the "truth" which emerges might not be truth at all, but covered-up domination.

In his review of Gadamer's basic work, *Truth and Method,* Habermas accepts Gadamer's insight that "in every dialogue a spirit rules, a bad one or a good one, a spirit of obdurateness and hesitancy or a spirit of communication and of easy exchange between I and Thou,"[14] but surely, he would argue, this is not to the point. The question still remains: how do I recognize a *true* spirit of communication from a sham one? Nor does Habermas, in the same review, shrink from praising Gadamer for his "first-rate critique of the objectivistic self-understanding of the cultural sciences," a critique (Habermas continues) which "hits not only historicism but also the false consciousness of the phenomenological and linguistic executors of its legacy."[15] But the *problem* with Gadamer's critique is that it is *incomplete.*

What Gadamer has missed is this: in stressing the truth that all knowledge is knowledge-in-a-situation, Gadamer overlooks the necessity of judging the coming-to-be of knowledge by impersonal methodological criteria which can be developed by an analysis of successful communication. "The confrontation of 'truth' and 'method' should not have misled Gadamer to oppose hermeneutic experience abstractly to methodic knowledge as a whole."[16]

The mention of words like "impersonal," "method," and "abstract" sounds a challenge. For Habermas, a "transcendental hermeneutic" (by that name or not) *is* possible, a setting up of the conditions for the possibility of successful interpretations. If conversations or interpretations do not meet our conditions, we will be able to see how they could have been improved and just where they went wrong. Thus, method can

[12]Cf. Walter J. Ong, *Fighting for Life: Contest, Sexuality and Consciousness* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981), esp. pp. 118-144.

[13]Jurgen Habermas, "Summation and Response," in *Continuum* 8 (Summer, 1970), 125.

[14]Habermas, "A Review of Gadamer's *Truth and Method*," in *Understanding and Society: An Inquiry*, edd. F. Dallmayer and T. McCarthy (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977), p. 344.

[15]Habermas, "A Review . . . ," p. 36.

[16]Habermas, "Summation and Response," p. 132.

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serve the purpose of truth, and should not simply be opposed to it, as Gadamer mistakenly argues. So Habermas.

But if it is possible for us to derive from the successful communication the transcendental conditions for its possibility, conditions which could achieve a "theoretical certainty" and form a part of an "impersonal methodology," then we are entitled to know what those conditions are. Habermas does not disappoint. The basic criterion he wishes to employ is that of *symmetry*. This may sound a bit odd at first, but it means that neither of the partners in a dialogue can be favored in any way. No dialogue partner must have an "authoritative" role, because this would mean that the conclusion is determined from the start. Rather, every dialogue partner must in practice and not just in theory be interchangeable with any other dialogue partner. Elaborating on this central concept, Habermas speaks of several different kinds of symmetry. Let us look at them more closely.

First, says Habermas, there is a symmetry of *asserting* and *opposing,* by which each partner is equally free to say what he or she wants and to reject what his or her partner says; secondly, there is a symmetry of *revealing* and *concealing,* whereby each partner is confident in self-presentation and accepting of the self-presentation of the other; finally, there is a symmetry of *rights* and *duties,* whereby neither party has privileges but each party expects of the other exactly and only what he or she expects of himself or herself. In some ways this list reminds one of Aristotle's discussion of friendship, though the differences will become obvious if they are not so already. The three symmetries are not simply phenomenological descriptions of conversation. They are much more. Habermas maintains that

> these symmetries of the choice and practice of acts of speaking *guarantee* the equality of the participants in the maintenance of their roles in dialogue, a maintenance which makes *structurally possible* a distinction between true and false statements, truthful and deceptive remarks, and right or wrong actions (italics mine).[17]

Habermas concludes his argument by claiming that, if these conditions are met, we can be sure that "a consensus would have to result which would be *per se* a true consensus" assuming the ideal conversation (for that is what it would be) goes on long enough.[18]

In the preceding quotation from Habermas' articles on Gadamer, the operative words are, I think, "guarantee" and "structural." Habermas is after, or rather, thinks he has found, a *formal* tool by which the *content* of any conversation can be critiqued with *certainty*. Thus the claim of a statement to truth can be decided apart from the meaning of the statement, by looking at *how* the statement was derived. If all the rules were followed, then the statement is true; if the rules were not followed, then the statement is false (or the action is wrong) precisely to the degree that the rules were not followed. Notice that Habermas is not denying the familiar Gadamerian point that statements have meaning only against a background, a tradition-context. Rather, he is saying that *the background itself, the tradition-context itself, can and must be judged,* and, *a fortiori,* the statements within. Habermas would no doubt want to nuance this analysis, but I believe that this is, in principle, what he is saying.

[17]Habermas, "Summation and Response," p. 132.

[18]Habermas, "Summation and Response," p. 132. For concrete suggestions on how this could be done, see "What is a Universal Pragmatics?" in Habermas, *Communication and the Evolutionary Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1979).

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At first glance, this solution may seem to set our minds at rest. The uneasiness which resulted from our suspicion of the tradition can be cured at last. The desire, programmed, apparently, into our genes, to free ourselves from the domination of nature *can* be fulfilled. Armed with the impersonal tool of method, we can set to work distinguishing between those aspects of the received tradition which have been handed down through coercion and domination, and those aspects which have resulted from free and unfettered communication. Of course, Habermas does not deny the unfortunate fact that there probably never has been an ideal speaking situation—this rather bolsters his case—but that does not take away from the contention that the ideal speaking situation is able to act as a norm.

With Habermas' intention there can surely be little disagreement. But has Habermas really escaped from Gadamer's (and his own) attack on objectivism? First of all, and most obviously, there is the question of whether "symmetry" is capable of functioning as the self-evident a priori norm of an ideal speaking situation. Is it really self-evident that the ideal situation is one in which neither of the partners has any advantage over the other? A student working with a trusted teacher on a common project would presumably never be able to have a real conversation with that teacher. The earnest wrestling in Plato's *Phaedo* between Socrates and his students about death must fall into the category of inauthentic discourse because all defer to Socrates. Habermas might reply that the conversation would be ideal *only to the extent* that everyone contributed equally and freely to the discussion, but it's hard to see why such a conversation could not reveal truth if the more and less learned still took each other seriously, precisely for what they were—teacher and disciple—and if the questions arose naturally and not from manipulative purpose. What is needed here, perhaps, is not so much *symmetry,* as *gnome,* the kind of fellow-feeling which Aristotle prized.

But let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Habermas has indeed been completely successful in establishing self-evident, a priori norms for the ideal speaking situation. Now let us allow ourselves a question: *where did these norms come from?* How did we learn to recognize and accept them as norms? (Surely not on the sheer authority of Habermas!) But if we are already able to accept them as such, how can they function to judge the very conversation in which we decided that they were, indeed, the norms for conversation in general? Was *that* conversation ideal? For any possible norms would either have to be developed out of human conversation or from outside of the human race, through some revelation from God.

We seem to be on the brink of a regress: we need norms by which to judge the norms. And if we obtained *these* norms, we would then need still more norms to judge the judging norms, etc. But they are self-evident! They derive from an impartial analysis of conversation! But *whose* impartial analysis? And isn't it naive to suppose that any analysis is absolutely impartial, or, better, that it is motivated purely by the emancipatory interest of which Habermas speaks?

But there is more. The problem of justifying the norms is really the other side of the classical hermeneutical issue, the issue which Habermas joined Gadamer in pointing to. The issue is that of *application.* Habermas, after all, agreed with Gadamer that knowledge is *not* a matter of applying universal rules to individual cases, where the rules are known clearly beforehand, but that the truth occurs only *in* the application and not before. This is an aspect of the paradox of the hermeneutical circle, and Habermas has learned too much from Heidegger to reject it. But it seems that this enterprise is precisely

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an attempt to escape *from* the hermeneutical circle, and, not incidentally, to escape from the whole problematic of *phronesis* which Gadamer has been developing over the course of a lifetime. In order to *apply* Habermas' rules to a concrete situation (what other situation is there?), we would have to possess a *principle* by which we would be able to know how to apply the rules to this particular situation. For rules change in their application, and their meaning only appears in the application. That principle, that dynamic reality which we all need in order to apply rules in a human and not machine-like way, is, of course, the prudence of which Aristotle spoke:

> The art of understanding, whatever its ways and means may be, is not dependent on an explicit awareness of the rules that govern and guide it. It builds, as does rhetoric, on a natural power that everyone possesses to some degree. It is a skill in which one gifted person may surpass all others, and theory can at best tell us why. In both rhetoric and hermeneutics, then, theory is subsequent to that of which it is abstracted; that is, to praxis.[19]

The "skill" to which Gadamer refers is, it need hardly be stated, the hermeneutical analogue to the "habit" which Aristotle called prudence. It is almost amusing to note that in this passage Gadamer accuses Habermas, who has been so heavily influenced by the thought of Karl Marx, of ignoring the centrality of *praxis!*

Perhaps we have said enough to justify the conclusion that Habermas can be indicted (if not outright convicted) for what Martin Heidegger attacks as *the* grand error of the Western philosophical tradition. He is trying to establish true knowledge as present-at-hand and objective in a way which ignores the primordiality and primacy of ready-to-hand, situational, historical knowledge. He is, in fact, trying to establish a theoretical knowledge by which one could escape in some way from the historicity of *Dasein, There*-being, not everywhere-being. Habermas' attempt to cure the problems of the contemporary world is precisely the old Enlightenment nostrum which has gotten us into trouble in the first place. The attempt to free *Dasein* from the bonds of historicity (body, situation, purpose, prejudice, community, tradition) can only propel it into what is, literally, a no-man's-land, an inhuman place.

On this last point Gadamer comments that "unconsciously the ultimate guiding image of emancipatory reflection in the social sciences must be an anarchistic utopia."[20] If Habermas ignored his mentor Marx before, perhaps, suggests Gadamer, he is ignoring his other mentor, Freud, now. If we re-examine that libidinal urge for freedom, is it really as benign as it appears at first? Throughout this debate, it appears as if Habermas is the heir of the Enlightenment's attack on the past and its prejudices, while Gadamer looks like the champion of tradition. So put, the question of which to choose is a difficult one, for even if we agree that Habermas' solution to the questions he poses of Gadamer are inadequate and do not do justice to Gadamer's analysis, nevertheless, something of the uneasiness he raises remains with us still. Are we not, in a Gadamerian world, condemned simply to a repetition of past mistakes? Does the Gadamerian perspective entail a static and blind traditionalism? Gadamer is barred from proposing a set

[19]Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," in Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, trans. D. Linge (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1976) pp. 20-21.

[20]Gadamer, "On the Scope and Function of Hermeneutical Reflection," in Gadamer, *Philosophical Hermeneutics*, pp. 20-21.

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of rules by which conversation—or society—could be bettered. Such rules would still require prudent application, and put us once again back into the center of the hermeneutical circle. Can nothing be done to improve conversation?

Gadamer, or any ethician, can only tell us clearly what we already know confusedly, but this is no small thing. To explain this point, Gadamer turns, not surprisingly, to Aristotle's discussion in the *Politics*:

> He [Aristotle] compares the intention of such a practically oriented pragmatics with the target being sighted by the archer when he aims at the goal of his hunt. He will more easily hit the mark if he has his target in view. Of course, this does not mean that the art of archery consists merely in aiming at a target like this. One has to master the art of archery in order to hit the target at all. But to make aiming easier and to make the steadiness of the direction of one's shooting more exact and better, the target serves a real function.[21]

Ethical and hermeneutical discussion, then, cannot turn bad people into good, but *it can make people more conscious of their goals,* and thus help them to attain them. As Gadamer says, "Practical philosophy presupposes that we are already shaped by the normative images or ideas in the light of which we have been brought up and that lie at the basis of the order of our entire social life,"[22] but it does not presuppose that those images are always clear to us or even that they cannot be changed. But as always, "the point here is a notion of science that does not allow for the ideal of the non-participating observer but endeavors instead to bring to our reflective awareness the communality that binds everyone together."[23] Thus, a conversation which focuses on conversation need not come up with a set of present-at-hand rules in order to be helpful in making future conversation better. It need only so describe what is really going on that we can recognize the picture and use it to do what we do more clearly, more intelligently. The picture is not infallible, is not authoritative except insofar as, in the situation, it seems so to be to the discussants. Or, as Gadamer himself puts it, "practical philosophy is not the virtue of practical reasonableness."[24] It is not the virtue itself, but it assists its exercise.

For Gadamer, then, the one thing we must be careful *not* to do is to short-circuit the actual conversation by developing norms for truth to be applied by somebody not doing the talking. Of course, we do not have to argue that Gadamer is sufficiently sensitive *personally* to the problem of systematic distortion of communication in modern culture. That conversation is, in our words, an eschatological ideal, is a truth which Habermas brings forcefully to our attention. Depth psychological (Freud) and economic (Marx) motivations *are* concealed, even (or especially) to the ones propelled by them; there is a place for a hermeneutics of suspicion, even in conversation itself. But it is precisely because we are sensitive to the issues of domination and freedom that we must argue that Habermas' solution is a form of that dogmatism which is at the heart of the very domination he decries so well, and the liberation from which is his central theme. To do transcendental meta-hermeneutics in the Habermasian way is to fall prey to the ultimate sin in the Gadamerian catalogue—it is to try to get a stranglehold on reality. To do this is to render oneself more and more incapable of experience, *real* experience, which always involves surprise and suffering.

[21]Gadamer, "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task" in *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. Frederick G. Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1976), p. 134.

[22]Gadamer, "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task," p. 135.

[23]Gadamer, "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task," p. 135.

[24]Gadamer, "Hermeneutics as a Theoretical and Practical Task," p. 117.

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We could use a Christian symbol here and say that this attempted stranglehold, this "captivation by dogma" is the original sin, for if we *are* conversation, then to try to get out of the conversation is to become less than human in the act of trying to become more than human. By speaking, the human person is placed in a place and a community, for speaking cannot be done alone. Further, by speaking, the human person discovers a real discipline, in which the question which arises is given room, and the answer which emerges is paid attention to as the source of the next question. For what we *are* as a conversation is a dialectic of question and answer. It is a game we learn by the playing of it and not by studying a rule book. "So it is well grounded for us to use the same concept of play for the hermeneutical phenomenon as for the experience of the beautiful. When we understand a text, what is meaningful in it charms [*einnimmt*] us."[25] With the event of truth, so too with the event of beauty, we cannot decide in advance of its arrival what it is going to look like. "In understanding we are drawn into an event of truth and arrive, as it were, too late, if we want to know what we ought to believe."[26]

Thus it all boils down to a disagreement over the ultimacy of method. It is hardly method itself which Gadamer opposes, only the attempt to turn method into an infallible tool. The discovery of such a tool may sound like a worthy goal, but Gadamer reminds us that when human beings claim to be infallible they generally require violence to secure their claim.[27]

[25]Gadamer, *Truth and Method* (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 324. Cf. the German original, *Wahrheit und Methode* (Tübingen, 1960), p. 343.

[26]Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, p. 446. Cf. *Wahrheit und Methode*, p. 465.

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Transcendental Method And Transcendental Arguments

Stephen Wentworth Arndt

IN THE NOT too distant past, M. S. Gram raised in a series of articles a number of objections against transcendental arguments (TA's) in their Kantian form as well as in their various reconstructions, which he classifies as the presupposition theory, the speech-act theory, the verification theory, and the practical syllogism theory.[1]

In the present paper we cannot undertake an exegesis of the *Critique of Pure Reason* to determine either Kant's understanding of TA's or his degree of success in constructing a valid argument of this kind. Neither can we attempt to evaluate the various reconstructions of Kantian TA's passed under Gram's critical review. We must content ourselves with a more modest task. I, therefore, propose to expound a further account of transcendental argumentation which Gram has not considered, namely, that of E. Coreth, a thinker belonging to a trend of thought sometimes designated as "Transcendental Thomism," whom I believe to have given one of the clearest expositions of the matter. I shall then re-examine Gram's objections to TA's in their Kantian form to see how well they are overcome by Coreth's method of transcendental argumentation.[2]

[1]For those who are interested in following the history of Gram's controversies, the following gives its broad outlines: M. S. Gram, "Transcendental Arguments," *Nous* 5 (1971), 15-26, where he criticizes the presupposition theory of P. A. Crawford, "Kant's Theory of a Philosophical Proof," *Kant-Studien* 53 (1961-1962), 257-68, and the speech-act theory of H. L. Ruf, "Transcendental Logic. An Essay on Critical Metaphysics," *Man and World* 2 (1969), 38-64; Gram, "Categories and Transcendental Arguments," *Man and World* 6 (1973), 253-69, where he criticizes the presupposition theory of P. F. Strawson, *Individuals* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1963); Gram, "Must Transcendental Arguments be Spurious?" *Kant-Studien* 65 (1974), 304-17, where he responds to J. Hintikka, "Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and Spurious," *Nous* 6 (1972), 274-81; Gram, "Must We Revisit Transcendental Arguments?" *Philosophical Studies* 31 (1977), 235-48, where he criticizes the practical syllogism theory of J. F. Rosenberg, "Transcendental Arguments Revisited," *The Journal of Philosophy* 72 (1975), 611-24; Gram, "Do Transcendental Arguments Have a Future?" *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 14 (1978), 23-56, where he repeats his critiques of Crawford, Strawson, Ruf, and Rosenberg and adds, among others, a further critique of the verification theory of B. Stroud, "Transcendental Arguments," *The Journal of Philosophy* 65 (1968), 241-56, as well as of the counter article by P. Haecker, "Are Transcendental Arguments a Version of Verificationism?" *American Philosophical Quarterly* 9 (1972), 78-85; Gram, "Transcendental Arguments. A Meta-Critique," *Kant-Studien* 70 (1979), 508-13, where he responds to O. Leaman, "Transcendental Arguments. Gram's Objections," *Kant-Studien* 68 (1977), 468-77.

[2]Among Coreth's writings relevant to an understanding of transcendental method are "Metaphysik als Aufgabe," in *Aufgaben der Philosophie*, ed. by E. Coreth (Innsbruck: F. Rauch, 1958), pp. 11-95, esp. pp. 40-49; *Metaphysik. Eine methodisch-systematische Grundlegung*, 3rd ed. (Innsbruck, 1980), esp. pp. 47-49; "Dialectic of Performance and Concept," in *Spirit as Inquiry. Studies in Honor of Bernard Lonergan, S. J.*, ed. by F. E. Crowe (Chicago: St. Xavier College, 1964), pp. 147-54; "Immediacy and the Mediation of Being," in *Language, Truth and Meaning*, ed. by P. McShane (Notre Dame: Notre Dame Univ. Press, 1970), pp. 33-48; *Was ist der Mensch? Grundzüge einer philsophischen Anthropologie*, 3rd ed. (Innsbruck, 1980), esp. pp. 9-21. All translations of German citation into English are mine.

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A. CORETH'S TRANSCENDENTAL METHOD

Coreth develops his conceptions of transcendental method (TM) primarily in a discussion of the possibility of metaphysics. Here we must abstract from the concrete form TM may take in the grounding of a critical metaphysics and try to present the general features of a TM that can be employed in other philosophical disciplines as well.

(1). The clearest definition of TM given by Coreth seems to be the following:

> Transcendental reflection means interrogating the phenomenon—self-performance, self-experience—with regard to its conditions of possibility, i.e., with regard to that which is necessarily presupposed.[3]

Two points call for comment in connection with this definition. First, Coreth does not restrict the applicability of TM to cognitional experience alone, as many do. Thus, for P. A. Crawford, for example, a transcendental proposition defines "the conditions under which the perception of an object can belong to possible experience."[4] For P. Haecker, transcendental knowledge is of "the necessary conditions of conceptualized experience."[5] For R. Bubner, transcendental knowledge is that in which "the relation of conditions of possibility of cognition, on the one hand, and empirical cognition, on the other hand, is itself an object of cognition."[6] In Coreth's estimation, it seems that all these definitions are too narrow. TM, according to Coreth, inquires about the conditions of possibility (C'sP) of the subject's total self-experience, be it cognitional, volitional, emotional, interpersonal, social, historical, or religious.

A second point deserving of mention is that TM is thus not limited in its utility to the solving of any one problem or any group of problems arising in the field of cognitional experience, such as the refutation of scepticism, the existence of material bodies, their continued existence apart from observation, etc. This narrowness reflects a one-sided tendency often found in verificationist reconstructions of TA's.[7] Rather, according to Coreth, TM may possibly offer a contribution to the solution of any problem that arises in the field of the subject's total self-experience.

(2). Since TM interrogates the C'sP of man's self-experience, it must take its point of departure from a description of this phenomenon. TM, therefore, includes as its first moment a phenomenological description:

> Transcendental reflection demands a phenomenological point of departure.... Transcendental questioning about the antecedent ground presupposes something interrogated that shows itself as conditioned and demands the question about its condition.[8]

Many different configurations of phenomenology have, of course, developed since Husserl. What type of phenomenology does Coreth have in mind? If we understand by "merely descriptive phenomenology" an analytical description of individual manifes-

[3]Coreth, *Was ist der Mensch*?, p. 19.
[4]Crawford, "Kant's Theory of a Philosophical Proof," p. 261.
[5]Haecher, "Are Transcendental Arguments a Version of Verification?",p. 82.
[6]R. Bubner, "Zur Struktur eines transzendentalen Arguments," *Kant-Studien* 65 (1974), 22.
[7]Cf. R. Rorty's discussion of the literature in "Verificationism and Transcendental Arguments," *Nous* 5 (1971), 3-14.
[8]Coreth, *Was ist der Mensch*?, pp. 18-19.

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tations of a given phenomenon and by "eidetic phenomenology" the attempt to gain insight into a general kind of phenomenon, then it seems that Coreth intends the latter. For we are interested in obtaining the C'sP not only for this particular question, but for the question as such; not only for this judgment, but for the judgment as such; not only for this decision, but for the decision as such, and so on. Insofar as an eidetic phenomenology is directed to intentional operations of consciousness and to their interrelated pattern, it may also be termed a "transcendental phenomenology."

Coreth would, therefore, seem to accept the basic intention of the Husserlian "eidetic reduction" insofar as it aims at attaining insight into the essential structures of intentional operations in order to be able to ask about their C'sP. But, as is well known, the Husserlian eidetic reduction brackets both the real existence of the object as well as that of the subject and his acts in order to concentrate on the essence of the phenomenon. This procedure is justified to the extent that, when one cognizes the essence of a phenomenon, one abstracts, but does not prescind, from the question of its real existence in the thing or from its intentional existence in the mind. But such an eidetic reduction here becomes problematic for Coreth, because it is not a question of interrogating intentional operations as abstract essences with regard to their C'sP, but it is one of interrogating the actual performance of the intentional operation with regard to its C'sP.[9]

Furthermore, Coreth would likewise seem to accept the basic intention of the Husserlian "transcendental reduction" insofar as it aims to lay bare the constitution of objects in consciousness. But the transcendental reduction also becomes problematic for Coreth when it brackets all independence of the conscious content from consciousness in order to explore the constitution of the object in the *noesis-noema* relation. For the consciousness in question here seems to be not the consciousness of the subject of his self-performance but a general, abstract consciousness divorced from the concrete subject. Once again, we should be left with the abstract essences of our intentional operations apart from our actual performance of them.[10]

(3). Since no object is given to the subject in pure immediacy but is always mediated by the performance of the subject, who makes the object to be *his* object, the phenomenological moment which attempts to disclose the immediacy of the subject's self-experience demands a transcendental moment which tries to lay bare the mediation of this immediacy:[11]

> Thus a phenomenology that understands its own essence and does not curtail it to a naively presupposed immediacy of the given must return to the preceding conditions under which the phenomenon can first be seen and understood at all. It must therefore go out beyond itself and ask—transcendentally—about the conditions of its own possibility.[12]

Coreth distinguishes carefully between three different types of C'sP.[13] An *ontic* CP of an intentional operation is presupposed as existing if the operation is to be performed, but it does not enter constitutively into the performance of the operation itself.

[9]Coreth, *Metaphysik*, pp. 76-77.

[10]*Ibid.*, p. 77.

[11]Cf. Coreth, "Immediacy and the Mediation of Being," pp. 34-35; *Was ist der Mensch?*, p. 18.

[12]Coreth, *Was ist der Mensch?*, p. 18. For a further explanation of what is meant by a "condition of possibility," cf. R. Freundlich, "Über transzendentale Reduktion," *Wiener Zeitschrift für Philosophie* 5 (1955), pp. 147-164.

[13]Cf. Coreth, *Metaphysik*, pp. 89-93.

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A *logical* CP is presupposed if an individual intentional operation of a given kind is to be performed insofar as it has a determinate specification. It does enter constitutively into the performance of the individual intentional operation, but only as a condition of the meaning and justification of its content, and not as that of its very performance. A *transcendental* CP, on the other hand, is presupposed if any intentional operation of a certain kind is to be performed at all. It enters constitutively into the performance of any and every intentional operation of a given kind, not as a condition of its determinate content, but as one of its very performance.[14] TM interrogates intentional operations only with regard to the lattermost type of CP.

(4). In every performance of an intentional operation, the subject is thematically aware of the object with which the operation is concerned. But the subject possesses simultaneously an unthematic awareness of himself also as performing the intentional operation. One thus has an unthematic "performative knowledge" (*Vollzugswissen*) of one's performance and all that enters modificatively or constitutively into it. This performative knowledge is of three kinds, according to Coreth.[15] The first he terms "*modificative co-knowledge.*" It forms the pre-understanding of a particular department of knowledge from out of which the individual intentional operation is performed. As such, it is prior to the individual intentional operation and functions only to modify its meaning. It is not in any sense a condition of the operation. The second Coreth calls "*constitutive co-knowledge.*" It represents that knowledge of the object which gives the individual intentional operation its determinate specificity. It is truly a condition of the intentional operation, but only a logical condition of the meaning and justification of the content of the individual intentional operation. It is not the condition of the performance of a given kind of intentional operation as such. The third Coreth names "*constitutive foreknowledge.*" It comprises one's anticipation of that towards which a given kind of intentional operation aims. If I may borrow B. Lonergan's terminology for the purpose of illustration, we may say that questions for intelligence and insights aim at intelligibility; questions for reflection and judgments aim at truth and being; questions for deliberation and decisions aim at value; and intentional feeling responses respond to intelligibility, truth, being, and value in their subjective importance for me.[16] It is the anticipation, then, of the horizon of being in its transcendental determinations of intelligibility, truth, and value which constitutes the unthematic foreknowledge of intentional operations.

If the task of TM is to discover the C'sP for intentional operations, and if an unthematic foreknowledge constitutes the CP for the performance of an intentional operation, then it is also the task of TM to explicitate or thematize this originally implicit or unthematic foreknowledge:

> Transcendental method . . . consists of its essence precisely in the mediation of immediacy: it has to mediate immediate yet unthematic knowledge to thematic knowledge.[17]

[14]Cf. O. Muck, "The Logical Structure of Transcendental Method," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 9 (1969), 353. His distinction between "methodological apriori conditions" and "pure apriori conditions" seems to parallel that between logical and transcendental conditions of possibility.

[15]Cf. Coreth, *Metaphysik*, pp. 102-104. I here try to generalize for all intentional operations what Coreth says about the performance of the question.

[16]Cf. B. Lonergan, *Insight, A Study of Human Understanding* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957). On intentional feeling responses as motivated by the important, cf. D. von Hildebrand, *Christliche Ethik*, (Düsseldorf, 1959).

[17]Coreth, *Metaphysik*, p. 78.

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But how is this mediation to take place? Since the unthematic horizon of being in its transcendental determinations cannot itself enter thematically into that horizon, it is not immediately accessible in itself. It must, therefore, be retrieved by means of a "transcendental reflection." Coreth likens this transcendental reflection to Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology, which tries to recover the phenomenon not in the "vulgar" sense of that which shows itself, but in the "phenomenological" sense of that which first of all, and for the most part, does not show itself, and must be brought to do so.[18]

Coreth distances himself from Heidegger, however, in that this thematizing or explicitating mediation does not consist in simply taking a look, but rather in a mediating reflection which has two moments: transcendental reduction and transcendental deduction.[19] The transcendental reduction proceeds from the explicitly and thematically given in the intentional operation by an explicitating and thematizing reflection to disclose the implicit and unthematic horizon of being in its transcendental determinations as the CP for the intentional operation. The transcendental deduction, on the other hand, consists in showing how the essential structures of the intentional operation necessarily flow from their C'sP exhibited in the transcendental reduction.

(5). The results of this transcendental reflection can be critically justified by retorsion.[20] For, if the unthematic foreknowledge of the horizon of being in its transcendental determinations enters constitutively into the performance of the intentional operation, then the denial of the thematization of this foreknowledge must be internally inconsistent:

> An immediate insight into a metaphysical state of affairs must accordingly allow itself to be reductively "proved" through the exhibition, namely, that the negation of the state of affairs has the positing of the same state of affairs as the condition of its possibility. The negation accordingly refutes itself through the co-performed positing—as its condition.[21]

The nature of this retorsive justification has at times been misunderstood. It is not, as M. G. Kalin affirms, a simple "thought experiment" that would "anticipate those fundamental changes in the structure of experience which should occur as the truth-value of the tested principle varies."[22] Nor does it show, as T. E. Wilkerson holds, a contradiction between a philosophical claim and "implicit assumptions about the logically contingent limits of human experience" or "contingent assumptions about human abilities . . . to which we can conceive no alternatives."[23] Rather, the denial of the transcendental CP of an intentional operation involves a contradiction between the content denied and the act of denial.[24]

[18]Cf. *ibid.*, p. 77.

[19]Cf. *ibid.*, pp. 60-61; "Metaphysik als Aufgabe," p. 44.

[20]Retorsion is a technique which demonstrates that the attempt to deny something involves the critic in an internal inconsistency between what is denied *in actu signato* and what is affirmed *in actu exercito*. Cf. above all G. Isaye, "La justification critique par rétorsion," *Revue philsophique de Louvain* 52 (1954), 204-33.

[21]Coreth, *Metaphysik*, pp. 57-58. Bubner, "Zur Struktur eines Transzendentalen Arguments," p. 21-22, (*Selbstbezüglichkeit*) of a transcendental argument.

[22]M. G. Kalin, "Kant's Transcendental Arguments as *Gedankenexperimente*," *Kant-Studien* 63 (1972), 323.

[23]T. E. Wilkerson, "Transcendetal Arguments Revisited," *Kant-Studien* 66 (1975), 112-13.

[24]I believe that E. Schaper, "Arguing Transcendentally," *Kant-Studien* 63 (1972), 111, has the same thing in mind when she writes: "A uniqueness claim *is* justified: when it can be shown that candidates for the title of competitors to the scheme in question must, if they are to be genuine alternatives, include or imply features inconsistent with other specific features of the scheme. To argue in this way is to show up such 'alternatives' as internally incoherent, not just logically incompatible with the scheme for which uniqueness is claimed."

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We may now ask how well Coreth's understanding of transcendental argumentation can meet Gram's objections to TA's.[25]

B. GRAM'S OBJECTIONS

Gram's objections concern primarily either the claim to the uniqueness of a transcendental mode of argumentation or the legitimacy of such a mode of argumentation. He has repeated, expanded, developed, and modified his objections in a series of publications over the years. Since an historical treatment of each of his polemical articles would lead to useless repetition, I shall try to present his objections not in their historical order but in a systematic form in the hope that I do not thereby falsify his thought.

According to R. Chisolm, "A transcendental argument could be said to be an argument formulating the results of a certain procedure—a 'transcendental procedure.'"[26] We have already examined Coreth's understanding of transcendental procedure or method. Since Gram's objections concern primarily the structure of a TA, we must now look at its concrete structure before considering his objections.

Chisolm describes the structure of a TA in the following way.[27] The major premiss (MaP) of a TA consists of a proposition or a group of propositions describing a certain subject matter. He terms this the "pre-analytic data." It corresponds to Coreth's phenomenological description. Through reflection upon the pre-analytic data, "one is able to apprehend certain necessary principles about the conditions under which it is possible for the initial subject matter to exist" or "for the pre-analytic data to be true." Chisolm terms this the "apprehension of certain transcendental principles." It enters into the minor premiss (MiP). The conclusion is derived from the conjunction of the propositions constituting the pre-analytic data and the transcendental principles.

If we were to cast an example from Coreth into syllogistic form, we should have something like the following:

MaP: I am able to ask of anything whatsoever what it *is* or whether it *is*.
MiP: One is able to ask what something *is* or whether something *is* only if one has some pre-grasp of being, otherwise one would not be able to ask. But this pre-grasp of being cannot be thematically exhaustive, otherwise one would not need to ask.
Conc: My ability to question operates in the unthematically pre-grasped horizon of being.[28]

The MaP is a phenomenological description of an intentional operation. The MiP is a transcendental principle stating the C'sP of performing the intentional operation. And the conclusion shows the horizon of my operation or the framework within which my operation can be meaningful.

Let us note in passing that TA's can also be formulated in the *modus ponendo ponens* form of the hypothetical syllogism (if P then Q, and P; therefore, Q). If we were to adopt this approach with regard to Coreth's example, we should then have the following:

[25]References to Gram's articles will be given in the body of the text by year and page number.
[26]R. Chisolm, "What is a Transcendental Argument," *Neue Hefte für Philosophie* 14 (1978), 19.
[27]Cf. *ibid.*, 20-21.
[28]Cf. Coreth, *Metaphysik*, pp. 110-18. The reader will please bear in mind that this is merely illustrative and not an adequate statement of Coreth's argument, for which many points would have to be developed and clarifications made.

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MaP: If I question what something *is* or whether it *is*, I have an at least implicit knowledge of being as the horizon of my question.
MiP: I do so question.
Conc: I do have an at least implicit knowledge of being as the horizon of my question.

We shall, however, make use in the following of the structure of TA's formulated by Chisolm unless otherwise indicated. We may now proceed to Gram's objections.

(1). One series of objections offered by Gram concerns the nature and role of the premisses that enter into a TA. Gram observes correctly that the MaP of a TA is an epistemic premiss like "*S* knows (perceives) that *p*" (1974:305). Although this statement is true, it would be incorrect to limit the verb of the main clause of the MaP to verbs of knowing and perceiving. Any verb describing an act of spiritual knowing, willing, or feeling would be admissible.

(a) Gram first objects to drawing a conclusion from the subordinate clause of the MaP. His objection runs as follows:

> Thus suppose that the conclusion follows from the description of the objects which are perceived. This is objectionable because all the conclusion would represent is the implication of concepts involved in describing what we perceive. And this would make a transcendental argument indistinguishable from any argument by which implications are drawn from the descriptions of *p simpliciter* (1974:103).

Gram is correct in saying that the conclusion of a TA is not simply the analytic explanation of the concepts contained in the subordinate clause of the MaP. Thus in our example the conclusion that questioning operates within the horizon of being does not follow from the questions "What is X?" or "Is X?" taken alone. This, however, is not a serious objection as long as the other possibilities remain.

(b). Gram, however, immediately tries to close other possible avenues. He says:

> Should we try to derive the conclusion of a transcendental argument from the main clause of the epistemic premiss (i.e., "*S* perceives..."), the argument faces another difficulty. Whatever conclusions that follow will be propositions about what Kant calls the subjective conditions of thought.... For it must assume an account of what these conditions are in order to establish the further conclusion that they make experience possible; hence, propositions about the subjective conditions of thought follow from the epistemic premisses in a transcendental argument only because they are assumed by the argument (1974:305-306).

Once again Gram would seem to be correct. It is impossible to argue from "I am able to ask..." to "My ability to question operates in the unthematically pre-grasped horizon of being." But this fact is as banal as it is true. For it is impossible in any deductive argument to move directly from the MaP to the conclusion without a MiP. The conclusion does not follow from the MaP alone (much less from either its main or its subordinate clause alone) but from the conjunction of the MaP and the MiP. If one grants the MaP based on phenomenological description, the question then becomes whether the transcendental principle stated in the MiP is legitimately employed or illegitimately assumed.

How then are we to establish the legitimacy of the MiP? We have seen that transcendental principles can be critically justified through retorsion, i.e., through the contra-

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diction generated by their denial. Here Gram betrays a serious misunderstanding. He writes:

> And, if the argument is to succeed, this contradiction must be deduced from the epistemic premiss without any further premisses. The need for this requirement is just that, without it, we can infer from whatever contradiction we might derive only that one of the propositions producing it is false. But this does not tell us which of the contradictories is false; consequently, no conclusion can be drawn (1971:23-24).

Gram assumes that the denial of the MaP must lead to an internal inconsistency. But it does not. It is simply a phenomenological description. It may be more or less complete, but it does not stand in need of critical justification.[29] Rather, it is the transcendental principle in the MiP that needs to be justified, if it is not to be illegitimately assumed. It can be so justified if its denial entails its implicit affirmation. If I question whether the conditions of possibility of questioning are what they are, then I must know that they *are* something but not be sure precisely what they *are*. And if my question is to be sensible, then I must have some pre-grasp of being given in the word "are."[30]

(c). Gram further objects to trying to establish the distinctiveness of TA's through the distinctiveness of the propositions which compose their premisses.

(i). He formulates his first objection thus:

> It merely postpones the problem of identifying such arguments. For *any* kind of proposition about which we can discover something distinctive can help constitute what we would have to call transcendental if it were combined in an argument with others having the same property (1977:235).

It is difficult to see how specifying the criteria for the admissibility of propositions into the premisses of TA's postpones the problem of identifying such an argument. For as soon as the criteria are specified, an argument containing such propositions can be immediately recognized as transcendental. And we have seen the criteria to be twofold: (1) that the MaP contain a phenomenological description of an intentional operation, and (2) that the MiP contain a transcendental principle stating the C'sP for the performance of such an operation.

(ii). Gram's second objection to establishing the distinctiveness of TA's through the distinctiveness of their premisses is:

> it also begs the question.... That we choose the feature we do demands an independent argument that we are correctly identifying their *transcendental* feature. And this, in turn, assumes that we already have a way of segregating those features of a proposition which are transcendental (1977:235).

[29]We can cast Gram's example as follows:

MaP: "All I perceive is a succession of momentary states of consciousness...."

MiP: "All perception of temporal relations requires perception of something permanent...."

Conc: "I perceive permanent items in time" (cf. 1971:24).

He argues that the denial of the MaP is not self-contradictory without introduction of the MiP. But note that Gram's MaP is not a simple phenomenological description but a statement of the position to be refuted.

[30]I concede that this example of retorsion, since it concerns the question, is not quite as clear as those concerning insights, judgments, decisions, and the like.

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Here Gram confuses two matters: the general definition of a TA and the correspondence of a particular argument to that definition. We have defined the argument as one the MaP of which contains a phenomenological description of an intentional operation and the MiP of which contains a transcendental principle stating the C'sP for the performance of that operation. This is a stipulatory definition and enables us to determine which kinds of premisses can enter into a TA. In the case of any given argument purporting to be transcendental, one can legitimately ask whether the phenomenological description given in the MaP is correct. And it will be correct to the extent that it answers all relevant questions about the intentional operation under consideration. One may also legitimately question whether the transcendental principle given in the MiP actually does state a CP for the performance of the intentional operation. And it will do so if it cannot be denied without internal inconsistency. Judging the correspondence of a particular argument purporting to be transcendental to the general definition of a TA, however, in no way begs the question.

(d). We have seen that the transcendental principle given in the MiP can be critically justified through retorsion insofar as its explicit denial entails its implicit affirmation. Gram brings two objections against what he terms the "Speech-Act Theory" which would serve to invalidate our claim.

(i). The first one states:

> The conclusion of any argument illustrating the Speech-Act Theory purportedly states a necessary condition of such acts as supposing and asserting. This may be true; but an argument of this form does not show that it is true. It assumes an independent means of isolating such conditions in order to generate the contradiction between the proposition being asserted or supposed and the fact that the proposition is being asserted or supposed. Thus an argument of the present kind cannot *tell* us what the necessary conditions of speed acts are. To show that the proposition, "There are no persons," is false whenever it is asserted or supposed to be true requires the introduction of the further proposition that persons are a necessary condition of the existence of speech acts. Without this further proposition, the contradiction cannot be derived. But with such a proposition, the derivation of the contradiction is a superfluous gesture (1971:17-18).

I have allowed myself this rather lengthy quotation because its misunderstandings are instructive. Let us cast Gram's example in syllogistic form:

MaP: I perform certain speech acts.
MiP: One is able to perform a speech act only if one is a person.
Conc: I am a person.

We note first that the MaP does not give a phenomenological description of an intentional operation, for a speech-act is an instrumental act expressing an intentional operation, be it one of conceptualization, judgment, decision, or whatever. We see further that the allegedly transcendental principle given in the MiP does not thematize the constitutive foreknowledge unthematically posited in the performance of the intentional operation as its CP. It, therefore, cannot be strictly justified critically by retorsion. For one does not involve oneself in internal inconsistency when, by means of a speech-act, one claims that even non-persons are able to perform speech-acts. One would implicate oneself in such an inconsistency only if one were to claim as a person by means of a

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speech-act that only non-persons are able to perform such acts. The conclusion of the argument, therefore, does not disclose the horizon in which an intentional operation is performed. Since Gram's is a faulty example of a TA, it cannot be used to refute the legitimacy of transcendental argumentation. I do not deny that personhood is a necessary condition of performing speech acts, but it would seem to be an ontic and not a transcendental CP. As such, it would not enter constitutively into the performance of the act, and for this reason it cannot be reductively exhibited through retorsion from the act. In a legitimate TA, however, the conclusion does not illegitimately presuppose "an independent means of isolating such conditions," first, because no conclusion can be drawn directly from a MaP without a MiP and, second, because the MiP itself does not rest on illegitimate assumptions, but merely explicitates the implicitly co-posited performative knowledge accompanying the performance of the internal operation.

(ii). Gram's second objection is:

> The theory tells us that acts of asserting, believing, or imagining certain propositions to be true imply that these propositions are false. But this is simply not the case.... It does, however, imply that the proposition is incompatible with another proposition describing the act of asserting or believing such a proposition (1978:41).

Again Gram gives evidence of a serious confusion. We may illustrate this with a classical example known already to Aristotle. Let A, as the asserted proposition, be the following: "There is no truth." And let B, as the proposition describing the assertion, read as follows: "I mean truthfully to assert that there is no truth." Gram claims that we have a contradiction only between proposition A and proposition B. But the contradictory of proposition A, "There is no truth," is not proposition B, as Gram holds, but a third proposition, C, which states, "There is truth." Rather, the glaring contradiction which Gram fails to see is between the main clause of the proposition B, "I mean truthfully to assert...," and the subordinate clause of the proposition B, "that there is no truth." It is not a contradiction between the contents of two propositions but, in this case, one between the explicit assertion of one proposition and the implicit denial of the same proposition.

(iii). In another context, namely, that of Kant's famous theorem/principle distinction, Gram brings forth another objection relevant to the present discussion. Gram asks whether the class of transcendental propositions might not be that of synthetic propositions with self-refuting negations. He answers:

> Let us suppose, first, a specimen of a transcendental proposition which is synthetic in that it has a self-consistent negation and, secondly, a synthetic proposition which contradicts such a proposition. But it is easy to see that the second proposition need not imply the first one (1973:257).

Two remarks are in order here. First, a transcendental principle with a self-consistent negation is a contradiction in terms: if the proposition has a self-consistent negation, it is not a transcendental principle; if it is a transcendental principle, it does not have a self-consistent negation. The inconsistency of the negation is not, however, between the content of one proposition that is affirmed and the content of the contradictory proposition denying it. Rather, the inconsistency is between the content of one proposition and the

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act of affirming the same proposition, as our previous example has shown. Second, it is not another proposition that implies the transcendental principle, but the implicit affirmation contained in the act of denying the transcendental principle itself.

The nature of the retorsive justification of a transcendental principle is highlighted by a contrast with analytic propositions. Gram asks us to

> Consider the proposition, "All brothers are male siblings." This and kindred propositions make possible their own ground as proof as long as experience is considered as such a ground... hence, a description of evidence that would refute such a proposition would also imply the original proposition... (1973:256).

Here one need have no recourse at all to empirical evidence to refute the denial of the proposition, "All brothers are male siblings." For "male siblings" is simply the analytic explication of the concept "brothers." The denial, "No brothers are male siblings," is indeed internally inconsistent. But the inconsistency is between the subject and the predicate nominative linked to it by the copula. It is thus a contradiction between two contents and not a contradiction between content and act, as occurs with the denial of a transcendental principle.

(iv). Gram raises another pertinent objection in regard to Kant's ostensive/apagogical distinction. According to Kant, the ostensive proof combines with the conviction of its truth insight into the sources of its truth. It seems that the retorsive justification of a transcendental principle would qualify as an ostensive proof, since it gives one an insight into the unthematic performative knowledge accompanying the intentional operation as a source of the truth of a transcendental principle. Gram writes of the ostensive/apagogical distinction:

> It confuses a logical with an epistemic issue. To say that a proof is ostensive rather than apogogical is to say something about our state of enlightenment about the propositions in such an argument. It does not say anything about the character of those propositions themselves apart from that state of enlightenment. Nor, for that matter, does it permit any conclusion about what is peculiar to the structure of the argument from what we may or may not know about the premisses... (1978:30).

I concede that the ostensive/apagogical distinction concerns first and foremost an epistemic, and not a logical, issue. But it seems to me that this distinction contributes nonetheless to an understanding of the structure of a TA. For it places the MiP in a unique relation to the MaP, which enables us to stipulate criteria for the construction of a TA. If the MaP contains a phenomenological description of an intentional operation, the MiP must formulate a transcendental principle stating the C'sP of the performance of that intentional operation in such a way that the denial of the transcendental principle would afford an insight into its own ground of truth.

(2). A second series of objections to TA's made by Gram concerns the relation of the premisses to the conclusions of such arguments.

(a). Gram first contends that transcendental arguments cannot assume the form of inductive proofs. He maintains:

> The description of anything which supposedly supports the inductive proof of a transcendental proposition itself assumes the truth of that proposition in order to count as an in-

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> stance. This is the sense in which the very experience which is the ground of the proof of a transcendental proposition assumes the proposition—which disqualifies any attempt at a cogent inductive proof (1978:53).

Gram is quite correct in holding that TA's are not instances of inductive proofs. But he is mistaken in the reason he offers. His mistake turns, moreover, on an ambiguity involved in the word "assumes." We must show later in what sense the MaP of a TA can "assume" the conclusion without being circular. Here it will suffice to point out that the phenomenological description of an intentional operation contained in the MaP of a TA forms the point of departure. It is, therefore, prior to the question about its C'sP answered in the MiP and to the conclusion resulting from both of them. Rather than presupposing the transcendental principle or the conclusion, the transcendental principle and the conclusion themselves presuppose the phenomenological description. The difficulty with inductive proofs is precisely the one which Gram rejects, namely, "moving from a mass of individual instances to a true generalization applying even to those instances which have not been canvassed as the evidential basis for the generalization" (1978:53). It is precisely in view of this difficulty that a TA does not begin with a merely descriptive phenomenology of an individual intentional operation as individual but with an eidetic phenomenology that seeks to grasp the essential structures of a particular kind of intentional operation.

(b). Gram also maintains that TA's cannot be distinguished from an ordinary case of deduction. He holds:

> Even (if) we do restrict the propositions whch can enter into the premiss set of an allegedly transcendent argument to whatever describes our experience of some phenomenon or another, we still have no way to distinguish between inference from a set of experiential propositions to a conclusion that describes something about experience and an inference to a privileged (read: "transcendental") conclusion from the same premisses (1978:31).

Here Gram simply overlooks the unique character of the premisses of TA's. For the premiss set of a TA does not contain just any propositions describing our experience of some phenomenon. If it did, it would indeed be indistinguishable from any other deductive argument based on experience. But it is distinguishable from such arguments, as we have repeatedly said, in that the MaP contains a phenomenological description of the essential structures of an intentional operation and in that the MiP contains a transcendental principle that states the C'sP of the performance of such an operation.

But Gram persists in his objection:

> Suppose we enumerate a series of premisses which describe facts of our experience.... Concede that these premisses imply propositions about my cognitive apparatus which must be true if I am even to have such an experience. This may be true of something called a transcendental argument. But it is also true of any argument which purports to show that any experience can be described differently from any other. The notion of a transcendental argument, then, applies to as many kinds of argument as there are descriptions of the kinds of experiences we have (1978:56).

Whether Gram is correct here depends on whether the "descriptions" in question proceed from a merely descriptive phenomenology or from an eidetic phenomenology. For

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there is not a separate TA for, e.g., every individual question I may be able to ask. Rather there is a TA based on the essential structures of the act of questioning. In the same way there will be other TA's based on the essential structures of acts of insight, conceptualization, reflection, judgment, deliberation, decision, love, desire, joy, hope, courage, etc. In other words, there can be as many TA's as there are distinct kinds of intentional operations. This fact, however, is not an objection against TA's. Rather, it merely demonstrates the immense fruitfulness of transcendental argumentation.

(c). Gram further objects that the relation between the premisses and conclusion of a TA cannot be a case of Strawsonian presupposition, which he formulates as " 'P' *implies* 'Q' just in case 'Q' is a deductive consequence of the truth of 'P.' But 'P' *presupposes* 'Q' just in case 'Q' is a deductive consequence of the truth or falsity of 'P' " (1971:18). Another formulation runs as follows: "If 'Q' is a necessary condition of the truth of 'P,' 'P' may be said to imply 'Q.' But if 'Q' is a necessary condition of the truth or falsity of 'P,' 'P' presupposes 'Q' " (1977:236).

Gram then makes the following objection to the Strawsonian presupposition theory:

> We cannot interpret the criterion for presupposition to mean that a proposition of the form '(P v not P)' implies 'Q,' whether implication is material or strict. This schema is satisfiable when either one of the disjuncts implies 'Q.' Thus any case of implication becomes a case of presupposition whenever it is placed in disjunction with another proposition (1971:19).

Gram's basic point seems to be that presupposition cannot be distinguished from implication. If I understand his reasoning, he means to say the following. In the case of material implication, the proposition P implies every true proposition and the proposition not P implies every proposition whatsoever. Thus, no matter if P or not P implies Q, we have nonetheless simply a case of material implication and not one of presupposition. Likewise, in the case of strict implication, if either every value of P or every value of not P strictly implies Q, we once again have merely a case of strict implication and not one of presupposition. Gram's mistake here seems to lie in considering the presupposition of Q to result from the *disjunction* of the implication of P and the implication of not P. Thus: (P v not P) implies Q. But it seems that Strawson wishes to say, on the other hand, that the presupposition of Q follows from the *conjunction* of the strict implication of P and the strict implication of not P. Thus: (P implies Q) & (not P implies Q).

Let us take an example. If I say, "This is a book," I must have an at least implicit knowledge of being in order to make the affirmation. Likewise, if I say, "This is not a book," I again must have an at least implicit knowledge of being in order to make the denial. Regardless of the content of my act of judgment, its presupposition remains the same.

J. Hintikka already made basically this same criticism of Gram.[31] In retort, Gram strangely claims that he did not say what he actually said:

> Hintikka...rejects that argument, saying that I falsely claim (P v not P) to imply Q whenever one of the disjuncts implies Q. Such a claim, I agree, would be false. But I make no such claim (1978:36, note 18).

One need only read the earlier quotation, however, to see that Gram did in fact claim what he here says he did not claim. But, be that as it may, Gram offers the following ex-

[31]Cf. Hintikka, "Transcendental Arguments: Genuine and Spurious," 279-80.

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planation: "What I *do* claim is that implication is a necessary condition of Q's being a presupposition of P" (1978:36, note 18). Here Gram is quite right, insofar as presupposition has as its necessary condition the implication of Q by the conjunction of both the strict implication of P and the strict implication of not P. But this suffices to distinguish presupposition from a case of ordinary implication in which either P or not P implies Q.

We, however, do not need to pursue the discussion any further for two reasons. First, since truth or falsity is a property only of judgments affirming or denying that something is or is not so, Strawson's criterion of presupposition would be applicable only to those TA's that establish the C'sP of the judgment. The relation of presupposition, therefore, could not characterize the relation between the premisses and conclusions of all TA's. Second, TA's are concerned not with the C'sP for the truth or falsity of propositions but with the C'sP for the performance of intentional operations. Thus, it is not so much the sentences "This is a book" and "This is not a book" which imply the unthematic knowledge of being but rather the sentences "I judge that this is a book" and "I judge that this is not a book." In these judgments I mean to say what truly is and is not, and must, therefore, have an at least implicit knowledge of being in order for either the affirmative or negative judgment to be sensible. There is, then, indeed a relation of presupposition between the premisses and the conclusions of TA's, namely: the conclusion explicitates the horizon which is ultimately presupposed in the performance of the intentional operation described in the MaP.[32]

(3). Gram adduces two further objections in regard to Kant's theorem/principle distinction, to which we made allusion earlier. Succinctly put, whereas a principle makes possible its own ground of proof, according to Kant, a theorem does not. According to Gram, this distinction renders TA's indistinguishable from any deductive argument. He writes:

> Suppose...that the conclusion of such an argument does make possible the experience which is said to be the ground of proof. This is undistinguishable from the way in which the conclusion of any valid deductive argument makes possible the grounds of its proof. For the conclusion of any valid deductive argument is a necessary condition of whatever premisses that generate it (1976:304).

We have seen that a TA can be cast in the *modus ponendo ponens* form of the hypothetical syllogism, and this is what Gram seems to have in mind here. Let us then test his assertions with a further example.

MaP: If I judge (i.e., if I mean to affirm what is, is, and what is not, is not), I have an at least implicit knowledge of being as the horizon of my judgment.
MiP: I do so judge.
Conc: I do have an at least implicit knowledge of being as the horizon of my judgment.

[32]Crawford, "Kant's Theory of a Philsophical Proof," 264, comes closer to this in the following: "When we say the premises of a deductive argument are logically prior to the conclusion we seem to mean at least that they are logically prior in the sense that they are that from which the conclusion can be deduced. On the other hand, when we say that a necessary condition is logically prior to that for which it is a condition we mean something quite different by 'logically prior'; we mean at least that the necessary condition must hold if that for which it is a condition is to hold . . . ."

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We notice here that the conclusion affirms the consequent of the hypothetical MaP. In affirming the conclusion, one thus affirms the condition of possibility of the experience (i.e., the intentional operation of judging) described hypothetically in the antecedent of the MaP and categorically in the MiP. Gram thus seems to be correct. The TA does not differ formally from any other case of the *modus ponendo ponens.*

But let us cast this argument in the *modus ponendo tollens* form of the hypothetical syllogism (if P, then Q, but not Q; therefore, not P). We now have:

MaP: If I judge, I have an at least implicit knowledge of being as the horizon of my judgment.
MiP: But I do not have such an implicit knowledge of being.
Conc: I do not judge.

We see at once the self-contradictory nature of the conclusion. First, in affirming, "I do not judge," I make a judgment. Second, in saying, "I do not judge," I mean to affirm not what seems to be, or what I wish to be, but what in fact *is*, and if this affirmation is to be sensible, I must have an at least implicit knowledge of being in order to be able to make the affirmation. The uniqueness of a TA becomes readily apparent if we examine another instance of the *modus ponendo tollens*:

MaP: If Socrates is a man, he is mortal.
MiP: But Socrates is not mortal.
Conc: Socrates is not a man.

Because the MiP of this syllogism is false, the conclusion is also false. In affirming the false conclusion, however, we involve ourselves only in error but not in self-contradiction. It is, therefore, a material, and not a formal, difference which distinguishes TA's from other forms of deductive arguments.

But Gram also proffers another objection with regard to the theorem/principle distinction:

> Suppose . . . that the conclusion of a transcendental argument is presupposed . . . by the premisses of the argument. This would only make such an argument peculiar in virtue of its circularity. It may, of course, be the case that circularity is an essential feature of every transcendental argument. But it is an equally distinctive feature of any argument the conclusion of which figures as one of its premisses (1974:304).

The question here is clearly in what sense a TA is circular or in what sense the MaP presupposes the conclusion. In a *circulus vitiosus* one attempts to prove each of two propositions to be proved from the other, as if, for example, one were to argue that the human soul is spiritual and not material because it is properly intellectual and not merely sensitive, but then to argue that the human soul is intellectual precisely because it is spiritual. Such a vicious circle does not occur in a TA, for there is, in Chisolm's formulation, no attempt to prove the MaP by the conclusion: it is simply a phenomenological description of an intentional operation. In a *petitio principii*, one assumes the conclusion to be proved in the MaP, as when Aristotle argues from the general MaP that heavy things gravitate towards the center of the universe, through the empirical MiP that we observe heavy things gravitating towards the center of the earth, to the conclusion that the center of the earth is the center of the universe. Such a begging of the question does not occur in

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a TA, for the MaP is again only a phenomenological description of an intentional operation, and, as such a description, it does not presuppose the horizon of the operation which comes to light in the conclusion after having explicitated the C'sP of the operation in the MiP. There is, however, a sense in which one can legitimately speak of presupposition here, although it is not the presupposition of one proposition by another. Rather, it is the presupposition of an implicitly known horizon by an explicit intentional operation performed within that horizon.*

*I wish to thank Profs. Emerich Coreth and Otto Muck for having read this paper and offered their comments.

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San-un Zendos
Kamakura, Japan

The Clôture of Deconstruction: A Mahāyāna Critique of Derrida

David Loy

> One senses Derrida is indeed *on the verge* of *someway* else, if not a something else, but surely he has not yet broken out of the turn. Derrida is in the turn of language, but he has logically demonstrated language to be not a turn but a labyrinth.
>
> Robert Magliola, *Derrida on the Mend*[1]

DERRIDA'S RADICAL critique of Western philosophy is defective only because it is not radical enough. His deconstruction is incomplete because it does not deconstruct itself and attain *clôture*: that much-sought *clôture* of metaphysical thinking which would also be the opening to something else. This is why Derrida remains in the halfway-house of proliferating "pure textuality," whereas deconstruction could lead to a transformed mode of experiencing the world.

Any notion of a *clôture* for deconstruction seems incongruous with Derrida's project, whose *différance,* in deconstructing any proffered "transcendental signified," allows the dissemination of endless supplementation. Nevertheless, I shall argue for this by contrasting Derrida's method and claims with another form of deconstruction that antedates his by some nineteen centuries: the Mādhyamika "anti-philosophy" of Nāgārjuna. A worthy opponent for the *enfant terrible* of contemporary Western philosophy, Nāgārjuna is indisputably the greatest thinker of Mahāyāna Buddhism, and many consider his Mādhyamika to be "the central philosophy of Buddhism."[2] Its influence in India, Tibet, Mongolia, China and Japan can hardly be overestimated. The Vajrayāna Buddhism of Tibet treasures Nāgārjuna's works as the most profound possible expression of philosophical truth; and while Zen Buddhism neither is nor has a philosophy, it is no less true that Mādhyamika (along with Yogācāra) provided the theoretical perspective which made the development of Zen practice possible. Even some of the devotional schools of Pure Land Buddhism look back to Nāgārjuna as their founding father.

Given this historical significance, it is an intellectual scandal that Mādhyamika is so little known in the West. But Nāgārjuna's subtle and complicated dialectical method is often difficult to follow, perhaps because it cuts too much to the bone, challenging commonsense more than we are able or willing to understand. Nāgārjuna is more systematic than Derrida in his critique and refutation of all possible metaphysical views, including any that might be called his own. To what end? To anticipate, the debate between them will turn on the following issues.

[1]Robert Magliola, *Derrida on the Mend* (Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1984), p. 48. This book discusses Derrida in relation to Taoism, Mādhyamika, and Christian theology ("the Blessed Trinity").

[2]For example, T. R.V. Murti, whose study remains perhaps the best work in English on the subject: *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1960).

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Nāgārjuna's dialectic works by undermining such "commonsense" dualities as that between objects and their causal relations, or that between things and time. In both of these examples (to be discussed later), the latter term may be used first to deconstruct the former and to deny that there is anything self-existing or self-present. Derrida's demonstration of the ineluctability of *différance* makes the same point. But that alone is incomplete. The interdependence of both terms in such dualities implies that the negation of either must also lead to negation of the other. We use "cause-and-effect" to explain the relationships between supposedly discrete things, which means that our concepts of objects and causal relations, being relative to each other, must stand or fall together: if there are no objects, then there can be no causality (as usually understood). We shall see that the same paradox holds true for time: if there is *only* time, because there are no objects "in" time, then there is *no* time. Each pole deconstructs the other. It is the necessity for this second and reverse movement that Derrida does not see. Expressed in his categories, Derrida, although aware that each term of a duality is the *différance* of the other, does not fully realize how deconstructing one term (transcendental signified, self-presence, reference, etc.) must also transform the other (*différance,* temporization, supplementation, etc.).

What is the result of this double-deconstruction of "commonsense" dualities? Derrida's single-deconstruction leads to the "temporary" reversal of their hierarchy, and/or to a discontinuous, irruptive "liberation" from reference grounded in the search for unattainable origins, into the dissemination of a free-floating meaning beyond any conceptual *clôture.* For Nāgārjuna, this would be only the illusion of liberation, while remaining trapped in a textual "bad infinity" which tends to become increasingly playful. What is needed is not just "a change of style," however seductive or frustrating that may be. Rather, the complete deconstruction of such dualities can lead, not merely to their more self-conscious "reinscription," but to a mode of experience which is not governed by them. Nāgārjuna agrees that such dualities are ineluctably inscribed in language, and thus are fundamental categories of thought; this means, however, not that they are inescapable, but that their deconstruction points finally to an experience beyond language—or, more precisely, to a different way of experiencing language and thought.

In other words, the ultimate irony is that deconstruction ends in the elusive "origin" which metaphysics has always sought and which Derrida believes he has refuted. They are both right. Philosophy will never come to rest in such an origin, for no "transcendental signified" can be located with/in language, and philosophy is a language-game. The rhetorical operations which produce supposedly logical proofs cannot be eliminated: philosophy, like all language, is basically metaphorical. This is Derrida's positive and, I hope, lasting contribution. But the deconstruction of thought *via* language—for this is what Nāgārjuna understood himself to be doing—offers a different mode of approach to the problem. "There is nothing outside the text" is more true for us now than Derrida realizes, but it is not necessarily true. In order to understand this, let us consider: What is the paradigm "transcendental signified," according to Buddhism? Not *nirvāna,* as two centuries of Western interpretation have led us to believe, for, as we shall see, *nirvāna* is neither transcendental ("The ontic range of *nirvāna* is the ontic range of the everyday world. There is not even the subtlest difference between the two." *MMK,* XXV, 20)[3] nor signified ("No truth has been taught by a Buddha for anyone,

[3]The Mūlamadhyamikakārikā (hereafter "MMK") is Nāgārjuna's most important work. References are to the translation by Mervyn Sprung, in *Lucid Exposition of the Middle Way: The Essential Chapters from the Prasannapadā of Candrakīrti* (Boulder, Colorado: Prajnā Press, 1979).

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anywhere." XXV, 24). On the contrary, the paradigm transcendental signified is *the thing*—here meaning not only physical objects but also the objectified subject. What most needs to be deconstructed is the apparent objectivity of the world, which is due to taking perceptions as "signs" of the object. The relationship between names and things is the archetypal signifier/signified correspondence, and the Buddhist goal is nothing less than its complete deconstruction: "... the non-functioning of perceptions as signs of all named things is itself *nirvāna*" (Candrakīrti)[4]. It is not Buddhism that postulates a metaphysical Reality behind appearance, but our usual "commonsense" view, which distinguishes them by objectifying the former with a name. *Nirvāna,* in contrast, is nothing other than "the utter dissipation of ontologizing thought" (Candrakīrti).

Unarticulated and delusive ontological commitments underlie even the most everyday uses of language. Suddenly, language/thought is no longer the means (as according to metaphysics) nor even the end (according to Heidegger and Derrida, in very different ways) but the problem itself. This perspective is essential to Buddhism and to most meditative traditions. Philosophy cannot grasp what it seeks in any of its categories, but, as language becoming self-conscious of its function, it can learn to "undo" itself and cease to be an obstruction, in that way allowing what we have long sought to manifest itself. This "origin-which-cannot-be-named" has always been the most obvious thing, but, says Nāgārjuna, all ways of thinking about it—whether metaphysical or deconstructive—can only conceal it by dualistically separating us from it.

To avoid becoming even longer than it is, this paper must presuppose some familiarity with the writings of Jacques Derrida. First I present, in some detail, the approach and perspective of Nāgārjuna, although with reference to Derrida when the similarities suggest such a comparison.[5] I hope that this first part is interesting in itself, but in any case it is necessary to the critique that follows. The main differences are reserved for Part Two, where Derrida is subjected to a Mādhyamika critique.

I

1. Even more than most philosophers, both Nāgārjuna and Derrida can be understood only within their philosophical context. Like Kant's dialectic, both deconstructive methods are dependent on philosophy having attained a high degree of sophistication; both are self-consciously parasitic upon the dogmatism of previous paradigms, "the interminable and total conflict of reason" (Murti). But otherwise the difference in their contexts is more striking.

Nāgārjuna is very much within the Buddhist tradition, which is as much religious as philosophical (a distinction whose invalidity becomes apparent in such an application), although Mādhyamika constitutes so major a development within Buddhism that it is almost a break with the prior tradition. But Nāgārjuna never questions Buddhist methods and goals, although he explains them in a new way. Also, like Kant, he is responding to a conflict of traditions.

[4]The *Prasannapadā* of Candrakīrti (see n. 3) is the best-known Buddhist commentary on the *MMK*; this is from the gloss to XXV, 24.

[5]The following exposition draws heavily on several previously published papers on the topic: "The Difference between Samsāra and Nirvāna," *Philosophy East and West*, 33 (October, 1983); "How Not to Criticize Nāgārjuna: A Response to L. Stafford Betty," *Philosophy East and West*, 34 (October, 1984); "The Paradox of Causality in Mādhyamika," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 25 (March, 1985); and "The Māhayāna Deconstruction of Time," *Philosophy East and West*, 36 (January, 1986).

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> There are two main currents of Indian philosophy—one having its source in the *atma*-doctrine of the Upanisads and the other in the *anatma* doctrine of Buddha. They conceive reality on two distinct and exclusive patterns. The Upanisads and the systems following the Brahmanical tradition conceive reality on the pattern of an inner core or soul (*ātman*), immutable and identical amidst an outer region of impermanence and change, to which it is unrelated or but loosely related. This may be termed the Substance-view of reality. . .
>
> The other tradition is represented by the Buddhist denial of substance and all that it implies. There is no inner and immutable core in things; everything is in flux. Existence for the Buddhist is momentary, unique, and unitary. The substance (the universal and the identical) was rejected as illusory; it was but a thought-construction made under the influence of wrong belief.[6]

It was the conflict between these paradigms that prompted Nāgārjuna's *aufheben,* which nonetheless did not lead to any merger between the two traditions (although Advaita Vedānta borrowed the dialectical argumentation of Mādhyamika for the same end, refuting the reality of the objective world). Nāgārjuna, although constituting a "Copernican Revolution" within Indian philosophy, understood himself as only explicating more clearly than others what the Buddha himself had taught.

In contrast to Indian pluralism, where conflicting systems evolved adjacently by adding sub-commentaries to commentaries on revered works, Derrida is heir to a more integrated tradition which has developed by repeatedly revolutionizing itself. Each philosophical generation defines its own identity by cannibalizing what its forebears have left. Since the failure of the Hegelian synthesis, this has meant killing not only one's own father but all one's forefathers. This difference is important because it affects their respective deconstructions. In contrast to Derrida's "hierarchy reversal" (e.g., a grammatology to replace phono- and logocentrism) there is no such reversal, temporary or not, in Mādhyamika because Nāgārjuna was reacting to a conflict between diametrically opposed paradigms.

Yet these differences should not overshadow what the two deconstructions share. One often-overlooked aspect of Buddhism, unusual for a religion but common with Derrida, is that Buddhism assumes no "golden age" in the past, no mythical pure point of historical origin to which Buddhists yearn to return. Because of their belief in an all-loving God, the Semitic religions must postulate a Garden of Eden from which man fell because of his own sin. Buddhism, accepting no such Creator, is silent about the origin of the world and of our *duhkha* (suffering in the broad sense: including dissatisfaction, frustration, *angst*). The most the Buddha ever said about this was that "a beginning cannot be found." Insofar as *nirvāna* might be taken as such an origin, it is not something that needs to be regained or even gained, but only to be realized by ending the delusion that keeps us from understanding the way things have always been. On other occasions, the Buddha pointed out that whether or not there was a beginning really makes no difference, since what is important is that there is an end. He often stated that he came to teach only two things: that our lives are *duhkha* (suffering), and there is a way to end that *duhkha.*

Most central to Buddhist doctrine is the denial of an ontological self. This brings us back to the paradigm conflict between Vedānta and early Buddhism. Essential to the Vedantic "Substance-view" is not only its postulation of an immutable soul (*ātman*)

[6]Murti, *The Central Philosophy of Buddhism*, pp. 10-11.

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but also the identification of that soul with the Ground of the universe (*Brahman*). The Buddhist rejection of self should be understood as a critique of any such self-existent, self-present transcendental signified, and the most important Buddhist doctrine, *pratītya-samutpāda,* is nothing less than a systematic deconstruction of any claim to self-reflexive "pure consciousness" (*cit*).

Pratītya-samutāda ("dependent origination") refutes any such conception by demonstrating the interdependence of all elements of our experience. Everything, including consciousness, may be located within a set of cause-and-effect, differing-and-deferring relationship ("when X exists, then Y arises") which precludes any simple "self-presence." The early Pali sutras contain various versions of this "interlocking chain," but the standard doctrinal compilation presents twelve factors.

(1) *ignorance* of the interdependent nature of all things (constituting not only the first "link" but the basic presupposition of the whole process) leads to the activation of
(2) *mental formations* (psychological causal factors derived from past thoughts and actions and usually understood as karmic tendencies persisting from past lifetimes) leads to
(3) (rebirth) *consciousness* (necessary for impregnation) leads to
(4) *name-and-form* (the developing mind-body complex of the fetus) which leads to
(5) *the six sense-organs* (including the mind as the organ of thinking) which lead to
(6) *contact* between such organs and sense-objects (including mind and "mind-objects") and thus
(7) *sensation* (pleasant, unpleasant or neutral) leading to
(8) *craving* (not only desire for objects of pleasure but also aversion to unpleasant ones and indifference to neutral ones) and hence
(9) *grasping* at sense-objects, the manifestation of craving, leading to
(10) *becoming* (the tendency to be reborn, a function of such grasping), which causes
(11) (re-)*birth,* which leads to
(12) *duhkha, old age,* and *death.*

Calling this a "causal chain" does not mean that the last link rejoins directly with the first. The first two factors are causes from the past affecting the present; the next seven are causes and effects operating in the present; the last three are the future effects of present causes. Whether or not this doctrine is taken literally as referring to past and future lifetimes or psychologized into past and future experiences, its importance for Buddhism can hardly be overemphasized. The interdependence of all experience is explained without any reference to a first cause (a creator God, etc.) or a final cause. There is only "conditionality": everything is both conditioned and conditioning, each event only a function of an "economy of differences."

But at first the full critique of self-presence (Nāgārjuna's term is *svabhāva,* "self-existence") was only implicit. It remained for Nāgārjuna, six centuries after the Buddha, to rethink *pratītya-samutpāda* as implying *śūnyatā* (devoidness, lack of being)[7] of all phenomena. By his time Indian philosophy had developed and formalized itself to a sophistication unknown to the Buddha's generation, and in his major work the *Mūlamadhyamikakārikā*—indisputably the most important work of Buddhist philos-

[7]Sprung's translation; usually "emptiness." *Śūnyatā* is from the root *śū*, which means "to swell" in two senses: not only "hollow or empty" but also "to be swollen" in the sense of full. It has been unfortunate for Buddhist studies in the West that "emptiness" captures only the first sense.

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ophy—Nāgārjuna examined the views of the main schools on the central problems of philosophy: causality, motion, the senses, material objects, the self, time, action, etc. In what follows we shall summarize Nāgārjuna's analysis of two issues, causality and time. The choice is not random. Causality is the fundamental problem for Nāgārjuna—many of the other topics, such as motion, only apply its general conclusions to more specific instances—and, given Derrida's critique of self-presence, temporality is the crucial issue for him. There is another reason for choosing these two. Causality and time imply each other, to the extent of being two sides of the same coin (or, to anticipate the deconstruction which follows, two aspects of the same bifurcation). Causality requires that cause precede the effect, and time requires that the past cause the future. Our plight—the root of our *duhkha*—can also be summarized in these terms: we feel that we are (or should be) free, but we know that our lives are physically and psychologically determined; we feel that we are (or should be) timeless, yet we realize that we are mortal, inextricably trapped in time. To deconstruct fully any of these philosophical problems is to deconstruct the others as well. But before we begin that deconstruction, a brief description of Nāgārjuna's method will be helpful.

It would be difficult to imagine a greater contrast of styles than that between Derrida's clever, multi-layered *bricolage* and Nāgārjuna's straightforward dialectics, whose dry "either/or" bears more than a passing resemblance to early Greek dialectics.[8] Without explicitly postulating the laws of non-contradiction and excluded middle, Nāgārjuna's makes liberal use of them, doing nothing more than demonstrating their full implications in order to deconstruct metaphysics (including the metaphysics enshrined in our ordinary ways of thinking, implicit in the categories of language).[9] Classical Indian philosophy was a quest to determine the Real, and the Real, it was agreed, is that which is self-existent, not dependent upon anything else. Anything which can be shown to be relative to something else is thereby refuted as a candidate. So Nāgārjuna's task was quite simple: to take all the proposed candidates for Reality and demonstrate their relativity (*śūnyatā*), leaving nothing—not even *śūnyatā,* since that term too is relative to the candidates. "...*śūnyatā* is the exhaustion of all theories and views; those for whom *śūnyatā* is itself a theory are incurable" (*MMK,* XIII,8). Rather than attempt to construct a new theory or language with *śūnyatā* as the key term, Nāgārjuna, while understanding that ordinary language is full of deluding ontological commitments, accepts it and deconstructs it from within: "*Śūnyatā* is a guiding, not a cognitive, notion, presupposing the everyday" (XXIV, 18). No privileged language is created in this deconstruction, and his goal cannot be expressed or pointed to without the delusive logocentrisms of language; but, like Derrida, Nāgārjuna thus uses it "under erasure," without committing himself to its categories.

It is here that we find the deepest resonance with Derrida, whose deconstruction also proceeds by demonstrating the inescapable *différance* infecting all Western metaphysical candidates for a "transcendental-signified." Deleuze's cryptic remark about Foucault —that he is a new kind of map-maker, constructing maps for use rather than to mirror the terrain[10]—is equally true for both Nāgārjuna and Derrida. The fun-

[8]For a provocative discussion of possible Greek influence, see Thomas McEvilley, "Early Greek Philosophy and Mādhyamika," *Philosophy East and West*, 31 (April, 1981).

[9]"The Mādhyamika is the most dogmatic rationalist of any tradition" (Sprung, p. 9).

[10]Quoted in Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Brighton: The Harvester Press, 1982), p. 128.

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damental presuppositions of metaphysics—that we can mirror the whole terrain from some Archimedean point of pure, self-contained thought—is the illusion they subvert, and their weapons are *śūnyatā/différance.* These mirror nothing because they have no reference apart from their subversive function; to fix them within a given system is to use them in ways that suppress that function.

Where they diverge is in their understanding of the result of this subversion. For Nāgārjuna the primary transcendental-signified to be deconstructed is the world we live, for the supposedly objective world is a function of our ways of thinking about it. In Indian philosophy *vikalpa* and *prapañca* refer to the superimposition of such reified thought-categories and the proliferation of thought-constructions that this generates. Realizing that the world is determined for us by our ways of thinking about it then yields to meditative practices which may lead to "the end of *prapañca*" (*MMK,* XXV, 24, the closest Nāgārjuna comes to a "definition" of *nirvāna*), allowing something hitherto obscured to reveal itself. In that sense, there is a "higher truth," but any attempt to describe it—even to call it a truth—can only be part of the "lower truth" which, as part of *prapañca,* must finally be superseded. In answer to an opponent's objection that then his own thesis is also self-refuted as *śūnya* (devoid of any truth-value), Nāgārjuna replied: "If I were to put forth any thesis whatsoever, it would have that defect; but since I advance no thesis, I do not have that fault."[11] Nāgārjuna has nothing to offer; he only wants to take something away from us. The following deconstructions should be read in that light.[12]

2. The problem of causality is the most important one for Mādhyamika, but at first encounter there seems to be a contradiction in Nāgārjuna's analysis. One the one hand, causal interdependence is so central that Nāgārjuna identifies it with the most important concept, *śūnyatā* (*MMK,* XXIV, 18). The undeniable relativity of everything is the means by which all self-existence (*svabhāva*) is refuted. At the same time, Nāgārjuna redefines *pratītya-samutpāda* in such a way as to negate causality altogether. The first and most important chapter of the MMK concluded that the causal relation is incomprehensible, and later chapters go further to claim that causation is delusive: "Origination, existence, and destruction are of the nature of *māyā,* dreams, or a fairy castle" (*MMK,* VII, 34). The last chapters seize on this issue as one way to crystallize the difference between *samsāra* and *nirvāna.* What is perhaps the most important verse in the MMK distinguishes between them by attributing causal relations only to *samsāra*: "That which, taken as causal or dependent, is the process of being born and passing on, is, taken non-causally and beyond all dependence, declared to be nirvāana" (*MMK,* XXV, 9).

How are we to take this obvious contradiction? The paradox, I shall argue, is that the experience of complete conditionality is phenomenologically equivalent to a denial of all causal conditions. A view which is so radical as to analyze all things away into "their" causal conditions is offering an interpretation of experience which becomes in-

[11] *Vigraha-vyāvartani* verse 29.

[12] I do not make a textual exegesis but present an interpretation of what Nāgārjuna's arguments are doing. Even in India and Tibet there has always been much controversy about the meaning of Mādhyamika, and other schools, naturally frustrated by not having any thesis to attack, have usually criticized Nāgārjuna as a nihilist. His own successors divided over the question of whether Mādhyamika was merely parasitic in offering a critique of any view (the Prasangika school) or could advance autonomous arguments of its own (the Svatantrika school). In the West, Nāgārjuna-interpretation is still in its infancy. For a critique of the two main lines of interpretation, see "How Not to Criticize Nāgārjuna" (n. 6).

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distinguishable from a view that negates causality altogether. Thus a dialectic is inherent in the Mādhyamika analysis. The first step examines the commonsense distinction between things and their cause-and-effect relationships, using the latter to dissolve the former and to refute the self-existence of "things." Less obvious is the second step, which reverses the analysis: the lack of "thingness" in things implies a mode of experience in which there is no awareness of cause and effect. Things and their causal relations must stand or fall together, because our notion of cause-and-effect is dependent on that of objectively-existing things. If causality explains the interaction among things, then things themselves must be "noncausal." And this is precisely our commonsense notion of what an "object" is: that thing whose continued existence does not need to be explained—i.e., once in existence, it "self-exists." The objectivity of the world (including the objectivization of myself, my own sense of being a discrete, persisting self) depends upon this dualism. It is the bifurcation between them that Nāgārjuna shows to be untenable, by using each pole to deconstruct the other.

In order to understand the Mādhyamika critique, we must begin with a clear sense of what it is that is being criticized: not primarily metaphysics, but our commonsense understanding of the world, which sees it as a collection of discrete entities (including myself) interacting causally "in" space and time. This understanding (one or the other aspect of which is absolutized in systematic metaphysics) is what makes the everyday world *samsāra* for us, and it is this *samsāra* that Nāgārjuna is concerned to deconstruct. The implication of Nāgārjuna's arguments against self-existence (e.g., *MMK* Chapters I, XV) is to point out the inconsistency concealed within this everyday way of "taking" the world: we accept that things change, yet at the same time we assume that they remain "essentially" the same— which is necessary if they are to be "things" at all. Other Indian philosophers, recognizing this inconsistency, tried to solve it by absolutizing one of these at the expense of the other. The *satkāryavāda* substance-view of Samkhya emphazied permanence at the price of not being able to account for change, and the *asatkāryavāda* modal-view of early Buddhism had the opposite problem of not being able to account for continuity. The basic difficulty with all such views is that any understanding of cause and effect which tries to relate two *separate* things *together* can be reduced to the contradiction of both asserting and denying identity.

As the first prong of his attack on the bifurcation, Nāgārjuna refutes our commonsense distinction between things and their causal relations simply by sharpening the distinction to absurdity. If things are to be self-existent, then they must be distinguishable from their conditions, but their existence is clearly contingent upon the conditions which bring them into being and eventually cause them to disappear. If it is objected that one cannot live without reifying such fictitious entities, at least to some extent, then the Mādhyamika agrees; but this "lower truth" (*samvrti*), while not denied completely, must not be taken as a correct understanding of the way things really are.

But that is only the first step, for now the critique dialectically reverses. The category of causality turns out to be just as dependent upon things as things are on their causal conditions. This second step is easy to state but harder to understand. Granted, if there is only cause-and-effect, then there is no thing which causes and no thing which is effected; but if there is nothing to cause or be effected, then there is no reason to perceive the world in terms of cause-and-effect. For example, implicit in our concept of change is the notion that a thing is becoming other than it was, so unless one reifies something self-existent in order to provide continuity between these different conditioned states,

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there is nothing apart from the changing conditions to *be changed*. The concept of change needs something to "bite" on, but the first step of the dialectic leaves nothing unconditioned to chew. If the colleague I meet for lunch is not in any sense the same person I saw earlier, because there is no substratum of permanence to "him," then it also makes no sense to say that "he" has changed. Thus, if there is *only* coming-and-going—with no "thing" that comes or goes—then there is *no* real coming and going.

What are we left with? A universe of *śūnya*-events, none of which occurs for the sake of any other. Each event—every leaf-flutter, wandering thought, and piece of litter (all things become "thingings")—is whole and complete in itself, because, although conditioned by everything else in the universe and a manifestation of that whole, for precisely that reason it is not subordinated to anything else but is an end-in-itself. In that sense each thing is the only thing in the whole universe (*tathatā*, "just this!") and thus is unconditioned, because the duality between determinism and freedom is deconstructed at the same time. If "liberty or freedom signifies properly the absence of opposition" (Hobbes), then such unimpeded interdependence implies freedom, since there is not only no "thing" that *does* the event but also no "other" to oppose it. This means that, whenever any event occurs, it is the whole universe that makes the event happen or rather *is* the event. If we accept that the universe is self-caused, then it acts freely whenever anything is done. The spontaneous actions of an enlightened person respond to a situation like a glove fits on a hand because they are not done by him (her). Without a sense of self, thoughts and actions are experienced as welling-up nondually from a source unfathomably deep—or (what amounts to the same thing) from nowhere. If one nondualistically *is* a cause/effect, without the sense of being a hypostatized self that dualistically *uses* cause/effect, then there is not the awareness that it *is* a cause/effect; it is experienced as whole, complete, and "traceless."[13] If we try to find a "transcendental signified" in Mādhyamika, it can only be *every event that ever occurs in the whole universe,* which is why the Buddha could teach simply by twirling a flower.

So there turn out to be only two alternatives: *either* cause-and-effect relationships between discrete thought-constructed objects, *or* nondual "all-conditionality" (*pratītya-samutpāda*) which is experienced as unconditioned freedom (*tathatā*).[14] In order to experience the latter, the heirarchy which causality constructs—for the most important hypostatized object is *me*, the subject who craves other objects and needs an understanding of cause-and-effect relationships in order to manipulate circumstances and obtain them—must be demolished. "All conditionality," in its complete negation of anything to be attached to, offers no practical utility, because there is no longer any object to be obtained or any self to crave it; whereas a hypostatized self which wants to obtain some other hypostatized thing will need to construct a causal chain of events which leads to it. Because each event in such a chain is experienced not *in itself* but only

[13]Tung-shan told his students to walk "in the bird's track," which is of course trackless. For further discussion of the relations among action, intention, and nonduality, see "Wei-wu-wei: Nondual Action," *Philosophy East and West*, 35 (January, 1985).

[14]This view of Mādhyamika is important for understanding the *trisvabhāva* ("three natures") doctrine of Yogācāra Buddhism. The "imagined nature" of *parikalpita* is our usual dualistic experience of a collection of discrete things causally interacting *in* space and time. "All-conditionality" corresponds to the "other-dependent" nature of *paratantra*. The Unconditioned is the perfectly-accomplished world of *parinispanna*. For both Mādhyamika and Yogācāra (the two main philosophical schools of Mahāyāna) an understanding of "all-conditionality," negating the self-existence of discrete things, is the crucial "hinge" by which we turn from delusion to enlightenment.

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for the sake of the next, and the next, . . . , the *śūnya* nature of each is overlooked in our eagerness to obtain the objectified goal. The dissatisfaction with each particular event, in hurrying to the next, is essential to the sense of self, which is why causality is the root category of thought and hence the one most in need of deconstruction.

3. Before considering the implications of the above analysis for Derrida, we must see that exactly the same paradox applies to temporality: if there is only time, then there is no time. To deconstruct the delusive dichtomy between beings and time is to realize that I am not in time because I am time, which means that I am free from time.

The early Buddhist emphasis on impermanence does not mean an acceptance of time and change as we usually experience them. *Samsāra* is literally the temporal cycle of birth and death, coming and going, which is somehow negated in *nirvāna*. What is the genesis of such birth and death? "... time is generated by the mind's restlessness, its stretching out to the future, its projects, and its negation of 'the present state'."[15] But there is no future without a past; expectations and intentions are determined by previous experiences—more precisely, by the "seeds" (*vāsanās*) and mental tendencies (*samskāras*) which remain from them. So past and future work together to obscure the present, usually negating it so successfully that we can hardly be said to experience it. The ceaseless stream of intentionality devalues the present into simply one more moment in the sequence of causal relationships, as an effect of past causes and a cause of future effects.

The consequence of this devaluation of the present is that time becomes objectified through a reversal taking place. Instead of past and future being understood as a function of present memories and expectations, the present is reduced to a moment within a "time-stream" which is understood to exist "out there"—a "container," as it were, like space, within which things exist and events occur. But in order for time to be a container, there must be a contained—something that is "in" it—which is objects. And in order for objects to be "in" time, they must in themselves be atemporal—i.e., *self-existing*. In this way, the delusive bifurcation that occurs between objects and causality is paralleled by the same bifurcation between objects and time, as a result of which each pole gains a spurious "reality." The first reified object, the most important thing to be hypostatized as atemporal, is the "I," the sense of an ontological self that is permanent and unchanging, which comes into being to discover itself in the anxious position of being an atemporal entity nonetheless inextricably trapped "in" time.

The first half of the Mādhyamika dialectic deconstructs the object that is "in" time by demonstrating that it *is* time. Much of our difficulty in understanding time is due to spatial metaphors, but in this case a spatial analogy is helpful. We normally understand objects such as cups to be "in" space, which implies that in themselves they must have a self-existence distinct from spatial relations. Not much reflection, however, is necessary to realize that the cup itself is irremedially spatial: all its parts must have a certain thickness, and without the various spatial relations among the bottom and sides and handle, the cup could not be a cup. One way to express this is to say that the cup is not "in" space but itself *is* space: the cup is "what space is doing in that place," so to speak. The same is true for the temporality of the cup. The cup is not an atemporal, self-existing object that just happens to be "in" time, for its being is irremedially temporal. This de-

[15]Hannah Arendt, *The Life of the Mind*, Vol. I (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), p. 45. Arendt is describing Plotinus and Hegel, but the quotation also fits the nondualist Asian traditions.

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stroys the thought-constructed dualism between things and time. When we want to express this, we must describe one pole in terms of the other, by saying either that objects are temporal (in which case they are not "objects" as we usually conceive of them) or, conversely, that time is objects—that is, that time expresses itself in the manifestations which we call objects. Probably the clearest expression of this was by the Japanese Zen master Dōgen: "The time we call spring blossoms directly as an existence called flowers. The flowers, in turn, express the time called spring. This is not existence within time; existence itself is time."[16] This is the meaning of his "being-time" (*uji*):

> "Being-time" means that time is being; i.e., "Time is existence, existence is time." ... Every thing, every being in this entire world is time.... Do not think of time as merely flying by; do not only study the fleeting aspect of time. If time is really flying away, there would be a separation between time and ourselves. If you think that time is just a passing phenomenon, you will never understand being-time.[17]

Time "flies away" when we experience it dualistically, with the sense of a self which is observing it from outside. Then time becomes something which I have (or don't have) objectified and quantified in a succession of "now-moments" that cannot be held but incessantly fall away. In contrast, the "being-times" which we usually reify into objects do not occur *in* time because they are time. As Nāgārjuna would put it, that things (or "thingings") are time means that there is no second, external time which they are "within."

This brings us to the second prong of the dialectic. Having used temporality to deconstruct things, we must now reverse the analysis and use the lack of a thing "in" time to negate the objectivity of time also. When there is no contained, there can be no container. If there are no things which have an existence apart from time, then it makes no sense to speak of "them" as being young or old: "So the young man does not grow old nor does the old man grow old" (Nāgārjuna)[18]. Dōgen expressed this in terms of firewood and ashes:

> ... we should not take the view that what is latterly ashes was formerly firewood. What we should understand is that, according to the doctrine of Buddhism, firewood stays at the position of firewood ... There are former and later stages, but these stages are clearly cut.[19]

Firewood does not *become* ashes; rather, there is the "being-time" of firewood, then the "being-time" of ashes. If there are no atemporal objects, then the present does not gain its value or meaning by its relation to past or future. Each "being-time" is complete in itself. But how does such "being-time" free *us* from time?

> Similarly, when human beings die, they cannot return to life; but in Buddhist teaching we never say that life changes into death.... Likewise, death cannot change into life.... Life and death have absolute existence, like the relationship of winter and spring. But do not think of winter changing into spring or spring into summer.[20]

[16]Masunaga Reiho, tran., *The Soto Approach to Zen* (Tokyo: Layman Buddhist Society Press, 1958), pp. 58-69.

[17]Dōgen Zenji, *Shōbōgenzō*, tran. Nishiyama and Stevens (Sendai: Daihokkaikaku), Vol. I, 1975.

[18]*MMK*, XIII, 5.

[19]Dōgen Zenji, p. 2.

[20]*Ibid.*

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Because life and death, like spring and summer, are not in time, they are in themselves timeless. If there is no one who is born and dies, there is only birth and death; but if there are only the events of birth and death, then there is no real birth and death. Alternatively, we may say that there is life and death in every moment, with the arising and passing away of each thought and act. Dōgen again: "Just understand that birth-and-death is *nirvāna* . . . only then can you be free from birth and death."

This paradox suggests two contradictory descriptions. We may say that there is only the present: not, of course, the present as usually understood—a series of fleeting moments which incessantly fall away to become the past—but a very different present which incorporates what we normally call the past and the future, because it always stays the same.

> We cannot be separated from time. This means that because, in reality, there is no coming or going in time, when we cross the river or climb the mountain we exist in the eternal present of time; this time includes all past and future time. . . . Most people think time is passing and do not realize that there is an aspect that is not passing (Dōgen).[21]

What is the aspect of time that is not passing? It is always *now*. Alternatively, this non-dual way of experiencing time may be described as living in eternity: again, not eternity in the usual sense, an infinite persistence *in* time which presupposes the usual duality between things and time. There is "an eternity on this side of the grave" if the present is not devalued, as Wittgenstein realized:

> For life in the present there is no death.
> If by eternity is understood not infinite temporal duration but non-temporality, then it can be said that a man lives eternally if he lives in the present.[22]

So there is nothing outside the incessant flux of change, yet there is also something which does not change at all. Transformation is experienced very differently if one is the change rather than an observer of it. The same is true for causality. The interdependence of time and causality means that to live (in) the Now-which-does-not-fall-away is freedom, for that Now is an unconditionality which is not incompatible with conditions as long as I *am* those conditions. To be the Now means to be one with whatever is happening, in which case conditions are not a constraint but constitute the everchanging web of possibilities which may be actualized (or not) freely. Such freedom is not a delusion born of ignoring the causal factors that determine my behavior, but just the opposite: it is motives, conscious or unconscious, which pull me out of the Now by objectifying both time and things (including, first, me) in order to provide a field-of-play for the network of intentions. Of course, there is nothing wrong with such an objectified field as long as it is realized to be a mental construction, for then I am not objectively trapped within my own objectifications. But, from the "highest point of view," we have always lived only (in) the Eternal Now. Any other sense of time is the result of *prapañca* thought-projection within that Now. That is why philosophy—not only metaphysics but even deconstructive anti-philosophy, including this paper—cannot be the Way, but must finally yield to something else. To identify with any thought-construction is to be objectified by it and lose the Now, whereas meditation—*zazen, yoga,* etc.—is learning how to dwell in that Now.

[21] *Ibid.*, pp. 69, 70.

[22] Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Notebooks 1914-1916* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1961), p. 75e, 8.7.16.

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II

1. In terms of the double-deconstruction above, Derrida performs the first phase of the dialectic but not the second. The Mahāyāna dissolution of self-existing objects "into" time anticipates the critique of self-presence which Derrida makes in textual terms, by showing that every process of signification is an economy of temporal differences:

> The play of differences supposes, in effect, syntheses and referrals, which forbid at any moment, or in any sense, that a simple element be present in and of itself, referring only to itself. . . . There are only, everywhere, differences and traces of traces.[23]

But, despite realizing that each term of such dualities is only the *différance* of the other, Derrida does not see the second phase, in which the dialectic reverses. In Dōgen's "being-time," lack of *self*-presence is not incompatible with "the eternal present of time," because without self-existing objects time is not composed of a succession of "now-moments." Such moments exist only relative to objects, as their successive modulations. Mahāyāna ends up with a distinction between the commonsense understanding of objectified time, in which the present shrinks to a moving dividing-line whereby the future continuously falls away to become past, and the non-metaphysical experience of an Eternal Now. It is no coincidence that this bears more than a passing resemblance to (among many other things) Heidegger's distinction between the "fallen" metaphysical conception of time and a more primordial understanding which the "fundamental ontology" of *Being and Time* attempts to grasp.

Derrida's most detailed examination of time and of Heidegger is in "Ousia and Grammē: Note on a note from *Being and Time*."[24] Its point of departure is a footnote from *Being and Time* in which Heidegger, having differentiated his own view of time from the traditional and metaphysical one, argues that the "fallen" conception of time is implicit in all Western metaphysics from Aristotle through Hegel and Bergson. It originates in an *aporia* found in Aristotle's *Physics* IV, in which the nature of time is determined as "nonbeing" because it is composed of a succession of elementary parts—"nows" (*nun*):

> But in order to be, in order to be a being, it [time] must not be affected by time, it must not become (past or future). To participate in beingness, in *ousia*, therefore is to participate in being-present, in the presence of the present, or if you will, in presentness (p. 40).

The circularity of this definition remains "unthought" until Heidegger. From the Mādhyamika perspective, this *aporia* is merely another version of the delusive bifurcation between things and time. Aristotle's metaphysical demonstration is only a more explicit determination of the duality already latent in ordinary language. Whether both terms resulting from the bifurcation are taken to be real (both "container" and "contained" being real, as presented above in Part I) or the reality of one is used to deny the reality of the other (as with Aristotle) is irrelevant to the main point.

[23]Jacques Derrida, *Positions*, trans. Alan Baas (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 26.

[24]Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 31-67.

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From a Mādhyamika perspective, what is most interesting is that Derrida's essay takes for granted the very metaphysical determination of time that Heidegger and (to a lesser extent) even Hegel are attempting to bring into question. Ironically, the many passages which Derrida quotes from Hegel and Heidegger repeatedly point to the second and reverse movement, a move which Derrida himself cannot see. It would be difficult to find another text that deconstructs itself so well. For example:

> . . . this Hegelian determination of time permits us to think the present, the very form of time, as eternity. . . . Eternity is another name of the presence of the present. Hegel also distinguishes this presence from the present as now (pp. 45-6).

Derrida's critique arises from not seeing the distinction which Heidegger makes between two different types of present: fallen and primordial, *gegenwärtig* and *anwesen*. Derrida introduces Heidegger's footnote by placing it in its context.

> The Note belongs to the next to last section of the last chapter ("Temporality and Within-Time-ness as the Source of the Ordinary Conception of Time"). Time is usually considered as that *in which* beings are produced. Within-time-ness, intratemporality, is taken to be the homogeneous medium in which the movement of daily existence is reckoned and organized. This homogeneity of the temporal medium becomes the effect of a "leveling off of primordial time". . . , and constitutes a world time more objective than the object and more subjective than the subject (p. 35).

Derrida sees that the "leveling" of which Heidegger speaks as due to the exorbitant privilege of the "now" and the "point" (p. 36). Yet, after reproducing the entire footnote, he can understand its significance only as calling into question, not some *conception* of the present, but, simply, "the present":

> Has not the entire history of philosophy been authorized by the "extraordinary right" of the present? . . . How could one think Being and time otherwise than on the basis of the present, in the form of the present, to wit a certain *now in general* from which no experience, by definition, can ever depart? The experience of thought and the thought of experience have never dealt with anything but presence (p. 38).

Derrida's concern is to overthrow the privilege granted to the present, but merely relegating presence into a function of past and future *différances* misses the deeper point of Heidegger's distinction and Nāgārjuna's critique. What is taken for granted in "*Ousia* and *Grammē*" is nowhere obvious there, but it becomes explicit in a much-quoted passage from the previous essay "Différance":

> *Différance* is what makes the movement of signfication possible only if each element called "present," appearing on the stage of presence, is related to something other than itself, but is retaining the mark of the past element and is already letting itself be hollowed out by the mark of its relation to the future element,—the trace relating no less to what is called the future than to what is called the past, and constituting what is called the present by this very relation to what is not; that is, not even to a past or a future considered as a modified present. *In order for it* [the present element] *to be, an interval must separate it from what it is not*; but this interval that constitutes it in the present must also, with one and the same stroke, divide the present in itself, thus dividing, along with the present, everything that can be conceived on its basis, that is, every being,—in particular, for our metaphysical language, the substance or subject (emphasis mine).[25]

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> the present in itself, thus dividing, along with the present, everything that can be conceived on its basis, that is, every being,—in particular, for our metaphysical language, the substance or subject (emphasis mine).[25]

An interval must separate the present from what it is not in order for the present to be itself. But how does an interval function to make the present "be itself"? It can only be by distinguishing one "now-moment" from another, which is not-yet or already-was. What remains "unthought" in this is the usual and apparently innocuous assumption that the present is a series of such "now-moments" which successively fall away. Now is the time to reflect further on the implications of this assumption. Doesn't any such conception of the present presuppose another present that each "now-moment" successively "occupies"? For what else can determine that one now-moment is *now* present, while another is not-yet or already-was? But this begins to sound oddly familiar. What did Derrida say about Aristotle's aporia?

> . . . time is defined according to its relation to an elementary part, the now, which itself is affected—as if it were not already temporal—by a time which negates it in determining it as a past now or a future now. The *nun,* the element of time, in this sense is not in itself temporal (p. 40).

Derrida's attack on "the privilege granted to the present" should not distract us from realizing that his own conception of time constitutes another version of the everyday and "commonsense" conception of time. Ironically, both are versions of the circular *aporia* which Derrida criticizes in Aristotle.

This shows us again that it is not only, or primarily, formal metaphysics which must be deconstructed, but the ontological commitments sedimented in the categories of ordinary language and thus in our everyday, taken-for-granted understanding of experience. Otherwise our analysis, although deconstructing the explicit "transcendental signifieds" of systematic metaphysics, also *reveals* the implicit, concealed ones of commonsense. Derrida concludes his essay by suggesting that "perhaps there is no 'vulgar concept of time.' "

> The concept of time, in all its aspects, belongs to metaphysics, and it names the domination of presence. . . . an *other* concept of time cannot be opposed to it, since time in general belongs to metaphysical conceptuality (p. 63).

This is more true than Derrida realizes: because his own conception of time, like that of commonsense, like *any* conception, is metaphysical. A view of time, and thus a metaphysics (whether articulated or latent) is unavoidable as long as the delusive bifurcation between time and things has not been eliminated through ending *prapañca* thought-construction. However much Derrida may "solicit" the history of Western metaphysics, this example suggests that his "de-sedimentation" finally functions to justify a commonsense view which does not become aware of its own metaphysical assumptions.

This critique of Derrida recuperates much of Heidegger against him. Derrida criticizes his valorization of presence and nearness, "the prevalence granted to the phenom-

[25]Magliola's trans., in *Derrida on the Mend* (see n. 1), pp. 32-33.

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enological metaphor."[26] From the strict perspective of Mādhyamika deconstruction, such metaphors are no more acceptable than any other attempt to describe what is, yet are also understandable as an attempt to describe the nondual experience which occurs when *prapañca* ends. If the sense of self is one of the objectifications due to *prapañca,* then (to paraphrase Eckhart) such experience is closer to us than we are to ourselves, and phenomenological metaphors seem naturally suggested. But despite his great attempt to deconstruct metaphysics and overcome philosophy, Heidegger never discovered the way really to do so. He realized the illusion of system-making, but never the root delusion of thought-construction. From a Buddhist perspective, one senses that he had some taste of nondual experience—perhaps at the time of the *Kehre*?—and that he spent the rest of his career in an attempt to develop philosophical categories adequate to express it. Derrida is correct to criticize Heidegger's opposition between "primordial" and "derivative" temporality as still metaphysical (p. 63), yet Heidegger himself knew this. Unfortunately, he never discovered the way out of metaphysics. But neither has Derrida.

2. What must be the nature of philosophical discourse which wants to announce the inability of thought and language to re-present reality? Simply trying to represent that inability is self-defeating and "risks sinking into the autism of the closure" (Ends, p. 135). But not to represent at all leaves only silence or the ludic free-play of discourse, neither of which in itself is of much help to anyone else. The Mahāyāna solution is to adopt both, using a "double-strategy" which produces a theory about the delusiveness of thought and also dismisses that theory by turning it back against itself. This is the strategy employed in the voluminous Prajñapāramitā (literally, "transcendental wisdom") literature of Mahāyāna, which contains countless formulations of the following form: "X is X, but it is not *really* X." Nāgārjuna's more rigorous deconstruction is a classic example of how the second strategy devours the first: head swallows tail, and nothing remains—no *nirvāna,* no Buddha, no teaching at all. "No truth has been taught by a Buddha for anyone, anywhere" (*MMK,* XXV, 24). One result of this was Zen:

> . . . the fundamental dharma (teaching) of the dharma is that there are no dharmas, yet that this dharma of no-dharma is in itself a dharma; and now that the no-dharma dharma has been transmitted, how can the dharma of the dharma be a dharma? (Huang Po[27])

The practice negated any theory, even though it was a particular theory which justified that practice and made it possible. Only meditative practice can actually end *prapañca* and open up a new mode of experience.

Derrida too has a "double-strategy," but his works very differently. His first strategy —his theory of why theory cannot re-present—is *différance* and the grammatological critique of self-presence; the second is the "dissemination" which this opens up, allowing "the seminal adventure of the trace." Again, the first strategy justifies and requires the second. There is an inevitable tension within both double-strategies, but Nāgārjuna's deconstruction is finally resolved in a *clôture* whose silence reveals an alternative to the superimpositions of thought-construction. In contrast, the contradiction within Derrida's deconstruction, rather than devouring itself, becomes an ambivalent "bad infin-

[26] "The Ends of Man," in *Margins of Philosophy*, p. 132; hereafter "Ends."

[27] John Blofeld, trans., *The Zen Teaching of Huang Po* (London: The Buddhist Society, 1958), pp. 64-65, with alterations.

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ity" in which what is unsatisfactory about each strategy is disguised by alternatively having recourse to the other.

Derrida understands that all philosophy, including his, can only "reinscribe," but, for him, the sole solution is to disseminate wildly in the hope of avoiding any fixation into a system that will subvert his insight.[28] One wonders what freedom can be found in such a need to keep ahead of yourself. In contrast, we have the Buddhist example of a Zen master, who plays with language—moving in and out of it freely—because he is not bound by it. His laconic expressions emerge from and are one with, an unrepresentable ground of serenity; and although they cannot point directly to this ground, there are ways to suggest it for someone else. In comparison with this freedom, to rejoice in being caught in a language which has lost its ability to represent any truth brings to mind Shaw's comment on the pleasures of an endless holiday: "a good working definition of hell."

3. The same criticism can be made from another direction. The exposition of Mādhyamika concluded with paradoxes: if there is only causation, then everything is unconditioned; if there is only time, then there is no time. Derrida's conception of interpretation and supplementation may be deconstructed into another version of the same paradox: if there is no pure and simple "origin," but only the deferral of supplements ("the trace is the origin of the origin"), then there is no supplementation either, because each supplement becomes its own origin. In one sense this indeed liberates interpretation, but in a more fundamental sense it refutes the possibility of "interpretation." If, as Nietzsche said, the text disappears under its interpretation, then so must the interpretations. As before, Derrida begins a deconstruction but does not complete it. By turning the deconstructed term back against the deconstructing one, dissemination may be deconstructed into "the end of *prapañca*."

"Poststructuralism" was inaugurated by the linguistic realization that in the functioning of the sign it is not possible to distinguish the order of the signified from the order of the signifier. The role of the signified is played by a set of signifiers. "The ontological consequences for such a view are immense. The rigid metaphysical distinction between empirical signifier and ideal signified becomes obliterated in a general circulation of signs, i.e., in the play of signifiers."[29] The literary consequences are equally immense. The sharp distinction between the original text-in-itself and its interpretations becomes obliterated in a "disseminating" discourse which can "decenter the text" by appending its own commentary as a "textual graft." "The hermeneutic project which postulates a true sense of the text is disqualified. . . . Reading is freed from the horizon of *the* meaning or truth of Being," etc.[30] This "liberation" of the signifiers also establishes a democracy among them; in the general circulation of signs, they become equal. By eliminating the intentions of the author (another signified "origin"), Nietzsche's cryptic remark on a scrap of paper—"I have forgotten my umbrella"—becomes "no

[28]"Both the destruction and deconstruction of the history of philosophy have the effect of leading, not to a forgetting or an overcoming of it, but to an increased preoccupation with it." [David Couzens Hoy, "Forgetting the Text," in *The Question of Textuality*, ed. Spanos, Bové, and O'Hara (Bloomington: Indiana University Press), p. 234]. It is a way to recuperate the tradition without believing in it; for what else are philosophers today to do?

[29]David B. Allison, "Destruction/Deconstruction in the Text of Nietzsche" in *ibid.*, p. 215.

[30]From Derrida's *Spurs*, quoted in Allison, *ibid.*, p. 211.

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more or less significant than any other passage." "Dissemination . . . *affirms* (I do not say produces or controls) endless substitution, it neither arrests nor controls play."[31]

Who likes to stop someone else from playing and having fun? But there is something odd here. *Why* does one interpret? The original motivation presupposed a search for truth, understood as a signified which language could come to signify. Supplementation and interpretation were necessary because previous attempts to signify this truth were inadequate: the old categories needed to be adjusted or, more radically, new paradigms substituted. But why supplement *now*, if we are no longer trying to discover some conceptual truth that can be signified? Derrida offers an alternative view of interpretation: there is not only "deciphering to end exile," but also "affirming play." If there is no pure origin then there is no exile to return from; but in what sense can such "play" still be called "interpretation," if the chain of supplementation is not rooted in some to-be-signified?

The poststructuralist response is that this objection is based on a confusion. Because other signifiers function as signifieds for each other, there is always reference—not to some mythical origin, but to other supplements. There is only the interpretation of other interpretations. This is why deconstruction is necessarily parasitic: not believing that there is any non-metaphorical truth-in-itself to be signified, it needs as "host" another text which attempts to provide such a signified. Then it is not only the host which makes truth-claims, but also the deconstruction which gains a derivative truth-signifying ability of its own from its critique of the proffered signified.

The irony in this is that Derrida, while believing that he has refuted any transcendental signified, has in effect reconstituted an equivalent in the truth-claim of the host-text, because that is the only way his own deconstruction can make any truth-claim. The motivation behind all interpretation is the belief that there is some truth to be discovered in the text, or—what amounts to the same thing—that some is to be derived from criticizing it. The demonstration of errors presupposes some truth, and whether that truth is a transcendental signified or a function of other signifiers makes no difference. Derrida eliminates the presumed origin of supplementation without realizing that this origin was also the origin of all truth, and this second loss infects all subsequent supplements all the way back to him.[32]

This is not a difficulty for Nāgārjuna, who realizes that his own deconstruction implies the refutation of all truth as well as error, including any truth that might be called his own. He does not mind this: on the contrary, he is happy for others to realize the ultimate meaninglessness of his statements as long as they realize the meaninglessness of all others as well. Any conceptual "truth" derived from deconstruction is no less deluding *prapañca* than error. The "devoidness" (*śūnyatā*) of all language pleases him because he has another, nonconceptual, perspective, the experience of which is the goal of Buddhist deconstruction.

It is not sufficient to answer that the deconstructive concept of truth, rather than presupposing a "transcendental signified" outside the text, requires only an "invagination" of the text, a reflexive infolding back onto itself. For the problem is precisely what is obscured by all self-referring involutions. The concept of interpretation, presuppos-

[31] *Positions*, p. 86.

[32] "The task confronting a post-structuralist . . . theory of reading is to explain misreadings without generating ontological committments of the same sort that caused previous distortions." (Hoy, *op. cit.*, p. 223).

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ing such reflexivity, is an instance of such "infolding." The conquence of this, as we shall now see, is that, although nothing escapes the circle of supplementation, for that very reason nothing has ever supplemented anything else.

This requires a brief discussion of Buddhist meditation, for it is in meditation that such thought-involutions unravel and we are able to realize the nondual nature of non-reflected experience. Some understanding of how meditation functions to end *prapañca* is essential to Buddhist deconstruction for the simple reason that it is the only effective deconstruction. Briefly, Zen Buddhist meditation (for example) is a means to *forget* oneself. Since there is really no self to eliminate, all that is needed is to "let go" of the sense of self. But this is not something that the sense-of-self can directly do, since it is itself the problem. What is needed is a special type of "self-forgetting." A common technique is to concentrate on something so completely that the sense of subject-object duality "fades away" as one "becomes one" with it. This mode of "forgetfulness" is best described in contrast with Nietzsche, Heidegger and Derrida, since "forgetfulness" is an important concept for all of them.

Derrida believes that it is Nietzsche's interplay between philosophical knowledge and an active, joyful forgetfulness of it which cannot be reconciled with Heidegger's one-sided metaphysical reading of him.[33] For Heidegger, forgetfulness of Being—which *is* metaphysics—is to be in a "remembering back" (*Wiedererinnerung*). It is this still-metaphysical "remembering back" to Being which Derrida wishes to eliminate in his deconstruction of any transcendental signified. This leaves him with what he thinks is an active Nietzschean forgetfulness, expressed in the "free play" of dissemination. The question already raised is whether such a forgetfulness of metaphysics is only a more subtle form of bondage to the unarticulated metaphysical categories implicit in our everyday understanding.

The "forgetfulness" of Zen meditation is different from these. For Buddhism, the fundamental duality in need of deconstruction is that between subject and object, between conscious self and the external world. As with the bifurcations already discussed in Part One, to deconstruct one of the two terms must result in a new understanding of the other. Dōgen again:

> To learn about Buddhism is to learn about yourself. To learn about yourself is to forget yourself. To forget yourself is to perceive yourself as all things. To do this is to let "fall away" the body and mind of self and others.[34]

> I came to realize clearly that mind is nothing other than mountains and rivers and the great wide earth, the sun and the moon and the stars.[35]

Such a nondual experience requires actually deconstructing one's own sense-of-self which means some form of meditation to unravel the self-reflexive thought-constructions which maintain the sense of self.

Derrida's view of the subject is similar—up to a point:

> It [the economic aspect of *différance*] confirms that the subject, and first of all the conscious and speaking subject, depends upon the system of differences and the movement of

[33]For example, see *Ends*, p. 163 and the discussion by Spivak in her introduction to *Of Grammatology*, xxx-xxxiii.

[34]From the "Genjo-Koan" first fascicle of the *Shōbōgenzō*; my version.

[35]Quoted in Philip Kapleau, ed., *The Three Pillars of Zen* (Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1966), p. 205.

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> *différance*, that the subject is not present, nor above all present to itself before difference, that the subject is constituted only in being divided from itself, in becoming space, in temporizing, in deferral . . .[36]

Buddhism agrees that *différance* is intrinsic to the subject. The disagreement is whether it is possible to put an end to such temporizing deferral. Can such a subject actually be deconstructed? Despite his critique of the Western metaphysical tradition, Derrida still implicitly accepts the post-Aristotelian view—a metaphysical view now too firmly inscribed in rationalist "commonsense" to be recognized as such—that any other mode of experience is a religious myth. Buddhism agrees that the subject is not a cause but an effect, and for that reason cannot directly undo itself. But in Buddhism it is the way the mind reflexively "doubles-back" upon itself that creates the sense of self—e.g., the sense of being a thinker, the one who links thoughts together. John Levy has elaborated this point into what is perhaps the classic argument against subject-object duality:

> When I am conscious of an object, that is, of a notion or a percept, that object alone is present. When I am conscious of my perceiving, what alone presents itself to consciousness is the notion that I perceive the object; and therefore the notion of my being a perceiver also constitutes an object of consciousness. From this, a most important fact emerges: the so-called subject who thinks, and its apparent object, have no immediate relation.
>
> . . . the notion, I am reading, does not occur while we are thus absorbed [in reading a book]: it occurs only when our attention wavers . . . . a little reflection will show that even when we are not thus absorbed for any appreciable lapse of time, the subject who afterwards lays claim to the action was not present to consciousness when the action was taking place. The idea of our being the agent occurs to us as a separate thought, which is to say that it forms an entirely fresh object of consciousness. And since, at the time of the occurrence, we were present as neither the thinker, the agent, the percipient, nor the enjoyer, no subsequent claim on our part could alter the position. . . .
>
> If the notions of subject and object are both the separate objects of consciousness, neither term has any real significance. An object, in the absence of a subject, cannot be what is normally called an object; and the subject, in the absence of an object, cannot be what is normally called the subject. It is in memory that the two notions seem to combine to form an entirely new notion, *I am the perceiver or the thinker.*[37]

Levy develops a point much stressed in Vedānta: the self is that which cannot be known, for to know it would be to make it into an object. What is usually overlooked about this point is that our usual sense-of-self is the result of exactly such an objectification. But then what would happen if I did not reflexively "superimpose" the notions of subject and object together in memory? If each thought were experienced autonomously, just by itself, wouldn't that eliminate the delusive sense of subject-object duality?

That this is the principle behind Zen meditation is suggested by perhaps the greatest Zen master, the sixth Chinese patriarch, Hui Neng:

> In the exercise of our thinking faculty, let the past be dead. If we allow our thoughts, past, present and future, to link up in a series, we put ourselves under restraint. On the other hand, if we never let our mind attach to anything, we shall gain freedom.[38]

[36] *Positions*, p. 29.

[37] John Levy, *The Nature of Man According to the Vedanta* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1956), pp. 66-67.

[38] Wong Mou-lam, trans., *Sutra Spoken by the Sixth Patriarch on the High Seat of the Treasure of the Law* (Hong Kong Buddhist Book Distributor, no date), p. 49.

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Hui Neng's "dharma-grandson," Ma-tsu, describes the result of this practice—how thoughts are experienced after enlightenment, once the sense of self has "fallen away": "So with former thoughts, later thoughts, and thoughts in between: the thoughts follow one another without being linked together. Each one is absolutely tranquil."[39]

This is not to deny that from another perspective thoughts are conditioned by other thoughts, a function of other mental events. Here we have another version of the causality paradox: the conditionality of all mental events—the fact that all thoughts are always "supplements"—means that each one may be experienced autonomously, as if it were the only one in the whole universe, springing up nondually by itself. In the causality paradox, this occurred because the "noncausal" term—the object—was deconstructed. The equivalent here is the *thinker*, the sense of a self which is supposedly *doing* the thinking by linking the thoughts together, never letting go of one until there is another to hold. When that thinker suddenly evaporates, the nondual nature of each thought becomes evident: I do not think it, because "I" *am* it.

This strange phenomenon is in fact quite familiar to us, for it is the source of creativity. This explains why creativity is necessarily mysterious, for the honest genius will admit that he doesn't know where his inspirations come from. Innumerable examples of such nondual thinking can be cited. Given the topic of this paper, the best examples are from Nietzsche and Heidegger:

> Has anyone at the end of the nineteenth century a clear idea of what poets of strong ages have called *inspiration*? If not, I will describe it.—If one had the slightest residue of superstition left in one's system, one could hardly reject altogether the idea that one is merely incarnation, merely mouthpiece, merely a medium of overpowering forces. The concept of *revelation*—in a sense that suddenly, with indescribable certainty and subtlety, something becomes visible, audible, something that shakes one to the last depths and throws one down—that merely describes the facts. One hears, one does not seek; one accepts, one does not ask who gives; like lightning, a thought flashes up, with necessity, without hesitation regarding its form—I never had any choice. . . .
>
> Everything happens involuntarily in the highest degree but as in a gale of a feeling of freedom, of absoluteness, of power, of divinity. . . .[40]

Notice how Nietzsche equates conditionality ("involuntarily in the highest degree") and the unconditioned ("a gale of a feeling of freedom . . ."). There are no such dramatic examples in Heidegger, but this concept of "nondual thinking" provides an insightful approach to all his later work, which is concerned not to construct a system but to think ever more deeply and nondually. In fact, this constitutes perhaps the major difference between his earlier project, which was still metaphysical in trying to represent Being, and his later work after the *Kehre* when his thinking was "claimed by Being."[41]

I know of nothing comparable in Derrida. Perhaps the French legacy of Cartesian subjectivity is not so easily effaced. Despite his clever "dance of the pen," Derrida's multivalent wit never becomes the inspiration of Nietzsche, any more than *savoir vivre* is found in the cruel laughter of the Overman, who leaves without looking back at the

[39]Quoted in Alan Watts, *The Way of Zen* (Penguin, 1962), p. 102 n.

[40]F. Nietzsche, *Ecce Homo*, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: Vintage 1966), pp. 300-301.

[41]"Letter on Humanism," trans. Frank A. Capuzzi, in *Martin Heidegger: Basic Writings*, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 199.

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texts burning behind him. Is it necessary to add that many examples of both are to be found in the Zen tradition?[42]

III

The purpose of this essay has been to show that, although Derrida's *différance* constitutes a major philosophical insight, his employment of it does not develop its most radical implications. There is no "transcendental signified" to which language can point, because every signified is only a function of other signifiers; all we can ever have in language is a general circulation of signs. The importance of this can hardly be overemphasized, but from this sudden checkmate of all philosophy there are two directions to go. One is to make the reasonable but solipsistic assumption that, because language cannot point outside itself, we must remain forever inscribed in its sign-circulation. This "liberates" the proliferations of *dissemination*, a "free-play" that must be called nihilistic if it is motivated by having nothing else to do.[43]

The other possibility is that perhaps what metaphysics has sought in language can be found in some other way. Needless to say, contemporary Western philosophy is not sympathetic to such a possibility; but isn't that a consequence of the frustration of its own attempt to point outside itself? *In language, such a possibility cannot be proven or disproven*, but most of the Asian philosophical tradition is predicated on that possibility. Of course, examples are not lacking in the West either.[44]

The poststructuralist response to this is predictable. What I have called a deconstruction is only another attempted *aufheben* of metaphysics. The Now-which-does-not-fall-away, etc., is merely another transcendental signified, a fact disguised by ambivalently signifying it and then denying that it can be signified. Of course, such a criticism is true. But it is unnecessary. This paper readily deconstructs itself, as Buddhism has been doing for over two thousand years. The truth of all this can only imply its ultimate meaninglessness, since this paper becomes merely a proliferation of thought-constructions. But that does not make me a Cretan liar, for the philosophical point has been to demonstrate the need to go beyond philosophy. Perhaps it is only in this sense that language can truly point beyond itself. May this critique contribute, not to the endless proliferation of commentary, but to that true deconstruction which abruptly finds its *clôture* in the nonconceptual realization of our nondual nature.

[42]For further discussion of how meditation functions to cut the chain of interlinking thoughts, see "*Mu* and its Implications," *Zen Buddhism Today III*, 1985, Institute for Zen Studies, Hanazono College, Kyoto; and "Nondual Thinking," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 13 (June, 1986).

[43]Given Derrida's fondness for Nietzsche, a Nietzschean evaluation is appropriate here. For Nietzsche, nihilism is a hope for the future, because it provides the possibility for a necessary "revaluation of all values." But more immediately it is a grave danger: "God (Being, the transcendental signified, value, reference, meaning) is dead; now everything is permitted." In *textual terms*, what form would such nihilism take? Do we find an equivalent in the loss of the original source of meaning, experienced as a vertiginous freedom to proliferate and disseminate in any way we want? Is it then that "I have lost my umbrella" becomes as meaningful as any other statement?

[44]This opens up the possibility of deconstructing another duality: that between Western philosophy, defining itself as rational inquiry, and its "shadow" the mystical tradition. The latter has survived only as a subterranean current distinct from the mainstream of Western thought, which has dismissed it as irrational. As long as philosophy was confident of its logical ability to derive a transcendental signified, this intolerance was inevitable; but perhaps a bridge can now be found. I think it is scandalous that Eckhart, for example, has not been incorporated into the main tradition. One wonders if Spinoza, had he not used a geometrical method, would have suffered the same fate.

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Axiomatics, Hermeneutics, and Practical Rationality

Carl Page

IN SO FAR AS one can speak of contemporary philosophy as a certain sort of whole, it makes sense to speak of the appearance of a "pragmatic" turn within it. Whatever the genuine unity of philosophy turns out to be in the end, it is evident enough that issues associated with *praxis* in the widest sense have come to dominate the collective intellectual sensibility. The breadth and momentum of this current as it is expressed in contemporary academic philosophy is at least illustrated in the work and efforts of writers as diverse as Gadamer and Rorty, to pick on merely salient examples.[1] In the one is found a vigorous endorsement of the spirit, if not the letter, of early American pragmatism combined with a background in the analytic tradition, and in the other an honourable plea for the rehabilitation of the ancient virtue of practical wisdom combined with a continental training and a paedeutic debt to Heidegger. Both are motivated by a sense of cultural crisis wider than their explicit concerns as professional philosophers. Furthermore, the attention that must be paid to these prominent thinkers is made more necessary by the self-consciousness with which they speak from their respective traditions, a critical reflection that renders the pragmatic aspects of their thought more than simply expedient. The heralds of the pragmatic turn, then, quite in accord with the principles of their creed, speak from the support of their past and bear, in each case, its burdens.

The emergence of this praxically oriented mood in contemporary philosophy is the central theme of Richard Bernstein's recent book *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism,* and in it one finds admirable documentation of a movement that seems not confined to any specific school of philosophy.[2] Bernstein's general thesis is that this pragmatic mood is a concrete sign of a first step beyond the pernicious effects of a common and essentially Cartesian heritage. To put the matter as briefly as possible, the principal defect of this tradition has been that it ultimately fails to let us make good sense of what we are doing, whether it be science or politics, because of its absolute and therefore tyrannical standards of reasonableness. The practical turn is an attempt to dissolve the impasses of the modern conception of reason by appealing to the implicit coherence of actual, and successful, communal practice. But more of all this later. As is fitting for someone who is attempting to write history as it occurs, Bernstein is suitably modest about prophesying a new direction for philosophy. Nonetheless, I am persuaded that he has managed to give a coherent single voice to a noteworthy trend in contemporary thought. My purpose, therefore, is not to contend with Bernstein's diagnosis, but to join issue over the ultimate significance of the pragmatic turn for philosophy.

[1]See H.-G. Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, trans. and ed. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), and *Reason in the Age of Science*, trans. F.G. Lawrence (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1981); Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1979), and *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1982).

[2]Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).

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I

Bernstein's *primary* purpose is evidently more practical than theoretical. At the beginning of the book he asserts that "in the final analysis, the movement beyond objectivism and relativism is not just a perplexing theoretical quandry [sic] but a practical task that can orient and give direction to our collective *praxis*" (p. xv); while the demand that the reflexive task of describing and explaining the pragmatic trend he discerns in contemporary philosophy thus ultimately gives way to a practical concern is especially evident at the very close: "it is not sufficient to try to come up with some new variations of arguments that will show, once and for all, what is wrong with objectivism and relativism; such a movement gains 'reality and power' only if we dedicate ourselves to the practical task of furthering the type of solidarity, participation, and mutual recognition that is founded in dialogical communities" (p. 231). What animates the book as a whole, therefore, is a passionate call for allegiance to the *telos* Bernstein sees implied by the pragmatic trend he, also, describes, a telos that amounts to a programme for social and political action. The hortatory dimension of the book conceals, however, a philosophical decision on an essential matter. As Bernstein himself makes clear, the fundamental philosophical issue at stake is nothing less than the nature of human reason, i.e. the proper interpretation of what it means to be a rational human being or, as the ancients had it, to be the creature with speech (*logos*).

In more theoretical terms, the general thesis of *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* might be isolated as follows: the presuppositions that underlie the dichotomy, or rather series of dichotomies, implied by the title have become seriously questioned in the philosophy of this century and are now manifestly inadequate. The history of philosophy has come to show that the framework that throws up these dichotomies is "misleading and distortive" and that the movement beyond the impasses of this way of thinking is just what has been afoot in the past few decades, constituting a sort of Hegelian *Aufhebung* of the Cartesian shape of consciousness. The list of "isms" which Bernstein seeks to draw into the discussion is impressive: objectivism, foundationalism, realism and essentialism on the one hand; relativism, skepticism, irrationalism, historicism, and nihilism on the other. Of course he is quite well aware that many of the oppositions implied by these labels are as old as philosophy itself, but his main concern is with an essential relation he sees these tensions to have assumed in the philosophical tradition since Descartes. The title points to the general framework of interpretation for which Bernstein recognises he must supply evidence, and that evidence is provided by how well we are persuaded of the evident fit between the concrete phenomena marshalled as the points of departure and the interpretive principle supposed to cast light on their significance. As I have already indicated, I do not propose to quarrel with Bernstein's diagnosis. My question concerns the relation between what I take to be a genuine movement in intellectual history and the peculiar virtues of philosophy.

In an effort to make this contrast as intelligible as possible, I shall examine the two main strands making up Bernstein's defence of his claim that there is a movement beyond objectivism and relativism at work in contemporary thinking and, having thus indicated the area of my agreement, raise some objections to both these components from the viewpoint of the ancient and time-tested notion of truth. First, though, some remarks about objectivism and relativism.

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> By 'objectivism' I mean the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness. . . . Objectivism is closely related to foundationalism and the search for an Archimedean point. The objectivism maintains that unless we can ground philosophy, knowledge, or language in a rigorous manner we cannot avoid radical skepticism (p. 8).

Leaving aside that it is perhaps *truths* that the objectivist would rather see well-grounded than the list of abstract substantives Bernstein mentions, it is apparent that the metaphor of foundation or grounding is the key to his notion of objectivism. In a terse paragraph Bernstein rejects absolutism as an appropriate characterization because it is "no longer a live option" (p. 12). This is equivalent to the fact that "the dominant temper of our age is fallibilistic" (p. 12). Whether the touchstone of mathematical knowledge can so readily be dismissed is no doubt questionable, but Bernstein is correct to note the general willingness to do so. In sum, then, the dominant theme on this side of the dichotomy is the desire for "a stable and reliable rock upon which we can secure our thought and action" (p. 19).

The talk of security indicates a theme as old as Plato's Ideas, which, according to Socrates, are the most stable hypotheses. But the Socratic idiom indicates an ironic awareness of our own insecurity in relation to them, for they are presupposed not on account of their intrinsic self-evidence but for the sake of the stability they provide for the one presupposing them. In having Socrates speak thus, Plato shows us that he is not a naive foundationalist, but the possibility that there is a difference between a naive and sophisticated foundationalism draws attention to a crucial qualification in Bernstein's characterization, namely, the mention of *rigour*. Naive foundationalism is potentially dogmatic about its understanding of what constitutes an adequate foundation, but most obvious version of such dogmatism being the position that rational justification must itself follow the canons of positive science. For Bernstein, however, in contending against misconceived standards of rigour, *the issue of rational justification itself is not in question*; the problem is whether the standards of its achievement have been set in the wrong place. The general direction of Bernstein's thought on this matter is that the "standards" must be located within a suitably rich notion of practical rationality, but his acceptance of the question itself is just what makes the book philosophically challenging. One outstanding symptom of his philosophical common sense on this point is the constructive rehabilitation Bernstein provides of the rhetorical excesses of Feyerabend and Rorty. Bernstein disarms the anarchy of these *enfants terribles* by simply agreeing with them that the *archai* most philosophers of the modern period have sought are not to be found. It is another question whether there are no *archai* at all.

Turning to the second main theme:

> Relativism is the basic conviction that when we turn to the examination of those concepts that philosophers have taken to be most fundamental . . . we are forced to recognize that in the final analysis all such concepts must be understood as relative to a specific conceptual scheme, theoretical framework, paradigm, form of life, society, or culture (p. 8).

The upshot of the relativist position is that the fundamental concepts (the same list of substantives as before) cannot be univocal. The meaning of rationality varies from

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paradigm to paradigm; the meaning of what is good changes from culture to culture and so on. Furthermore, the meaning of these fundamental notions is so determined by their locale within a framework that it makes no sense to postulate a "substantive overarching framework or metalanguage by which we can rationally adjudicate or universally evaluate competing claims of alternative paradigms"; in brief, "there can be no higher appeal than to a given conceptual scheme, language game, set of social practices or historical epoch" (p. 11).

This formulation certainly makes it clear that the point at issue is justification, *i.e.*, what makes legitimate our claims to know what is true and to do what is good. Bernstein's initial characterization, however, is somewhat weaker than the relativism he means to attack in the title and comes closer, in fact, to the conception suggested by Rorty's point that "the philosophers who get *called* 'relativists' are those who say that the grounds for choosing between opinions are less algorithmic than had been thought."[3] This vision of rationality is one that Bernstein is willing to concede and to this extent he may himself be called a relativist. Consequently, the relativism that is to be transcended in a non-anarchistic pragmatic turn must be something a little more extreme, and we don't need to go far to find a characterization of that extreme; indeed, there are two. Relativism in the bad sense may be construed on the the one hand as the "myth of the framework" (a phrase Bernstein borrows from Popper). This is the idea that any one of the governing perspectives mentioned above provides a deterministic prison for thought and life. The horror that this form of relativism presents to Popper, for example, (as much as it does to Gadamer), is the fear of *closure,* is a remarkably prevalent contemporary obsession. The second form of extreme relativism is the supposition that one framework is as good as any other and that the choice of perspective (as *per impossibile* according to the first sense) is completely arbitrary. Feyerabend has spoken of the circumstances in which "anything goes" but he certainly did not intend to uphold the philosophical attitude that this amounts to, namely, nihilism.[4] The "radical skepticism" to which Bernstein earlier and elsewhere refers, turns out, therefore, to be a euphemism.

The basic problem to which Bernstein's interpretive dichotomy points is *reasonable* justification of what we think and say and do. That such a problem exists is a simple consequence of the truth that we do in fact discern differences between true and false, explanatory and question-begging, worthwhile and frivolous, good and bad. And that we are capable of mediating these differences is precisely what we mean by being reasonable. Nihilism as a doctrine denies the possibility of this mediation and therefore results in the anarchy of uninformed will. It must also be noted, though, that a given philosophical stand can be nihilistic in effect without being so in intent, not by denying the mediation but by rendering it senseless. The threat of such nihilism is, in the first instance, the motivation behind objectivism as the desire for ultimate or absolute constraints, but it is, in the second place, a projected enemy of the pragmatism Bernstein wishes to defend. What is being hoped for in the move beyond objectivism and relativism, or beyond absolutism and nihilism, is just enough constraint to guarantee stability and lend meaning to individual purpose yet not so much as to stifle the possibility of autonomous and maybe creative action. Compared with Nietzsche's almost reckless

[3]"Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism" in *Consequences of Pragmatism*, p. 166.
[4]Cf. Paul Feyerabend, *Science in a Free Society* (London: NLB, 1978), pp. 39-40.

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philosophical nihilism and Plato's ironic absolutism, there is something timid, even pathetic, about this hope. To need meaning and to want to be free is the lament of unresolved finitude, but as legitimate a starting point as this might be for both philosophy and the foundation of the political order, it is not obvious that the appropriate form of resolution is identical in both cases—the issue goes back at least to the *Republic*. This traditional problem notwithstanding, the contemporary trend documented by Bernstein amounts to an unabashed turn to the community of enquirers and citizens in the face of the various philosophical *aporiai* associated with justification. Community, it is claimed, is what preserves not only political stability, but also human freedom and even truth. The turn is one that meets with Bernstein's approval and his vision of a liberal intellectual utopia is apparent throughout the book; but if it should turn out that the philosophical treatment of the original theoretical issue—namely the nature of human reason—has been inadequate, then it becomes impossible to endorse wholeheartedly this pragmatism that must end by thoroughly politicizing philosophy.

II

The first part of Bernstein's project concerns the issues surrounding the rationality of method, and in particular those surrounding theory-choice in the natural sciences. This leads to a general discussion of *incommensurability,* which seeks also to include mention of methodological problems in the social sciences, and culminates in the "recovery of the hermeneutical dimension of science" (cf. p. 30). The clouds of confusion around the notion of incommensurability are admirably condensed in Bernstein's analysis, but he is more concerned with the whole dimension of rationality to which it at least points if only haltingly clarifies. Having considered in detail Kuhn, Popper, Feyerabend *et al,* "we can appreciate how much skill, art, and imagination are required to do justice to what is distinctive about different ways of practicing science and how 'in some areas' scientists 'see different things.' In underscoring these features, we are not showing or suggesting that such comparison is irrational but opening up the types and varieties of practical reasons involved in making such rational comparisons" (p. 93). The inclusion of Winch and Geertz generalizes the result to making rational comparisons between "forms of life, cultures, and traditions" as well as between scientific theories. According to Bernstein, the essential feature of this practical rationality is a dialogical interplay of the familiar and the alien, an interplay that must learn to avoid the extremes of romanticism and ethnocentrism, prejudice and abandon (pp. 91-92, cf. also p. 173). In so far as the situation that calls forth this practical rationality is neither merely given nor merely inscrutable, its understanding is hermeneutic. There is no separate component given in advance and outside of the attempt to understand, but the necessity for interpretation does not thereby remove the possibility of gaining the truth. This "recovery of the hermeneutic dimension" in human experience in general leads to the second main part of Bernstein's book.

In the discussion of Gadamer and Habermas the issue of practical rationality is broadened at least to touch on the domains of art, literature, history, the politics of culture, and the politics of communication. The mention of hermeneutics is itself simply a bridge, and, in all the domains of experience mentioned, serves to highlight the issue rather than itself constitute the move beyond objectivism and relativism. The radicaliza-

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tion of the hermeneutical, whereby the cognitive functions of the human soul are construed as essentially interpretive (the import of calling it ontological), poses in its most pervasive form the issue of justification: the recovery of the hermeneutic dimension at these various levels of experience is not yet a validation of the interpretive activity taking place on any one of them. Hermeneutics is not transparently self-justifying, and it is this that eventually takes Bernstein "beyond philosophical hermeneutics" (p. 167). In doing so, however, he seeks to expose the tacit dimension of justification underlying Gadamer's hermeneutics, and this amounts to a nostalgia for the Greek *polis* wherein the ancient virtue of *phronesis* has its greatest stability (cf. pp. 174-5). The healthy city is supposed to encourage and vouchsafe healthy understanding. Even so, the generally political turn counts, for Bernstein, as both evidence for, and endorsement of, the notion of community central to his own philosophical interest, despite the fact that he criticises some of the details of Gadamer's political vision. The issues of political corruption, the abuses of the city's dynamics, are thus included through a discussion of Habermas, while the underlying moral-political intention of both thinkers is shown to be mutually reinforcing (cf. pp. 196-97).

It is not difficult to concede, having followed Bernstein's analysis, that there is a thread running through the initially diverse sources upon which he draws. Moreover, what is thus common to work otherwise distinct is, not without justice, characterized as practical. And yet the image of practical rationality, that emerges is not quite as clearcut as one might hope. This is at least partly due to Bernstein's own interest in actually encouraging the conditions under which this "more historically situated, nonalgorithmic, flexible understanding of human rationality" (p. ix) might flourish, rather than pausing to offer an exhaustive theoretical account of its nature. A second reason for the lack of focus is simply that the domain of practical rationality as Bernstein seeks to reveal it, is not quite so continuously one as his moral-political purpose encourages us to think. Bernstein begins by noting that contemporary philosophy is remarkably united in its Freudian rejection of Descartes, the father-figure, and this is certainly reflected in the various attempts to develop a new conception of rationality in opposition to the mathematical conception and the tyranny of method associated with Cartesianism and the Enlightenment tradition. On the other hand, Bernstein discerns a greater unity than this opposition before a common foe, and posits a convergence on a common objective among these alternatives to the modern legacy. As it turns out, however, this convergence is more the result of a common sense of social and political crisis than an underlying and shared vision of the nature of human reason. Practical rationality becomes, as the book proceeds, virtually identified with what must be done in order to heal the manifold breaches in the contemporary social fabric. Indeed, the united opposition to Descartes is not so much a theoretical objection to the inadequacy of his philosophy as it is a practical reaction to its socio-political effects. There will, of course, be bound up in any such reaction an interpretation of human reason and Bernstein is, I believe, correct to point to the practical cast of the contemporary versions. But the unity of these presuppositions is more generic and less determinate than the singleness of Bernstein's treatment makes evident. Eagerness to get at the political problem, and there is no denying that there is such a problem, tends to obscure the simple but effective differences between such human activities as scientific theorizing, understanding history, and learning a citizen's responsibility, while it is just these differences that serve to articulate and thus, to a certain extent, break up the unity which Bernstein understands as practical.

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Perhaps the most obvious gloss of this sort is evident in how little fuss is made over the transition from an orienting subject matter which is theoretical to one which is practical, while the fact that the word *phronesis,* for example, appears on both sides of this transition is, in itself, no guarantee of any deeper continuity. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether the diverse talk of practical rationality in the contemporary sense as accurately represents the phenomena as its proponents claim. Showing that it does not is the burden of the next two sections, and provides a third, more critical, reason why a coherent picture of practical rationality does not and cannot emerge from a wholly pragmatic orientation.

III

Near the beginning of his account of post-empirical philosophy of science, Bernstein suggests some parallels between the general procedures concerning theory-choice as analysed by Kuhn and the notion of *phronesis* in Aristotle (p. 54). That both involve choice and deliberation is presupposed while the specific similarities mentioned are 1) that the criteria for choosing between theories are indeterminate in a way that requires judicious mediation and 2) that "the character of our judgment and rational deliberation . . . is shaped by the social practices of the relevant scientific community" (p. 54). The comparison with Aristotle will indeed turn out to be instructive, but not quite in the manner Bernstein proposes. In fact, the philosophical authority of Aristotle is here being abused in appropriating *phronesis* to describe an activity of reason for which he gave a quite different account. In light of that account, the need to speak of any undergirding practical rationality becomes far less compelling, or even plausible, and is exposed as depending on a philosophically inadequate picture of science. In justifying these criticisms, I hope to suggest also that Aristotle provides us with the materials for a sober objectivism that contrasts with both the Enlightenment mania for clarity and the contemporary pragmatic turn.

The idiom of theory-choice is itself irredeemably modern, not only through its overtones of whim and fancy but more significantly on account of its presupposed notion of theory as a mathematical construct or model. Of course, the choice between models is more than a matter of whim, but the very talk of choice in this context suggests that what is chosen could as well have been otherwise, as indeed any construct could well have been otherwise. The contingency of the model in its own right, however, is not equivalent to the contingency of what it is supposed to represent. Remembering this much prevents any hasty rejection of the modern conception of scientific theory as a model. Indeed, the possibility of such mathematical representation is undoubtedly an insight of modern thinking, and its viability is what gives substance to the question of choosing between models, of deciding about better and worse theories. As modern as the idea of theory-choice is, the notion of assessing the adequacy of various and conflicting speculations is nothing foreign to Aristotle. One need only glance at the opening chapters to all his major treatises. Furthermore, the insight at which contemporary philosophy of science seems to have so cumbersomely arrived—that scientific theory cannot be justified scientifically—is also a point with which Aristotle would have no trouble agreeing. The philosophical dispute occurs over the question of what is the court of appeal in thus justifying scientific theory; whether the reasonableness involved is truly practical or whether it is theoretical in a deeper sense.

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Scientific knowledge (*episteme*) for Aristotle is nothing if not universal and necessary. This characteristic does not stop science being about spatio-temporal particulars, since it is quite possible to know things necessarily and universally true of them despite the fact that their singular existence is contingent. Indeed, scientific knowledge that bears upon particulars is science in the strongest sense. Systematic knowledge is realized in possessing the appropriate demonstration (*apodeixis*), but there are limits to this apodeictic knowledge. The very opening sentence of the *Posterior Analytics* announces that "all discursive teaching and learning proceeds from prior familiarity" (A1, 71a1), and in the particular case of scientific demonstration the required familiarity is not accessible through the method of demonstration. The validity of deduction, therefore, does not even extend to the whole of deductive science (for its axioms must be presupposed), let alone to justify that science *in toto*. Aristotle begins to address these issues in the final chapter of the *Analytics* where he gives a psychogenetic account of our access to the universal principles (*archai*) of demonstrative knowledge. This process is Aristotelian induction (*epagoge*), which is distinguished from the modern conception in that it results in an apprehension of a universality somehow present in the particulars, instead of in a construction from out of them. It is made possible by a power of the soul Aristotle designates as *nous,* a term often rendered as "intuition," but which might also be translated as insight or understanding. Without digressing into a detailed account of all that *nous* means for Aristotle, its function in relation to science is made clear enough. The virtue of scientific knowing is being able to demonstrate, given the axioms, but the security of this knowledge depends on that givenness being more trusted and familiar than the conclusion (*Nic.Eth.* Z3, 1139b 34-35). This security is vouchsafed by *nous* because *nous* is the only power "more accurate" and "more true" than *episteme* (*Post.An.* B19), a role specifically denied to *phronesis* because the latter is a virtue of deliberation and therefore necessarily concerned with what is contingent (*Nic.Eth.* Z6, 1141a1; 1141b 8-11). Trust (*pistis*) in the principles of demonstration is sufficient for science, and corresponds to the hypothetical grasp of its subject matter mentioned at *Metaphysics* E1, 1025b12. This state can, however, be refined into one of wisdom, wherein one knows "not only what follows from the principles, but also the truth about the principles" (*Nic.Eth.* Z7, 1141a 17-18). This perfection of science is also the work of *nous,* and is once again expressly distinguished from *phronesis* (Z7, 1141a 22 ff). Moderns may find Aristotle's psychology of noetic insight a difficult doctrine, but that does not of course constitute a refutation. Its most apparent virtue is that it allows us to speak about the *truth* of our axioms in a full-bodied sense. If there is any intelligibility at all to the question of whether the axioms are true, and it would seem the truth of their consequences depends on it, then Aristotle's testimony must be considered. It must also be noted that there is nothing mystical about noetic insight and that for Aristotle it is necessarily wedded to the moment of sensuous encounter. Finally, the issue of justification is not exhausted by this psychology alone. The truth of the axioms of positive science depends on insight into the being and essence of things with which it purports to deal (cf. *Meta.* T1; E1; *Post.An.* A1, 642a 25ff). This amounts to an ontological justification of science. If epistemology means anything to Aristotle apart from psychology or ontology, it is the logic of systematic knowledge which one finds in the *Posterior Analytics.* There is nothing practical about the justification of scientific knowledge.

The watershed between classical and modern views of the reasonableness of science is determined by the modern conception of method. This conception is marked by a de-

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mand for a *systematic* justification, which distinguishes it from ancient canons of enquiry, and is best represented as the passion for *certainty*. The quest for certainty makes absolute demands on method and creates a hope that method might do all our thinking for us, but as Bernstein is keen to show, the intellectual tyranny of this overly rationalistic demand is losing its hold. Whether forsaking absolutism and embracing fallibilism has compromised the quest for truths as well is not so easy to say.

Bernstein characterizes this emerging post-empiricism along the following lines. First, recognition of how science is actually practised has led to a rejection of the "Cartesian dream" that "with sufficient ingenuity we could discover, and state clearly and distinctly, what is the quintessence of scientific method and that we could specify once and for all what is the meta-framework or the permanent criteria for evaluating, justifying or criticizing scientific hypotheses and theories" (p. 71). But, second, the acknowledgment that there are manifestly better and worse arguments involved, points to the issues of the standards implied by those appearances of better and worse. According to Bernstein, the consensus that has emerged from this problem is "to emphasize that any appeal to arguments and reasons is contestable and/or fallible and that our idea of what we consider to be good reasons and arguments can change is not at all to call into question the rationality of this process but rather to characterize the rationality of the self-corrective nature of scientific inquiry" (p. 72). Alluding to Peirce, Quine, Sellars, and Wittgenstein, he adds, "There is no need to presuppose that there is some ultimate foundation . . . to make this activity intelligible" (p. 73). In so far as the question of justification is still in place after this quite radical relativization, the third point is that avowedly interim standards now tend to be justified by an appeal to history. Yet the appeal to history cannot be left as an appeal simply to what happens, not only for the reason that history is not itself a "given," but because it is the rational activity which takes up time and goes into history which is the real source of the proposed legitimation. Fourth and last, this reasonable activity is the *practice* of the scientific community. By calling it practical, Bernstein wants to "underscore the role of choice, deliberation, conflicting variable opinions, and the judgmental quality of rationality," and to urge that there is "nothing sacrosanct" about the standards and criteria that are "hammered out in the course of scientific inquiry" (p. 74).

The development also receives a dialectical analysis using as a touchstone what Bernstein calls the "epistemological unit." At the beginning of contemporary analytic epistemology the issue of justification hinged upon the single term, the logical atom, as the primary epistemological unit. Thence the focus shifted to the proposition as a whole, and thirdly to the conceptual scheme. The last stage has turned out to be significantly unstable, resulting in "the increased realization that when it comes to interesting questions about the rationality of scientific inquiry we must focus on the conflict of theories, paradigms, research programs, and research traditions in their *historical development*" (p. 77). The historical turn once again points to the stability produced by the practising community and brings in its train the philosophical thesis that rationality "essentially involves the notion of community," which is in essential respects "dialogic and intersubjective" (p. 78). Finally, then, progress in science depends on the persuasion and considered endorsement of the scientific community (cf. p. 67). But one cannot help but wonder whether what drives the dialectic Bernstein discerns is more the notion of an epistemological unit itself. In postulating bearers of meaning and truth it is perhaps too easy to begin thinking of them in terms more concrete than is appropriate. This ten-

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dency to reification is exacerbated by the sharp distinction of truth from meaning also characteristic of the tradition under discussion, a distinction rooted in rejecting the possibility that concepts be about anything real. The net result is that the intentionality of the epistemological unit, i.e. its logical property being of or about something else, is overshadowed in favour of its own apparently autonomous existence, and it is just this missing intentionality that is being pursued in the phases of Bernstein's dialectic. Thus, it is only having underplayed the intentional aspect of scientific models that renders plausible the unabashed turn to genealogy. Once a theory is understood as primarily a construct, which by accident might mirror or predict, it becomes simple to imagine its historical development as the essential determinant of its being. In contrast, as we have already seen in the case of Aristotle, it is possible to conceive of the essential determinant as the reality with which the theory deals. Moreover, this approach has no need to abandon the distinct questions concerned with the transcendental conditions for the representation implied here. Such an approach eventually requires metaphysical presuppositions of a type uncongenial to the contemporary mind, but this is not an objection; it is a relocation of the dispute on a metaphysical ground it should not have left.

Perhaps what is most striking about contemporary philosophy of science is the virtual disappearance of a concern for the *truth of scientific theory* and its replacement with an emphasis on the *rationality of scientific enquiry*. Thus, despit their potential agreement on the original problem (the need to decide between rival accounts of the same phenomena) it would seem that Aristotle and contemporary epistemologists end by talking about quite different things. And yet as interesting as it might be in its own right, elaboration of the logic of scientific discovery and the sociology of knowledge must remain subordinate to the simple constraint that a better theory is ultimately a truer one. The charm of the new relativism or the pragmatic turn is that it seems to do greatest justice to the activities of scientific enquiry and in particular preserves the openness which is its life-blood. In this way, the virtue of the community of enquirers is taken to be its admirable combination of long-run stability and short-run tolerance. That such a pragmatic attitude is desirable for the continued success of scientific endeavour would be difficult to deny, but it is not so clear that it counts as a justification of scientific truth and, by implication, as an adequate interpretation of human reason. In the light of the modern obsession with method, it is no doubt salutary to note that scientists by and large muddle through, by means both canonical and heretical, and that the demand for a systematic decision procedure or algorithm by which to reconstruct these intuitive procedures is misplaced. The makeshift quality of scientific enquiry as it has become more evident with the passing of time would be no surprise to Aristotle, who insisted that the scientific disposition is constitutionally incapable of assuring itself of its own truth. Yet even if one is not obsessed with method, whether as an Aristotelian or an epistemological anarchist, the question remains as to why the heterogeneous procedures of the scientific community generally manage to sort out better and worse theories. In other words, by what right do the results of this methodological free-for-all count as truths?

Contemporary philosophy of science has taken a discernibly transcendental turn in relation to this issue. Being uncertain of how to begin talking about truth when it comes to the axioms of systematic science, the response has been to examine what scientists actually do, rather than what they achieve. At first sight it would seem wildly implausible that such an examination could even begin to answer the question, in so far as methodology, while it may bound the domain of possible truths, does not itself determine

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their content. Moreover, the "practices and standards that have been hammered out in the course of scientific inquiry" are themselves in need of explanation as to why they vouchsafe scientific truths (although this reflection is not one that belongs to the scientist). And yet the transcendental turn here is not a simple confusion of the context of discovery with the context of justification. The ultimate strategy of this new pragmatic attitude as a *philosophical* answer (as opposed to a heuristic one) is that the truths of science are justified precisely because the activity that produces them is rational. This accounts for the great efforts that have gone into defending the reasonableness of scientific enquiry in face of the evident inadequacies of method in the strict sense. The strategy has a measure of truth, but does not go far enough. What has been neglected is that *there is no sense to be made of talking about reason without talking at the same time about truth*. One cannot speak of being rational *simpliciter*, and this is why, for Aristotle, reason is a disposition or faculty of truth (cf. *Nic.Eth.* Z2). Asserting the rationality of scientific enquiry is at best a first step, since the reasonableness of any endeavour depends on that with which it is, in the broadest sense, concerned. The view that science is wholly a matter of problem-solving is an attempt to stay within the bounds of the pragmatic conception, and should be suspect on those grounds alone, but even this view needs to face the questions of how problems are recognized as such and how their solutions are acknowledged. The final truth of scientific enquiry is the truth of scientific theory—as Aristotle says, those who know do not seek—and it is adequacy to this truth that becomes the architectonic standard for justifying the modes of reason, however heterogeneous, employed in science.

One might, in fact, be puzzled as to why in respect of scientific theories closure is not thought more a virtue than a vice. It is the well-foundedness of a theory's axioms that lends explanatory power to the deduction of its theorems and so to the extent that these are seen as revisable, to that extent the system as a whole is unstable. The question of closure in its genuine form, on the other hand, comes into view quite plainly in two extra-theoretic ways: one, the question of a theory's adequacy (say, Einsteinian over Newtonian physics) maintains the openness of further theorizing in light of an assumed and well-bounded domain, and two, the problems associated with the comprehensiveness and unity of scientific endeavour in general also require a much more flexible way of thinking than the deductive rigour characteristic of a specific theory or model. Answers to both these types of question involve philosophical decisions, and they must eventually be examined despite their occlusion by the perfectly legitimate intent to keep scientific methodology as elastic as possible.

In sum, in the case of scientific knowledge the issue turns out to be, not the mistaken hypothesis of an objective or foundational truth, but the mistaken projection of an assumed and systematic means of achieving it. The new relativists are correct to attack the tyranny of method, but this leaves the possibility of a sober objectivism quite unscathed.

IV

Hermeneutics in its radical post-Heideggerian sense is a reaffirmation of the abiding truth that men have to work to understand. It doesn't follow from this that the only thing they comprehend is their own activity. If the criticisms of the previous section be well taken, it should also be clear that the existence of a "hermeneutical dimension" is perfectly compatible with a healthy Aristotelian realism, at least in the case of science and maybe, therefore, elsewhere as well. Aristotle's own acknowledgment of the

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hermeneutical phenomenon in its ontological form is apparent in his distinction between what is more knowable to us and what is more knowable in itself, along with his insistence on always beginning in the realm of *doxa* or opinion. What distinguishes Aristotle, and Plato for that matter, from contemporary hermeneutics is acceptance of the possibility of transcending opinion, both in knowing the true and in doing the good. It is not surprising, therefore, to find that Bernstein's account of Gadamer seeks to criticize the latter's notion of truth. In doing so, Bernstein also tries to bring out the implied political telos of Gadamer's view of human reason, and yet in managing thus to point beyond hermeneutics there is a problem as to whether Bernstein's critique is radical enough to leave sufficient room for philosophy.

That the hermeneutical dimension, if not the hermeneutical problem, was as present for Aristotle and Plato as it is for Gadamer, shows once again that hermeneutics itself plays only a transitional role in the development that interests Bernstein. Its specific function is to expose the implicit connection between practical rationality as it first appears in the guise of underwriting theory and what would seem to be its more obvious home behind the activities of praxis, i.e. the domain of social, political, and moral action. For this reason, the most important theme in Gadamer for Bernstein's purpose is what he calls the "fusion of hermeneutics and praxis," a theme also expressed in Gadamer's claim that hermeneutics is heir to the older tradition of practical philosophy.[5]

There can be no doubt that Gadamer is concerned with enriching our conception of reason, a conception he wishes to take beyond the strictures of method to "an entirely different notion of knowledge and truth."[6] Furthermore, this defence of a practically enriched notion of reason is primarily in service of socio-political amelioration, and this concern becomes evident in the tandem themes of attempting to reform our deformed contemporary praxis and extricating our self-interpretation from the domination of a technologized mode of thinking.[7] One recognizes here of course the influence of Heidegger, but that influence becomes even more apparent in Gadamer's unqualified acceptance of historicity. Gadamer makes no move to question this ontological foundation and on its basis proceeds to elaborate what might be called a phenomenology of tradition, where tradition is construed as a structure of this human historicity. The phenomenological cast of *Truth and Method* makes it difficult to grasp the explanatory power of what Gadamer has to say, and any underlying vision of the nature of human reason is left more to be picked up by the reader than it is asserted by the author. Bernstein interprets that vision as follows: "Reason is not a faculty that can free itself from its historical context and horizons. Reason is historical or situated reason which gains its distinctive power always within a living tradition. For Gadamer this is not a limitation or deficiency of reason, but rather the essence of reason rooted in human finitude" (p. 37, cf. TM 245, 251).

[5]"Hermeneutics and Social Science," *Cultural Hermeneutics* 2 (1975), p. 316. The passage is worth quoting in full: "the chief task of philosophy is to justify this way of reason and to defend practical and political reason against the domination of technology based on science. That is the point of philosophical hermeneutic. It corrects the peculiar falsehood of modern consciousness: the idolatry of scientific method and of the anonymous authority of the sciences and it vindicates again the noblest task of the citizen—decision-making according to one's own responsibility—instead of conceding that task to the expert. In this respect, hermeneutic philosophy is the heir of the older tradition of practical philosophy."

[6]"The Problem of Historical Consciousness," in Paul Rabinow and William M. Sullivan, eds. *Interpretive Social Science: A Reader* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1979), p. 113.

[7]Cf. "Hermeneutics and Social Science," p. 312.

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As apparent as the phenomena of historical determination are, equally apparent is the phenomenon of the difference between present individuals and the traditions of which they are heirs. Gadamer remains true to this appearance and it provides for him a crucial moment of the hermeneutical dimension, namely, the moment of application (*Anwendung*) or appropriation. Appropriation is the point at which interpretation and understanding are to make a difference in the present. The question—make a difference to what?—is not, however, easily answered in Gadamer's case. He eschews talk of understanding as the activity of the subject, largely on account of the truncated senses of truth and rationality with which it is associated. And yet there is an uncomfortable tendency in his richer phenomenological account for selves to disappear altogether from the present in this attempt to do justice to the complexities, indeed realities, on both sides of what would have been called, in the less adequate idiom, the relation between subject and object. This disappearance is perhaps clearest in Gadamer's understanding of play, which is a central tool for his entire analysis. "Play fulfills its purpose only if the player loses himself in the play. The movement of play as such has, as it were, no substrate" (TM pp. 92-92), and in the last pages it is "the game itself that plays" (TM p. 446). There is also a tendency for the very present itself to disappear under the combined pressure of an inherited Heideggerian analysis of understanding that is future oriented and Gadamer's own concern to retrieve the reality of tradition and the past. "Historical thinking has its dignity and its value as truth in the acknowledgment that there is no such thing as 'the present,' but rather constantly changing horizons of future and past" (TM p. 484). In both these instances, what can be seen is a tendency to lose hold of the concreteness associated with the moment of present encounter, the tangibility of truth that Heidegger himself tried to get at in his resurrection of the Greek conception of *aletheia*. I would also suggest that this disappearance of the present is the ontological correlate of the epistemological neglect of intentionality.[8] Where knowledge as truth was lost before, now what is lost is reality as presence. Part of the reason for this loss is also the same, namely, the appeal to transcendental conditions in face of the philosophical need to justify discriminations. This will be made clearer as this section proceeds.

The point of welding the moment of appropriation into the unity that also comprises understanding and interpretation is to retrieve the connection between *theoria* and *praxis*, between the cognitive and the normative, a connection obcured by the modern conception of the abstract subject. That understanding things makes a difference to who we are and, therefore, to what we do, has long been recognized (one might recall Socrates' warning to young Hippocrates in the *Protagoras* over the dangers of simply listening to theoretical discourse), while Aristotle's observation that who we are makes a difference to what we can understand, has also been noted.[9] The relation is evidently a delicate one, and one brutalized, according to Gadamer, by the modern emphasis on technical competence. That is, effectiveness at the practical level still tends to be understood in terms of technique. In contrast, the ethical finesse associated with the ancient

[8]The nihilistic implications of what I am calling the disappearance of the present have already been noted. See Hans Jonas, "Gnosticism, Existentialism, and Nihilism," in *The Phenomenon of Life* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 230ff., and cf. Stanley Rosen, *Nihilism* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1969), pp. 99-100.

[9]Cf. Charles Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," in Rabinow and Sullivan, p. 71. Taylor refers to the first book of the *Ethics*, presumably A3, 1094b28-1095a12; A4, 1095b6. But consider also *Meta.* A3, 994b32ff., T2, 1004b23-26.

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virtue of *phronesis* is one reason why Gadamer chooses to weave it into his account, but he also sees the mode of reasoning associated with this intellectual virtue as being of more universal application than the specifically practical domain. The crux of the extended analogy is the manner in which *phronesis* mediates universal and particular, for it concerns, not insight into what is always the name, but insight into something that is becoming and that needs the contribution of action in order to become what it is supposed to be. This structure Gadamer takes to be common to the hermeneutic effort in general and accounts for his talk "the coming into being of meaning" (TM p. 146) and the idea that "the same tradition must always be understood in a different way" (TM p. 278). The ambiguity is patent: does this contribution of the interpreter, which undeniably contributes to the truth of the situation as whole, belong to the truth understood in the act of interpretation or to the truth belonging to the interpreter himself, or can we not legitimately make this distinction? It is at this point that the differences between the domains of theory and praxis tend to be glossed by those predisposed to the pragmatic turn. It is entirely plausible that the contributions of the agent are essential and determining when it comes to doing justice to one's fellows and discharging the obligations of a citizen and family-member, for this is the subjective correlate, so to speak, of the objective correlate, so to speak, of the objective formulation that human praxis is directed toward what can be otherwise (and within human power to direct). Moreover, what can be otherwise is able to be significantly otherwise, and this is what makes room for the talk of virtue, since in being able to do otherwise it is possible that one's actions be better and worse.

The activities of the individual in the processes of understanding, whereby the goal is a grasp of some truth rather than achievement of some action, is not, however, self-evidently analogous—not even formally. It is a virtue of praxis to bring some good to be where it was not before and would not have been were it not for that action, but it cannot be a virtue of understanding that, in its own activity, it augments the truth it is trying to grasp. Nonetheless, Gadamer comes perilously close to asserting just this in what he means by the "coming into being of meaning," and this is certainly how Bernstein interprets him (cf. p. 139). It needs to be remarked that the contribution of the interpreter upon which Gadamer insists, putting to one side for the moment whether or not it determines the content, is not subjective in the mundane idiosyncratic sense. It is, rather, the result of the workings of "effective history" (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) in that, for Gadamer, the full-blooded meaning that transpires in the moment of appropriation encompasses both the object understood as well as the tradition borne by the interpreter. "The true historical object is not an object at all, but . . . a relation in which exist both the reality of history and the reality of historical understanding" (TM p. 267). The phenomenon Gadamer wishes to preserve is the truth of whatever difference history makes (cf. pp. xiii; 276). In arguing with Leo Strauss, for example, Gadamer claims that Aristotle's *Ethics* means something more and different today than it could possibly have meant to any of Aristotle's contemporaries, simply because history has made clearer its superiority in relation to later conceptions (TM p. 485). It must be granted that the history of Aristotle's *Ethics* in our cultural tradition adds a dimension of meaning to the original text that the latter does not wholly determine, but although this looks like the thin edge of the deconstructivist wedge, it does not require us to abandon the fact of the author's intention (as much as its significance might be controversial). More importantly, though, this intention has been altered by cultural history as little as has the power of

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the soul to reason practically which Aristotle sought to describe in the first place.

Gadamer is correct to underline the complex interplay between the work as conceived and the work as received, but that the weaving of the two and the meaning that emerges out of both is not reducible to either one does not imply that the two are indistinguishable (cf. TM p. xix). Further, underneath this complex interrelation there remains, as Gadamer acknowledges, the subject matter itself, namely, the truth for which the original work and its interpretation were undertaken. Neither this truth nor the truth proper to the history of the completed work is thematized in *Truth and Method*, for Gadamer is more concerned there to explicate the circle of interpretation in which he claims, and it may be conceded, they stand. The subtlety introduced by his analysis is not that we cannot avoid creating history when we try to understand what has gone before (though this certainly tends to happen), but that the medium of history, structured by temporal distance, horizons, prejudice, and the rest, is precisely what enables us to grasp the truth at all. The philosophical rub, though, is whether such a structured medium can be rendered transparent or not, and if the answer were affirmative it would still remain to assess the manner and nature of achieving such transparency. Gadamer certainly recognizes the problem, acknowledging it quite explicitly in the foreword to the second edition and implicitly in the distinction of blind from enabling prejudices, talk of truth, and insistence on the critical dimension of the appropriation of tradition.[10] And yet as much as Gadamer accepts the phenomenon of critical appropriation, his descriptive resources do it no justice. Enabling prejudices arise simply by standing the test of time, but this is no explanation of how they manage to do that nor of why they should be trusted. Further, one can agree that prejudices are tested by their encounter with an alien tradition claiming truths counter to one's own, but this is only the beginning of the critical task.

On this point Gadamer gives no account of how we penetrate the meaning of even our own prejudice, let alone the alien claim to validity. The "fusion of horizons" is only an assertion that the second task can be done, and lacks any explanation of what grants intelligibility to an horizon as such. Lacking this we have no ground for deciding whether our fusion grants truth or only further opinion. The shuffling of horizons, no matter how historically disciplined, does not suffice to transcend the cognitive emptiness of either arbitrary replacement of one for another or remaining imprisoned in a single horizon (the two forms of extreme relativism). One might also wonder what, in more precise terms, the mechanism of "effective history" is, *i.e.* where is it that the determining reality of prejudice—so easily presupposed when using the metaphors of perspective and horizon—is supported? And this is just what needs to be known in order to appreciate what it means to say that "history does not belong to us, but we belong to it" (TM p. 245). Finally, even if it be admitted that there is a truth proper to history, it still remains to account for its specific meaningfulness. In particular, does anything more significant transpire in history over and above, or least in relation to, the truths that provoke men to create it in the first place?

The lacunae in Gadamer's treatment of truth are at least partially explained by his emphasis on the new meaning he supposes to emerge at the moment of appropriation, in that this emphasis encourages him to overlook the more fundamental conditions for the possibility of appropriating truths *already* claimed and therefore sufficiently determinate to have made their own demands on the interpreter, in advance of any emergent

[10]See *Truth and Method*, p. xxv. The word "enabling" is Bernstein's (p. 128), but cf. TM pp. 246ff.

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meaning. Those conditions are the ones that make a lucid appropriation of the tradition possible, whereby, in Strauss's formulation, the reader's thinking becomes contemporaneous with his author's.[11] Yet it is just these prior truths that lend substance to the workings of "effective history" and provide that ground upon which it becomes meaningful to talk of a hermeneutic *response*, for it cannot be the transcendental structure of responsibility itself that determines the meanings whose maintenance and augmentation it makes possible in an instrumental rather than constitutive sense. Indeed, this structure cannot by itself be considered to ground even the newly emergent truth. And yet intelligible truths, whether emergent or abiding, are able to make a difference to the one appropriating and occasioning them. This dimension of the hermeneutical experience is really Gadamer's animating concern. It is for him a matter of intellectual probity that genuine understanding be seen as a gentle opening out and responsiveness to what needs understanding, while a domineering appropriation or abstract gaze will necessarily pervert the course of truth.

This slant becomes especially clear in the way Gadamer explicates the notion of experience. To be experienced means both to know things and to have acquired skills but also to be undogmatic and ready to experience and understand further. He goes so far as to assert that the fulfillment of experience is precisely "that openness to experience that is encouraged by experience itself" (TM p. 319). It is tempting to read this remark entirely transcendentally, in which case its absurdity is clear enough, but this would not be entirely fair. The truth of having become experienced in this way does, for Gadamer, have some content, namely, having become reconciled with the general truths of human finitude.

It is this reconciliation that Gadamer hopes to effect with the fusion of hermeneutics and praxis, but his manner unfortunately obliterates the possibility of an accurate or true understanding in favour of a good attitude. As I have already suggested, the simple co-presence of several determinations of an articulated complex of truths is not grounds for their identity. The truths of responsibility, whether entirely formal or whether containing a general orienting content, must be distinguished from the claims to truth, that confront the interpreter and demand his understanding. For not only are the former truths in the service of the latter, but should he fail to understand *their* truth then, no matter what other truth might emerge in the encounter, he cannot be said to have understood *them*. And even if he does understand something else, the transcendence involved in appreciating this other truth is also to be recognized; it must still be explicable as a cognition and not reduced to an event or passion.

V

Without acknowledging that the fusion of hermeneutics and praxis might well confuse several strata of distinguishable issues, Bernstein attempts to show a way out of the impasse over distinguishing opinion from truth by pointing to the further implications of the form of practical rationality Gadamer himself exposes (cf. pp. 154, 168). Bernstein claims that as much as they might be bound up with the determinations of tradition and "effective history," and as much as they might be indeterminate to a degree that re-

[11]See Leo Strauss, "Political Philosophy and History," in *What is Political Philosophy*? (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), p. 76. (Reprinted from *Journal of History of Ideas* 10(1949), pp. 30-50.)

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quires quite sophisticated mediation for their specification, there are standards or principles presupposed in the activity of criticism and these must be acknowledged. These standards, he suggests, are vouchsafed by the sort of universality associated with *phronesis* as Gadamer uses the term—standards that are "of course fallible and that are anticipatory" (p. 154). Note, however, that the standards Bernstein has in mind are entirely procedural rather than standards of content: "a *true* understanding of the thing itself must be *warranted by appropriate* forms of *argumentation* that are intended to show that we have properly grasped what the thing itself says" (p. 154). This is the same manouvre as before, namely, the attempt to guarantee truth by defending the rationality of procedures that may, in advance, be supposed to be achieving it; and the essential criticism remains the same. The folk-wisdom that might *post facto* accumulate on the basis of, by and large, managing an access to truths is never equivalent to a philosophical account of the prior grounding of those truths as truths. Furthermore, procedural or methodological wisdom can never arbitrate a question of content because content determines method or, as it was put before, reason is a disposition of truth. Thus, Bernstein's reference to the history of practice underwrites the possibility of truth no more than does Gadamer's structural account of "effective history."

Both Gadamer and Bernstein appropriate the notion of *phronesis* in face of an ostensibly theoretical issue, namely, understanding. They do so for two reasons. First of all, *phronesis* is the capacity to mediate a domain of indeterminate universality and the particulars of action, and, according to Gadamer, the particulars of action may be extended to include the particular that is present understanding. I have criticized this conflation of the practical and theoretical because it fails to appreciate the ways in which present understanding must be subordinate to prior truth. It might be noted that this applies as much to praxis as it does to theory. Praxis as a human activity is more than behaviour, not simply because it is accompanied by consciousness but because it is directed at what has been interpreted to be good. Even praxis, therefore, is not independent of truth, and it is precisely on account of this relation to the truth that one talks of practical *reason* at all. Furthermore, in both the practical and theoretical cases, dealing with a determinate domain of universality is not itself grounds for imagining that only history can be the source of its determination in the present. On this point both Gadamer and Bernstein misinterpret the place of convention (*nomos*) in Aristotle's conception of *phronesis*. The inculcation of good habit on the part of the city is designed to facilitate insight into what is good (e.g. Nic.Eth. Z13, 1144a 30-36), but this is not to say that the universality mediated by virtue, whether practical or intellectual, is itself grounded by the conventions inculcated by habit. In fact, far from *phronesis* "presupposing the existence of *nomoi*" (p. 156) as Bernstein has it, according to Aristotle "nomos has a compelling power, because it is from a certain *phronesis* and *nous*" (K10, 1180a 22). To simplify what perhaps should not be simplified, there is, in short, no mistaking the sovereignty of *nous*—even in matters of praxis. What seems to hinder appreciation of this priority is the contemporary prejudice against intuition, but without having to lay that story out in full, this prejudice can evidently be seen to lie behind the transcendental pragmatic turn already mentioned. The general problem with the move is that the universals of mutually respecting discourse determine nothing about theoretical truth or practical action: the "ideal of reciprocal discourse and dialogue" (p. 195) is necessarily silent on the questions of what we are speaking about and for the sake of what we are engaging such mutuality.

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The second motivation for the appropriation of *phronesis* is a moral-political concern, for *phronesis* seems able to be at once reasonable and practically effective, without producing a domineering world-view. In so far as the goal here is political amelioration, the immediate inadequacy of an account of the hermeneutic underpinning of *phronesis*, projected as a political ideal, is obvious. As much as hermeneutics in this sense might be construed as an heir to practical philosophy, it is not itself praxis; what is required is the actual employment of *phronesis* for the ends it discerns, not its analysis. And yet a second inadequacy is revealed in this simple constraint, for the employment of *phronesis* depends on a grasp of truth in the event made impossible by the pragmatic account of how the standards of that employment are justified. The praxis of the community is still constantly open to the critical question, despite its continuing success or even because of it, and it is not enough to be told that such practice is justified by having been hammered out in the course of history. Both Gadamer and Bernstein pose the critical question and yet swerve away from it at the crucial moment. When the latter, having pushed his objections to Gadamer's notions of truth and criticism, comes to analyze the domain of universality associated with *phronesis* (p. 150ff), he pays attention only to the practical version of the problem, discussing the purported communal mediation of our "practical lives" and the corruptions to which it is susceptible. Gadamer, for his part, takes refuge in the rejoinder that hermeneutics has the virtue of being a salutary corrective, not only to modern misconceptions of the nature of reason but also to the *hubris* of philosophy in general (cf. TM p. xxv).

This last point is worth dwelling on. The rejection of *nous* or intuition, evident in the theoretical domain, is also reflected in the blatant politicization of philosophy apparently endorsed by both Gadamer and Bernstein. Of the philosopher, Gadamer claims: "however much he may be called to make radical inferences from everything, the role of prophet, of Cassandra, of preacher or even of know-all does not suit him." Rather, what is needed is "not only a persistent asking of ultimate questions, but the sense of what is feasible, what is possible, what is correct, here and now" (TM p. xxv). Bernstein's valorization of the community in both its practical and theoretical modes betrays his version of this tendency, and he greets with approval the way Gadamer's highlighting the virtues of dialogue "softens the elitist connotations of *phronesis*" (pp. 164, 190). Bernstein's uneasiness with the *hubris* of the philosophers is also clear in the following: "The Platonic tendency to denigrate the realm of opinion, to judge and condemn it for the failure to live up to the standards of truth is essentially antipolitical" (p. 221), and to be antipolitical is, presumably, to be something monstrous (although not obviously irrational).

But is this the best way to understand the uneasy relation between philosophy and politics? Not many would regard truth as the natural medium of politics, but philosophy's insistence on its ultimate hegemony does not have to be construed as a denigration—it is, to the contrary, an attempt to *redeem* opinion and thus, while perhaps revolutionary, not necessarily antipolitical. The difficulty of transmuting opinion into truth has always been grounds for suspicion of philosophy's virtue, and yet the impossibility of turning all citizens into philosophers is not a good reason for judging her by the standards of the city. Aristotle has already warned us about this form of capitulation: "It is not necessary, as some exhort, to be mindful of only human things because one is human, or only mortal things because one is mortal" (Nic.Eth. K7, 1172b 31-33), and the vigor of this advice must be compared with the contemporary at-

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tempt to make a virtue of fallibility. The pragmatic turn is a failed attempt to provide a universal and democratic justification of the significances of human life. It fails because it does not have the resources for acknowledging that truth remains an ultimate value regardless of the state of men's opinions, and lacks these resources because it has taken opinion one step too seriously. Failure to make the deepest truths a public possession, however, does not imply the failure of philosophy altogether, no matter how much one might be tempted to deny the possible meaning of those truths for the sake of a specious universality.

It must be admitted, though, that the rejection of the pragmatic turn does lead in a somewhat aristocratic direction; Bernstein called this the elitism of *phronesis*, but it is in some respects no more than the uncommonness of common sense. At this point there are differences between philosophy and the city at large that must simply be acknowledged, at least by those interested in talking about such things with any accuracy. This also involves recognizing that the philosopher was never meant to be a "culture hero" and that it is a misplaced arrogance to have located him among the intellectuals who are the proper candidates for such a role. None of this, of course, is to deny that philosophy has a responsibility to the city and the domains of opinion.

From the contemporary point of view there is something uncomfortably free-wheeling and exclusive about the possibility of rational insight. Descartes' confidence in intuition has not passed on to his epigones, but they have nonetheless remained terrorized by what he himself referred to as hyperbolical doubt. Whatever it meant for Descartes, method soon became the projected hope of a reason uncertain of its own power and newly released to indulge its curiosity to the hilt. The desire for such stability as method was originally thought to provide has not abated with the recognition of method's inadequacies; it is now expressed in the various hopes for the epistemological solidarity of community, which tend to make a fetish of finitude in order to encourage maximum participation. The appeal to canons of rationality outside of the deductive rigour of mathematical system has ended by identifying our assurance as to the meaning of what we do with either its history or its transcendental conditions, or the possibility of being able to carry on the conversation. Of course we do indulge many conversations for reasons all quite different from the truths they may happen to contain, but if they are not underwritten somewhere by an appreciation of what is true and worthwhile (and this does not have to appear as the explicit content), then we cannot tell the difference between talking and silence. If speech never reflects truth then it is an instrument of uninformed will, and this leads to evident political problems. Fackenheim, for example, has already noted the inevitable degeneration of "pragmatic make-believe" into "ideological fanaticism."[12] Gadamer and Bernstein fare somewhat better than Rorty in this regard, yet despite their recognition of the issue, they also remain inadequate to the challenge of truth. What is it, then, that skews their admirable intentions?

Bernstein expresses an awareness of the stultification associated with Cartesian skepticism in his formulation of what he calls the Cartesian Anxiety. At its most general, the Cartesian Anxiety is an underlying symptom of the mistaken view of human reason beyond which contemporary philosophy is seeking to move and is characterized by the presupposition of what is taken to be an exhaustive dichotomy: "*Either* there is some support for our being, a fixed foundation for our knowledge, *or* we cannot escape the

[12]Emil F. Fackenheim, *Metaphysics and Historicity* (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1961).

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forces of darkness that envelop us with madness, with intellectual and moral chaos" (p. 18). The Anxiety, Bernstein claims, is more in need of exorcism than any refutation, and this is to be achieved by that reconciliation with human finitude represented in the turn to community (cf. p. 169). Put another way, "the skeptic is always playing on the fear that unless we achieve finality we have not achieved anything," but there is a middle ground attainable once it is realized that "the seduction of such skepticism depends on accepting a notion of what counts as knowledge and what counts as rationality that needs to be abandoned" (p. 69). The form of rationality Bernstein proposes to put in its stead requires a recognition that "we cannot escape from the dynamic power of effective-history, which is always shaping what we are becoming. We become fools of history if we think that by an act of will we can escape the prejudgments, practices, and traditions that are constitutive of what we are" (p. 167). Gadamer puts the same point as follows: "there is undoubtedly no understanding that is free of all prejudices, however much the will of our knowledge must be directed toward escaping their thrall" (TM p. 440).

The talk of "will" here is revealing. In order to transform opinion into truth, or to be enabled by prejudice, it is surely not an act of will that is required but an act of insight. That Gadamer and Bernstein express themselves in this way betrays their modern presuppositions about the possibility of *theory*, in particular that it must be constructive in a manner ultimately subordinate to will. Their attack on method they have themselves misconstrued as an attack on theory in general, and it is little wonder that having rejected what they take to be theoretical reason they should turn to its practical mode. It is almost enough to make one believe in dialectic. But what has not been addressed in this rejection of the methodological implications of the Cartesian paradigm of theory is the paradigmatic status of mathematical reason itself, and it is the Cartesian assertion that theory is essentially mathematical that holds in place the "shape of consciousness" out of which the contemporary pragmatic turn has devolved.

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Univ. of Nigeria

A Critique of Olufemi Taiwo's Criticism of "Legal Positivism and African Legal Tradition"

P. C. Nwakeze

I READ with keen interest F. U. Okafor's article, "Legal Positivism and African Legal Tradition" in the *International Philosophical Quarterly* (June, 1984), 157-164, and a reply to it by Olufemi Taiwo in the same journal (June, 1985), 197-200.

The major thrust of Okafor's paper is that legal positivism is alien to African legal practice and that there is thus the need to synthesize the best in the African legal tradition and marry it with the best in the Western/positivistic legal system. This elicited critical response from Taiwo.

The central argument of Taiwo's essay is that it is wrong to talk of "African Culture" mainly because the socio-cultural diversity, as well as the vastness of the continent, would not allow it to share a tradition in anything, including the legal system (see Taiwo's reply, p. 198). It is also the implicit and basic assumption of the essay that all African cultures, norms, and values, have virtually collapsed under the weight of change brought about by the European contact.

The aim of this rejoinder is to demonstrate that in the midst of the diversity of African cultures, there is striking cultural uniformity which allows us to talk of "African culture." Another very important point which would be stressed is that, contrary to common belief, many aspects of African culture(s), particularly in the normative realm, have exhibited significant resilience in the face of modernization and change.

A critical appraisal of Taiwo shows that he labours under two major problems, among others: one is conceptual/methodological; the other is substantive.

The conceptual problem stems from his failure to distinguish between the use of "African Culture" in the generalized context and "African cultures" in the specific sense. It is possible, and quite correct too, to talk of African culture, African legal tradition, African personality, African socialization, norms and values, etc. so long as what is significantly common and fundamental to the cultures being examined is abstracted and emphasized.

Admittedly, there are ethnic, national, sub-regional, regional, and in fact global variations in cultures, but this must not deter us from systemtically and objectively abstracting, where necessary, the relevant commonalities in cultures for educated generalizations. Taiwo is definitely from Nigeria, a country with three major ethic nationalities in addition to over 200 smaller ethic groupings with varying shades of cultures. Would it not be right and proper for us to abstract, where necessary, the common cultural facts among the different ethnic groups to arrive at the concept of "Nigerian culture"? Or must we always isolate and classify the cultures into their ethnic elements? Too much fixation at the micro-perception of cultures, implicit in Taiwo's approach, would ques-

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tion not only the concept of African culture, but also those of European culture, American culture, Asian culture etc., since there are observable cultural variations within each of these groups.

I submit, therefore, that there is nothing intrinsically wrong with either the concept "African culture" or "African cultures" depending, of course, on whether one is concerned with cultural peculiarities or cultural uniformities. While the concept of "African culture" refers to broad, generalized, commonly shared aspects of African life-experience, "African cultures" refers to specific cultures peculiar to groups and individuals. A conceptual clarification of this nature, I believe, is crucial in a serious scholarly discussion of this nature so as to avoid the fruitless "argument of the deaf."

Taiwo appears to be unaware of this. Had he taken note of this conceptual dualism, he might, perhaps, have been more cautious and less prone to confusing appearance for the total reality. It was the unjustifiable fixation at the level of cultural specificity and peculiarity which led to his unguarded assertions against facts. He argues: "Africa is a vast continent . . . unless one is a very poor student of the social sciences, it is hard to imagine that such a continent with a kaleidoscope of peoples and cultures would share a tradition in anything." (Taiwo's reply to "Legal Positivism . . ." p. 198). Taiwo is certainly a student of the social sciences, but I doubt whether he is a very good student of culture, particularly that of African societies.

There is no question that Africa is a vast continent with cultural differences, but there is a very serious question over Taiwo's doubt that African people share a tradition in anything. On the contrary, a comparative study of past and contemporary African social structures would clearly show that there has been quite a remarkable cultural uniformity in some areas of life in spite of the over-orchestrated cultural diversity. In fact, I consider it apt to observe that the diversity of African cultures with regard to institutional arrangements, norms, and values is more apparent than real. This assertion is supported by the fact that the focal value of virtually all African cultures is community—rather than individual—oriented with very powerful emphasis on the extended family and kinship relations. The point being made here is that the African social institutions give primacy to the group, and the group itself functions primarily to reinforce the social structure. For the African, any social institution, including the legal, must first and foremost operate to preserve community interest and solidarity in order to make itself relevant to the community. One cannot, therefore, pretend to overlook the remarkable common consequences of the overarching family and community-centered culture on the overall African institutional arrangements and world-view.

I do not intend to go into the sub-area of sociology of development and underdevelopment. Suffice it to say that it is this very strong community/family-centeredness, rather than cultural diversity (as suggested by Taiwo on p. 198 of his essay), which has often been cited by scholars following Hoselitz[1] as a major explanatory variable for Africa's backwardness and underdevelopment.

Focusing specifically on the African traditional legal systems, it could be argued that the theories behind them are essentially sociological. Behaviour is not judged in abstract terms, but according to what the society deems reasonable in time and place. Even though it may be right to assert, as Taiwo did on p. 199 of his essay, that every society

[1]B. F. Hoselitz, *Sociological Factors in Economic Development* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960).

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has laws to prevent social disorganization, it is important to note that there are differences in social functions of laws as well as in the theories behind those laws.

In the western system, for instance, legal reality is approached more from the individual, rather than the group, perspective; and the ultimate goal of law is to safeguard individual/personal rights and interests. In the non-Western, particularly in the African, societies, the emphasis is primarily on protecting the interests of the group/community. According to Holleman, the African's approach to justice is a realistic one.

> He knows that the relations between man and his fellowmen are not governed by law alone. Hence in the determination of a lawsuit law is not taken as the only determining factor. The whole social setting and relationship of the parties and their positions in the community are taken into consideration; and in the interest of justice 'legal rules' are sometimes thrown overboard.[2]

In Holleman's view, logical, impersonal, impartial judgment, following clearly defined legal principles, would do in western societies, but not in "tribal," non-western, and African societies, where the court goes beyond what is right or wrong to ensure future cordial relations between the contending parties. What is being emphasized is that in Africa, legal tradition duly takes into cognizance the survival of the community through the amicable settlement of disputes, acceptable to all parties concerned. Thus, the role which all African legal systems play is basically reconciliatory. This element of reconciliation, according to Abraham, "is lacking in Western penology (where) the offender is punished without making restitution. On emerging from prison he is reconciled neither to himself, his victim nor to society."[3] In the light of all this, it is right to say that even though there may be legal structural differences among Africans in terms of court settings, who and who constitute the judges, and court procedures, these in themselves cannot nullify the sociological factors which underline virtually all African legal institutions and traditions.

Let us also examine Taiwo's assumption that African cultural values have not stood the impact of colonial contact and the attendant change. He contends that one of the shortcomings of Okafor's "Legal Positivism . . ." is that it failed to address itself adequately to change. This is certainly not correct. The point is that while Okafor recognizes the resilience of some aspects of African culture in the face of the colonial contact, Taiwo tends to see the colonial experience as resulting in almost total acculturation of the Africans into the "dominant"/colonial culture.

It may be pertinent to note at this point that contemporary Africanists have followed two major theoretical orientations for the explication of current African socio-cultural facts. One approach argues that colonialism and the consequent capitalist mode of production and social relations of production have completely integrated African nations into the world socio-economic and political order. For these total integrationist theorists (and Taiwo is certainly one of them), there is virtually nothing left of our past which could truly be regarded as African. A major shortcoming of this approach is that it exaggerates change and underplays continuity in African culture(s).

An opposite viewpoint, to which Okafor perhaps subscribes, points out the resilient

[2]J. F. Holleman, *Issues in African Law* (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1974), p. 17.

[3]J. H. Abraham, *Sociology: A Historical and Contemporary Outline* (London: Holder & Stoughton, 2nd ed., 1975), p. 187.

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nature of aspects of African culture(s) in the face of the colonial-accompanied change and modernization. There are, according to this perspective, quite significant aspects of African values and norms which have survived the impact of Western contact. I subscribe to this viewpoint because it affords us the liberty to recognize not only change but also continuity in African culture(s). And it is against this backdrop that I will examine the acculturation thesis implicit in Taiwo's essay.

I do not doubt the significant impact on our traditional values by the European contact and the attendant monetized economy, but it would definitely be wrong and naive to assume that the totality of the African values, customs, traditions, and in fact the African world-view, have collapsed under the weight of modernization and change.

It may be theoretically tempting to place only change at the centre in the analysis of African socio-cultural phenomena, as Taiwo seems to advocate, but social proposition/"theory" must necessarily be made to confront empirical facts; and a "theory" falls or stands depending on the extent to which it is supported by empirical reality. The empirical facts clearly show evidence of both change and continuity, but obviously do not underline only change. Taiwo's theoretical/analytical framework helps us to account for only an aspect of reality. It is, therefore, inadequate and must be rejected as such.

Bascon and Herskovits are among the early scholars who drew our attention to the facts of continuity and change in African cultures. They observed that in spite of the colonial contact no African culture "entirely gave way before it . . . (and) there is no evidence which supports the assumption that so often underlies thinking about Africa's future, that African culture whether in its religious or other aspects will shortly disappear."[4] This observation, made over two decades ago, is still valid today.

A study by Dike[5] among the Igbo of Southeastern Nigeria shows that there is a remarkable resilience and continuity of traditional practices in spite of the long centuries of Western contact.

In the area of fertility behaviour and family norms, the urban African, not to talk of his rural/traditional counterpart, still subscribes heavily to large family norms due to cultural influences. As for the peasants, they are fatalistically pronatalist; they still count their blessings in terms of children and there is a considerable degree of sex preference generally in favour of the male children. The rural/peasant Africans (we must not forget that they constitute the African majority) welcome every child, not only because it is a potential economic asset, as some people often think, but also because it is God-sent and might be a reincarnated ancestor coming back to warm life after a long stay in the spirit world.[6] In fact, the aching problem of the high fertility rate among Africans has so far defied population theorists who had attempted to explain the phenomenon purely from economic and modernization standpoints. Today, demographers and social scientists are realizing the contributions of subtle, but ever powerful, cultural factors to the persistence of high fertility in Africa. Caldwell's work[7] is a major contribution in this direction.

[4]M. J. Herskovits and W. R. Bascom, "The Problem of Stability and Change in African Culture," in W. R. Bascom and M. J. Herskovits (eds.), *Continuity and Change in African Cultures* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1959), p. 3.

[5]A. A. Dike, *The Resilience of Igbo Culture: A Case Study of Awka Town* (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1985).

[6]G. Parrinder, *African Traditional Religion* (London: Sheldon Press, 1962), p. 138.

[7]J. C. Caldwell, "Towards a Restatement of Demographic Transition Theory," *Population and Development Review* (September/December, 1976).

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Excluding continuity in African culture(s) for undue emphasis on change, as Taiwo advocates, how could we explain the fact that the peasant African "implicated in a monetized economy" as it were and "who has to share his visual space with the ubiquitous Coca Cola" (Taiwo pp. 198-199) is still dominated by pronatal tendencies. Could Taiwo tell us why his "monetized" and "Coca Cola" peasants go to modern law courts for settlement of disputes only as a last resort? The point is that the so-called modernized and monetized African is not devoid of his traditional values, and this fact must be appreciated for a holistic grasp of the dynamics of his behaviour in the face of modernization.

I must say it is unfortunate that Taiwo's analysis is monodimensional, a-holistic, and full of over-generalized assertions. His perception of Africans always stops at the level of change, and he makes no serious attempt to get at the "inner logic" and dynamics of their actions brought about by traditional continuity.

Taiwo chooses to close his eyes to, or perhaps he is unaware of, the differences in levels of change perceptible in the material and ideational spheres: changes in the former are always more remarkable than changes in the latter. In contemporary African societies, changes in the ideational/normative realm are lagging far behind stupendous changes in the material realm. This fact must be borne in mind for a more acceptable "theory" of socio-cultural change in contemporary African societies.

I must say, with due respect to Taiwo, that the central shortcoming of his essay is that it exaggerates change and suppresses (or rather overloooks) the elements of African cultural continuity, all in an apparently vain attempt to show that the Africans are now like other people. I do not know enough of Taiwo's socio-cultural background, particularly in relation to the duration and intensity of his interaction with African peasants, but from what he says I would guess that he belongs to a small band of the well-urbanized, westernized, de-Africanized Africans who tend to think that the African would be reckoned with, only by renouncing himself and whatever is "African." But no wishful thinking, no matter how strongly expressed, will remove the fact that, for better or for worse, the African in many respects is still fundamentally African. Our academic and scholarly responsibility compels us to state, so far as is possible, the facts as they are.

Finally, I will not end this rejoinder without touching on Taiwo's substantive problem. In his pursuit of the futile arguments that the Africans would not share a tradition in anything and that the "monetized," "Coca Cola" peasants may no longer be really Africans, he grossly neglected the central, and very important, issue raised by Okafor in his article: the issue of reforming and making our contemporary legal system philosophically and sociologically authentic and more relevant to Africa.

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BRIEFER BOOK REVIEWS

Die Idee als Ideal. By Katharina Comoth. Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1986. pp. 90. DM28.

It is well known that Hegel was strongly influenced in his philosophizing by the German mystics, with whom he was very familiar, Eckhardt, Tauler, Seuse, Angelus Silesius, Jakob Böhme. Less well known is the fact that an important task of Hegel's *Science of Logic* was to unfold the relationship of speculative philosophy and mysticism, a relationship with which the traditional logic could scarcely come to grips. Katharina Comoth has set herself the task of articulating this unfolding as economically as possible by showing how the *Logic* is made more and more explicit as it is manifested in the steady march of the human spirit toward freedom as it is found reconstructed in the *Lecture on the History of Philosophy*, the *Lectures on Aesthetics* and the *Fundamental Principles of the Philosophy of Right*. One has to wonder, however, whether the brevity of the exposition can do adequate justice to the complexity of the thought being unfolded. By the same token, the diagrammatic aids to comprehension would themselves seem to need more explanation if they, in their turn, are to be comprehensible.

Fordham University *Quentin Lauer, S.J.*

The Letters of Marsilio Ficino. Trans. by the Members of the Language Department of the London School of Economic Science. London: Shepheard-Walwyn, vol. 1, 1985. pp. 248. $23.50; vol. 2, 1978. pp. 121. $18.95; vol. 3, 1981. pp. 162. $19.95.

This ongoing project translates the correspondence which Ficino edited for publication as the twelve books of Latin *Epistolae*, the standard, though by no means critical, edition of which is the Basle *Opera omnia* of 1576 and its facsimile. The first of these handsomely produced volumes (hereafter *Letters* 1, followed by the number of epistle in question) comprising Book I, represents the correspondence between 1457 and 1476; *Epistolae* Book II has been omitted for the present since its contents are more treatises than letters; the second (hereafter *Letters* 2), comprising Book III, contains the correspondence from August, 1476, to May, 1477 (hereafter *Letters* 3), the third comprising Book IV, includes mainly the correspondence from 1 March to 1 August, 1477, with a few extraneous authorial insertions from before and after this period. These translations, like the original *Epistolae*, include some letters to Ficino from others, e.g., *Letters* 2.23; the Table of Contents does not tell who is writing to whom.

Although the Latin original is not given, all variants from the Basle edition in the principal MSS and early editions which have any likelihood of being authorial, and there are many, are given either at the bottom of the page (*Letters* 1), in the Notes on the Latin Text, or in the Notes on the Letters (*Letters* 2 and 3). Sometimes the variants have been accepted as the basis for the translation. This represents a provisional solution to a complex problem. A critical edition of the entire Latin text of the *Epistolae* is sorely needed, and one is reportedly being prepared by Sebastiano Gentile. In most cases, we no longer possess the MS which was actually sent, only the version edited by Ficino for publication. Additional Ficino letters and additional MSS of those we know about are still being discovered—chiefly by Professor P. O. Kristeller, who has worked closely with these translators on all volumes; see for example those edited in his *Supplementum Ficinianum,* in a contribution to *Studi di bibliografia e di storia in onore di Tammaro de Marinis,* vol. 3 (Verona, 1964),

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pp. 5-33, and in *Atti di Convegno 'Marsilio Ficino e il Ritorno di Platone,'* ed. Giancarlo Garfagnini (Firenze, 1986).

In general, aside from an occasional missed allusion or technical meaning (e.g., comparison with the Platonic text alluded to shows that in *Letter* I.7, page 46, *"singulis orbibus insidere"* should be translated more literally as something like "sits upon each sphere"), the translation under review achieves a high standard of accuracy. I have it on good authority that the members of the Language Department of the London School of Economic Science do indeed work closely as a team, although a given person may have primary responsibility for translating a given letter. Besides the gain in accuracy, this brings an added benefit for style, which might in other respects suffer from this procedure, in that the team works out together English equivalents for Ficino's many puns, half-puns, polyptotons, and etymological figures. The polyptotonic and half-punning title of 3.20 may represent the result of one of these punstorming sessions: *"Quantum astronomi metiuntur, tantum astrologi mentiuntur"* is aptly translated, "To the very degree that astronomers measure, astrologers misrepresent." Notes and bibliographies are deliberately brief. The indices are adequate and accurate. The translators have supplied "Notes on Ficino's Correspondents" at the back of each volume, based mainly on Della Torre's *Storia dell'Accademia platonica di Firenze* and Kristeller's *Supplementum Ficinianum,* with assistance from several other sources. It is convenient to have this material updated, translated, and appended to the relevant letters. For further biographical information, Corsi's *Life* of Ficino—our most important single source, despite its obvious errors, which are noted—is translated and included as an Appendix to *Letters* 3.

Once one recognizes its constant word-play, Ficino's style is ornate but not particularly difficult—not as difficult as that of Erasmus. Indeed, Ficino often reasons by puns, not unlike some modern philosophers, but with more justification than they have, grounding his practice on a straightforward reading of Plato's *Cratylus* and on the then widespread assumption of a close relationship between word and thing.

Playing the role both of taste-maker and of philological pioneer, Ficino was "chiefly responsible," as Charles Schmitt put it, "for the penetrating influence which Platonism gained in Renaissance and post-Renaissance literature, art, philosophy, and science." These letters were a channel of that influence. The content of the *Epistolae* is so diverse that it is impossible to summarize; but a quick conspectus can be gleaned from the titles in the Table of Contents, and I will highlight some which are of interest to readers of this journal. The titles are authorial, but they often impose on the material a more pious orientation than it actually possesses. The Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives called Ficino a "philosophaster." While this judgment is unfair to Ficino's philosophical treatises and commentaries, philosophers will not find the contents of these volumes particularly rigorous. Some letters are well-formed essays, e.g. the important letter "On divine frenzy" (1.7); some indeed also stood on their own, but their form is generally rhetorical rather than demonstrative. Nowadays we would class the Ficino we meet in the *Epistolae* along with Petrarch as a "man of letters." Certain of the letters, such as 1.123, 3.13, and 3.18, discuss the role of philosophy, the discipline which Ficino, above all, professed. 3.19 represents the *Life of Plato.* This letter exemplifies the way in which certain letters doubled as prefatory material to Ficino's original works, translations, and commentaries, thus acquiring great significance for his total *oeuvre,* for an early version of it formed the first chapter of Ficino's commentary on Plato's *Philebus* (n. 1). A student unfamiliar with Ficino who might be daunted by a treatise occupying a hundred closely-printed Renaissance folios in the Basle edition will be allured gradually into his ways of thinking by browsing in the *Letters.* An advanced scholar can find useful material on his specialty by sifting the *Letters* through the various indices available: the index of the Basle edition, those in the editions under review, and the detailed *index sententiarum* appended to the Italian translation of the *Epistolae* by Filippo Figliucci in the sixteenth century. The translators are to be commended for what is obviously a labor of love.

Cornell University *Carol V. Kaske*

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Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early Middle Ages. By J.J.E. Gracia. Washington, DC: Catholic Univ. of America Press, 1984. Pp. 302. $54.95.

This volume is largely about the fortunes of what Gracia calls the Standard Theory of Individuality, or STI. According to Gracia, early medieval writers in the Latin West were led to the STI by their reading of Porphyry and Boethius, and this theory flourished there until the mid-twelfth century (p. 125). The STI's tenets were (1) that individuality is a kind of difference or distinction from other things, (2) that only substances are individual, and (3) that substances are rendered individual by the collection of (chiefly accidental) features associated with them (pp. 125-127). Gracia adds that (4) proponents of the STI regularly failed to distinguish the epistemic problem of individuation (that is, the question of what renders an individual discernible from another individual) from the ontological problem of individuation (the question of what accounts for a thing's being individual, rather than for the possibility that we perceive it to be individual) (p. 126). Gracia discusses Porphyry and Boethius, STI's sources, Eriugena, Odo of Tours, William of St. Thierry and John of Salisbury, who are said to be among its orthodox exponents, and also Gilbert of Poitiers and Abelard, who in various ways departed from the theory even before the tide of Aristotelianism swept it aside. The book opens with a terse but wide-ranging subsequent historical exploration. In this chapter, Gracia distinguishes several areas of inquiry often conflated under the heading "individuation"—the intension of individuality, its extension, its ontological status, its cause, the discernibility of individuals and the function of proper names and indexicals. He also briefly indicates some strengths and weaknesses of a variety of competing theories on each of these questions, bringing in both medieval and contemporary analytic authors.

Gracia lists (4) as a "tenet" of STI (p. 126), though it is hard to see how a failure to realize that there is a distinction to be made can merit this title. In any event, (4) seems to underlie (3). We discern material individuals from one another by their perceptible features, such as color, shape and (most basically) location. If one does not distinguish epistemic from ontological individuation, one may well conclude from this that these features must be the real root of their bearers' individuality. (4) likely underlies (1) as well, since what we discover when we perceive two things to be discrete individuals is the things' difference or distinction from one another. (2) is motivated not so much by a view of individuality as by the widespread extreme realism of the day, realism's thesis being that things' attributes are general entities. (By contrast, later medieval realists insist that common natures as existing in particulars are themselves particularized.) So the STI proper seems to stem from a confusion of two very different questions, and a history of the STI in essence traces the story of early medieval philosophers' falling prey to this confusion and gradually freeing themselves from it. Again, Gracia states that the purpose of his opening discussion of individuation is to provide a framework for the historical investigation to come. But in practice, the distinctions Gracia makes serve largely to point out questions that the sources and partisans of the STI failed to discuss or even notice. Little if anything is written about the theories of individuation of Porphyry, Boethius, Eriugena, Odo of Tours, William of St. Thierry and John of Salisbury. Gracia's book exhibits just why this is so.

This volume thus poses an odd challenge for a reviewer. It is meticulously researched and carefully, if at times repetitiously, written. And the subject of individuation is of great philosophical import. But fully half of Gracia's book is spent examining a group of authors whose views on that subject have little more than purely historical interest—and given the STI's lack of influence after the twelfth century (p. 275-277), not much of that either. One cannot help but wonder, then, why the STI deserves the labor Gracia has given it. So in sum, the bulk of this book will be of use to a limited audience with an interest in the figures discussed or a curiosity about the rise and fall of a poor theory. Non-medievalists will likely find little beyond the opening treatment of individuation and perhaps the discussion of Abelard to interest them.

Fordham University *Brian Leftow*

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Knowing the Unknowable God: Ibn-Sina, Maimonides, Aquinas. By David C. Burrell, C.S.C. Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1986. Pp. 130. $15.95

In a brief but very stimulating monograph, Burrell brings out the importance of inter-faith and transcultural communication for mediaeval philosophy. The Muslim theologian, Ibn-Sina, influenced the Jewish theologian, Maimonides. Both of them influenced Aquinas. All three were committed by their respective religious faiths to the existence of a transcendent God, the Creator of all things in the world. Distinct from the world as its Creator, their God could not be known in the same way in which the things in the world could be known. The Creator-God of their faith was "unknowable," yet, since all three addressed Him their prayers, all three had also to hold that the names which they applied to Him while praying gave them some knowledge of who He was.

Thus, when they reflected on their faith, the three philosophical theologians were confronted in succession with the same set of problems. The relation between the "unknown" God and His creation had to be determined philosophically in a way which preserved the "distinction" between the transcendent God and the created universe without rendering His active presence in it incomprehensible. God's "nature" had to be determined by discovering what attributes could be affirmed of it from our knowledge of the "things within the world." And, finally, since the three faiths proclaimed that their transcendent God directed the free contingent actions of His creatures through His providence, each theologian had to work out the relation between God's eternal knowledge and the freedom and contingency of human action.

The three theologians inherited a Neoplatonic schema in which contingent, composite secondary beings proceeded from the simple, necessary first. Knowing the simple primary being through the composite multitude of its emanations, men could return to that first being through knowledge and love. The metaphysics of being, procession and knowledge then held the key to the philosophical development of this common schema. Burrell traces their evolution, step by step, as he makes his way from Ibn-Sina through Maimonides to Aquinas.

Ibn-Sina began the evolution with his distinction between essence and existence in composite secondary beings. For him existence, in appearance at least, was something like a superadded property. It was not yet Thomas' *esse,* the act which confers the whole of its reality on the singular existing being. For Avicenna, the ideal of knowledge, realized perfectly in the first being, was Aristotle's speculative knowledge. Secondary beings then proceeded from the first with the necessity of conclusions flowing from a premiss. Universals alone were knowable, and so the Provident One knew material individuals only as instantiations of a species. His providence could not extend to material individuals in their singularity.

Maimonides' devotion to the Torah required him to break with Ibn-Sina by affirming God's knowledge of singulars and the human freedom which belief in personal providence entailed. As a philosopher, he also saw that Ibn-Sina's commitment to Aristotle's ideal of speculative knowledge had been mistaken. Aristotle's second form of knowledge, the practical knowledge of the artist, which allowed for freedom in the maker and contingency in the made, should be the model for God's knowledge. Maimonides did not develop this discovery. Neither could he reconcile his logic of attribution—which entailed composition between an attribute and its subject—with the divine simplicity. Hence his agnosticism.

The third theologian in the series, Aquinas, solved both problems through two striking moves. Existence became the act which gives singular beings their entire reality. God then was existence rather than essence. Through His practical knowledge, which allowed for freedom and contingency, God gave to every individual being, through the activity of creation, a share in the *esse* which He was.

Aquinas' innovations in the metaphysics of being and knowledge led to significant changes in the logic of the divine names. Being, simplicity, goodness, infinity and eternity were no longer properties applied to a subject. They were formal features of God's existence determining the *how*

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of attributing attributes to it. Existence could not be considered any more as a sort of undetermined subject to which attributes were logically super-added. Existence was the infinite act which by identity already contained within itself any attribute affirmed of it. Thomas' account of understanding and of the judgment justified analogous attribution of the divine attributes identified with God's existence.

Burrell's discussion of the logic of attribution is very relevant to contemporary philosophy of God. This brief but profound little book, therefore, should be of interest to philosophers whose interests extend beyond mediaeval philosophy. Not all will agree with it, but they will find in it stimulus for reflection and discussion.

Fordham University *Gerald A. McCool, S.J.*

Augustine. By Henry Chadwick. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986. Pp. vi & 122.

This is another in the series of tidy but comprehensive summaries on "Past Masters," each written, as this one is, by an acknowledged expert. In a style both sober and lucid, Chadwick presents ten chapters introducing the reader to the influences which played a part in the "formation" of Augustine's mind, to the development recorded in his early works, to his conversion and *Confessions,* and to the themes that occupied him while dealing with the Donatist and Pelagian heresies, the mystery of the Trinity, and the recrudescence of paganism that prompted *The City of God.* The book is a marvel of comprehension achieved without any loss of clarity. As a connected account of Augustine, the thinker, it will doubtless stand as among the most popular which now exist.

One is repeatedly struck by the easy grace and sane judgment with which Chadwick picks his way through the minefields of conflicting scholarly opinion. Especially good are his treatments of Manichaeism, of the "soldier of Christ" motif as it appealed to the recent convert, and of the themes and intentions Augustine encased in his *Confessions.* This "past master" has found the master expositor he deserves.

The positions which Chadwick advocates are regularly the conservative and hence presumptively reliable kind appropriate to a series of this nature. Even granted the legitimacy of that stance, though, there are puzzles, not all of them minor: one would have to ask, for example, whether the mother of Adeodatus was Augustine's "concubine" (p. 12) or "common-law wife" (p. 15); whether the Platonic "Forms" were truly "universals," or "abstractions" (p. 18; p. 95), and whether Neo-Platonic Matter was a product of Soul (p. 19; cf. p. 20). Given what Chadwick has told us of Manichaeism's pretensions, it is scarcely accurate to say so flatly that the pre-conversion Augustine was not a Christian (pp. 23-24). And the new convert's preoccupation with Academic skepticism arose less from the quest for "truth" in our usual sense of the term, than from a conscious quest for the "Truth" he envisaged, and even then (and quite possibly as early as his nineteenth year!) it was Truth as the Eternal Christ (p. 51). Even the "reliable" authorities Chadwick selects for his reading list (p. 120) would find his affirmations on all the above in need of honing; and in several instances it makes an important difference to our understanding and appreciation of Augustine's thought.

But there are other questions which more recent scholarship would raise about this study: did Porphyry wield all the positive influence Chadwick seems to think he did (pp. 20-21 and *passim*)? Is "memory," for Augustine, all that distinct from "illumination" (p. 22)? Is there more to our relationship with sinful Adam than the juridical and biological links Chadwick mentions (p. 111)? And would a closer analysis of our human "fallen-ness" (p. 61) require revision of what Chadwick has written about our souls' temporal condition (pp. 71-72)? Especially since the book is so well done, and since Chadwick's deserved prestige will "sell" it for an appreciable time, it might have

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been fairer to breathe a hint that, on these and on associated issues, all is by no means so serenely settled as Chadwick's readers might innocently suppose. And yet, on an escutcheon so bright, these blots are minor.

Fordham University *Robert J. O'Connell, S.J.*

The Philosophy of Leibniz: Metaphysics and Language. By Benson Mates. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986. Pp. 271. $29.95.

This book is a critical exposition of the fundamental elements of Leibniz's philosophy. Mates follows the recent trend in Leibnizian scholarship which opposes the view of Leibniz as the author of a purely deductive system which begins with certain intuitive or self-evident truths and then tries to deduce the rest from these. Stuart Brown in his recent work, *Leibniz* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984), argued that Leibniz's method is properly understood as one of hypothetico-deductive response to an array of practical and theoretical problems. Mates' interpretation is compatible with Brown's but his emphasis is on the internal coherence of Leibniz's systematic constructions. For Mates, Leibniz's doctrines are "simply a network of important truths that have many interesting logical interrelationships" (p. 4). Some of the standard objections about "question begging" or "vicious circles" are thus out of place since they presuppose that Leibniz was a rationalist in the sense that he intended to work out a purely deductive system. Understood in Mates' fashion, you can begin an exposition of Leibniz's thought just about anywhere, since everything is ultimately connected with everything else. His metaphysics can be derived from his logic, or his logic from his metaphysics; it all depends on where one wants to begin. In this way Mates sees disputes which were current earlier in this century, such as that between Bertrand Russell and Louis Couturat concerning the relative priority of Leibniz's metaphysics or logic, to be futile and misconceived.

Anyone who has worked even casually at Leibniz's philosophy knows how difficult it is to try to command an adequate knowledge of the text. Leibniz published only one book in his lifetime, the *Theodicy.* Most of his better work, Mates points out, is contained "in the great mass of letters, drafts, notes and bits and pieces he left behind, most of which are preserved in the State Library of Lower Saxony, in Hanover, Germany. Some of this material has been published, but a large amount remains unedited. Two World Wars have delayed the work of the Berlin Academy in producing a definitive collection of Leibniz's writings. Nevertheless, Mates has done extensive research on the material which has been made available by scholars at the Leibniz Archive in Hanover and the Leibniz Research Center at Münster. One feels confident that Mates has as much mastery of Leibniz's text as is possible at this time. When Mates concludes, as he occasionally does, that, despite his most persistent efforts at comprehension, a particular doctrine of Leibniz still does not completely make sense to him, one is sure that it is not because Mates has not taken the trouble to try to consider all the available pieces.

Mates devotes a very valuable first chapter to a discussion of Leibniz's life and works. He makes available much more material in this area than one would expect in a book which deals mainly with Leibniz's philosophy. However, an appreciation of Leibniz's many projects and cosmopolitan concerns is good background for appreciating some of the very disparate elements in his philosophy. Mates also does his best to dispel what he regards as Russell's unfortunate charge that, while Leibniz was certainly a distinguished philosopher, as a human being he "was not admirable." Russell claimed that Leibniz had a public and a private philosophy. The public one, in which the Deity plays a major role, was designed to please people in high places; the private one, in which the origin of the world is explained without reference to God, represented Leibniz's real beliefs, according to Russell. Mates claims that a careful study of all the material, some of which was not available when Russell wrote, makes it quite clear that Leibniz was a sincere believer, even if not a

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distinguished churchgoer. "The 'esoteric' philosophy, which Russell says was left unpublished in Leibniz's desk, turns out to be all of a piece with the exoteric doctrine he put before the public" (p. 16).

Mates' second chapter is a ten page summary of Leibniz's "System in Outline." This is the best short summary of Leibniz's main doctrines which I have come across. Teachers who are looking for a brief reliable account of what Leibniz is all about to put in the hands of their advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students could hardly do better, and could certainly do much worse, than to refer them to this chapter. Mates writes with the clarity and precision which we would expect from his previously published works; he does not get bogged down in overly technical, formal analyses, nor does he give in to the temptation to fudge difficult issues.

The summary chapter is followed by eleven additional chapters in each of which Mates pursues at greater depth one or another of the topics which have been discussed or implied in the summary chapter. Many of these topics are of interest not only to students of Leibniz but also to metaphysicians or logicians who have been pursuing these matters independently of any concern with Leibniz. A list of the main topics will give the reader a sense of the rich variety of material here discussed: Propositions and Concepts; Possible Worlds; Truth; Necessary and Contingent Truths; Identity in the Actual World; Cross-World Identity; the Principles of Identity, of Sufficient Reason, of Continuity, and of the Best; Leibniz's Nominalism and the *Lingua Philosophica*; Leibnizian Substances; Relations and Denominations; Space and Time.

One feature of Mates' interpretation, frequently neglected by other commentators, is the importance he sees in Leibniz's distinction between essential and existential propositions. Any proposition 'A is B,' according to Leibniz, is equivalent to the proposition 'AB is an entity.' But "entity" is ambiguous; it can mean any "possible thing" or an "actually existing thing." Thus, "Pegasus is a winged horse" is true if understood as an essential proposition, but false if understood as an existential proposition. Attending to this distinction enables Mates to offer a solution to the earlier dispute between himself and other scholars, such as Theo Meijering, concerning Leibniz's doctrine that an affirmation is true if its predicate is contained in its subject. Mates now agrees with Meijering that Predicate-in-Subject containment is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the truth of a proposition, if the proposition is understood as an essential proposition (p. 86).

Mates confines himself almost exclusively to internal criticism of Leibniz's doctrines. This is certainly satisfactory in a book of this nature, since radically calling into question various presuppositions of Leibniz may be a very valuable thing to do from a purely philosophical perspective, but probably better comes after the kind of sympathetic efforts at comprehension which Mates offers. He makes clear, however, that his ultimate judgment on Leibniz's doctrine is that it strikes him "as a certainly interesting and perhaps heuristically useful fairy story" (p. 4).

It is this kind of dispassionate objectivity which enables Mates to recognize the importance of distinctively theological questions to Leibniz, and yet deliberately to exclude them from center stage in his discussion, because, apparently, of his own lack of interest in these topics. Mates has written what is now probably the best general account of Leibniz's philosophy from the perspective of the logician and general metaphysician. It does, however, leave those of us who still retain an interest in theology wondering what more there may be to learn from Leibniz if his theology were to be taken seriously by a philosopher interested in theology.

Fordham University *Vincent M. Cooke, S.J.*

Nagarjuna: The Philosophy of the Middle Way. Mulamadhyamakakarika. Sanskrit text with Introduction. English Translation and Annotation by David Kalupahana. New York: SUNY Press, 1986. Pp. 412. $49.50.

Kalupahana's new version of Nagarjuna's masterpiece attempts to distinguish the philosopher's original position from the idealistic interpretations of Candrakirti, the classical commentator, and from sectarian polemics of the later Mahayana. He makes a strong case on both counts.

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Kalupahana's Nagarjuna does not turn his back on the discourses of the Buddha preserved by the Nagarjunists; indeed, he follows one of these rather closely. Neither does he attack the Abhidharma phenomenology of early Buddhism, though he criticizes its ontological interpretation by the Sarvastivada and Sautrantika schools. While asserting that all beings are essentially "empty" (*shunya*), he does not reify the Void (*Shunyata*) as his followers will, much less does he picture all beings or thoughts as emanations of it. That picture of an unreal world emanating from a reality beyond any possible prediction will become a Buddhist-Hindu commonplace. Kalupahana's interpretation aligns Nagarjuna with the radical empiricism of William James and the linguistic philosophy of the young Wittgenstein rather than with the schools of Zeno, Pyrrho, or Plotinus.

Kalupahana uses comparisons with Western philosophy merely for the purpose of illustration. He is less concerned with whether Nagarjuna anticipates this or that modern Western thinker, than with whether his work is an authentic development of Buddhism and whether it is faithfully interpreted by later commentaries. According to Kalupahana, Nagarjuna's destruction of metaphysics is fully compatible with the early Abhidharma philosophy, and fundamentally misrepresented by later voidism and idealism. He suspects that these later trends, by recasting Buddhism in the mold of Hindu philosophy, contributed to its extinction in India. There are some grounds for this suspicion, though many Hindus claim with equal reason, that Shankara and the other theorists of cosmic illusion who come just after the heyday of Buddhism, were themselves Buddhists in disguise! It may be that some kinds of idealism cut the heart out of the moral and religious life of any denomination, even though they are based on the mystic's testimony that nothing else could be real as his Lord is real. Mysticism of this sort has nothing to do with the teaching of the Buddha.

Kalupahana believes deeply in the possibility of a philosophical Buddhism which is non-sectarian in spirit. He is, therefore, concerned to show the seminal thinker of the Mahayana as the fruit of earlier tradition rather than its refutation. To do this he must distinguish between Nagarjuna's madhyamaha position and the idealism of his yogacara commentators, and posit a similar distinction of the Sarvastivadim and Sautrantika commentaries. The present work is a giant step in that direction, and it will be interesting to see how it fares under expert criticism. It is well to remember that Abhidharma, Madhyamaka, and Yogacara have been studied side by side in Tibetan religious houses: ecumenical Buddhism is not an idle fancy. The real test will be whether Theravadin scholars accept Kalupahana's purified Nagarjuna as an orthodox Buddhist in full conformity with the Abhidharma.

It would be presumptuous for this reviewer to pretend to judge this translation as a translation. It is, however, possible to note that Kalupahana gives good grounds for his interpretations, and states them clearly and persuasively. His methodology is as sound as it is unusual, seeing Nagarjuna in the light of the texts and schools with which he was familiar, rather than the later developments to which his position would give rise. The translation does not disguise the knottiness of the original, and the reader is grateful for a preceding comprehensive synopsis. It remains an exceedingly difficult work, but at least the difficulties are intrinsic rather than artificial, and Kalupahana's conviction that Nagarjuna is of more than academic interest carries one along.

New York *Frank Purcell*

The Moral Dimensions of Politics. By Richard J. Regan, S.J. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986. Pp. 204.

Within recent years, a number of remarkable and too little attended books have come from Catholic and natural law sources that bear considerable study in social philosophy. I am thinking mainly of John Finnis' *Natural Law and Natural Right,* Thomas Molnar's *Politics and the State,* Henry Veatch's *Natural Law: Fact or Fancy?,* Roger Charles' *The Social Teachings of Vatican II,* Michael Novak's *Freedom with Justice,* John J. Schrems' *Principles of Politics,* and James Wiser's *Political Theory: A Thematic Inquiry.* Richard Regan's contribution to this list is noteworthy and deserves attention.

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In the first place, Regan attempts simply to state clearly the intellectual tradition of Aristotle and Aquinas in terms intelligible to the modern reader. At the same time, he has given a minimal account of the main sorts of opposition in modern thought to this position and why this opposition is problematic in terms of the Aristotelain-Thomistic tradition. Finally, Regan endeavors to indicate some general areas wherein this tradition is of particular applicability, notably to questions of war and development.

Contrary to so much writing in the religio-political field by theologians and other advocates, this study is quite devoid of ideological overtones from modern philosophy disguised as Christianity. Regan clearly understands the danger of transforming Christian thought into merely another advocacy for pacifism, socialism, marxism, or some other such political movement. In this sense, this is an anti-utopian book in the best sense. That is, in understanding the limits of politics and economics, it can attempt to state prudently and clearly what it is that might be possible and reasonable.

Though Regan does mention, say, Rawls, this book leaves untouched the context of modern political philosophy as this is seen in Strauss, or Voegelin, or Arendt. This is unfortunate, I think, in a way, because it does not address the deeper issues in terms of which alone Aristotle or Thomas can be understood and defended before modern thought.

Regan's discussions of war and economy are careful and refreshing. I have never been enamored with the phrase "welfare capitalism" when applied to a sensible free market system, but it is in common usage and Regan defines the way he uses it. Sentences like "modern welfare capitalism contains both capitalist and communist principles..." (p. 128) seem confused to me, but this is probably nothing more than the classic discussion from Aristotle and Plato.

In this text, I still did not have the sense of what it means to create a productive economy, but Regan's analysis is a far cry better than most in recognizing that something broader than the minimal welfare of peoples is the ultimate aim of the social order. He also understands that Marxism does not work. There is, however, little of P. T. Bauer's attention in development questions to the intellectual and moral duties of those who need a productive economy.

The chapters on war, modern, nuclear, and revolutionary, are judicious and thorough. Regan admits that many of his conclusions are tentative and that prudent men could come up with other conclusions on particular points. However, Regan for the most part is willing to admit the need of force and the centrality of freedom. He judges Truman's use of atomic weapons to be immoral because of the actual deaths (p. 156). I can easily imagine a moral discussion like this one to judge *ex post facto* that not dropping the bomb was immoral after, *ex hypothesi,* the allies had gone ahead and invaded Japan and, as a result, one or two million were killed plus the material damage.

Indeed, I often wonder whether texts like these cannot become handbooks for the operators of the worst regime to gain control. Regan's only defense against this is to cite the *Crito* (p. 171). But this is why more on modern political philosophy, especially on Hobbes, might have been in order since the establishment of the worst state in which the distinction of good and evil was not possible was what we were trying to prevent. What seems to win out in this case is not virtue, but the continuance of life at any cost.

Too, I find some difficulty with Regan's footnote #2, p. 194 to the effect that the domino effect did not happen after the Vietnamese war. It seems rather that Cambodia and Laos suggest it did, and that, rather than accounting for these horrors as signs that the unfortunate war was more just than we thought, we are left with the implication that the standard version of the war was correct.

But these are minor points. This is a very excellent effort, well worth study and wide readership. Regan attempted to keep the arguments spare to the point. He is most balanced in ways that are not common today among religious and academic-based writers. He writes in straightforward terms and makes the classical arguments come alive in modern contexts. The book is, hopefully, a sign of a much more careful and reasonable spirit arising in religious academic circles.

Georgetown University *James V. Schall, S.J.*

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Due to a printing error on page 379 which appeared in Issue 104, Volume XXVI, No. 4, we have reprinted the corrected page. Please tear out the page as it appears in that issue and replace it with this page.

be "Graph Theory," an offshoot of topology[5]. Peirce's awareness of, and participation in, the early development of graph theory is a story yet to be told.

I believe that MS 482 represents at least one place where Peirce came very close to stating explicitly the reduction proof in terms of valency analysis. So what I present here (based on MS 482 and allied items) will include a reconstruction of what that proof might have been if it had been fully displayed.

Why did Peirce not present valency analysis or this proof in an explicit manner? The best speculation I can produce so far is that it was simple, as he often stated (for example, MS 292:80). Peirce was an accomplished mathematician, and it might have been a potential source of embarassment to him to have written out such a "simple" presentation—he may have thought other mathematicians might regard it, and him, as trivial. And perhaps it is in the context of research-level mathematicians, but the application of it in the theory of categories, and elsewhere in Peirce's system of science, is far from trivial. I should add that I have presented only one aspect of MS 482, and when the whole piece has been fully studied it may involve items that even a research mathematician would regard as important.

PART ONE: VALENCY ANALYSIS

Let

[Fig. 1]

represent an entity with one "loose end," and let it be named "Monad." Let an entity with two loose ends

[Fig. 2]

be named "Dyad." Let

[Fig. 3]

an entity with three loose ends, be named "Triad." Let an entity with N loose ends be named a "spot." (Monads, dyads, and triads are also spots.) What I am here describing as an "entity" is some as yet unanalyzed relation name. For example, consider a triad: the entity could be specified as



[Fig. 4]

or as 

[Fig. 5]

[5]N.L. Biggs, E.K. Lloyd, and R.J. Wilson, *Graph Theory 1736–1936* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1976).

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Sarah Lawrence Coll.

The Metaphysics of Claude Lévi-Strauss' Structuralism: Two Views

Robert L. Zimmerman

THIS PAPER is divided into three parts. In the first section I attempt to make explicit and clarify the metaphysical assumptions and commitments which provide the basis for C. Lévi-Strauss' anthropology. In the second section, I offer a critique of what I take to be an unresolved tension or even contradiction in his metaphysic. I work at exposing this central logical problem by utilizing the perspective and critical canons of so-called analytic philosophy (although I don't want to claim that all philosophers working in that tradition would agree with me). In the third section, I offer an exposition of J. Derrida's critique of the metaphysics of structuralism, Heideggerean in spirit, in an effort to illuminate how the other dominant persuasion within modern thought, viz. so-called speculative philosophy, sizes up and assesses Lévi-Strauss' system. It goes without saying that the conclusions reached by the Derridaen-Heideggerean approach are both different from the conclusions reached by the analytic approach, *and* that not all philosophers using the speculative approach would necessarily agree with me. My primary aim in involving both approaches is to shed as much light as I can on the metaphysics of Lévi-Strauss' structuralism. My second aim—more nearly a hope—is to use Lévi-Strauss' thought as a paradigm in terms of which the hermeneutical possibilities of both approaches can be thrust into relief. My third aim—utopian to say the least—is to reach some philosophically substantive conclusions about the two traditions themselves and their possible *rapprochement*.

I

In *Totemism* Lévi-Strauss states that structuralism has "rescued" associational psychology from "discredit." He says, "It is certainly the case that one consequence of modern structuralism (not, however, clearly enunciated) ought to be to rescue associational psychology from the discredit into which it has fallen."[1] This would seem to place structuralism in the empiricist tradition of, for example, John Stuart Mill, who held, in his *System of Logic,* that the associations between states of consciousness, once fully and properly mapped, would articulate the "Laws of Mind" governing all human thought. Mill went on to develop the consequences of this and evolved both a conception of the relation between psychology — the science which uncovered the Laws of Mind—and the other social sciences—which were in principle reducible to psychology

[1]C. Lévi-Strauss, *Totemism* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 90.

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—and a methodology for the social sciences which still, with numerous modifications, governs the thinking of many social scientists and philosophers of science. And, it is fair to say, that, with modification, it is a theory of human psychology which is operative in the thinking of Lévi-Strauss. Thus in *Totemism,* he approvingly quotes Radcliffe-Brown to the effect that, "The Australian idea of what is here called 'opposition' is a particular application of that association by contrareity that is a universal feature of human thinking, so that we think by pairs of contraries, upwards and downwards, strong and weak, black and white."[2] Admittedly contrareity and opposition were not singled out as the governing principles of associational thinking by Mill, but it is certainly consistent with his thinking and easily assimilable to his conception. Thus, in general terms, it can be said that structuralism is a direct descendent of associationalism.

Still, notwithstanding the continuity between associationalism and structuralism, Lévi-Strauss does not simply hold a modified version of it. Because he rejects its empiricist epistemology, he, in effect, understands associationalism in terms very different from those of Mill. He concedes that associationalism succeeded in articulating the contours of the elementary logic which governs human thinking, but points out that it failed because it conceived of this logic as "an inert product of the action of the environment on an amorphous consciousness."[3] The critical terms here are "an inert product," "the action of the environment," and "an amorphous consciousness." Lévi-Strauss does not believe that the elementary logic which governs all human thinking *is* an "inert product" engraved on "an amorphous consciousness" by "the action of the environment." The associationalists (David Hume, e.g.) explained the constant association or conjunction of states of mind empirically. That is, they believed that conscious state *x* was associated with conscious state *y* originally because perceptions of the world yielded sense-impressions of event *x* and event *y* in repeated temporal and spatial sequence. The subsequent association of the two conscious states was a function of these original perceptions: a mirroring process ensued. The mind was habituated to the event *x*-event *y* linkage by its experience and, ultimately, even in the absence of the actual *x* or *y,* it came independently, spontaneously, and lawfully to associate them in thought. An amorphous consciousness, through the actions of the environment, had an inert product engraved upon it.

We all know how the critical philosophy of Kant turned this human empiricism around, how Kant played Copernicus to it. And Lévi-Strauss follows suit. It is not, he tells us, the action of the environment on an amorphous consciousness that produces the linkages between conscious states: it is rather "the structure of the mind."[4] One cannot, according to Lévi-Strauss, interpret the recurrent associations of mental states as an internalizing process, as a mirroring within the mind of what it has observed outside itself in the world. Constant conjunction and habituation will not do. Rather the associated states recur because the human mind *a priori* simply associates certain states of consciousness. It is not that experience and observation are irrelevant: they just do not explain. Like Kant, Lévi-Strauss locates the bonds between states of consciousness in the transcendental structure of the human mind. Consciousness is neither amorphous—it has an internal and inherent structure—nor are its workings simply the inert product of the action of an environment upon it—its workings are dynamic, active, intrinsic to

[2] *Ibid.,* p. 90.
[3] *Ibid.,* p. 90.
[4] *Ibid.,* p. 90.

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it, and substantially independent of that environment. It is because of the way we think that we experience events as associated; we do not think of events as associated because of how we have experienced them.

Thus the relation between modern structuralism and classical associationalism is analogous to the relation between Hume's empiricism and Kant's critical philosophy. Structuralism goes beyond associationalism in locating the links between events and states of consciousness in the grid the human mind imposes upon its experience, just as Kant went beyond Hume in locating the relations between events and states of consciousness in the *a priori* structure that the human mind imparts to the sensuous manifold. All parties agree on the facts but disagree on what grounds explain them.

That Lévi-Strauss is a Kantian should, of course, surprise nobody. The epigraph from *Totemism* is a quote from A. Comte in which the French sociologist and father of positivism says, "The laws of logic which ultimately govern the world of the mind are, by their nature, essentially invariable: they are common not only to all periods and places but to all subjects of whatever kind. . . .[5] In *The Savage Mind,* as if to specify this in anthropological terms, he says, "Ethnographic analysis has to arrive at invariants beyond the empirical diversity of human societies."[6] And, in *The Raw and the Cooked,* describing the intention behind his work he says,

> Starting from ethnographic experience, I have always aimed at drawing up an inventory of mental patterns to reduce apparently arbitrary data to some kind of order and to attain a level at which a kind of necessity becomes apparent underlying the illusion of liberty. . . . In allowing myself to be guided by the search for the constraining structures of mind, I am proceeding in the manner of Kantian philosophy. . . .[7]

Little more is needed to convince one of the Kantian metaphysics and methodology at work in Lévi-Strauss' thought.

What is perplexing about his Kantianism, however, is that however much in evidence it is, however much it is avowed, it is also surprisingly disavowed by him. Or at least, and this is the heart of the perplexity, it is not clear in what sense it is avowed and in what sense it is disavowed. For while he speaks with an unequivocal Kantian accent, he also accepts the label of materialist and reductionist. In *The Savage Mind,* in the middle of a retort to Sartre, Lévi-Strauss characterizes the goal of the human sciences as that of "dissolving" man. He reiterates his Kantianism, saying, "Ethnographic analysis tries to arrive at invariants beyond the empirical diversity of human societies,"[8] but he calls it, ". . . the first step in a procedure which involves others."[9] And those others, the procedures that come after and presumably represent a deeper analysis than the one ethnography presents, he describes as ". . . the reintegration of culture in nature and finally of life within the whole of its physico-chemical conditions."[10] He adds in a footnote, "The opposition between nature and culture to which I attached much importance at one time now seems to me to be of primarily methodological importance."[11] He goes

[5] *Ibid.*, the Epigraph.
[6] C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1966), p. 247.
[7] C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked* (N.Y.: Harper and Row), p. 10.
[8] *Ibid.*, p. 11.
[9] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[10] *Ibid.*, p. 12.
[11] C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind,* p. 247.

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even further in the 1966 edition of *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* by allowing that the nature/culture dichotomy or bi-polarity is "an artificial creation of culture, a protective rampart thrown up around it." He continues, and presses his materialistic monism, by observing,

> . . . the interrelationship between nature and culture does not favor culture to the extent of [culture] being hierarchically superimposed on nature and irreducible to it. Rather, [culture] takes the form of a . . . duplication of mechanisms already in existence [in nature] a duplication, moreover, permitted by the emergence of certain cerebral structures which themselves belong to nature.[12]

Thus the ultimate explanation of the "empirical diversity of human societies" is the reduction of that diversity into physico-chemical terms, i.e., a materialist rendering or translation of them. Ethnography takes but the first step—it locates what is invariant culturally in human societies, "primitive" *and* "modern," and, ideally, through these structural constants, maps out the form of Thought-As-Such, the recurrent, ineliminable, Kantian form of "possible experience" which pervades all human social life. But that is to be followed by successive reductions and to end in final and ultimate reductions or explanations couched in terms of the materialistic metaphysic of the physical sciences.

Although surprising and even somewhat baffling (after all, Kantian necessity is ruled out by materialist contingency), this string in Lévi-Strauss' thought should not strike us as "out of the blue," so to speak. In *Totemism* he had already indicated that tendency. There, in speaking about the ". . . elementary logic, which is like the least common denominator of all thought . . .," he had characterized it as, ". . . a direct expression of the structure of the mind (and behind the mind . . . of the brain).[13] And in *The Savage Mind* he characterized the thinking of the historian in the following terms:

> . . . a historical fact is what really took place, but where did anything take place? Each episode in a revolution or a war resolves itself into a multitude of individual psychic movements. Each of these movements is the translation of unconscious developments, and these resolve themselves into cerebral, hormonal, or nervous phenomena, which themselves have reference to the physical or chemical order.[14]

Finally, with respect to mathematical thinking, he says, ". . . mathematical thought . . . reflects the free functioning of the mind, that is, the activity of the cells in the cerebral cortex . . . obeying only its own laws." His Kantianism seems indeed to be methodological rather than metaphysical![15]

But, and here both the perplexity I alluded to earlier and the complexity and ingenuity of his reflections become apparent, Lévi-Strauss resists allowing his thought to be conceived of as *simply* reductive, *simply* materialist. Or rather he presents us with a conception of what it means to reduce something to something else—the mind to the brain, life to matter—such that one has difficulty in knowing to *what* he is metaphysically committed. He seems to avow materialism, but at the same time he seems unwilling to deny a

[12] C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Elementary Structures of Kinship* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1969), pp. xxix, xxx.
[13] C. Lévi-Strauss, *Totemism*, p. 90.
[14] C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind*, p. 257.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 248.

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kind of ultimate reality to other than physical states of affairs. Thus, in *The Savage Mind,* he says, "... the verb 'dissolve' does not in any way imply (but even excludes) the destruction of the constituents of the body subjected to the action of another body." He cites the dissolution of the molecules of a solid in a liquid as evidence of this by pointing out that these molecules are "put by" so that, "... they can be recovered in case of need and their properties be better studied."[16] In this case the molecules of the dissolved entity remain existent in the dissolving substance although not connected as they were in their original predissolved form. Presumably, reducing life to matter or consciousness to physical brain states works the same way. In claiming that the former are reducible to the latter one has not destroyed or eliminated the former.

Lévi-Strauss adds to this interesting conception of reductionism two further qualifications. He says,

> The reductions I am envisaging are ... legitimate, or indeed possible, only if two conditions are satisfied. First, the phenomena subjected to reduction must not be impoverished; one must be certain that everything contributing to their distinctive richness and originality has been collected around them.... Secondly, one must be ready to accept, as a consequence of each reduction, the total overturning of any preconceived ideas concerning the level, whatever it may be, one is striving to attain. The idea of some general humanity to which ethnographic reduction leads, will bear no relation to any one may have formed in advance. And when we finally succeed in understanding life as a function of inert matter, it will be to discover that the latter has properties very different from those previously attributed to it. Levels of reduction cannot therefore be classed as superior and inferior, for the level taken as superior must, through the reduction, be expected to communicate retroactively some of its richness to the inferior level to which it will have been assimilated.[17]

Thus, by implication, when we reduce life to inert matter, we shall have a more dimensioned conception of inert matter, a conception which recasts the properties thought to have been peculiar and irreducibly a function of life as, rather, a function of inert matter. And when we succeed in reducing conscious states to brain states, we shall have a more dimensioned conception of brain states, a conception which re-casts the properties thought to be peculiarly and irreducibly a function of conscious states as rather a function of brain states. The usual problem about reductionism — e.g., the identity thesis of a materialist like J.J. Smart—simply would not occur or be a problem. One could not ask the kinds of questions many have raised in connection with the identity thesis. One could not, for example, ask how conscious states, which have no spatial location and which, by virtue of our having "first person," "privileged access" to them, provide us with a unique epistemic situation, could be reduced to being states which *do* have a spatial location and which *do not* allow us privileged access to them but rather "third person," observational, *inferential* knowledge. Or again, one could not ask how conscious states, which are often about "universals" (or at least non-particulars), and which have certain properties such as intentionality, could be reduced to brain states which are clearly *not* intentional nor about universals. Presumably, according to Lévi-Strauss, "not existing in some particular place," "having intentionality," and "being incorrigible" *would become* properties of brain states: conscious states could "communicate retroactively" these properties to brain states; the richness of the supe-

[16] *Ibid.*, p. 247.
[17] *Ibid.*, pp. 247-48.

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rior level would have been transmitted to the inferior level. Disparities between what one might call "levels of reality" would disappear since whatever was found on one level would also be found on the level "beneath" it. The dichotomies between life and matter and conscious states and brain states and the strenuous problems they have posed for philosophers would vanish.

II

Now, projecting or hypothesizing a scientifically legitimate conception of matter that locates consciousness and/or its ground within it, sounds, on first hearing, possible and plausible. But, I suggest that, in point of fact, it actually makes little, if any, sense. Minimally, it begs several questions and defies ordinary language. Let me spell this out.

I think Lévi-Strauss is misled here by seeing analogies where they do not exist. He sees an analogy between a single general humanity and the many particular humanities, on the one hand, and life and inert matter on the other; and just as, when we reduce the particular humanities to the general humanity, we must relocate features of the particulars in the general, thereby altering our preconceived idea of what the properties of a general humanity are, so when we reduce life to matter, we will have to alter our preconceived ideas of the properties of inert matter.

But surely the analogy is misleading. Phenomenologically, particular humanities differ from a general one, but both are, after all, humanities; phenomenologically, life and inert matter, and even more so consciousness and brain states, differ *qualitatively*. It is not like humans with different skin, hair, or eye color, all being humans nonetheless. The properties of consciousness and the properties of brain states are incommensurable. Conscious states are intentional; they have no mass; some, at least, have no place; and so on. These differences in kind have no parallels in the particular humanities/general humanity analogy.

If Lévi-Strauss were to retort to this line of criticism that it begs the question, it seems to me that the whole problem would vanish. Thus he could claim that such criticism simply defines the terms of the dualism in such a way that they can never be linked, whereas he has not so defined them. Rather he has left open the possibility that we might come to definitions of the terms such that they could be linked. Either we begin with levels of reality and we accept their qualitative, phenomenological differences and go on (somehow, somewhere) from there, or we *do not* begin with levels of reality, *do not* accept their qualitative, phenomenological differences, and instead see in our lower or lowest level what we also see in our higher or highest level. In the latter case, to make it wholly explicit, we have in theory at least—or so it seems—completely done away with (the entire problem of) "levels" of reality and the conceptual perplexities which most have found inherent in the thesis of materialistic reductionism.

Lévi-Strauss seems to come close to this last position when he says, "Scientific explanation consists not in moving from the complex to the simple but in the replacement of a less intelligible complexity by one which is more so."[18] Thus the difference between life and matter, and between consciousness and brain-states, lies not in their qualitative differences, whether phenomenologically perceived or scientifically inferred (where the former are more complex than the latter) but in their relative intelligibility. Thus he

[18] *Ibid.*, p. 248.

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says, in *The Savage Mind,* "... the truths learned through men are 'of the world'.... This holds even for mathematical truths ... mathematical thought ... reflects the mind ... the mind ... is a thing [and] the functioning of this thing teaches us something about the nature of things...."[19] Here he means to assert that, when we reach the stage of having located and specified the neuro-cerebral events to which mathematical thinking reduces and which it really is, then we will have rid ourselves of a scientifically unintelligible domain, namely, that occupied by an autonomous consciousness and its creations. We will have replaced it with a more intelligible domain occupied by physical, electromagnetic, gravitational, etc., particles and processes.

Once, however, inert matter has had the properties of life and consciousness "retroactively communicated" to it, it would not be less complex and more intelligible, but *more* complex and *less* intelligible. Surely a physical and/or energetic set of metaphysical ultimates carrying a spectrum of possible properties ranging from the conventionally materialist to, for example, mathematical thought, properties such as "describing non-spatial and a-temporal entities" or "describing non-existent, irrational, and imaginary entities" is an *enormously* complex, relatively (to me at least) *un*intelligible class of metaphysical ultimates—an ontological melting pot, as it were, with ingredients, some of which will not melt!

I think, in this context, that Lévi-Strauss is also misled by his other above-mentioned analogy, namely, the dissolution of a solid in a liquid. A solid is dissolved in a liquid by a process of diffusion, to speak loosely, *i.e.,* the molecules of the solid are distributed throughout the molecules of the liquid. The change that occurs is spatial. The molecules of a solid exist in portions of space after they have been dissolved different from those occupied before they had been dissolved. (There are other changes as well but they are all quantitative.) Now, notwithstanding these changes, we are dealing *only* with molecules—the molecules of a solid and those of a liquid and how they relate to each other—and not with different entities, namely, states of consciousness and physical brain states. One cannot really think of states of consciousness distributed throughout physical brain states in the way in which one can think of the molecules of the solid distributed throughout the molecules of the liquid. And, again, for the reasons I have already given, it will not do to respond that one begs the question by denying that states of consciousness can be distributed throughout physical brain states. As we have seen, this does not solve the problem, it just verbally glosses over it.

An interesting and relevant argument has recently been made (by Jacób Liszka) to the effect that Lévi-Strauss' meaning here must be grasped as an extension and extrapolation of R. Jakobson's semiotic model of the relation between phonemes and morphemes to the domain of the nature/culture opposition. Liszka points out that for Jakobson, "... signs organize themselves ... from ... non-meaningful units to meaningful complexes ... from the level of the phoneme [the acoustical, sound unit] ... to the level of the ... meaning unit, the morpheme.... The phoneme imparts meaning but never embodies it."[20] Jakobson himself says, "... it is one of the most essential dialectical antinomies of language that this literally most meaningful of all sign systems [i.e., language] is built up of empty, negative basic units."[21] Thus, just as sound (the

[19] *Ibid.,* p. 248.

[20] J. Liszka, "Peirce and Lévi-Strauss: the Metaphysics of Semiotic and the Semiosis of Metaphysics," *Idealistic Studies,* 12 (1982), p. 117.

[21] R. Jakobson, *Selected Writings* (The Hague: Mouton, 1971), vol. 1, p. 19.

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phoneme) yields sense (the morpheme), so elementary particles and energies (nature) yield consciousness and meaning (culture). But surely there is some agency which mediates sounds taking on sense, namely, humans who engage in linguistic activity, just what is absent in the nature/culture analogy. There is, quite simply, no mediating agent for Lévi-Strauss which enables the former to manifest or develop the latter. His material rules out the kind of transcendant, divine agency required to negotiate or enable this ontological phenomenon. Thus even if the Jakobsonian semiotic model is at work in Lévi-Strauss' thinking, it is not of very much help.

The metaphysics of Lévi-Strauss' structuralism seems, then, to be plagued by serious problems. It is thus, I conclude—and with that the first and second sections of this paper —an inadequate metaphysic. It would seem that Lévi-Strauss needs to commit himself either to the materialistic, monistic strain in his thinking or to his Kantian strain. The first alternative implies reductionism and so a rejection of Kantianism. Thus he would give up all claims to having demonstrated an element of necessity in the structures and relations he has allegedly discovered and instead allow only for explanations which, *qua* scientific, carry only probability and contingency. On the second alternative, he is committed to affirming the universality and necessity (the *a priori* character, so to speak) of the invariant structures which he has allegedly discovered and so to accept the metaphysical dualism therein implied (rejecting, therefore, the monism thereby ruled out). He would be further committed to rejecting his reduction of consciousness and culture to thing-hood and nature.[22] I now turn to the third section of this paper which treats of Derrida's reading of Lévi-Strauss.

III

Derrida's analysis and critique of Lévi-Strauss' structuralism are both of a piece with mine but goes beyond the issues I have raised and finally *does not*—at least simply or completely—agree with my conclusions. Let me deal first with the points of convergence, then the points of divergence, and end by drawing some general conclusions about Derrida's position, philosophy in general, and the relations between the two traditions in modern philosophy I mentioned at the outset.

In what is probably his most systematic and clear analysis and assessment of Lévi-Strauss (the essay "Structure, Sign, and Play" in his book of essays, *Writing and Difference*)[23] Derrida comments on the centrality of the nature/culture dialectic. He says,

> In order to follow . . . the text of Lévi-Strauss, let us choose as one guiding thread. . . the opposition between nature and culture. . . . From the outset of his researches, and from his first book (*The Elementary Structure of Kinship*) on, Lévi-Strauss simultaneously has experienced the necessity of utilizing this opposition and the impossibility of accepting it.[24]

And even though Derrida cites the incest prohibition, which is both natural (in being universal) *and* cultural (in being a social fact) as evidence of the bind within which Lévi-Strauss is caught,[25] the point he wishes to make is more general. He says, "Lévi-Strauss will always remain faithful to this double intention: to preserve as an instrument some-

[22]Liszka disagrees. See "Peirce and Lévi-Strauss . . . ," pp. 128-29.
[23]J. Derrida, *Writing and Difference* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 278-93.
[24]*Ibid.*, pp. 282-83.
[25]*Ibid.*, p. 283.

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thing whose truth value he criticizes."[26] In other words, Lévi-Strauss both affirms the nature/culture opposition (and in this asserts his Kantianism) and rejects it (and in this asserts his materialism). And that is contradictory.

This contradictory way of proceeding is also in evidence, according to Derrida, in Lévi-Strauss' understanding of the status and relations between the *a priori* and the empirical. He says, in *The Raw and the Cooked,*

> If critics reproach me with not having carried out an exhaustive inventory of South American myths before analyzing them, they are making a grave mistake. . . . The total body of myth belonging to a given community is comparable to its speech. . . . Experience proves that a linguist can work out the grammar of a given language from a remarkably small number of sentences. . . . Should fresh data come to hand, they will be used to check or modify the . . . grammatical laws, so that some are abandoned and replaced by new ones.[27]

But surely one cannot have it both ways. *Either* one characterizes the syntax of a language as *absolutely* and *completely* discoverable *despite* the limits of empirical research, or one allows that *because* of the limits of empiricism one cannot ever assert of any allegedly discovered syntax that it is absolute, complete, invariant. In other words one can be a Kantian and argue that, on the basis of a finite amount of evidence (the empirically ascertained way we *categorically* think and speak), one can "transcendentally deduce" the universal and necessary structure of the mind and thereby *all* possible, future experience; or one can be an empiricist (whether one is also a materialist or not) and argue, like Hume and others, that there is *no way* to detect and ground such a transcendent subjective and objective set of structures. Lévi-Strauss seems rather casually—or mindlessly—to argue that both are true. And that, says Derrida, brings it about that, ". . . Lévi-Strauss . . . ends up . . . with a number of absolutely contradictory propositions. . . ."[28] Thus I conclude that my earlier critique and Derrida's, although not identical, move in the same direction and share the same critical insight.

Derrida makes the same point in a different and rather interesting way utilizing Lévi-Strauss' notion of "*bricolage*" and his (Derrida's) rather analogous notion of "play." He points out that ". . . in *The Savage Mind,* he [Lévi-Strauss]presents as what he calls *bricolage* what might be called the discourse of this [the structuralist] method." Lévi-Strauss says,

> The *bricoleur* is someone who uses the means at hand, that is, the instruments he finds . . . around him, those which are already there, which had not been especially conceived with an eye to the operation for which they are to be used and to which one tries by trial and error to adapt them, not hesitating to change them whenever it appears necessary, or to try several of them at once even if their form or origin is heterogeneous. . . .[29]

Bricolage, then, allows for continuity and discontinuity, rigor and inventiveness, a methodology with laws but also with considerable free play. This is what Derrida calls the element of "play" in the structures of theory and practice. And this is where the contradiction in Lévi-Strauss' procedure again shows itself. For if the anthropologist (or

[26] *Ibid.*, p. 284.
[27] *Ibid.*, pp. 288-89.
[28] *Ibid.*, p. 288.
[29] *Ibid.*, p. 285.

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theoretician in general) is engaged in *bricolage* then nothing *ontologically absolute* can be asserted as an element in the domain explored. The *bricoleur* is the non-dogmatic, non-doctrinaire, relativistic, *pragmatic* inquirer. Engaging in *bricolage* rules out his countenancing *any* absolute, timeless, platonically eternal and self-same domain, process, or set of objects as what we must confront, penetrate, and appropriate in order to grasp, what Derrida calls, the "structurality of structure," that is, the set of "totalized" (*i.e.*, entirely complete and un-changing) structures which comprise the real. If thinking is *bricolage,* says Derrida, *only* an itinerant ontology, so to speak, is in order, and surely not a "foundationalism," (to use Richard Rorty's term) such as a naturalist or Kantian metaphysic and/or epistemology. Derrida says,

> . . . structure—or rather the structurality of structure— . . . has always been at work, has always been neutralized or reduced . . . by a process of giving it a center or of referring it to a point of presence [Heidegger's general term for what the finite, "ontic" ego can actually and potentially appropriate through its theoretical and practical experience], a fixed origin. [This is what Derrida calls elsewhere the "transcendental signified," viz. the external, autonomous reality to which our thought presumably must correspond if objective truth is to be achieved.] The function of this center was . . . to . . . organize the structure . . . but above all to . . . limit what we might call the *play* of the structure. . . . The center . . . closes off the play. . . . As center, it is the point at which the substitution of contents, elements or terms [that is to say, where projecting new paradigms or engaging in bricolage] is no longer possible. . . . The concept of centered structure—although it represents coherence itself . . . is contradictorily coherent . . . the concept of centered structure is. . . . The concept of a play based on fundamental ground [*e.g.*, material particles and energies or Kantian categories], a play constituted on the basis of a fundamental immobility and a reassuring certitude, which is itself beyond the reach of play. . . . This is why one perhaps could say that the movement of any archaeology [any analysis of origins] like that of any eschatology [any analysis of ends or goals or teleological termini] is an accomplice of this reduction . . . and always attempts to conceive of structure on the basis of a full presence which is beyond play.[30]

Thus in introducing *either* a materialist *or* a Kantian metaphysic—much less both—Lévi-Strauss, in effect, eliminates "play" or *bricolage* from his enterprise. And that, it would seem, is inconsistent.

These contradictions, however, says Derrida, are not to be understood in the limited terms of logic, epistemology, or any set of formal, technical, methodological norms. Rather—and here is where his analysis and critique diverge from mine—he understands them as functions of "historicality" or "epochality" (Heidegger's terms). That is, they are expressive of our moment in time and reveal that, at this historical juncture Platonism and Cartesianism have lost their power and philosophical significance. That is to say that our age no longer altogether accepts the centrality and the dominance of "presence," i.e., the normal commitment to the self-consciously available ego as the arbiter, the measure, the standard of and for meaning and truth. Derrida says,

> . . . if we wished to choose several . . . authors in whose discourse this occurrence has kept most closely to its most radical formulation, we . . . would . . . cite the Nietzschean critique of metaphysics, the critique of the concepts of Being and Truth, for which were substituted the concepts of play, interpretation, and sign (sign without present truth); the Freudian cri-

[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 278-79.

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> tique of self-identity, and of self-proximity or self-possession; and, more radically, the Heideggerean destruction of metaphysics, of onto-theology, of the determination of Being as presence.[31]

He also says, and it is most revealing, that, "...the critique of *ethnocentrism,* ... [is] the very condition for ethnology...."[32] Ethnology, i.e., its sheer emergence and presence, is anti-Platonic, anti-Cartesian. He says, "In effect, what appears most fascinating in this critical search for a new status of discourse is the stated abandonment of all reference to a *center*, to a subject, to a privileged reference, to an origin."[33] Here, Lévi-Strauss' work on mythology has been central. In referring to *The Raw and the Cooked,* Derrida says, "...the absence of a center is here the absence of a subject and the absence of an author...."[34] He then quotes Lévi-Strauss: "...the myth and the musical work are like the conductors of an orchestra.... If it is ... asked where the ... center of the work is to be found, the answer is that this is impossible to determine. Music and mythology bring man face to face with potential objects of which only the shadows are actualized.... Myths are anonymous."[35]That is, no finite, individual ego or self or person stands behind the myth as its maker and thus bears a privileged relation to it. This is true for Lévi-Strauss where myths and music are concerned, but it is also true of *all* the products of human thought. He says, in the context of responding to the often repeated charge that he insensitively and irresponsibly imposes a procrustean structure on the "savage mind" he has spent his career analyzing,

> ...if the final aim of anthropology is to contribute to a better knowledge of objectified thought and its mechanisms, it is ... immaterial whether ... the thought processes of the South American Indian take shape through the medium of my thought, or ... mine ... through ... theirs. What matters is that the human mind, regardless of the identity of those who give it expression, should display an increasingly intelligible structure as a result ... of two thought processes acting upon one another."[36]

The individual, subjective ego—Descartes' ultimate court of appeal—is rendered irrelevant, operationally gratuitous, by the sheer emergence of ethnology, or, at the very least, by the emergence of structural anthropology in which objectified thought *alone*—and not individual thinkers or acts of thinking—is ontologically countenanced as real and relevant.

It is against this background, by the way, that one can understand R. Rorty's[37] claim that Derrida's project unexpectedly is of a piece with the projects of Dewey, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Quine, Kuhn, Sellars, Feyerabend, and Foucault: they each attempt to undermine the Cartesian model which, to them, has disastrously damaged modern thought.

Thus Lévi-Strauss may be articulating contradictory ideas; but the problem is not merely logical nor analytic. It is rather "epochal," i.e., existential, and thus laden with concrete, worldly consequences.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 280.
[32] *Ibid.*, p. 287.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 286.
[34] *Ibid.*, p. 287.
[35] *Ibid.*, p. 287.
[36] C. Lévi-Strauss, *The Raw and the Cooked,* p. 13.
[37] R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 165-394. This "large" claim is elaborated and argued by Rorty in the last five chapters of his book.

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In relation to this point Derrida draws his most dramatic conclusion. He argues that a thinker like Lévi-Strauss, who expresses our moment in time, is caught in a terribly dramatic bind; viz. he has a sense of being at the end of a way of thinking and being, at the end of history, but is nonetheless still caught, trapped by or within the language and rules of coherence and truth of that tradition. He thus, echoing Hegel (and more recently S. Cavell) cannot mean what he says nor say what he means. Derrida observes,

> . . . all these . . . discourses . . . are trapped in a kind of circle . . . there is no sense is doing without the concepts of metaphysics in order to shake metaphysics. We have no language . . . which is foreign to this history; we can pronounce not a single . . . proposition which is not ready to slip into the form, the logic, and the implicit postulations of precisely what it seeks to contest.[38]

And again, "it is a question of explicitly and systematically posing the problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself."[39]

Derrida does not exclude his own work from this problematic. His outlandish style, his abstruse locutions, erased words, puns, playing, coining of new terms, etc. are efforts to ease but not, he concedes—(in, among other works, *Of Grammatology* and *Positions*)—to overcome this problem. Like many intelligent Hegelian-Marxists (e.g. Lukacs) who understand that their own thinking, of a piece with the general reified, fetishized thinking which capitalism has brought about, can only be minimized by acts of self-consciousness but not eliminated, Derrida offers nothing that is more ameliorative. We are, to speak with Wittgenstein, like the fly forever caught in the fly bottle, who would have only the dimmest of senses—if even that—of what it is like outside the bottle, or even of the very situation of being trapped inside at all.

The conclusion to be drawn from this discussion, this look at two ways of coming to grips with Lévi-Strauss' enterprise, is to my mind, that they ought to, and can be, utilized to enrich and shed light on each other. Derrida's more global and far-ranging interpretation provides a *framework* for analytic-systematic philosophy, a way of judging it which it itself hasn't provided.[40] And the more formal and scientifically rigorous critique of the empiricist camp provides the kind of specificity and analytic rigor that Derrida's Heideggereanism usually lacks. Or, utilizing T. Kuhn's distinction between "normal" and "revolutionary" science,[41] one can say that the systematic philosophy assumes Lévi-Strauss' structuralism to be "normal science" and judges it as such; whereas a philosopher like Derrida understands it to be "revolutionary science," a breakthrough—even if not yet accomplished—to a new paradigm and "judges" or simply articulates it as such. And there is no reason I know of not to confront and converse about the metaphysical aspects of Lévi-Strauss' thought alternating and, where appropriate, interrelating both approaches.

Finally what is missing from *both* accounts—and I shall only allude to this—and what to my mind supplies a necessary element without which the entire discussion lacks a cer-

[38] J. Derrida, *Writing and Difference,* pp. 280-81.

[39] *Ibid.,* p. 282.

[40] Rorty's book, in a way, attempts to do this. He also finds in the works of Dewey, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein analogous efforts.

[41] R. Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,* pp. 322-23.

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tain concreteness—is a kind of Hegelian-Marxist component which I associate with A. Gramsci's concept of "hegemony."[42] I assume here, without the argument needed to support it, that hegemony is most profitably understood as dialectical synchrony, i.e., as a relation between co-present social structures which is marked by dialectical reciprocity. As such, the inability of philosophy and the sciences to make sense of the subject, i.e., of the individual *morally* potent and accountable agent behind human action, and the need in late capitalism for entirely manipulable, replaceable, anonymous, homogeneous consumers is of a dialectical piece. The task then, as I see it, is to mark and somehow to transcend this unwitting, unintended, but not thereby innocent, state of theory and practice; it is not, as Lévi-Strauss' structuralism does, to raise it to a new, seductive, but pernicious level of mystification.

[42]A. Gramsci, *Prison Notebooks*, (N.Y.: International Publishers, 1978), p. 245.

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Schemata: Heidegger and Lewis

Patrick L. Bourgeois and
Sandra B. Rosenthal

HEIDEGGER'S philosophy, even within the phenomenological tradition, has remained too much a philosophy for Heideggerians. In this country in the past decade, however, there has been increasing interest in certain possible correlations between his philosophy and that of American pragmatism. But too often the presentation of Heidegger's philosophy, in the process of such a correlation, is at best superficial and inadequate, allowing the Heideggerian to reject the very project of explicating any affinities between Heidegger's philosophy and that of others.

The purpose of this paper is to delve into the fundamental level of Heidegger's ontology in *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*[1] in order to render an adequate context for a radical critique of one point of his Dasein analysis and interpretation — a critique which demands an expansion of his hermeneutical phenomenology in a direction which, on further investigation, makes apparent a particular point of affinity with the implicit but central role of schemata in the pragmatic philosophy of C.I. Lewis. Thus, the stages of development of this paper are predetermined by the very project itself: first, an in-depth, evaluative re-construction of Heidegger's problematic on the radical level of Dasein's existential structure of comprehension, leading to a more specific focus on the schemata; second, this focus leads to insights for a critical evaluation of certain limitations, rooted in the most primordial and fundamental level of Dasein's structures, demanding an expansion of the Dasein's structures, demanding an expansion of the Dasein analysis; finally, in the context of this expansion, the general context will be then restricted to the one main theme of the schemata central to Lewis' pragmatic philosophy in a way parallel to its role in Heidegger's philosophy. Affinities between Lewis and Heidegger, which are centered around the one theme of the role of the schemata so central to both their philosophies, *explicitly* indicate possibilities for overlap and integration, and *implicitly* indicate a more all-pervasive possibility of affinities, far-reaching enough to demand more efforts in this direction of integration and correlation between Heidegger and Lewis, and also, between phenomenology in general and pragmatism in general. Turning to the first stage of our study, a few remarks are in order concerning the general thrust of existential phenomenology, constructing a general context for focusing on Heidegger.

Existential phenomenology, by deepening and extending intentionality, requires a

[1]Martin Heidegger, *Being and Time*, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962); Martin Heidegger, *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*, trans. by James S. Churchill (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1962). Hereafter cited in the text as *BT* and *KPM*.

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changed view of sense experience, understanding, imagination, and schemata, in contrast with the epistemological emphasis of the moderns. In dealing with sense perception, existential phenomenology attacks the empiricist view of sense as a cause-effect relation, and any reductionistic view of perception, while at the same time, it attacks the intellectualist theory of judgment. It abandons theories according to which we experience brute sense data or qualities instead of the things themselves. It has discovered, as Merleau-Ponty well puts it, "that from the moment behavior is considered 'in its unity' and in its human meaning, one is no longer dealing with a *material reality* nor, moreover, with a *mental reality,* but with a significative whole or a structure which properly belongs *neither to the external world* nor to internal life."[2] When existential phenomenology deepens and broadens the notion of intentionality, it requires this redefinition of understanding, so that it now can encompass the whole intention and the unique mode of existing. This is required by the extension of the notion of intentionality beyond the restricted Kantian judgemental function to the prepredicative and prejudgmental level. Following this tendency, Heidegger extends and deepens the notion of understanding to the level of Being-in-the-world, no longer considering it to be particular acts or functions of connection in the Kantian context. Understanding, rather than an act, is a mode of being of Dasein, distinguished from the derived levels of understanding. Thus, for Heidegger, we must distinguish the understanding, as one type of cognizing distinguished from explanation, from the understanding which is their ground as "one of the constituents of the Being of the 'there in general' " (*BT,* p. 185). The former is an existential derivative of the latter, just as intuition, including the phenomenological intuition of essences, and thinking are remote derivatives of understanding. This primordial understanding, constituted by the circularity of the "forestructure" and "as structure," involves the possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing: "In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing" (*BT,* p. 195). But this primordial kind of knowing is only taken hold of when the theme springs from exfoliating these fore-structures in terms of things themselves. The whole of *Being and Time* attempts to do this by continually questioning the adequacy of the fore-structure of Dasein taken as a whole. And, further, hermeneutic phenomenology in general must proceed by constantly deepening its fore-having (fore-structure), explicating the hermeneutical situation. Here, Heidegger tells us that this is the condition for primordial knowing: that the presuppositions are explicitly worked out, that the fore-structure of Dasein's understanding is worked out in terms of "the things themselves." The basic court of appeal is "the things themselves." Thus, the fore-structure must be presented by the things themselves, and not by anything else such as prejudices, fancies, and popular conception. Heidegger says this as follows:

> In the circle is hidden a positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing. To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we have understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, foresight, and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make the scientific theme secure by working out these fore-structures in terms of the things themselves (*BT,* p. 195).

Thus, the whole of *Being and Time* takes place in the context of primordial knowing, since it is constantly concerned that its theme is secured by working out the fore-under-

[2]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *The Structure of Behavior* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), p. 176.

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standing (or fore-having, fore-sight, and fore-conception) in terms of the thing itself—Dasein as a whole.

In turning to Heidegger's specific focus on the schemata in an explicitly Kantian context, it must be kept in mind that Heidegger, who has much to say about the Kantian schemata and schematism, deals with Kant in the context of a destruction of the history of ontology, and in the context of a repetition. It must also be kept in mind that, in a way, Heidegger's *Being and Time* is the prolegomenon for his *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,* which receives its directive idea from the former work. In order further to illuminate the relation between Heidegger's *Being and Time* and *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,* the role of the destruction of the history of ontology and the role of repetition in his ontology must be briefly dealt with. Consequently, it is to these points that the following discussion must briefly turn.

Heidegger's notion of "destruction" will be dealt with in relation to his treatment of Kant in the context of the ontological tradition and time. Dasein, essentially constituted by primordial time, has grown up in a traditional way of interpreting itself. The past, a constitutive aspect of Dasein, already goes ahead of Dasein, becoming an important part of any analysis which tries to be authentic and adequate, especially dealing with the question of being. Dasein can fall back upon its world, but it can fall prey to tradition too, in such a way as to be enslaved by its way of posing the question of being and dealing with it. Heidegger realizes the need therefore to destroy the tradition in terms of the content and history of ontology. In the following text Heidegger indicates both the negative and the positive aspects of this destruction, showing how the positive aim and purpose bring us in a special way to Kant, whom he considers to hold a primordial and decisive place in the ontological tradition.

> We must, on the contrary, stake out the positive possibilities of that tradition, and this always means keeping it within its limits; these in turn are given factically in the way the question is formulated at the time, and in the way the possible field for investigation is thus bounded off. On its negative side, this destruction does not relate itself towards the past; its criticism is aimed at 'today' and the prevalent way of treating the history of ontology. . . . Its negative function remains unexpressed and indirect. . . . The destruction of the history of ontology is essentially bound up with the way the question of Being is formulated, and it is possible only within such a formulation. . . . In line with the positive tendencies of his destruction, we must in the first instance raise the question whether and to what extent the Interpretation of Being and the phenomenon of time have been brought together thematically in the course of the history of ontology, and whether the problematic of Temporality required for this has ever been worked out in principle or ever could have been. The first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality or has let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves is Kant. Only when we have established the problematic of Temporality, can we succeed in casting light on the obscurity of his doctrine of the schematism. . . . In pursuing this task of destruction with the problematic of Temporality as our clue, we shall try to Interpret the chapter on the schematism and the Kantian doctrine of time, taking that chapter as our point of Departure. . . . (*BT,* pp. 44-45)

The role of "repetition" in Heidegger's philosophy is likewise an essential aspect of his entire project, for it is central to the hermeneutical approach to the history of ontology and must be aligned with his attempt to destroy that history. This notion of repetition must not be trivialized by considering it simply as re-presenting the past, or taking it

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up again. Rather, it comes to grips with *those possibilities of existence which have come down to us.* Since the cornerstone of the temporal exstases is the future and since he deals with the repetition of possibilities in terms of future, his research into the history of ontology reveals possibilities especially in relation to future.

We must keep in mind that the working out of historicality is simply a more concrete working out of temporality, and is interrelated with the resoluteness of Dasein. "The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the *repetition* of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. Repeating is handing down explicitly—that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there" (*BT,* p. 437). This repetition, strictly in terms of possibilities, does not attempt to make past actualities recur. And anticipatory resoluteness is the existential ground for the authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has-been-there, thus allowing, as Heidegger says, "the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero" (*BT,* p. 437). And in the choice of Kant, we have an instance of such a repetition. Kant's role in the history of ontology is decisive for that history, and merits repeating as delving into the latent possibility to be handed down from the future. Since "the laying of the foundation (of metaphysics) is based on time" (*KPM,* pp. 207-8), and since "the first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of Temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves is Kant" (*BT,* p. 45), Heidegger approaches Kant as playing a decisive role in the tradition of ontology.

Thus, in making the task of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics* to explicate the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics, Heidegger reaches for the revelation of the internal possibility of ontology. Heidegger proceeds to give an ontological interpretation, based on Kantian texts, especially from the edition of 1781, to the Copernican revolution, showing that Kant does not wish to establish that all knowledge is ontic, nor does he want to exclude what that presupposes—ontological knowledge. For "ontic knowledge can be adequate to the essent only if the essent is already manifest beforehand as essent, that is, if the constitution of its Being is known. . . . The manifestation of the essent (ontic truth) depends upon the revelation of the constitution of the Being of the essent (ontological truth)" (*KPM,* pp. 17-8). Once the hermeneutical situation, the totality of presuppositions, has been explicitated in *Being and Time,* the way is open to investigate the ontological tradition. For, once the fore-understanding has been explicitated, we have the stance from which to interpret the history of ontology in terms of possibilities latent in that tradition. And, such an analysis is necessary to bring the question of Being to its depth: "The question of Being does not achieve its true concreteness until we have carried through the process of destroying the ontological tradition" (*BT,* p. 49). This effort at destruction of the ontological tradition, carried out as an ontical possibility of Dasein, most properly depends on the first two divisions of *Being and Time,* and consequently comes after the published volume, containing these first two divisions. Thus it can be said, especially in the context of the destruction and repetition of the ontological tradition, that *Being and Time* is the prolegomenon to *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.* For, once one focuses on the Being question, the fundamental theme of Heidegger, the whole of the analysis of schema-schematism falls into place in relation to *Being and Time,* revealing the importance of the schemata as the matrix of many tangents and intersecting vectors. As the horizon, and as the formation of time, they form the temporal horizon of encounter, produced by transcendental imagination, rooted in primordial time. Thus,

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Being-in-the-world of *Being and Time* is in the background of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.* "The laying of the foundation of metaphysics is based on time. The question as to Being, the fundamental question of a laying of the foundation of metaphysics, is the problem of *Sein und Zeit.* This title contains the directive idea of the present interpretation of the *Critique of Pure Reason* as a laying of the foundation of metaphysics" (*KPM,* pp. 207-8).

Although the orientation and problematics are different from that of *Being and Time,* there is a certain epistemic dimension to Heidegger's *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics,* making it relevant to our study in a way which goes beyond merely his comments on the schemata. This epistemic dimension is manifested in the manner in which the schemata are dealt with in the Kantian context, but are repeated in the context of fundamental ontology. In this book, Heidegger expresses the view that ontological, primordial knowledge is "made up of transcendental determinations of time because transcendence is temporalized in primordial time" (*KPM,* p. 203). Primordial, originary time is the basis and origin of all else in human finite knowledge and existence. As such, it is a source of the categories, of the conditions of objectivity and of subjectivity, in their primordial unity. Primordial time gives rise to transcendence by forming the horizon of transcendence in the schemata, thus exfoliating the conditions of possibility of the objectivity of the object. The practical reason, together with the schemata, is grounded in the Kantian transcendental imagination which is rooted in primordial and originary time. And the horizon of transcendence, as the schemata, is derived time as the time formation which Kant focuses on explicitly, failing to go further to the source in primordial originary time. Heidegger says explicitly that "the pure schemata as transcendental determinations of time form the horizon of transcendence" (*KPM,* p. 204). The schemata of the transcendental imagination, as forming the horizon of transcendence, and produced by the transcendental imagination, constitute the temporalization of primordial time itself (*KPM,* p. 201, 202). And it is primordial time which allows the pure formation of transcendence to take place. Thus, primordial time, as the "innermost essence" of the self, makes possible transcendental imagination, as essentially spontaneous receptivity and receptive spontaneity. "Only in this unity can pure sensibility as spontaneous receptivity and pure apperception as receptive spontaneity belong together and form the essential unity of pure sensible reason" (*KPM,* p. 202). This interpretation, chiefly in the context of Kant's language and problematics, indicates how Heidegger pulls Kant in the direction of the presupposed ontology from which he is operating, and in terms of which he has extended the transcendental imagination as Care in *Being and Time.*

If a being is to be given to man, a finite being, man must be receptive or orientated to receive it beforehand. The horizon within which something is encountered must be "an anticipating proposition of something which has the nature of an offer" (*KPM,* pp. 94-5), and one which is "perceptive as a pure aspect the formation of which is brought about by pure imagination." Heidegger distinguishes two roles of the pure imagination in the formation of this aspect. "Not only does the pure imagination 'form' the intuitive perceptivity of the horizon, in that it 'creates' *this horizon* by the free turning-toward, but also in this act it is 'formative' [*bildend*] in yet a second sense, namely, in that it provides for the possibility of an 'image' [*Bild*] in general" (*KPM,* p. 95).

According to Kant, time is the pure intuition yielding "an aspect prior to all experience" (*KPM,* p. 108). As such it is a pure image. "Thus, even the schema of a pure con-

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cept of the understanding can very well be put into an image, provided that the term "image" be taken in the sense of "pure image" (*KPM,* p. 108). This "pure image is the schema-image, giving the schema of the notions the special character of representing unities as rules which bear upon a possible aspect. . . ." Time is not only the necessarily pure image of the schemata of the pure concepts of the understanding but also their only possibility of presenting a pure aspect (*KPM,* p. 109). Since that is the case, time as pure image must be able to be formed in different ways. The schemata, deriving their image from time as a pure aspect, introduce the notions in time under the form of rules, thus unfolding the "unique possibility of a pure aspect into a multiplicity of pure images" (*KPM,* p. 109). This is the sense of Kant's calling the schemata "a priori determinations of time in accordance with rules" (*KPM,* p. 109).[3] They are thus transcendental products of the imagination, forming transcendence *a priori.*

> The ob-jectification of that which offers itself as ob-ject, i.e., that which is in opposition, takes place in transcendence and in this way: Ontological Knowledge as schematizing intuition renders distinguishable and, hence, receivable *a priori* the transcendental affinity of the rule of unity under the image of time. Because of its pure schema-image, the transcendental schema necessarily possesses an *a priori* correspondence-character. Consequently, the interpretation of the individual pure schemata as transcendental determinations of time must exhibit the character which is constitutive of this correspondence (*KPM,* p. 201-202).

Before turning to the empirical dimension of the schema, image, and concept interrelations, it must be kept in mind that Heidegger's account of the Kantian pure *a priori* schematization of the concept for an image is really an attempt to show how Kant almost speaks of the fundamental originary level of schematizing and reception of an entity and the structure of Dasein in terms of its comprehension of Being. He is less interested in the *a priori* and pure dimensions of Kant's account, than he is in interpreting the cognitive synthesis as an ontological synthesis presupposing the synthesizing of temporalizing primordial time, which produces the horizon in the schemata: "The pure schemata as transcendental determinations of time form the horizon of transcendence" (*KPM,* p. 204). Likewise, this level of primordial knowledge is his concern in turning to discuss the empirical dimension of schema, image, and concept. For Heidegger, the experience of an entity demands that the experiencing entity must have this anticipatory structure as its mode of Being, must "bring a schema of all possible being."[4] In turning to the empirical dimension of Kant's analysis, however, we are closer to the context from which we can ask Heidegger questions more crucial and critical than the almost myriad questions posed in the last few pages of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics.*

Turning to Kant's examples of empirical and sensible concepts, we find that the schema is the focal point and pinnacle of this discussion. The schema mediates the concept of understanding and the image of sense. Heidegger has to uncover the dimensions of the schema reflecting both the concept and the image, using the examples of the concepts of "dog," "triangle" and "number."

According to Heidegger's interpretive appropriation of Kant, the schema, formed as a mode of sensibilization, has a Janus-like bipolarity. For, on the one hand, although it

[3]Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* trans. by Norman Kemp Smith (London, 1929), p. 185; quoted by Heidegger, *KPM,* p. 190.

[4]Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception,* trans. by Colin Smith (New York: The Humanities Press, 1962), p. 429.

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must be distinguished from the image, it necessarily possesses the "character of an image," (*KPM,* p. 102) which character has its own nature. On the other hand, the schema is the representative of the rule, which necessarily remains relative to a possible schema-image to which no particular thing can claim to be the only possible example. "The concept 'dog' signifies a rule according to which my imagination can delineate the figure of a four-footed animal in a general manner, without limitation to any determinate figure such as experience, or any possible image that I can represent *in concreto* actually presents" (*KPM,* p. 103).[5]

Heidegger indicates that for Kant, the aspect of an entity immediately represented does not attain that which is represented of it in the concept; or the aspect of the thing immediately present does not "attain" the empirical concept of the thing. And he interprets Kant further: not attaining the concept means not presenting it "adequately" (*KPM,* p. 102). According to Heidegger, this inadequacy points out the necessity for the schema-image, which is the image of the concept. The empirical aspect, or the object immediately on hand, contains everything in the concept, if not more. But the aspect does not contain its object in the manner in which the concept represents it, i.e., as the one which applies to many (*KPM,* p. 102-3). Further, the inadequacy between the empirical aspect and the empirical concept requires the mediating function of the structural relation of the schema-image to the schema. This mediating function expresses the regulative function of the concept in providing a possibility of an image or of an empirical aspect, revealing the centrality of schema and schematism.

> This relation (between schema-image and schema) makes the schema-image a possible representation of the rule of presentation represented in the schema. . . . This means, at the same time, that beyond the representation of this regulative unity the concept is nothing. What in logic is termed a concept is based upon the schema. The concept 'always refers directly to the schema' (*KPM,* p. 102).[6]

The importance of this is that the image derives its intuitive character from the "fact that the schema-image comes into being and from the way in which it comes into being from a possible representation which is represented in its regulative function, thus bringing the rule within the sphere of a possible intuition" (*KPM,* p. 104). This means that the image derives its intuitive character from above—not from the content of sense. The rule is brought to bear on the possible intuition. Thus, one must clearly distinguish between image and the image character of the schema as the schema-image. Expressing the relation between the concept and the schema, Heidegger, using Kant's example of the five points, explains that the image has its possibility already formed in the representing of the rule of presentation. The true aspect in the schema as the schema-image is the possibility. The possibility of the image is already formed in the act of representing the rule of presentation (*KPM,* p. 105).

The role of the concept is such that the concept, as a represented universal, cannot be represented by a singular representation or intuition, because of the distance between the concept and the sense presentation. Thus a mediation is required. This leads Heidegger to the "how" of the concept, to its regulative function in providing a possibility for an image to be "that which regulates and predetermines how, in general, something must

[5]Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* p. 182; quoted by Heidegger, *KPM,* p. 103.
[6]Phrase quoted from Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason,* p. 182 (Parenthetical expression not in text).

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appear in order to be able, as a house, to present an aspect corresponding to its nature. The predetermination of the rule . . . is a distinguishing characteristic (*Auszeichnen*) of the whole of that which is intended by 'house' " (*KPM,* p. 100). This "intended" must be represented as regulating the possible inserting of the complex (house) into an empirical aspect. This means that it is represented as unifying and regulating the possibility of the concept into a possible aspect. "If, in general, a concept is that which serves as a rule, then the conceptual representation is the supplying, in advance, of the rule insofar as it provides an aspect corresponding to the specific way in which it regulates" (*KPM,* p. 100). Since this representation of the rule as a regulative action of structural necessity refers to a possible aspect, as a mode of sensibilization, it does not give an immediate, intuitive aspect of a concept. Thus, Heidegger concludes that

> the rule is represented in the *how* of its regulation, that is, according to the manner in which, in regulating the presentation, it inserts itself in, and imposes itself on, the aspect which presents the presentation. The act of representation of the *how* of the regulation is the free (i.e., not bound to a representation) "construction" (*Bilden*) of a sensibilization. The latter, in the sense just described, is the *source* of the image (*KPM,* p. 101).

Thus, for Heidegger, the schema-image cannot be separated from the concept, but rather it is generated by, and gains its character from, the regulative function of the rule which generates it. Nor can the specific sensory content experience be separated from the schema-image, for only within the possibilities presented by the schema-image can sensory content come to awareness.

The present discussion must now turn to consider *the epistemic dimensions* latent in the Heideggerian efforts toward a fundamental ontology and in his interpretation of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* in the context of fundamental ontology. These epistemic dimensions emerge in the realization that to investigate the pre-reflective or originary level grounding any knowledge is already to investigate in some way the epistemic substrate for knowledge, even if it involves the explication of the structures and the process of the being of the knower. In this shift of focus from the strictly ontological considerations to epistemological considerations, the perspective upon the schemata is no longer limited to the context of the Being of entities encountered in Being-in-the-world. Rather, the focus, in the fore-understanding, grasps the schemata from the point of view of any possible cognitive access to these same entities. Thus it comes to grips, from the cognitive point of view, with how the schemata are meaningfully grasped, regardless of whether or not the ground of this cognition is ontological understanding. Rather, the concern is with understanding and knowledge on any level precisely from the limited point of view of knowledge.

The epistemic focus changes the attitude toward the schemata but retains the legacy of existential phenomenology. The chief contribution of existential phenomenology regarding the nature and role of the schemata results from the deepening of intentionality, in one way or another, below that of acts of awareness to the underlying structure, which includes schemata and schematization. Ontological considerations of this originary level do not totally and exhaustively account for it. Before the "change-over" and narrowing to the present-at-hand, there are epistemic dimensions of a schematism which underlie the subject-object split and the derived modes spoken of by Heidegger in *Being and Time.* If understanding as a mode of Being and schemata, extended in being

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deepened to the ontological level of intentionality, demand fundamental ontological unveiling, they also require an investigation into their epistemic ramifications. And this epistemological consideration obtains at the originary level just as does any fundamental ontology. For, this originary level is epistemic precisely as grounding all cognitive levels and so must be unveiled and investigated from that epistemic point of view. Heidegger's limited and archaic view of epistemology does not allow for this point of view. Before turning to Lewis' pragmatic philosophy for the clarifying light which it sheds on this epistemic dimension of existence, it will be helpful to clarify further the epistemic dimension at issue as it relates, in a general way, to Heidegger's view of epistemology. This requires a short critique of Heidegger's view of epistemology, rounding out the above critique of his claim for the inclusiveness of ontology under the guide of the primacy of being and ontology. For the critique of Heidegger's failure to allow for epistemological considerations is rooted in his narrow and archaic view of epistemology.

Heidegger has consistently eschewed any positive effort to reconsider epistemology in a way parallel to his recasting of ontology as fundamental. Consequently, what he reacts against should not be considered the only possible contemporary epistemology. And the kind of epistemology against which he reacts is clear from paragraph 13, where he states, "The evidence for this is the procedure (still customary today) of setting up knowing as a 'relation between subject and Object'—a procedure in which there lurks as much 'truth' as vacuity. But subject and object do not coincide with Dasein and the world" (*BT,* p. 87). Throughout *Being and Time* Heidegger expresses chagrin with traditional epistemology, as well as traditional metaphysics, because both have failed to get below the derived mode of Being of the present-at-hand in questions of Being and of knowledge. Thus he takes these back to their foundations in the existential analytic of Dasein. He wants to show why an epistemological formulation of questions fails:

> Our task is not to prove that the 'external world' is present-at-hand or to show how it is present-at-hand, but to point out why Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, has the tendency to bury the 'external world' in nullity 'epistemologically' before going on to prove it. The reason for this lies in Dasein's falling and the way in which the primary understanding of Being has been diverted to Being as presence-at-hand—a diversion which is motivated by that falling itself. (*BT,* p. 250).

Further, he indicates an important aspect of his view of epistemology:

> What is needed rather is the basic insight that while different epistemological directions which have been pursued have not gone so very far off epistemologically, their neglect of any existential analysis of Dasein has kept them from obtaining any basis for a well secured phenomenal problematic (*BT,* p. 250).

Although it is necessary to agree with Heidegger's insistence on an existential analysis of Dasein for an adequate basis, the first part of the above statement reflects a philosophically naive and archaic view of epistemology. For, epistemology, not limited and restricted to Heidegger's view of it, can enter the contemporary world-view just as the ontology to which Heidegger subordinates his restricted and limited epistemology. Two questions come to the fore: 1) Is there a richer and more fundamental existential view of epistemology (not an epistemological existentialism, but an epistemological point of view on the foundational, existential and ordinary level)? and, 2) Is an epistemic-episte-

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mological aspect of the existential analytic of Dasein possible? The answer to the second question will stem from the answer to the first.

Epistemology does not necessarily remain within the framework of the modern era. A viable theory of knowledge must today seek the originary levels of existence, of experience, and of Being, ground of all aspects and levels of knowing and understanding. Once we have overcome the narrow, derived, and fixed epistemology criticized by Heidegger, we can go beyond it or beneath it, to its epistemic existential foundation, in a way similar to the way in which Heidegger has done in his fundamental ontology. This requires the investigation of the foundational level of Being-in-the-world from the point of view of its epistemic ramifications, especially with regard to what Heidegger calls "primordial knowledge"—as a possibility of Dasein contained in the circle of understanding, which constitutes Dasein's being. Consequently, there is an alternative to castigating logical and epistemological analyses of meaning by opening them up to their full epistemic depth to reach the fullness and richness of meaning at the ground level of lived experience as existence, mode of being, or being-in-the-world.

Epistemology in the contemporary world-view does not necessarily institutionalize the subject-object split. It can look beneath that split to its source in the behavior or response of the being which knows, thus getting to the originary level from the point of view of epistemology even prior to the "change-over" to the theoretical, thematizing, and objectifying attitude, in which there is the subject-object dichotomy. Thus Heidegger has failed to allow the epistemic dimension of existence to be explicitated precisely as epistemic, since he does not allow existence, as foundational, to be approached both ontologically and epistemologically as reciprocally interrelated, but distinct, points of view. To investigate the pre-reflective and originary level grounding any knowledge is to investigate in some way, at least, the epistemic substrate for knowledge, even if it involves the explicitation of the structure and process of the being of the knower.

It is clear that Heidegger's ontological considerations of the originary level of intentionality and the schemata do not exhaust the ways of treating this level. It is in the context of this epistemological focus that a rapprochement with the implicit role of the schemata in C. I. Lewis' pragmatic philosophy is sought, not on the way to Heidegger's ontology, but rather, on the way back from fundamental ontology to epistemology. Lewis, approaching the schemata of Kant from the direction of his pragmatic, dispositional theory of meaning, deals with that same originary level of meaning, overcoming the problematic dimensions of Kantian philosophy with regard to sense and understanding, and finding the coming together of the two at the basic level of being-in-the-world. It is to the clarifying light which Lewis' pragmatic philosophy can cast on this epistemic dimension of existence that the concluding discussion will turn.

Lewis, in returning to the orginary level of meaning within lived experience, attacks both the empiricist view of sense as a cause-effect relation, or any reductionist view of perception, as well as the intellectualist theory of judgment. As Lewis characterizes his position, it is empirical in recognizing experience in general as its starting point, but it is not empirical in the sense of taking this experience to coincide with data of sense which are merely given to the mind.[7] And, it is rationalistic in recognizing that it is seeking principles "in some sense *a priori*", but it is not rationalistic in the sense of presuming the mind is grasped as an initial datum or its findings known apart from sense experi-

[7]C. I. Lewis, *Mind and the World Order* (New York: Dover Publications, 1929), p. 33.

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ence.[8] Further, Lewis recognizes that meaning is to be found beneath the level of a subject-object split, for "It is an error common to rationalism and to pure empiricism that both attempt an impossible separation of something called the mind from something else called experience."[9] Rather, for Lewis, the "reality which everybody knows is a whole in which mind and what is given to mind already meet and are interwoven."[10] Finally, Lewis finds this level of meaning in a corporeal intentionality in which Kantian schemata emerge as playing a little mentioned but essentially central role. It is to Lewis' appropriation of the Kantian schematism, as incorporated within his examination of cognition as "vital function, continuous with animal behavior and with habit,"[11] that the ensuing discussion will turn. And, at the heart of such an appropriation is his development of "sense meaning."

For Lewis, meanings are neither Platonic entities in the metaphysical sense, nor are they psychological facts. Meanings are to be understood as relational structures emerging from behavioral patterns, from the lived through response of the human organism to that universe with which it is in interaction.[12] Or, in other terms, human behavior is meaningful behavior, and it is in behavior that meaning is rooted. Only within the context of principles embodied in purposive behavior does the sensory come to awareness. And, such interpretive principles are embodied in the sense meanings through which man interacts with his world. Such sense meanings are reducible neither to pure principles or patterns of response apart from the character of the sensory,[13] nor to the sensory as existing apart from patterns of response.[14] Rather, sense meanings, as the inseparable mingling of the sensory and the relational, yield the possibilities in terms of which the sensory may appear; they provide, literally, the "sense" or principle or form by which man interprets and organizes sensory experience. And, sense meanings are developed as schemata in the Kantian sense. Or, perhaps it can best be said, a sense meaning is an inseparable unity of concept sensibilized by a schema. An implicit sense meaning for Lewis is a disposition or habit by which man interacts with the environment, while an explicit sense meaning is a precise "imaginatively inspectable" schema or criterion of recognition of the sensuous.[15] It is to the interrelation of implicit or concrete sense meaning as dispositional, and explicit sense meaning as Kantian schemata, that the ensuing discussion will turn.

[8] *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

[9] *Ibid.*, pp. 24-25.

[10] *Ibid.*, p. 29.

[11] C. I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1962), pp. 11-12.

[12] It will be seen that to speak of organism and environment in separation is to speak of abstractions from what is, in fact, an inseparable unity.

[13] Lewis holds that a pure conceptual pattern of relations "is, of course, an abstraction; no such concept ever existed apart from imagery and sensory material in any human mind."

[14] For Lewis, "a state of intuition unqualified by thought is a figment of the metaphysical imagination" (*Mind and the World Order,* p. 66).

[15] Although Lewis usually speaks of sense meaning as a precise, explicit schema, yet sense meaning is, for Lewis, intentional or conceptual meaning and this he frequently identifies as a disposition or habit. He clarifies this dual aspect of sense meaning when he observes that "A sense meaning *when precise and explicit* is a schema." (*Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation,* p. 134). Furthermore, though he speaks of sense meanings as being "in mind," he observes that though "we have thought it well judged to take sense meaning as criterion in mind," yet "the important character connoted by 'in mind' here is 'entertained in advance of instances of application which are pertinent'. . . . One may consider such criteria of application, as meanings entertained in advance, in terms of incipient behavior or behavior attitudes if one chooses" (*Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation,* pp. 143-44).

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An explicit sense meaning for Lewis is a schema — a rule or prescribed routine and an imagined result. However, there must be within the schema not only the prescribed act or routine and imagined result, but also the sensory cues which lead to the instigation of the act. And, if the act is dependent upon the cue, then different cues will give rise to different acts. Thus, there is not one act but an indefinite number of acts corresponding to an indefinite number of possible cues or appearances. (For example, varying perspectives yield varying appearances or cues and hence varying resulting acts.) Indeed, even if one considers only one essential property, so that the application of the physical object meaning is determined solely by the presence of one property, the use of test routine leads to an unlimited number of possible tests. Yet, this indefinite number of cues and acts radiate from one intended objectivity. Precisely what it means to apprehend an object or objective structure rather than an appearance only is to have "filled in" the result of a particular act with the results of other possible acts, given other possible cues. Thus, in a sense there are an indefinite number of cues, acts, and resulting appearances. Yet, in another sense, though there are an indefinite number of cues and acts, they are all "part of" the one result, an objectivity having certain characteristics. The difference between an apprehended appearance and an apprehended object for Lewis is not the difference between internal and external, or between subjective and objective, *but rather is precisely this difference in levels of meaning organization*.

To perceive a world of objectivities, then, there must be, in addition to sensory cue, act, and further sensory appearance, that which binds into a system the set of possible sensory cues and possible resultant acts which, as a system, give rise to the resultant objective structure. Here it must be remembered that although Lewis speaks of the result of a schema as an image, the image, as part of the schema, is general as opposed to particular.[16] Yet, Lewis emphatically rejects the traditional notion of abstract general ideas. His position can perhaps best be clarified by taking the term "image" as "aspect." For example, one may say, quite correctly, that a mountain range presents a majestic image or aspect. And, while the specific empirical content of experience is best understood as one particular among many, the image of the schema as criterion of recognition is best understood as the *one* which applies to the many. Indeed, the importance of the content of the image of the schema lies in the way in which it comes into being. Such an image represents an aspect of the structural order by which it is regulated, whether the resultant image is taken at the level of appearance or objectivity. This regulative order requires further examination.

The emphasis on an indefinite number of cues and acts stresses a variability of sense meaning in that an indefinite number of schemata is needed to exhibit fully the totality of appearances implied in attributing even one character to an object. Yet, the variability is limited, and in some sense the totality of the range is brought to bear in the apprehension of an objectivity. In addition to the diversity of specific schemata, then, there must be that which limits the range of varying schemata and imaginatively "fills in" the resultant appearance of a particular act with the results of other possible acts, thus giving objectivity to that which is produced via the schema. There must, in short, be what Lewis calls a "fixity" to meanings. What is "fixed" is precisely that which determines the nature of and governs the range of the inexhaustible variety of specific schemata.

[16]For Lewis, it will be remembered, the schema is an intrinsic part of meaning and thus partakes of the generality of meaning. (See *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation,* pp. 161-63 for Lewis' discussion of this point in relation to the Kantian synthetic *a priori*.)

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Thus, what is "fixed" is a structure or rule of generation of explicit schemata, and this, for Lewis, is the concrete disposition or habit. Concrete sense meaning, as the disposition or habit, is the source of the generation of explicit schemata, each of which makes precise for conscious awareness some aspect of the concrete sense meaning, some selection from the inexhaustible range of possibilities.

Further, and perhaps most important within the context of the general purpose of this essay, there is the consideration that the generality of the image lies precisely in the fact that as an aspect of the dispositional structural ordering, it reflects, in its very generation, the generality of such an ordering. In brief, appearances come to awareness only within a world of appearing objects, for appearances as generated by schemata are generated as *appearances of intended objectivities* because of the functioning of the concrete disposition or habit as the rule of generation of explicit schemata. The most adequate model, for Lewis, to indicate the relationship intended is that of a "mathematical rule generating a number series."[17] What are the characteristics of such a model?

First, a mathematical rule cannot be reduced to the number series nor constructed out of the series, for it is necessary to the formation of the series and to the character which each member of the series possesses. Like a mathematical rule, a dispositional rule of generation cannot be reduced to nor constructed out of the series generated, nor can it be separated from that which it generates, for that which is generated represents an aspect of the structural order by which it is generated. Not only is the meant objectivity fixed in its character through the functioning of habit in "filling in" the results of an act with the results of other possible acts given other possible cues, but the appearance which is apprehended by a change of focus which attempts to "withhold" this "filling in" is itself partially fixed in its character precisely by that which is attempting to be "withheld." Apprehended appearance is not brute uninterrupted content but is shot through with the dispositional structural orderings of objectivities. Appearances are meanings which emerge via abstractive attention from the context of meaningful objectivities, for the focus on appearance is the focus on that which is generated indirectly through the functioning of habit. At every level, man's response enters into the very character of the data.

Secondly, the number series generated by the mathematical rule has the capacity for indefinite expansion. Just as a mathematical rule may generate an unlimited series of numbers, or just as a continuum may generate an unlimited number of cuts within itself, so a disposition as a rule or organization contains within itself an unlimited number of possibilities of specific schemata to be generated. Furthermore, the inability to exhaust via enumeration all possibilities is not a contingent fact, but rather is intrinsic to the nature of the generating rule. Meaning as dispositional, then, is the source of the concrete unity of objectivity as more than a collection of appearances. Such an objective concreteness which transcends any indefinite number of appearances is built into our very sense of objectivity, for meaning as dispositional is the source of a sense of a reality of physical objectivities whose possibilities of being experienced transcend, in their very nature, the experiences in which they appear.

The above analysis of Lewis' incorporation of Kantian schemata within his pragmatic, dispositional theory of meaning has shown that for Lewis, as for Heidegger, the schema-image cannot be separated from the concept, but rather it is generated by, and

[17] *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation,* p. 110.

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gains its character from, the regulative function of the rule which generates it. Nor can the specific sensory content experienced be separated from the schema-image, for only within the possibilities presented by the schema-image can sensory content come to awareness. For neither Lewis nor Heidegger can we construct physical objects from data of sense, for the regulative function of the rule is the source of the concrete unity of objectivity as more than a collection of appearances. Rather, for both Lewis and Heidegger data of sense emerge only within the context of a world of objects.

At this point, some implications of Lewis' dispositional theory of meaning should be briefly noted, for these implications clearly accentuate the affinity with phenomenology. First, Lewis' dispositional theory of meaning requires the concept of time as process. What occurs within the present awareness is not the apprehension of a discrete datum in a moment of time, but rather the time-extended experiential "feel" within the passing present of a readiness to respond to more than can ever be specified. As Lewis observes, "It is not the time-extended cognition but the chopping of it up into unextended instants which is fictitious."[18] Or, as he elsewhere states, "There is only one given, the Bergsonian real duration. . . . The absolutely given is a specious present, fading into the past and growing into the future with no genuine boundaries. . . ."[19]

Second, it is the awareness of habit as a disposition or readiness to respond to more than can be specified which gives a concrete meaning to the concept of unactualized possibilities, of a reality of potentialities which outruns any experienced actualities. That readiness to respond to more than can ever be made explicit, which is "there" in the functioning of habit, is immediately experienced in the passing present and gives experiential content to the concept of the "more than" of objectivities which can never be exhaustively experienced, to the concept of unactualized possibilities of being experienced which pervade every grasp of the world around us and which belie any attempt at phenomenalistic reductionism.

Thirdly, meaning as dispositional brings a sense of real alternatives—the "could do otherwise"—into the heart of perceptual awareness and leads away from deterministic hypotheses and toward a recognition of what Lewis refers to as a "primordial sense of probable events." Lewis clearly recognizes that, epistemically, the sense of the possible to experience is the basis of our sense of a thick world of things,[20] and that "the possible is antecedent to the real."[21] In the functioning of habit in generating schemata, the source of both roles of possibility is to be found.

Finally, Lewis' dispositional theory of meaning becomes the tool by which Lewis, throughout his theory of empirical truth in terms of verification in sense experience, avoids the extensionalist confusion of meaning and evidence.[22] Lewis does not hold that meanings are reducible to the experiences which verify, for as indicated by his dispositional theory of meaning, meanings outrun in principle any number of experiences, and

[18] *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation,* p. 330.
[19] *Mind and the World Order,* p. 58.
[20] *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation,* pp. 17-18.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] As a related point, it should be noted that knowledge, for Lewis, must not only be verified as true; it must be justified as rationally credible. Lewis rejects what he considers the overemphasis on future experience contained in empiricistic theories which put forth an account of the verification of knowledge as if it were the whole story. It is precisely the function of empirical judgment to save the hazards of action without foresight. In this fact lies the significance, for Lewis, of the justification of knowledge as distinguished from the verification of it. Lewis is led thus to define empirical knowledge not as verified belief but as justified belief.

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in fact help give structure to the experiences. The possibilities of experience contained within the meaning structures may be progressively fulfilled, but they can never be completely and finally fulfilled. Meanings for Lewis are rooted in experience, and verified by experience, but not reducible to experience.

Further, though meaning applications are verified by experience, or fulfilled within experience, there remains the significant issue as to the nature of the experiences which verify. For Lewis, as for the pragmatists in general, experience is that rich ongoing transactional unity between man and his environment. Only within the context of such an interactional unity does what is given emerge for conscious awareness. Indeed, one of the most crucial insights of pragmatic epistemology is its recognition that experience has the character of an interactional unity between man and his environment.[23] The philosophic attempt to view experience in terms of a reduction to any type of atomic elements loses the very nature of experience, for it loses the ongoing dynamic process of man's interaction with his world and hence it loses the characteristic features of lived experience which such a dynamics incorporates, characteristics which are "there," which are experienced, but which are lost to the philosophic awareness which tries to understand experience in terms of a naive reification of the products of second level reflections. In attempting to understand the epistemic aspects of lived experience which are foundational to such second level reflections, pragmatism in general, and Lewis in particular, have cast a clarifying light on the way man, as a being-in-the-world, understands his world. Indeed, neither the ontological nor the epistemic aspects of this foundational level is alone exhaustive in understanding its richness, for they both offer differing but complementary lights cast on one and the same reality.

[23]The pragmatic focus on scientific *methodology* as the lived activity of the scientist, as opposed to any focus on scientific contents and their illicit projection as the building blocks of reality, leads precisely to the pragmatic focus on the creative interaction between man and his environment through purposive, goal-oriented modes of response.

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Murray State Univ.

On the Philosophical Use of *Ad Hominem* Argument in Nietzsche, Marx, and Dewey

Gayne Nerney

> The outcome of every argument is necessarily an insult. Either the truth insults its opponent, or a compromise insults the truth.
>
> —David Kipp

While the role, perhaps even the indispensable role, of *ad hominem* argument in ethics is generally acknowledged,[1] other philosophical uses of this fallacy have received less attention. In this essay, I want to focus on certain philosophers whose use of the *ad hominem* argument is not incidental, but, in fact, virtually necessitated by their view of the nature of philosophy and the nature of things. My thesis is that besides the strategic-rhetorical uses that philosophers make of *ad hominem* argument, there are philosophers for whom the use of *ad hominem* argument is philosophical in the strict sense, i.e., a systematic necessity. In order to argue the plausibility of this hypothesis, I will examine three paradigmatic cases from the works of Nietzche, Marx, and Dewey. And, assuming the plausibility of my case, I will conclude with a brief reflection on the significance of this finding.

The form of *ad hominem* argument that interests philosophers is, of course, the more sophisticated variety—the *ad hominem* circumstantial argument—rather than its vulgar (but not altogether artless) cousin, the *ad hominem* abusive argument. This traditional distinction is useful, even if it is true that the various species of *ad hominem* circumstantial argument—the *tu quoque*, the genetic fallacy, and the "poisoning the well" fallacy—are ultimately the most abusive because their common point of attack is the very dignity of man as such—namely, his capacity to be determined in his utterances by reason and evidence, and not merely by the causal force of passion and interest.

Even though my focus in this paper will be on the philosophical use of the *ad hominem* circumstantial argument (and when I use the term "*ad hominem* argument" without qualification, this is what I mean), conscience dictates that we note the charms of straightforward abuse. If pedagogical concerns are a necessary component of philosophical discourse, there is nothing like unabashed abuse for softening up the beach for the dialectical landing craft. For example, near the beginning of *The Guide of the Per-*

[1]Three classical expositions of the view that all moral argument is essentially *ad hominem* can be found in George Santayana, "Hypostatic Ethics" in *Winds of Doctrine* (New York, 1926), pp. 147-152; R. M. Hare, *Freedom and Reason* (London, 1963), p. 111; and Marcus B. Singer, *Generalization in Ethics* (New York, 1961), p. 40. Critical reflections on this view may be found in Gertrude Ezorsky, "Ad Hominem Morality," *Journal of Philosophy*, 63 (1966), 120-125, and Alan Gewirth, *Reason and Morality* (Chicago, 1978), p. 102.

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plexed,[2] while introducing the basic principles of his Allegorical Method of interpreting scripture, Maimonides considers the objection of some nameless commentator whose failure to face the equivocal nature of Biblical terms has led him to a very pernicious interpretation of the Fall of Man. Maimonides *opens* his exhaustive refutation of this grave error with the following amazing specimen:

> Hear now the intent of our reply. We said: O you who engage in theoretical speculation using the first notions that may occur to you and come to your mind and who consider withal that you understand a book that is the guide of the first and the last men while glancing through it as you would glance through a historical work or a piece of poetry—when in some of your hours of leisure, you leave off drinking and copulating; collect yourself and reflect, for things are not as you thought following the first notion that occurred to you, but rather as is made clear through reflection upon the following speech (Guide I,2).

To return to the issue, despite the appeal of straightforward abuse, it is the circumstantial variety of *ad hominem* argument that is more significant for philosophers. The reason for this is that the deployment of the *ad hominem* circumstantial argument involves the conflation or the obscuring of a crucial philosophical distinction—namely the distinction between *explanation* and *justification*. All *ad hominem* circumstantial arguments[3] share the common feature of substituting a causal explanation of the assertion (or doctrine) under consideration for a logical-rational refutation of the evidence and argument that purports to justify the assertion (or doctrine) in question. Ordinarily such a substitution involves one in the commission of a fallacy of relevance, i.e., when this substitution is made, as if by itself, it sufficed to refute logically the assertion (or doctrine) at issue. The substitution of an explanatory account for a counter-justificatory discourse can, however, be made justly, i.e., non-fallaciously: for example, if it is appended to a logical-rational refutation; if it is used 'protreptically,' i.e., to open the mind for the reception of a logical-rational refutation; or if it is used in connection with other evidence which calls into question the reasonableness of assuming that *this* maker

[2]Maimonides, *The Guide of the Perplexed,* trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago, 1963), hereinafter *Guide* with references inserted in text.

[3]This also applies to the *tu quoque.* The person who commits this fallacy thinks that by pointing out that his adversary "is another" he has rebutted his adversary's objection. Of course, he must be the kind of "thinker" who can overlook the inconvenient fact that committing the fallacy is tantamount to granting his adversary's point. There is, however, a deeper logic to this fallacy. The use of this rhetorical ploy may suggest that in argument, as in other matters, one ought "Judge not, that ye be not judged"—a gesture that can be as self-serving as it is a mark of humility. Along this line, the person committing the fallacy may be suggesting that a critic-adversary must practice what he (implicitly) preaches, that a critic-adversary should not be guilty of what he decries in another. So, in addition to the demand here for "consistency," and to the suggestion that the critic-adversary's words and deeds are in contradiction, the use of the *tu quoque* can suggest that the critic-adversary's "inconsistency" is indicative of a double standard. And this is to suggest that the critic-adversary is motivated and determined in *his* utterance by some reason-occluding passion. For, assuming that the claim made by the person committing this fallacy is accurate (even if logically irrelevant), what else can *explain* the fact of the critic-adversary's objection? After all, if the critic-adversary's words and deeds are in "contradiction," is there not at least a *prima facie* basis for questioning the rationality of the critic-adversary, for at least entertaining the suspicion that his objection is a creature of passion and not a deliverance of disinterested reason? Of course, even if the points of this analysis applied to someone committing this fallacy, the logical problem does not disappear. All that this analysis is intended to show is that the *tu quoque* plays on the distinction between explanation and justification, just as do the genetic fallacy and the "poisoning the well" fallacy, albeit in a somewhat more convoluted way.

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of *this* assertion on *this* topic was determined in his utterance by the rational assessment of evidence and not by the causal force of passion and/or interest.[4] In any event, as a weapon in the strategic rhetoric of philosophy, this sort of *ad hominem* argument is generally used only occasionally, i.e., not necessarily infrequently, but apropos of a specific rhetorical situation, and only discretely, i.e., not necessarily with discretion, but apropos of a specific adversary (whether proper-named or not).

Yet even in the most respectable *ad hominem* argument there is something insidious, or, at least potentially corrupt. One might say that given the propensities of human nature it is dangerous even to suggest that an *ad hominem* argument could be respectable. For besides a prudent regard for the ills that mind is heir to, there is in the deployment of every *ad hominem* argument the possibility, the temptation, of globalizing the target, of straying from a discreetly occasional conflation of explanation and justification to a generalized obscuring of this distinction. This is, of course, serious business, since in the eyes of at least some philosophers the distinction between explanation and justification is the point on which rationality itself stands or falls. The thesis of this essay is that there are philosophers who make precisely this move, philosophers for whom the occasional and discreet use of *ad hominem* argument itself becomes an occasion for attacking the classical conception of reason. What makes this interesting is that these philosophers know exactly what they are doing. Let us consider a few examples.

There is in Nietzsche's *Beyond Good and Evil*[5] a use of *ad hominem* argument that is philosophical as well as rhetorical. I am referring here to the famous paragraph #22 where the "old philologist" indulges his "malicious" impulse to criticize "bad arts of interpretation."

The larger context of the 'narrow' point Nietzsche makes in this paragraph is his ongoing critique of the realist construal of scientific method and theory. With phrases that sound strikingly contemporary, Nietzsche has claimed that the activity of the physicist is essentially 'poetic', an activity of "inventing" not "discovering" (BGE 11); that the very principles of mathematical physics are "fictions"; that "physics too is only an interpretation and arrangement of the world according to our own requirements" (BGE 14); and that science is an activity involving "a continual falsification of the world" (BGE 4), which even though *false* is *necessary* "for the preservation of beings such as us" (BGE 3). The specific point that Nietzsche focuses on in paragraph #22 is the principle of the continuity of nature, "nature's conformity to law." He writes:

> . . . but 'nature's conformity to law' of which you physicists speak so proudly, as though —it exists only thanks to your interpretation and bad 'philology'—it is not a fact, not a 'text,' but rather only a naive humanitarian adjustment and distortion of meaning . . . (BGE 22).

Nietzsche goes on to claim that the notion of natural law or 'the laws of nature' is an

[4] An objection may be raised here about the use of terms. As I am using the term "*ad hominem* argument," it is possible that an argument be *ad hominem* and yet not fallacious. I admit that the standard use of this term is to designate only the fallacy. In terms of the standard usage most of the arguments which I am considering would not be instances of the *ad hominem* argument because they are not fallacious. I grant the point and ask only that the utility of heuristically proposing a "broad" (descriptive) and "narrow" (normative) definition of "*ad hominem* argument" be judged by the fruits of this exercise.

[5] *Beyond Good and Evil,* trans. R. J. Hollingdale (Harmondsworth, 1973); hereinafter BGE with references inserted in text.

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expression of the will to power of the democratic soul, an expression of vulgar democratic *ressentiment* against "everything privileged and autocratic." After making this point, he continues his observations this way:

> But, as afore said, that [i.e., the notion of nature's conformity to law] is interpretation, not text; and someone [e.g. the "old philologist" himself] could come along . . . with an opposite intention and art of interpretation . . . (BGE 22).

and read the same text, the "same phenomena," using the hypothesis of the "will to power" to produce an interpretation more favorable to aristocratic than to democratic sentiments. Nietzsche then concludes the paragraph with the following:

> Granted this too is only interpretation—and you will be eager enough to raise this objection?—Well, so much the better (BGE 22).

What are we to make of this "conclusion," in which Nietzsche appears to tempt his imagined reader-adversary[6] into an *ad hominem* argument of the *tu quoque* variety?

In this paragraph Nietzsche is arguing simultaneously on a number of distinct levels. The key points, however, are his statements about the doctrine of the "will to power," i.e., the "old philologist's" concern with the "arts of interpretation" as such. So, besides his specific points about the ontological status of the "laws of nature" and his criticism of the realist understanding of method and theory in physics, Nietzsche makes a number of general hermeneutical claims:

1. Assuming the clarity of the distinction between interpretation and text, he claims that most of what passes for straightforward and unfalsified reports of *text* (i.e., "phenomena") are, in fact, *interpretations*.

2. Calling into question the assumed clarity of the distinction between interpretation and text, he claims that these supposedly straightforward and unfalsified reports of text are, in fact, *inventions*, inventions *of the text* in question, despite the fact that these *inventeurs malgré eux* understand themselves to be simply discovering the text.

3. Depending on what we *take to stand for the text*, i.e., what we take *to be* the phenomena, he claims that "the same phenomena" may be consistently rationalized or "saved" by (many) radically different hypotheses invented for (many) radically different purposes.

[6]Who is the reader-adversary? I think it is clear that Nietzsche does not assume him to be one of the "new species of philosopher," a "philosopher of the dangerous 'perhaps' " (BGE 2), but is at most (at best!) educable in this direction. He may be a Platonic Realist who, *qua* Platonist, could be assumed to be half-open to this argument; he may be a Romantic-Conservative who might yet become one of the new breed of philosopher (BGE 10). In any event, Nietzsche assumes that his reader-adversary will have a passionate commitment to the concepts of objectivity and truth which are attacked in this paragraph; that this commitment will issue from the reader-adversary's own "will to power," and not simply from disinterested reason (BGE 5,6); and that because of this the reader-adversary will yield to the temptation Nietzsche offers him.

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It is, however, the way that Nietzsche closes this paragraph that is of special interest for us. What intrigues us is not just the sophisticated "self-consciousness" of Nietzsche's "consistently" acknowledging that "this too" (i.e., the doctrine expounded in paragraph #22) is "only interpretation"; nor is it the sly way that Nietzsche tempts-discourages his reader-adversary to use this acknowledgement as polemical ammunition. No, what intrigues us is that Nietzsche does all of this and adds the phrase, "well, so much the better." What intrigues us is that Nietzsche takes the possible objection, namely, "that too (i.e., the doctrine of the will to power) is only interpretation" as a confirmation of his "art of interpretation" and of the doctrine of the will to power.

At first glance the trickery here is fairly obvious: to retort to Nietzsche's (anti-realist) construal of the concept of natural law that "it too" is "only interpretation" is to grant the very point that Nietzsche wants to make. Thus, the use of such a retort by Nietzsche's reader-adversary is "so much the better" precisely in the way that anyone who argues *ad hominem* in the manner of *tu quoque* necessarily grants (albeit, implicitly) his adversary's contention; to say to someone, "you are another" is (at least) to admit that "I too am one." The rhetorical recoil of the *tu quoque* is all the more striking in this case because in addition to the "narrow" point about the ontological status of natural law, Nietzsche is also making a general point about interpretation as such—namely that the *text* (i.e., the phenomena) in pure, unfalsified form is inaccessible, and that, consequently, everything thought by anyone is "interpretation," i.e., *invention* (not *discovery*) of the *text*.

If this were the only wrinkle in the closing of paragraph #22, then all that we could say is that Nietzsche is just a very clever polemicist, a very clever practitioner of the philosopher's strategic rhetoric described at the beginning of this paper. This is not, however, the only wrinkle; there is something more interesting, more provocative in Nietzsche's deployment of the *ad hominem* argument in this paragraph. The result reached is "so much the better" in a more profound, and profoundly unsettling way.

Besides the rhetorical victory that is gained by tempting his reader-adversary to argue *tu quoque*, Nietzsche also plants the thought that such objections are *the right sort of objections*. In fact, what Nietzsche suggests is that such objections, such "fallacies," are the only really *serious* objections, the only *truly philosophical* objections. So, the reader-adversary's yielding to temptation (for which he might want to kick himself) is ironically the beginning of his wisdom. His succumbing to temptation, to this particular temptation, is "so much the better" if it signals the recognition that all philosophical argument is essentially, and not merely accidentally, *ad hominem*.

That *this* interpretation of Nietzsche is not utterly fanciful can be shown by entertaining for a moment this most untimely suggestion about philosophy and *ad hominem* argument. Clearly Nietzsche cannot mean that this dangerous claim is simply true *de facto*; it is not as if philosophical argument is invariably *ad hominem* merely because philosophers are invariably human, all too human. Rather, Nietzsche must mean that this claim is true *de jure*, true essentially. For *if* "every great philosophy has hitherto been . . . a confession on the part of its author, a kind of involuntary and unconscious memoir," *and if* "the moral (or immoral) intentions in every philosophy have been the real germ of life out of which the entire plant has grown," *and if* "in the philosopher [unlike the philologist or chemist] . . . there is nothing whatever impersonal," *if*, in other words, a philosopher's "morality," which is the seed out of which his philosophy grows, ". . . bears decided and decisive testimony to *who he is*," *then* philosophical ar-

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gument (unlike scholarly or scientific argument) is inevitably and necessarily *ad hominem*.[7] And, to complete this most untimely thought, it must also be understood that far from discrediting philosophy, this claim constitutes Nietzsche's highest praise of philosophy—the most tyrannical drive, the most perfect and single-minded will to integrity, the most spiritual will to power. For the philosophical school of which Nietzsche means to be the founder, the "philosophy of the dangerous 'perhaps'," will not in this sense be any different from philosophy as it "has been hitherto." It will merely do openly, honestly, even joyfully, what philosophy has always done surreptitiously. And (in part) by this transformation philosophy will become in deed the real power that it has hitherto been only involuntarily and unconsciously.

This ambition for philosophy seems to be characteristic of those philosophies that use *ad hominem* argument in this radical way. Perfectly consistent with the Eleventh Thesis on Feuerbach— "(Hitherto) the philosophers have only *interpreted* the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to *change* it"—Marx describes the inevitability, the necessity, of *ad hominem* argument in philosophy like this:

> The weapon of criticism can not, of course, replace criticism of the weapon, material force must be overthrown by material force; but theory [i.e. philosophy] also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped the masses. Theory [i.e., philosophy] is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates *ad hominem*, and it [philosophy] demonstrates *ad hominem* as soon as it becomes radical.[8]

This radical ambition for philosophy, which arises coevally with the critique of the classical conception of reason, implies a transvaluation of philosophical values, a transvaluation, if you will, of the "cognitive morality" of philosophy. Part of what this means is that *ad hominem* argument comes to be integrated into the very structure of philosophical discourse, *and* into the ground-plan of philosophical scholarship.

A striking manifestation of this latter development can be seen in John Dewey's *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, where he offers his general interpretation of the classical tradition of philosophy.[9] Dewey states frankly that the motive behind his "plea for reconstruction" in philosophy is practical. This reinterpretation of the classical tradition —the reconstruction of philosophy — is to be the prolegomenon to "the development of a philosophy that will do for our time and place what the great doctrines of the past

[7] See BGE 6. It is important to note that Nietzsche does not believe that every form of intelligent argument is necessarily *ad hominem*. Philosophy is not the only manifestation of intelligence; it is only the highest or most spiritual manifestation of intelligence. While philosophy necessarily argues *ad hominem*, the situation is "different—'better,' if you will" in the case of authentic scholars (like philologists) and really scientific men (like chemists). These sorts of intellectuals have a *Fach*, an area of expertise and competence, as well as a desire to hone their ability in this area. This desire, however, is not the ruling passion in the lives of such men; their "will to power" is manifested in other ways and in other endeavours. The scholar (philologist) and the scientist (chemist) are not characterized in their very being by the knowledge they have of their specialty. *Fachwissen* is not the product of a spiritual, identity-constituting *conatus*. Such knowledge can be objective in the classical sense. Thus, the argumentative structure of *Fachwissen* is not inherently and essentially *ad hominem*, but quite the reverse—i.e., cool, detached, and impersonal. The irony implied in Nietzsche's use of "better" to characterize this sort of knowledge reveals his "existentialist" ambivalence toward this kind of knowing; cool, detached, and impersonal knowledge cannot be the most profound knowledge.

[8] *Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's* Philosophy of Right, cited from *Marx & Engels on Religion* (New York, 1964), p. 50.

[9] *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (Boston, 1948); hereinafter RP with references inserted in text.

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did in and for the cultural media out of which they arose" (RP viii). More specifically, his reconstruction of philosophy has the goal of creating the conditions for "a systematic exploration of the values belonging to what is genuinely new in the scientific, technological, and political movements of the immediate past" by freeing these explorations from "the incubus imposed on them by habits formed in a pre-scientific, pre-technological-industrial, and pre-democratic political period" (RP xxxvi-xxxvii).

Thus, Dewey's aim in re-interpreting the classical tradition is not the theoretical one of trying to understand the past as it understood itself, but the practical one of using this reconstruction as a vehicle for attacking *his* contemporary adversaries, persons who take their authority from the prestige of past systems. This polemical undertaking is necessary because these adversaries use their undeserved authority to defend "vested institutional interests" (RP xiv). In turn, these vested interests stand in the way of the attempt ". . . to carry over into [the] inquiry into human and moral subjects the mind and method (the method of observation, theory as hypothesis, and experimental test) by which understanding of physical nature has been brought to its present pitch" (RP ix).[10] Our interest is in the way that Dewey carries out this polemical undertaking.

It is clear that the actual addressee of Dewey's reconstruction is only accidentally the actual representatives of these vested interests. For various reasons, addressing them would, in Dewey's opinion, probably be a waste of time. More promising would seem to be the tack of addressing those men and women who still recognize those authorities, but who are not so tied to them as to be beyond the pale of persuasion. Further, since loyalty, even if misplaced and undeserved, can be a significant obstacle in any practical-political endeavour, the best approach with these educable followers would be to attack the source of this misplaced and undeserved authority—the classical tradition of philosophy—rather than the contemporary authority figures themselves.

Yet, while appearing to avoid the very ground on which *ad hominem* could emerge, Dewey's reconstructive undertaking is in its overall structure a grand *ad hominem* argument. Near the end of the first chapter of *Reconstruction in Philosophy* Dewey boldly states his intention:

> This course of lectures will be devoted to setting forth this different conception of philosophy [i.e., Dewey's pragmatic-instrumentalism] in some of its main contrasts to what this lecture has termed the classic conception. At this point it [i.e., Dewey's pragmatic instrumentalism] can be referred to only by anticipation and in cursory fashion. It is implied in the account which has been given of the origin of [classical] philosophy out of the background of an authoritative tradition; a tradition originally dictated by man's imagination

[10]Besides the more obvious reasons for the resistance of these unnamed vested interests to Dewey's proposals, there may be a philosophical reason to wonder about his project. One of the results of applying the experimental method to ethics will be the transformation of what are commonly taken to be ethical norms into *hypotheses*. As "hypotheses" basic ethical norms would have to be corrected, altered, or even abandoned as the practical situation (context of application) changes. So, if an ethical norm, conceived as a hypothesis, were found to be inconsistent with some "end in view," some end describing a situation that one wishes *to be* part of the practical data or "phenomena," using the experimental method in ethics would seem to legitimate abandoning this inconvenient ethical "hypothesis" in favor of one more consistent with what we wish *to be* the "data" of practical life. This kind of approach to ethics would certainly introduce great flexibility; it would certainly liberate us from ethical absolutes. But one wonders if this approach would not transform ethics into the discipline of rationalizing desire, or into nothing more than a system of explanatory purport. One thinks here of the response of Milton's Lady to the sophistry of Comus: "false rules prank'd in reason's garb."

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> working under the influence of love and hate and in the interest of emotional excitement and satisfaction. *Common frankness requires that it be stated that this account* of the origin of [classical] philosophy claiming to deal with absolute Being in a systematic way *has been given with malice prepense.* It seems to me that this genetic method of approach is a more effective way of undermining this type of philosophical theorizing than any attempt at logical refutation could be (RP 24; glosses & emphasis mine).[11]

And of course. If one can 'explain' a doctrine, in the sense of telling an interesting 'story' about its genesis, and yet clearly indicate that one does not hold it oneself, one thereby creates the impression that one has *gone beyond* or *surpassed* the doctrine so reconstructed. The "genetic method of approach" is rhetorically more powerful than logical refutation precisely because it allows one to pose as the most just of men, besides offering the opportunity for a display of intellectual erudition. For what could seem more just or respectable in response to a false doctrine than to go out of one's way to explain, i.e., reconstruct, the source of the falsehood? Sometimes justice is just condescension. With uncommon frankness Dewey drives home the *ad hominem* character of his reconstruction:

> If this lecture succeeds in leaving in your minds as a reasonable hypothesis the idea that [classical] philosophy originated *not out of intellectual material, but out of social and emotional material,* it will also succeed in leaving with you a changed attitude toward traditional philosophies (RP 25, gloss & emphasis mine).

If classical philosophy can be made to appear as the child of emotion and social accident, and not as the offspring of intellect and reflection, one will no doubt look at it "from a new angle" and "in a new light." For even if one does not openly laugh or visibly blush, one will certainly cease to regard classical philosophy with reverence (to

[11]In my gloss of this passage I will always insert [classical] when Dewey writes "origin of philosophy." Likewise, if I were glossing the "basic postulate" of *Reconstruction in Philosophy,* I would insert [any] where Dewey writes, "The distinctive office, problems, and subject matter of [any] philosophy [grows] out of the stresses and strains in the community life in which a given form of philosophy arises, and that, accordingly, its specific problems vary with the changes in human life that are always going on that at times constitute a crisis and a turning point in human history" (RP v-vi). While I think these glosses justified, I will admit that they may be interpretations as much as clarifications. This "interpretation" has the effect of bringing Dewey closer to Nietzsche, and of obscuring the Hegelian element in Dewey's views. It may be that by inserting the terms "classical" and "any" in Dewey's statements I make him seem to be more of a relativist than he is, and, perhaps most important, I may obscure the element of continuity, the progress, that Dewey thinks characteristic of Western history. This is the Hegelian element—i.e., the idea of rationality, or the progressive direction of historical change in the West—in Dewey's historicism that is quite at odds with the radically anti-teleological view of historical change which one finds in Nietzsche: See *On the Advantage and Disadvantage of History for Life,* #1, near end; *The Will to Power 90*; and Leo Strauss, "The Three Waves of Modernity" in *Political Philosophy*, ed. Hilail Gildin (Indianapolis, 1975), pp. 95-96. If Dewey is an historicist, he seems, like Hegel, to hypothesize something like an "absolute" moment in which the inspired gropings of previous philosophy enter on the sure and steady path of coherent and systematic development. Thus there is in Dewey a reenactment of the "quarrel of the ancients and the moderns," with Dewey making anew the arguments of the 17th century defending the qualitative advance which is signaled by modernity. Dewey is like a Baconian-Cartesian-Hobbesian prophet come to warn us about the back-sliders in our midst. Nietzsche's historicism is more radical precisely because he is prepared to surrender all "the plaguey prejudices of a philosophical whiggery," and, in particular, the notion of the rationality of the historical process. Incidentally, it is because of this—his granting to no one any presumption—that Nietzsche's interpretations of the ancients are in many ways more profound than Dewey's.

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say nothing of how one will look on those contemporaries who take their authority from the prestige of such systems). Who is to doubt that engendering embarrassment and provoking laughter allows one to leap over barriers that cannot be breached by formal argumentation? And if Hobbes is right that laughter is "sudden glory," so much the better; for is not such an enspiriting dose of manly pride just what is needed if we are intrepidly to dare the application of scientific method to all "human and moral subjects?"[12]

In conclusion, I must emphasize that it has not been my intention, my pretension, to offer anything like an interpretation or critique of the substantive philosophical opinions of Nietzsche, Marx, and Dewey. It has been my aim to suggest that the appearance of *ad hominem* argument in their work is neither accidental nor simply an instance of the traditional strategic rhetoric so dear to philosophers. I have argued that in the work of all three thinkers the deployment of *ad hominem* argument is in a certain sense dictated by their respective views of the nature of philosophy, the nature of reason, and the nature of things. I have suggested that the place and significance of *ad hominem* argument in their work is somehow connected with their "genetic" concerns, and with their common ambition that philosophy become in deed a social-political force for the transformation of the world. I do believe, however, that closer reflection on the "philosophies" of these three men might make one wonder if the real power of philosophy does not consist precisely in the refusal to become committed in this way. Perhaps the more modest, admittedly less glorious, goal of striving to be a force for the transformation of individual souls (*Republic* 592b) is the renunciation required to prevent philosophy from being dissolved into ideology. And so:

> [It seems of late that] the philosophers have only desired to change the world; the highest form of philosophical praxis is, however, merely to understand it.

[12]In light of the "basic postulate" of *Reconstruction in Philosophy* (see note #11), one would assume that it would be fair to read Dewey's own philosophy in the same way. This, of course, would not be true if Dewey hypothesizes something like an absolute moment in the history of philosophy after which his "basic postulate" would not apply in the way that it applies before that moment. It seems that something along this line must be conjectured to account for Dewey's "vexed" response to Bertrand Russell's rather "innocuous" application of his version of Dewey's "basic postulate" to pragmatic instrumentalism itself: see Bertrand Russell, *A History of Western Philosophy* (New York, 1945), pp. 826-827.

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Editor D. P. CHATTOPADHYAYA

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Drew Univ.

Jaspers' Critique of Heidegger: The Arrogance of Thought

Raymond E. Gogel

ASSUMING THAT one takes philosophy seriously, it cannot help but appear that there is something highly questionable about any attempt to compare Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. Perhaps even the inclusion of the comparative method in the standard repertoire of philosophical tools is questionable, but those who employ that approach can often point for their justification to the great gains in elucidation which that method provides. There are, of course, always elements and moments of a thinker's enterprise which remain essentially foreign and inaccessible to us, and at least some of these can, in capable hands, be made to yield themselves to us in a fruitful way through the use of comparison.

It is noteworthy, therefore, that this particular avenue of approach has, despite frequent employment, shown itself to be less than fruitful when the objects of comparison just happen to be Karl Jaspers and Martin Heidegger. Here comparisons generally seem to remain either a type of *external* critique, whereby they run the danger of doing justice to neither thinker, or they end up subscribing to one position and violating the other, in which case, of course, they fail to take philosophy seriously. In the first instance there is a tendency toward eclecticism whereby we run the risk of becoming, as Heidegger once phrased it: "the Little Moritz of philosophy who intends to make out of five philosophers yet a sixth."[1] In the second case, philosophy becomes dogmatic and the act of philosophizing is replaced by a more or less uncritical adherence to the ground-tenets of a particular school of thought.

In the eyes of both Heidegger and Jaspers, either of these two options would be "unphilosophical." Both men shared a *formal* understanding of the genuine task of philosophy, seeing philosophy as a process of self-transformation. It was in the *deformalization*[2] and *concretization* of this shared understanding that these thinkers went radically

[1]Martin Heidegger, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1978), p. 178.

[2]Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, in an excellent little study entitled *Der Begriff der Phänomenologie bei Heidegger und Husserl* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1981), has demonstrated how such "deformalization" is an essential part of all phenomenological research. He points out that both Heidegger and Husserl shared the same *formal* understanding of phenomenology as the return to the *"Sachen selbst."* It was in their specific *deformalization* of the genuine goals of phenomenological research that they went radically separate ways. The notion of "deformalization," however, should not be restricted simply to phenomenology. It must be extended to the process of *philosophizing as such* since the formal truth claim of any thinker always presupposes a deformalization and concretization. As the present investigation will show, however, the direction of such deformalization always remains outside the domain of thematic justification. Particularly striking in this regard

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separate ways. Despite the striking similarity of their concerns and methods, an unbridgeable gap exists between the thought of Heidegger and Jaspers. It is a gap that cannot be bridged through the use of the comparative method without creating that phantom phenomenon commonly referred to as "existentialism." And more importantly, it is a gap which *should not* be bridged, but rather *understood*.

Karl Jaspers spent almost four decades of his life trying to do just that: understand the gap. His attitude toward Heidegger's thought was ambivalent; he felt both drawn to and repulsed by it. He sought to enter into a philosophical dialogue with Heidegger, first on a personal basis and then later on a public level, but ultimately both intentions miscarried. On his desk at the time of his death, however, was a notebook containing his thoughts on Heidegger, spanning the years 1928-1964. It is in this notebook, edited by Hans Saner and published in 1978 by Piper Verlag under the title of *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger*, that his critique of Heidegger is to be found.[3]

What is most significant about this critique is that it does not attempt to analyze and refute *elements* of Heidegger's thought. On the contrary, its innermost goal is confrontation, radical *Auseinandersetzung*, even (to use a term which Jaspers frequently employs) "*Bekämpfung*" ("combat"). The word is aptly chosen, for Jaspers does not offer a concrete, critical examination of Heidegger's concepts; instead he attacks and wrestles with Heidegger's thought *as a whole*, openly seeking a ground-confrontation between their disparate viewpoints. In short: Jaspers challenges not *aspects* of Heidegger's thought, but rather the overall Heideggerian *project*, and in doing so, he questions Heidegger's concrete understanding of the genuine task of philosophy. As a result, the very *form* of Jaspers' approach raised for him the question of the possibility of philosophical critique as such. This problem is not just an interesting addendum to Jaspers' critique of Heidegger, but rather the very essence of that critique.

The Heidegger chapter of Jaspers' *Philosophical Autobiography* closes, not with a critique of Heidegger (which is conspicously absent from the *Autobiography*) but by posing the question of the possibility of philosophical critique in general. This question, writes Jaspers in the *Notizen*, constitutes "one of the most exciting problems of philosophy as it seeks communication."[4] In the *Autobiography* we find the same sentence, but Jaspers goes on to add that this problem revolves around "the question of meaningful philosophical discussion (*sinnvollen Auseinandersetzung im Philosophieren*), (a question) which, in my opinion, has never yet been posed with sufficient clarity, let alone answered."[5] Accordingly, the very possibility of genuine philosophical com-

is a statement from Heidegger in his Marburg lecture *Logik: die Frage nach der Wahrheit* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1976), p. 280: "Every philosophical problematic has something at its back which it cannot elucidate despite its greatest clarity since it has this clarity precisely because it doesn't know its own presupposition." Cf. also *Sein und Zeit* (Tübingen: Niemeyer Verlag, 1972), p. 35, for Heidegger's brief treatment of the concept of "deformalization."

[3]Karl Jaspers, *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger* (München, R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1978). A translation and exposition of the most important sections of the *Notizen* by Leonard Ehrlich, Edith Ehrlich and George Pepper is scheduled to appear shortly from Ohio University Press. Their long-awaited book, *Karl Jaspers: Basic Philosophical Writings*, will finally provide the English-speaking philosophical community with texts that will enable a comprehensive and systematic study of the overall development of Jaspers' thought. Besides selections from the *Notizen*, they have included large sections of Jaspers' seminal works: *Von der Wahrheit* and *Philosophie*.

[4]Karl Jaspers, *Notizen zu Martin Heidegger*, p. 135.

[5]Jaspers, *Philosophische Autobiographie* (München: R. Piper & Co. Verlag, 1977), p. 106.

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munication was questionable in general, and particularly so in respect to Jaspers' critique of Heidegger since the communication which Jaspers sought there was of a fundamental nature: a dialogue between horizons, a "knightly combat"[6] which would transcend the essential restrictions inherent in both perspectives. Such a dialogue, however, would ultimately have to confront the question of the true "task," or *Sache,* of philosophy.

Every significant thinker has a more or less thematic understanding of the goals of his philosophy and this understanding underwrites and shapes his thought as a whole. What we consider to have ultimate philosophical relevance, for instance, determines *in advance* which direction our investigations can and should take. It decides which of the very few themes, out of the almost infinite variety of interesting possibilities, will, in fact, capture our attention, and so be thought through, that is, be "actualized."

Each specific understanding of the task of philosophy, however, is eminently question -able (*frag-würdig*), since it can never be vindicated or justified *within* the context of any investigation. Instead, it functions as the ground-presupposition of our philosophizing, as the standard against which we measure both our process and our results. In the final analysis, our understanding of the task of philosophy represents an untested horizon that shapes both the *what* and *how* of our thought, i.e., it delineates not only our binding concerns, but also our methodological apparatus.

The problem here, of course, is that although a concrete understanding of the task of philosophy constitutes the condition of possibility for all philosophizing, it does so *unthematically*. It remains a *hidden*, and unquestioned, presupposition which can never present itself to us directly such that we might expose it to the light of critical analysis and test it for its legitimacy. Instead, we *experience* the "bindingness" (*Verbindlichkeit*) of this inexplicit presupposition only in and through our involvement with the *Sachen* (i.e., the objects) of philosophy, while the *Sache*, or task, of philosophy remains the always submerged but ever "active" principle traversing that involvement. We are faced here with yet another version of the hermeneutical circle: the "success" of any investigation only *seemingly* justifies our understanding of the *Sache* of philosophy, for that understanding actually defines in advance the criteria of the concepts "success" and "failure."

Nor does raising the question of the legitimacy of one's particular understanding of the task of philosophy in any way circumvent this predicament. In order for the question of the task of philosophy to present itself *as* a binding and significant theme would presuppose, once again, a specific understanding of the task of philosophy. We cannot, in the final analysis, ever climb out of our skins and test our presupposition. Thus, our understanding of the *Sache* of philosophy is not only untested but also untestable. In spite of our best efforts, the purported truth of our understanding of the *Sache* of philosophy remains outside the field of possible legitimation. What we take to be the true task of philosophy is never the achievement of rational insight, critical analysis, or philosophical thought; ultimately, it reflects the horizon of our lived-world, i.e., the concrete situation in which we always unwittingly and sometimes unwillingly find ourselves "thrown."

If, then, an understanding of the *Sache* of philosophy constitutes the untestable condition of possibility for philosophical thought, then the very possibility of philosophical

[6]Jaspers, *Notizen,* p. 214.

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critique—the cornerstone of philosophy—is jeopardized. We are faced, as it were, with two options: either we can test the horizon of another thinker by subsuming that particular understanding of the *Sache* within our own horizon (in which case our interpretation remains external and, as Heidegger has often demonstrated, "violent" (*gewaltsam*)[7], or we can attempt, with limited success, to subsume *ourselves* within the understanding of the thinker we seek to examine. In this case, we endeavor to enter into the intrinsic "movement" of his thought and try to *experience* the bindingness of *his* horizon. In other words, we can either "objectify" a foreign horizon or "reify" ourselves. In either case, disturbing consequences arise which threaten the possibility and justification of philosophy as a whole. In the final analysis, both Jaspers and Heidegger sought to escape these consequences by proposing specific, and radically different, conceptions of the real task of philosophy.

To Jaspers, Heidegger represented more than just an "opponent" (*Gegner*). He was, in fact, Jaspers' philosophical "*Wider-sacher*," i.e., someone who opposes by going "against" ("*wider*") the *Sache* of philosophy. Accordingly, Jaspers' critique is geared to confronting—no, to *combating*—Heidegger's specific understanding of the task of philosophy. He saw in Heidegger's answer to this ground-problem of philosophy more than just an "inadequate" solution. He thought in fact, that he perceived what was at heart a "demonic" tendency.[8] Here, for Jaspers, was a philosophy marked by "nihilistic hybris" and by a fundamental proclivity toward self-isolation, a philosophy which was ultimately "solipsistic" and "without love."[9] He writes,

> Despite its thrownness, existence is still conceived as something entirely self-sufficient. Its authenticity is marked by isolation. A symptom of this monistic monotony is that communication only appears as "idle talk" (*Gerede*) and human beings only as society (*Gesellschaft*).[10]

And further, "We ask, here and now, for (and about) ourselves, but the entire presentation objectifies in such a way that the 'we' disappears."[11]

At the heart of this philosophy lay, according to Jaspers "a deep despair: (there is) no belief in communication, (only) the consciousness of total loneliness . . . (and) of the fall and end of human history. . . . "[12] At the same time, there is an "artificial and untrust-

[7]Heidegger has contended that all hermeneutical interpretation is essentially "violent" in nature. Jaspers was clearly disturbed by the *"Gewaltsamkeit"* (p. 83) of both Heidegger's interpretation and language. Although he acknowledged the "virtuosity of form" of Heidegger's style, Jaspers adamantly rejected that style as both "empty" and "veiled" (p. 83) and as running the "double dangers" of either a "sophistry born of virtuosity" or a "fanaticism" which results from being "tied to a specific type of thought" (pp. 104-5). The latter danger, it seems, accounted for what Jaspers perceived as the "dictatorial" form of Heidegger's expositions (p. 152). In a rather striking passage of the *Notizen* Jaspers writes: "Just as Zeus hurls his lightning from the clouds, so Heidegger flings his pronouncements (*Machtsprüche*), but they are only smoke and fireworks" (p. 92), Cf. also p. 237.

[8]Cf. *Notizen,* p. 89. The question of the "demonic" aspect of Heidegger's thought constitutes a subdominant theme running throughout the *Notizen,* but it is a question which Jaspers failed to resolve in any clear way. It is clear, however, that an essential dimension of the question revolved, in Jaspers' eyes, around Heidegger's involvement with National Socialism and his unwillingness—or inability—to accept responsibility for that involvement. Cf. also, pp. 58, 77, 92.

[9]*Ibid.,* p. 34.

[10]*Ibid.,* p. 33.

[11]*Ibid.,* p. 37.

[12]*Ibid.,* p. 147.

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worthy summoning up of primitive possibilities"[13] which ultimately demonstrates a "lack of regard for the human being."[14] Jaspers objected to the "grotesque and obvious equivocality"[15] of any form of thought which "rejects science and (yet, at the same time) maintains (its own) truth in the sense of being generally valid."[16]

It was the "power of this form"[17] which troubled Jaspers because, *as* a form, it seemed to negate the specific understanding of the task of philosophy to which Jaspers himself subscribed. A cryptic note is repeated throughout the *Notizen*: Heidegger's "work (is) void of communication; it is worldless and godless."[18] The problem, of course, was not that Heidegger's language was inaccessible; the simple fact of Heidegger's popularity vividly demonstrated his extraordinary ability to communicate. But, the very form of Heidegger's thought was "seductive;"[19] it suppressed the *genuine* communication between horizons which for Jaspers constituted "the eternal and unobjectifiable task"[20] of philosophy. As a result, Heidegger's philosophy forfeited "the ability to be a friend"[21] and lost sight of the essential significance of "love"[22] for existence. In their stead, Jaspers found only "the demand of an uncaring 'courage for one-self.' "[23] Rather than the radical openness of "possible *Existenz*" for communication, Jaspers perceived in Heidegger's thought "an ontological system which in fact closes itself."[24]

Moreover, it was a system which, for Jaspers, also seemed thoroughly traditional: "Heidegger still remains in the tradition of an objectifying philosophy (*Sachverhaltsphilosophie*), a philosophy of inquiring which finds or seeks to find a generally valid truth."[25] In the end, wrote Jaspers, "the elucidation of *Existenz* is transformed into the knowledge of existentials . . . (and) the elucidation of Being . . . is decisively presented in objectifying concepts."[26] Accordingly, the existentiell drive for communication and self-transformation was lost to the "seduction of the system"[27] and replaced by the "magic of the iron construction."[28]

It can be argued that the genuine goal of Heidegger's philosophy was *not* the construction of a metaphysics of Being. The posing of the question of Being and the concomitant search for the "sense" of Being were only meaningful if, as he wrote in *Being and Time*, "the end . . . of all philosophical questioning is anchored at the point out of which such questioning arises and toward which it kicks back (*zurückschlägt*)."[29] The

[13] *Ibid.*
[14] *Ibid.*
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 124.
[16] *Ibid.*
[17] *Ibid.*, p. 38.
[18] *Ibid.*, p. 56.
[19] *Ibid.*, p. 103.
[20] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[21] *Ibid.*
[22] *Ibid.* Cf. also p. 197.
[23] *Ibid.*, p. 32.
[24] *Ibid.*
[25] *Ibid.*, p. 180.
[26] *Ibid.*, pp. 137-38.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 104.
[28] *Ibid.*
[29] Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit*, p. 38. See also pp. 13-14, where Heidegger notes that the analysis of Dasein ultimately has "existentiell, i.e., ontic roots. Only if the questions of philosophical research are themselves grasped as existentiell possibilities of the Being of the individual existence of Dasein is there the possibility of

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inherent difficulty here is that, in the very moment in which we attempt to analyze existence, we also "objectify" it. Heidegger's interpretation of the "existentials" of Dasein was, of necessity, a *categorial* interpretation, but one which presupposed a prior act of transcendence on his part, i.e., a leap out of the categorial sphere of thought. This is recognized by Jaspers throughout the *Notizen*: "Heidegger touches the boundaries with his concepts; (he) executes an act of genuine transcendence but (only) to operate in the next moment with those concepts as if they were ontological knowledge."[30] At the heart of such transcendence lay, according to Jaspers, a fundamental confusion: on the one hand, Heidegger's thought was definitely a philosophizing which seeks

> what is genuine; one sees this for an instant and then it disappears immediately. Heidegger is perhaps the only one of today's official philosophers who knows what philosophizing is all about. The question is whether he is able to handle it. No, he confuses matters, not so much logically . . . as existentielly."[31]

In the final analysis, it was the *existentiell* consequences of Heidegger's thought, and not Heidegger's *categorial* expositions, which troubled Jaspers. He saw beneath Heidegger's interpretations of Dasein and Being a fundamental, and fundamentally dangerous, proclivity toward the oracular and prophetic, a type of "gnostic" philosophy which claimed to be the "thinking proclamation of the one absolute truth . . . ."[32] Heidegger's approach to philosophizing necessarily undermined genuine communication by isolating the individual and relieving him of his responsibility toward his community. Wrote Jaspers:

> Here is the decisive point: all significant philosophy awakens through its thought something which cannot be presented as science, but which can only be felt through and fulfilled by possible *Existenz*, i.e., by the presence out of and toward which I live. In communicative thought (*Mitdenken*) I am brought toward something and become at home in the *encompassing* through the acting, feeling, living, choosing and comportment of my self. I grow in this communication and am encouraged by the communality (of thinking). . . .[33]

It is no surprise, then, that Jaspers was repulsed by "the factual and fundamental communicationlessness"[34] of a philosophy which "experiences loneliness and distrusts each step outside of it; (a philosophy which) suffers and yet obstinately maintains that such loneliness is inescapable."[35]

Heidegger neglected the essential communality of both thought and everyday existence by turning his attention instead upon those rare, and isolated, individuals who were called upon to "let Being be" and to participate in the history of Being as the "story" (*Sage*) of the historical unveiling of infinite Being in the form of human "fates" (*Geschicke*). For this reason, Heidegger's philosophy had, to Jaspers' ear, the claim and

disclosing the existentiality of existence. . . ." Of particular significance are also the passages in *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik* where Heidegger unfolds the "metaontological" dimension of philosophical thought. Here one encounters Heidegger's earliest discussion of the "turning" (*Kehre*) as "*metabole*" or "Umschlag" (pp. 196-201).

[30] Jaspers, *Notizen*, p. 40.

[31] *Ibid.*, p. 38.

[32] *Ibid.*, p. 228.

[33] *Ibid.*, p. 82-83.

[34] *Ibid.*, p. 171.

[35] *Ibid.*, p. 197.

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> style of a proclamation which deals with insights that are not known as insights. Rather they are revealed (*geschickt*) not only to the one who expresses them, but also to those who listen to him. (Heidegger) does not grasp these insights as a human being, but as mankind in this moment of history in which the history of Being speaks through the thinker.[36]

Thus, in the place of a praxis of personal engagement and communication (the benchmarks of genuine philosophy for Jaspers), Heidegger offered, as the highest *Sache* of philosophy, the thinker's participation in the self-revelation of Being in history. For Jaspers, this meant that "Heidegger has abandoned philosophizing under the measure of truth,"[37] by relinquishing the essential criteria of genuine communication and replacing them only with a type of "speaking which only 'senses' (*ahnungshaftes Sprechen*) and proclaims in equivocal and obscure hints and promises."[38] In this manner, wrote Jaspers, "a space of philosophical reflection which we share in common is closed off and in his isolation (Heidegger) invents fantastic counterfeits with the false consciousness that in this manner he is part of the essential course of genuine history."[39]

So much for the basic elements of Jaspers' critique of Heidegger. The question is, of course, whether that critique is justified. The lack of direct references and the general confrontational tone of Jaspers' interpretation make it exceedingly difficult for us to judge its legitimacy. Moreover, I suspect there *are* no final answers to this question, nor perhaps, should there be. It is, however, possible to identify the source of Jaspers' objections to Heidegger's thought and, at the same time, to illustrate concretely those objections.

If, as Heidegger has stated, every great thinker has but "one single thought," then it must be noted that Heidegger's ground-thought revolved around Being as truth. It is not surprising, then, that the very "dangers" which Jaspers sensed in Heidegger's philosophy can be traced directly to the latter's truth concept. Although it is a concept which evolved through three distinct stages, its earliest formulation (in §44 of *Being and Time*) already contained the essential elements, and significant dangers, which disturbed Jaspers.

As the publication of his early lectures now makes abundantly clear, *Being and Time* should be understood as Heidegger's attempt to "radicalize" the phenomenology of Husserl. The ontological "roots" of phenomenology had to be unfolded in order both to "justify" her results and to transform her self-understanding. For this reason, §44 sought to deepen the Husserlian concept of evidence found in the *Logical Investigations*[40] where truth was unfolded as a specific type of intentional act, namely, an act in which an *intentum* is given *just as* it is intended by the *intentio*. Such givenness was pure and self-evident intuition, an act which "experienced" the "plenitude" (*Fülle*) of the Being of its object.

This interpretation of truth appeared to Heidegger to be more than a bit naive: how could we ever say that an *intentio* "grasped" its *intentum just as* the intentional object was in fact given?[41] Doesn't this presuppose that we can, at some point, stand outside of

[36] *Ibid.*, p. 219.
[37] *Ibid.*, p. 78. [38] *Ibid.*, p. 79.
[39] *Ibid.*, p. 197.
[40] Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Logische Untersuchungen* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1968), vol II/2, §39, pp. 122-27.
[41] Heidegger's most detailed analysis of this problem is found in his lecture: *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*, esp., pp. 101-2, 139, and 162-74. *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1975), also treats this theme by presenting a radicalized concept of "world" which undercuts Husserl's approach by showing that all intentionality presupposes the *a priori* comprehension of Being. Cf. pp. 249-50.

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all intentional relationships and perceive things "just as" they "are"? Far from overcoming the difficulties of the subject-object split, Husserl succeeded only in internalizing them within consciousness. Intentional evidence, i.e., ontic truth, necessarily presupposed the *prior* comprehension of Being as the specific regard in terms of which an object was "envisioned." In other words, Dasein's prethematic understanding of Being always shapes in advance the possible range and contour of any intentional act.

Accordingly, such "*Seinsverständnis*" functions concretely as an apriori standard which "measures," as it were, all meaningful intentional relations between subject and object. Thus, ontic "discovery" (Heidegger's term for the intentional act) presupposes the prior "discover*ed*ness" (*Entdeckt*heit) of Being. In order for an object to be able to present itself self-evidently, Dasein must first "climb over" that object and comprehend its Being or, what is the same, Dasein must understand, if only vaguely and unthematically, the specific measure in terms of which that object is to be encountered in a meaningful way. In other words, the "prior" discoveredness of a region or *category* of Being constitutes the condition of possibility for all ontic truth.

The understanding of *categorial* Being, however, does not constitute the final, or even penultimate, dimension in Heidegger's concept of truth. The discoveredness of categorial possibilities of Being (*das Sein des Seienden*) presupposes, in turn, the prior disclosedness (*Erschlossenheit*) of the Being of Dasein's concrete existence. All categorical standards as the Being of object-things are themselves "measured" by this existentiell dimension of Dasein's comprehension of the essential "truth" or "sense" of its existence.

One of the charges leveled against Heidegger's concept of truth is that it ultimately results in the loss of the "specific truth phenomenon," i.e., ontic truth.[42] This, in fact, is not the case. Discoveredness and disclosedness are always concrete; "what" they unveil, in each case, is a specific *possibility* of Being, not Being as such in its complete plenitude. It would, therefore, be a relatively simple matter to show how intentional evidence (and with it the specific truth phenomenon) are made possible with, and explained by, the ontological concept of truth which Heidegger presented in §44.

What is particularly significant for our purposes is that Heidegger, who was well aware of this possibility, did *not* attempt to do just that. Although the specific truth phenomenon represented the basis for all concrete philosophical propositions, Heidegger's thought was occupied with other and, for him, more pressing, concerns. *Aussagewahrheit*, propositional truth, never constituted a binding or significant concern for Heidegger's thought. This, of course, indicates more than an oversight on Heidegger's part; in fact, it reflects an essential dimension of Heidegger's approach to philosophy.

Rather than establishing his continuity with phenomenology in particular and the philosophical tradition in general, Heidegger devoted himself to a different task altogether. The discovery of disclosedness as the horizon of all categorial truth opened for him yet another, and radically new, dimension of thought, one which took precedence over and usurped, as it were, the concerns of the tradition in which he stood. It was *this* dimension of thought which occupied Heidegger's attention in the form of the question: what is the final horizon, or ground, of Dasein's understanding of the Being of its existence?

[42]Cf. Ernst Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1970), pp. 328-49.

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In *Being and Time*, Heidegger attempted to pave the way for a possible fundamental ontology by first examining the existential structures of Dasein. To this end, he presented the two fundamental ways in which Dasein encounters Being: categorially and existentially. Both of these *ways* of Being (*Seinsweisen*), however, represent just one *type* of Being (*Seinsart*): Being for us (*Sein in der Seinsart des Daseins*). The essential ontological constitution of Dasein—its ek-static participation in Being—demonstrated, however, that the final horizon or measure of discoveredness and disclosure was not Dasein, but ultimately a possibility of *Being in itself*. From the start, the explication of the structures of Being, and not Dasein, represented the genuine goal of Heidegger's thought. He sought to unfold a *Way* of Being which would be common to all possibilities of Being, namely, "Time." It was through the interpretation of Time and temporality that the most fundamental and significant possibility of Being in itself could be revealed: Being as *aletheia*, i.e., as the historical process of Truth in which possibilities of Being are revealed to Dasein while, at the same time, Being as a whole also withdraws and conceals itself. Thus, *aletheia* constituted the "Idea of Being," the final ground of all the manifold possibilities of Being as such. At the same time, this radically new understanding of Being meant, for Heidegger, that a new, and all-inclusive, possibility of Being had, in that moment, revealed itself to Dasein. The famous (and infamous) "turning" (*Kehre*) in Heidegger's thought resulted from his attempt to unfold thematically the aletheiological dimension of Being.

That attempt, however, made explicit a tendency that was already implied in *Being and Time*; namely, the insight that the existentiell acts of a philosopher could be epoch-making—not simply important for himself, but, above all, significant for the aletheiological process of Being as such. At certain points in history, the significant thinker was presented with both the possibility *and the obligation* to cast off the constricting bonds of traditional understandings of Being in order that new measures, as new concrete possibilities of Being itself, might be able to manifest themselves. Accordingly, only a truly radical thought could help to usher in a new age of Being. This, however, presupposed individual acts of genuine transcendence on the part of the thinker (and poet). It required an authentic engagement and participation in Being itself, an engagement, we should note, which was not possible in the realm of categorial thought (*Vorstellen*), but which was only given in and through the thinker's individual *experience* of Being as his concrete measure. As a result, genuine thought struggled to unfold its own particular experience of measure and thus let a new possibility of Being unveil itself. In the final analysis, the one true task of philosophy, for Heidegger, was to serve as a "shepherd of Being" and to help "prepare" the "new beginning" (*der andersanfängliche Anfang*).

Jaspers' critique is directed at precisely this dimension of Heidegger's thought, i.e., at Heidegger's understanding of the genuine task of philosophy. Here Jaspers saw more than an aberrant philosophical tendency. Here he saw, instead, the fundamental *arrogance* of that philosophy. There was an "authoritarian claim and dictatorial form"[43] at the heart of Heidegger's thought which demanded a radical acceptance of *his* specific ground-position and of *his* particular understanding of the task of philosophy. As a result, that understanding remained essentially closed, myopic, and ultimately, unquestionable. Jaspers objected to "the claim of a total renewal, transformation and new grounding of philosophy in world-historical perspective"[44] and proposed instead a

[43] *Notizen*, p. 228.
[44] *Ibid.*, p. 136.

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"modest renewal in the form of a return to genuine philosophy as opposed to the guild-like academic representatives of the 19th and 20th centuries."[45] In the final analysis, he rejected as dangerously arrogant Heidegger's "claim to recognize the entire history of philosophy as a 'dead-end' (*Irrweg*) and to begin anew by returning to the primordial origin."[46]

This essential incongruity of their approaches to philosophy led Jaspers to formulate his chief differences with Heidegger:

> He claims for himself something completely new and gnostically sees an historical process of Being, while I live in the appropriation of a *philosophia perennis* and place no value on renewal. . . . Heidegger abandons the ground insights and attitude (of philosophy), but I wish to preserve and renew their meaning as something significant. . . . Heidegger is captivated by something he senses, while I live among the traditional contents.[47]

Jaspers realized that the radical disparity exhibited by these two philosophical "positions" seemed to preclude the possibility of any genuine dialogue with Heidegger. Thus, again and again throughout the *Notizen*, Jaspers raised the central question: "Is a critique here possible at all?"[48] Ultimately, such critique was not to be directed against the man Heidegger, nor even primarily at his work. Jaspers wanted to grasp, instead, the "cipher-character"[49] of Heidegger's thought; he did not seek a "rivalry of intellectual achievement, but a struggle on behalf of the *powers* (*Mächte*) which we each strive to serve."[50]

Jaspers felt it necessary "to show how the essential form of this philosophizing must lead in the praxis to total domination."[51] Heidegger's involvement with national socialism was not to be seen as an "error" or "lack of judgement" on his part; it was, in fact, an essential danger inherent in his philosophy because, in the final analysis, Heidegger's thought served a dangerous "power." Wrote Jaspers, "Heidegger portrays himself as a solitary man who stands against the times, but in fact he is the echo or representative of the moods, powers and movements of our time."[52]

Assuming that Jaspers' interpretation of Heidegger does, in fact, point to an inner tendency of Heidegger's thought, a tendency which is only questionably "philosophical," we find ourselves, like Jaspers, confronted with the fundamental problem of the possibility of philosophical critique. How would it ever be possible to demonstrate the illegitimacy of such a position? A dialogue between horizons—i.e., between different understandings of the "true" *Sache* of philosophy—is essentially precluded; one can either subscribe to Heidegger's ground-understanding and enter into the immanent movement within his "system," or one can remain outside, presenting as so often has been the case, an external critique of Heidegger which substantially fails in its effort to communicate. This second possibility, it should be noted, can itself be the result of re-

[45] *Ibid.*
[46] *Ibid.*, p. 127.
[47] *Ibid.*, p. 72.
[48] *Ibid.*, p. 136.
[49] *Ibid.*, p. 213.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 89.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 183.
[52] *Ibid.*, p. 93.

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maining within the unquestion-ability of one's own "system," a dogmatic approach which Jaspers branded the "*Unphilosophie*."[53]

Ultimately the charge of arrogance cannot be directed just against Heidegger. It must be directed at thought itself. Every understanding of the task of philosophy is incapable of self-justification, and to the extent that we labor with such an understanding as the untested "regulative idea" behind our work, we are essentially and unavoidably arrogant. Perhaps it is the task of philosophical thought to ferret out and expose such arrogance. If so, must not every thinker be most concerned about his *own* arrogance, his own myopia about what constitutes the genuine task of philosophy?

It was for this reason that Jaspers posed the question of the possibility of a philosophical critique as such. Any philosophy which doesn't raise the question of its own legitimacy is and remains arrogant. And yet we cannot pose this question on our own; we cannot rise above our understanding of the task of philosophy and test it by ourselves. What we can do, however, is to be willing to enter the "battle of the powers;" we can *risk* our horizon through an act of genuine communication. Such communication is never won through elucidation; it is not the achievement of our thought. Rather, this form of communication is a process of foundering and miscarriage (*Scheitern*) in which the unquestionable legitimacy of our horizon is shattered. In and through such foundering, we are granted a moment of transcendence but we do not win an ultimate justification or a final respite from the constant battle for a truthful *Existenz*. Instead, we are thrown all the more decidedly into that battle.

It is there that we encounter other horizons as ciphers of Being, as powers which challenge the ultimate legitimacy of our understanding of existence. And, in that encounter, we *experience* the resistance of Being not as an encumbrance, but as a positive and emancipating presence, as a force which breaks through the seemingly impermeable horizon that shields each of us from the question of the truth of our own existence. This is the highest goal of genuine communication, for in and through such experience we are confronted with the ultimate question-ability of human existence and we are forced to recognize the essential arrogance not only of thought, but of existence as such. In such moments, the real task of philosophy becomes the Sisyphean attempt to escape our arrogance and live in the essential question-ability of concrete existence.

In the final analysis, it was for *this* reason that Jaspers presented his critique of Heidegger—not to challenge Heidegger's interpretations, or even to decry a dangerous tendency of thought—but to try to mitigate the arrogance of his own thought by breaking through for himself into the questionability of existence. Such was the task of his philosophy of communication: "a philosophy of the miscarriage of the never foundering philosophers."[54]

[53] *Ibid.*, p. 237: "I am acquainted with only a few critiques of Heidegger. For the most part my impulse when reading them is to put myself on the side of Heidegger. At least in his case there is philosophy—even if it is, in my opinion, inadequate (*meiner Erfahrung nach verkehrte Philosophie*)—but by his critics there is only non-philosophy (*Unphilosophie*).

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 98.

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Pontifical Academy of Cracow

Freedom As Reconciliation: The Essence of the Individual's Freedom in the Philosophy of Hegel

Tadeusz Gadacz, S.P.

> For it is a false principle that the fetters which bind Right and Freedom can be broken without the liberation of conscience—that there can be a Revolution without a Reformation. (*Phenomenology of Spirit*, Oxford 1977, p. 109)

IN HIS youth Friedrich Hegel—a true symbol of his epoch—was the embodiment of his generation's desire for freedom and independence. The oncoming French Revolution, with its slogans of "equality, brotherhood and freedom," became his ideal. Yet, what did it actually bring? Its final phase was a period of raging terror; fundamental ideals were more and more often neglected as the Revolution proceeded. Hegel stood on the ruins of his hopes and expectations. He began a search for the reasons. He presented two ways in which humanity searched for its freedom. The first way was to escape from the reality of evil and bondage into the subjective inner world where man can be at home with himself. Such an escape, however, was only an apparent solution, a short-lasting illusion, since it did not introduce any change in the world itself. The second way was to begin an outer, objective revolution in which violence is fought with violence. Yet in this dialectic of violence, one does not go beyond violence itself.

On this basis, Hegel developed his thought and concluded that the inner and outer worlds, both so important to man can be reconciled. At the same time he gave a fundamental condition for obtaining freedom: "For it is a false principle that the fetters, which bind Right and Freedom, can be broken without the liberation of conscience—that there can be a Revolution without a Reformation."[1] True "revolution" must first take place at the level of the human spirit: "*Historia est magistra vitae.*" In 1917 a new generation revolted with the ideal of freedom on their lips. The result was generally the same as before. What is more interesting, the ideologues of the revolution considered themselves heirs of Hegelianism. One could say: "*Historia est ironia vitae.*"

The subject of this article is Hegel's concept of the human individual's freedom. But the notion "freedom," writes Hegel:

> . . . is indefinite and infinitely ambiguous. Being the highest concept, it is liable to an infinity of misunderstandings, confusions and errors and may give rise to all possible kinds of extravagances. All this has never been more clearly known and experienced than today."[2]

[1]Hegel, *The Philosophy of History* (New York: Dover, 1956), p. 453.
[2]Hegel, *Reason in History* (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), p. 25.

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The condition of freedom is the consciousness of freedom. There is no freedom without the consciousness of it. "Orientals," writes Hegel, "do not yet know that Spirit—man, as such—is free. And because they do not know it, they are not free."[3] There is no freedom without the truth about freedom. "Truth, as Christ had already said, makes the Spirit free, freedom makes it true."[4] My aim, therefore, will be to reach the truth about the freedom of a human individual through an analysis of Hegel's philosophy. I do not intend to broaden the classical interpretation of Hegel's philosophy for that would serve only to enlarge an already rich bibliography. Rather, I want to describe the way in which the human spirit is searching for its "lost" freedom.

I accept the category of reconciliation (*Versöhnung*) as fundamental for this description. There seems to be no better category for the description of freedom in Hegel's philosophy than the one which is immanent to the Spirit and springs from its very essence. The essence and the goal of the Spirit is a unity obtainable by way of reconciliation.[5] This category seems to be the essence of Hegel's dialectic, which consists in reconciling opposites in a higher synthesis. At the same time, it conveys the basic difference that exists between Hegelianism and Marxism. While Hegel's aim is the reconciliation of the opposites, Marxist dialectic keeps them in conflict.

I

Let us begin our way of reaching the essence of the freedom of a human individual by defining its place and thus its horizons. Freedom is the essence and the substance of Spirit as its only and true definition.[6] And so, speaking about freedom, we will speak about the essence, substance, and definition of spirit.

> . . . the Spirit that we are examining here is the middle point between the extremes of nature and God, between the starting point and the ultimate goal. The question what Spirit is, therefore, is contained in two questions: Where does Spirit come from? What does it aim at? Where does it come from? It comes from nature. What does it aim at? It aims at its freedom.[7]

According to Hegel, there is only one Spirit—that of God in man and that of man in God. The absolute and the individual are united in such a way that they preserve their individuality at the same time. This union of the finite and the infinite remains a holy mystery.[8] The mutual relationship between God and man is not a subject/object relation. A mountain and an eye that perceives it remains an object and a subject. Yet, between man and God, Spirit and Spirit, no such objective distinction is possible. The same divine Spirit originates from nature as the human Spirit, as man as such. The development of the world of nature into the world of social and cultural life on the part of the human Spirit is a return of the Absolute Spirit to itself. Let us ponder for a moment the finite aspect of Spirit, leaving aside its absolute aspect. Speaking about the Spirit we will now

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 23.
[4] Hegel, *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,* Vol. I (Dordrecht and Boston) §382, p. 49.
[5] Hegel, *Early Theological Writings* (Chicago: The Univ. of Chicago Press, 1948), p. 311.
[6] Hegel, *Nürnberger und Heidelberger Schriften* (Frankfurt aM: Surkhamp, 1971), p. 347 and p. 421.
[7] Hegel, *Berliner Schriften* 1818-1831 (Frankfurt aM: Surkhamp, 1971), p. 528.
[8] Hegel, *Early Theological Writings,* p. 262.

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speak about the finite Spirit, i.e. about the human individual. We stopped at the point where Spirit originates from nature and where the history of its striving for freedom begins.

Spirit originates as self-consciousness. Self-consciousness is a result of its own activity. It goes beyond its own immediateness, and is then mediated by what is different, and returns to itself.



The first level of this self-consciousness emerging from nature—as the movement of departure and return—is desire.[9] In the act of desire, self-consciousness, convinced of the nothingness and the dependence of the object, annihilates it thus affirming itself. However, this affirmation is obtained by the cancellation of the object, which makes self-consciousness dependent on the object. Its act of desirous negation cannot exist any longer without this object. Therefore, self-consciousness "creates" it anew and with it its own desire.[10] In such a way it falls into a vicious circle. It is a circle where the desire of self-consciousness becomes finally totally dependent on its own existence, as the natural object of desire appears to be its own existence. This is animal-like existence. An animal raises itself over nature through its animal desires only to close itself within nature's limits once the desire has been satisfied. According to Hegel, the existence of self-consciousness requires the transcendence of oneself as a determinate being (*Dasein*). This is possible only when the desire refers not to the determinate being (*Dasein*) but to the indeterminate being (*Nichtsein*), for it is only when self-consciousness perceives the insufficiency of the surrounding world that it begins to transcend itself. This indeterminate being (*Nichtsein*) is the desire for another self-consciousness. One self-consciousness meets another.



Self-consciousness always appears to itself as coming directly from outside itself. It appears as "not-I." It constantly loses itself because it constantly finds itself as another being. It loses itself to find itself in its otherness. However, "You" is not the object "It" any longer; "You" is also another self-consciousness. It has the same structure as "I." As "I" perceives its otherness in "You," likewise "You" perceives the same in "I." Self-consciousness, therefore, duplicates itself.

[9]Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), p. 105.
[10]*Ibid.*, p. 109.

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

"I" the extreme term

self-consciousness, the middle term

"You" the extreme term

There is one self-consciousness as there is one spirit. It is one, but it is duplicated. It consists of two self-consciousnesses—two extremes, each one a self-consciousness in itself, but only as inseparable elements of the self-same whole, that is, the middle term.[11] Self-consciousness, then, appears to be interdependent. Nothing that is to originate will do so without reciprocity. An act of each one of the self-consciousnesses directly influences the other and, at the same time, the whole (totality) which they constitute by their reciprocity and in which they have their existence.

The self-consciousnesses, however, are as yet not aware of this influence they have on one another, nor are they even aware of the fact that they are elements of the self-same duplicated self-consciousness. We who describe them know about them. They themselves, however, are each concerned with their independence and individuality. Self-consciousness is the self in relation to itself. It must have its own being in itself and owing to itself. This determines its independence and autonomy; it is an expression of its own freedom. Each of the self-consciousnesses is convinced of its independence; but as a result of its relation to the other, of which it becomes gradually aware, this conviction gives way to the idea that they are mutually independent. And so the conviction becomes a doubt, hence the need of being affirmed by another self-consciousness. Since truth is something common to the reality they share, they must both recognize and acknowledge it as the truth.[12] This is necessary because of their common world. The particular spaces defined by the life and freedom of each self-consciousness are here identical, and since these are desiring self-consciousnesses, as mentioned before, they experience their mutual presence as their own limitation. That is why acknowledgement of the truth takes place amidst strife. An individual confronts another individual.[13]

Two self-consciousnesses fight in a mortal struggle. Each one of them does exactly the same as the other. The act of the one is the act of the other. One wants to kill the other. Yet, raising its hand against the other, it must be ready to risk its own life, to accept the nothingness of death. Two self-consciousnesses are engaged in battle, but in fact, they are each fighting with death. The object of this fight with death is their biological animal life. The two self-consciousnesses started the fight to put each other to death. But through mutual death they obtain no aim. Concludes Hegel, therefore, one of them gave in to death, and, thus, overcame it.



[11] *Ibid.*, p. 112.
[12] *Ibid.*, p. 111.
[13] *Ibid.*, p. 114.

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The other, overcome by the fear of death, lost, and becomes death's slave. And while the latter turned out to be death's slave, the other turned out to be its master. For the master is not the master of the slave, but the master of death. Likewise, the slave is not the slave of the master, but the slave of death. The master conquered death, therefore, he lives. The slave lost, therefore, he should die. But the death of the other self-consciousness is also impossible. The dead one is silent. The master, the victorious self-consciousness, must look for a third way out. If the other self-consciousness cannot be killed and, at the same time, it cannot be allowed to live, a third solution should be found. This solution is found in the dialetic negation (*Aufhebung*) of the self-conscious. One self-consciousness cannot kill the other nor leave it alive, but it can negate it; preserve its own biological life which it is afraid to sacrifice and negate its independence (*Will*); and raise it to a level higher than that of mere struggle between life and death, to the level of bondage. Bondage, then, is the level of existence between biological life and death. It is a "new" kind of life. The master who became master and the owner of death and, by the same token, the owner of life can give life anew to the slave of death. The master cannot kill the slave, nor keep him alive, but he can beget him: "I grant you life;" "I give you life." In this way the master becomes the originator of the slave.

But the master begins to become aware that he also owes all his existence to the slave who works for him and that he is nothing without the slave's acknowledgement. In such a way he becomes a slave to his own slave. The space of authority and bondage turns out to be the space of mutual dependence and servitude. This dependence and surrender takes place through the experience of fear which is a dominant factor here.[14] It is not only the slave who experiences fear, the master does too. And so both, the one who is exposed to fear and the one who controls it, are in the same position.[15] There has emerged a world of "lost" freedom.

In Hegel's philosophy, freedom is a notion which "originates" and takes shape in the context of another man. It is a dialogical notion. It is possible for a human individual to move freely in space where no other human individual exists and without feeling the ties that bind him, but he will never call this situation freedom. Freedom is "hidden" in him, but he will never come to the awareness of the human being, and it will never appear in its speech. It is only in a dialogue that the problem of freedom appears for the first time. This problem never appears in solitude. It originates in an individual's mind at the moment when it meets another individual. And it is in this space of their meeting, the space of dialogue, that all questions about freedom must be asked and all answers must be given. At first the dialogue between individuals is a negative dialogue of fight resulting in bondage. But it is only the act of bondage that has been experienced as such, the act that mediates self-consciousness, which lets freedom "be born," and which lets an individual discover it in himself. Yet, freedom born in such an act is already a "lost" freedom. In Hegel's opinion freedom is possible at the beginning only as a lost freedom.

Both self-consciousness aiming at the liberation from the state of nature and the affirmation of their independence yielded to an illusion. They failed to recognize their primary fundamental unity. They perceived each other as objects "immersed in the being of life," as individuals limiting each other. This apparent and only phenomenal cognition resulted in a misunderstanding that was tragic in its consequences and sanctioned the fact of their mutual bondage.

[14]Hegel, *History of Philosophy,* Vol. I (London and New York, 1968), p. 97.
[15]*Ibid.*

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Fight and bondage, reconciliation and unity, are the manifestations of two different experiences of the notion of infinity. Self-consciousnesses yielded to illusion because they clung to the false notion of infinity (*schlechte Unendlichkeit*). Freedom exists only in the notion of true infinity (*wahre Unendlichkeit*). In what do the notions of the one and the other infinity consist?

In order to know itself self-consciousness moves from its state of immediateness and abstraction to definition. Being definite it appears to itself as the finite. What is finite has a limit. The finite has another side of its own limit and is itself a limited representation of this limit. This other side is infinity. In such a situation infinity is only an abstraction of the finity, a negation of its limit. In such a way there originates infinity in its first definition — the false infinity. Being a negation of the finite, it turns out to be finite. An image of the notion of false infinity is a straight line which constantly goes beyond itself.[16] It is only the notion of true infinity that solves the aporia that exists here. True infinity appears when the finity negates itself and becomes immersed in infinity. "But as true infinity, turned back upon itself, it has for an image the circle, the line which has reached neither beginning nor end."[17] The mistake that the self-consciousnesses made was that they perceived each other as beings that limit each other. And the limit is experienced through negation. Thus they started the conflict in the name of falsely understood absoluteness and infinity. Freedom exists only in the notion of true infinity. And the latter does not mean going beyond the limit but withdrawing from it towards oneself. True infinity is a self-reflection.[18]

At this stage the task of the self-consciousness is liberation. There are two ways leading to this aim because there are two notions of infinity. Yet, only one of the ways is true. The other one leads nowhere. The way to nowhere is, as we have said at the beginning, the way of revolution only. Revolution is an act of struggle in which the slave confronts the master. Such an attack against the master, as has been shown in the structure of fight, would have to end with his death (which is no solution) or his bondage. In this way the slave would find himself in exactly the same situation as his former master. He would have to look for still new forms of satisfaction thus moving towards false infinity which constantly creates limits and constantly cancels them. Here, at this point, Marxism and Hegelianism diverge. The first one is the conflict of the opposites, the latter consists in reconciling them. "For it is a false principle," writes Hegel, "that the fetters which bind Right and Freedom can be broken without the liberation of conscience — that there can be a Revolution without a Reformation."[19] The essential message of reformation is that man is originally meant for freedom.[20] And what has always been by nature man's destiny, said Luther, must take place in himself. Everything must be brought back to these inner sources. True historical revolution corresponds to the true notion of infinity. The notion of false infinity, and hence the notion of false revolution does not go beyond the relation thesis/antithesis. The notion of true infinity, and so the notion of true revolution, is contained in the reconciliation of the thesis and antithesis in a higher synthesis. But the condition for a revolution understood in this way is reforma-

[16]Hegel, *Philosophy of Right* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1949), additions, §22, p. 232; *Hegel's Logic* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1975), §94, p. 137-38.

[17]Hegel, *Logic*, §94, p. 137-38.

[18]Hegel, *Nürnberger und Heidelberger Schriften*, p. 186.

[19]Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, p. 453.

[20]*Ibid.*, p. 417.

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tion. It must take place in the human heart and mind. This is the first place where a human individual must liberate himself. "Outward suffering must . . . be merged into a sorrow of the inner man. He must feel himself as the negation of himself; he must see that his misery is the misery of his nature."[21] In what does this misery consist? Man as individual, a self-consciousness related to himself. In this relation he has a side of his individuality, naturalness and his general essence. Therefore, according to this natural side, he is not what he should be. An animal is by its nature what it should be.[22] Therefore every man should make an act of reconciliation within himself.[23]

We are withdrawing from the world of lordship and bondage into the inner world of human self-consciousness.

II

Self-consciousness is a self-relation and has knowledge about itself. Hegel reminds us about an inscription in the temple of Delphi: "know yourself."[24] This expression does not mean the necessity of being conscious of the particularity of one's own mistakes and weaknesses. It is not a particular man who is to know his particular essence, but man in general is to know himself. Hence the object of the self-consciousness will not be now some object of its consciousness that is external to it but self-consciousness itself (*Selbst*), its deepest essence. The circle of infinite reflection closes in, and there is only, the self-consciousness which is really at home with itself and free. Freedom is real only as will[25] and thinking.[26] Let us now search for freedom with the will which a bound self-consciousness gives to another self-consciousness.

While searching for freedom, we come to the will; since freedom is the essence of will. "Will without freedom is an empty word," writes Hegel, "in the same way as freedom is actual only as will, as subject."[27] When we speak about freedom of the will, we do not think of any kind of power existing beyond the will which also would be endowed with freedom. Just as omnipotence exists only in God, so does freedom exist only in the will. All other kinds of freedom are only a variety.

Will is duplicated in its structure. This duplication is a result of the dialectical character of being, which, according to Hegel, is "torn" in itself into notion and appearance, into content and form.[28] And so, on the one hand, will is subjectivity, a pure form of choice. But in its depth, it contains the true notion, the objective content.[29] As a form it is individuality, and as a notion it is a universal being. Hence, when we speak about free will without relating it to its own notion, we speak only about a disposition to freedom.[30] But a disposition to freedom is not yet freedom itself. How does will manifest itself in its disposition to freedom, will as form?

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 321.
[22] Hegel, *Nürnberger und Heidelberger Schriften,* p. 258.
[23] Hegel, *Philosophy of History,* p. 416.
[24] Hegel, *Berliner Schriften,* p. 526.
[25] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* additions §4, p. 226; *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,* Vol. III, §469, p. 231.
[26] Hegel, *Berliner Schriften,* p. 560.
[27] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* additions, §4, p. 226.
[28] Hegel, *Nürnberger und Heidelberger Schriften,* p. 222.
[29] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* §26, p. 32.
[30] *Ibid.*, §22, p. 30.

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Will turns to itself first of all.[31] This is its refuge from any definite content. It wants to rely only upon itself and to be absolutely autonomous.[32] At this level of absolute abstraction from any objectivity, the freedom of the will is manifested only as negative.[33] It experiences its existence only through an act of destruction. It lives on a constant negation of objectivity.

> This form of freedom appears more correctly in the active fanaticism of both political and religious life. For instance, during the terror in the French Revolution all differences of talent and authority were supposed to have been superseded. This period was an upheaval, an agitation, an irreconcilable hatred of everything particular. Since fanaticism wills an abstraction only, nothing articulated, it follows that when distinctions appear, it finds them antagonistic to its own indeterminacy and annuls them. For this reason, the French Revolution destroyed once more the institutions which they had made themselves since any institution whatsoever is antagonistic to the abstract self-consciousness of equality.[34]

Yet, will must be cured of this "disease." It must be the will of "something." This is why will constitutes a unity of these two aspects. On the one hand, it is pure, universal subjectivity, and, on the other, it is a subjectivity turning into objectivity but, at the same time, preserving in itself its subjective autonomy. This unity of the two aspects of will is not yet fully defined. It is only in paragraphs seven and eight of the "Philosophy of Right" that Hegel makes a distinction between the two forms of this unity, according to whether objectivity remains outside as estranged to will, or whether will recognizes itself in it. At the level of form that we are now discussing, the subjectivity of the will relates to things in an outward manner as well. Its content is an accidental content of facultative aims.[35]

Such will can only be called caprice (*Willkür*). Caprice is the most common idea of freedom that man has. But it "is irrational; it depends upon a choice and self-determination which has nothing to do with a rational will, but is rather the product of accidental impulses and their dependence on the world of sense and physical nature."[36] It is interested in itself. When speaking about freedom, remarks Hegel, "we should always remember whether what we are talking about is not, in fact, a private interest." The most characteristic embodiment of caprice is the will of the "Emperor."

> In the person of the Emperor isolated subjectivity has gained a perfectly unlimited realization. Spirit has renounced its proper nature, inasmuch as limitation of being and volition has been constituted in an unlimited absolute existence. . . . Individual subjectivity thus entirely emancipated from control, has no inward life, no prospective nor retrospective emotions, no repentance, no hope, no fear—not even thought; for all these involve fixed conditions and aims, while every condition is purely contingent. The springs of action are none other than desire, lust, passion, fancy—in short, caprice absolutely unfettered.[37]

[31] *Ibid.*, §5, p. 21-22.
[32] *Ibid.*, additions, §26, p. 230.
[33] Hegel, *Logic*, §112, p. 163.
[34] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, additions, §5, p. 227.
[35] *Ibid.*, §25, p. 31.
[36] Hegel, *The Philosophy of Fine Art* (New York, 1975), p. 135.
[37] Hegel, *Philosophy of History*, p. 315.

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If the will of one individual tried to put a stop to the caprice of the "Emperor" such an action would result in a fight. Since, however, it does not do so, the relationship of the "Emperor's" will to some other will is a relation of unlimited lordship and slavery.

Caprice is a "will" contradictory in itself[38] or, should we rather say, it is not a will at all. Freedom is the essence of will and the will is free, not when it makes a choice, but when it chooses freedom. "And so, a will is truly a will when it wills, its content is identical with itself when, that is to say, freedom wills freedom."[39] Caprice, then, turns out to be merely a form of will. Its form is the choice. But the choice cannot be the choice of anything, and the form cannot be the form of any content. The will, by the very fact of making a choice, is free only formally. It is truly free when it chooses what is its own essence, when it becomes reconciled with itself. But before a will becomes reconciled with itself, with its own essence, it should establish what its essence is. What is freedom? We now know how freedom should manifest itself and where we should look for it. Yet, we do not know what it is in itself. The aim of the will is a universal content. But such a content is given only in thinking and through thinking.[40]

Thinking can be also considered at its formal and essential level. Thinking at the formal level is a stoic, skeptical ideology, an unhappy consciousness. Stoicism is a withdrawal into a simple essentiality of thought; it is becoming indifferent to the evil and bondage in the surrounding world. Stoical thinking is only concerned with thinking. It aims at no truth, let alone the truth about freedom. Skepticism is active doubting and negating the outward values. Being a total nihilism, it leads to the questioning of freedom itself. Finally, the unhappy consciousness places its freedom in the divine actuality, on the other side of this world. It is a liberation within the sphere of religion, but, at the same time, indifferent to the conditions of this world. Thus it leads back to stoicism. Formal thinking (thinking at the level of form), then, is unable to reach the truth. Therefore, Hegel does not consider it interesting. What is logical and rational is not a specific characteristic of human thinking. Only such thinking which corresponds to the nature of things is logical. And only this is thinking on the level of essence.

Thus, the task of thinking appears to be bringing things to their own truth. Truth is the foundation of this type of thinking, but truth not in the traditional sense of *"adaequatio rei et intellectus."* We are dealing here with the truth of being itself. In this sense a being whose nothing has not yet passed into the phenomenal reality is not a true being. But what criterion should be applied to distinguish between appearance and notion and to estimate the degree of truth of being? Such a criterion is a direct result of speculation, which is a discourse of reason itself. In everyday language speculation stands for a mental construction or abstract thinking. Such an understanding of speculation, in the tradition of German philosophy and European culture, is a remnant after Kant. Hegel reaches for its Christian understanding. According to Boethius as well as the Patristic and Scholastic traditions, *"speculum"* means a universal knowledge of God through His works. *"Speculum"* in its deepest sense means a mirror, a reflection. Speculation is an act of creating the objective world and in this way mediating the very content of the objective reason. This objective world being a consequence of the action of an individual is a mirror (*speculum*) in which the content of its inner truth is reflected. However, in

[38]Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* §15, p. 27-28.
[39]*Ibid.*, §21, p. 29.
[40]Hegel, *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,* Vol. III, §469, p. 231.

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order to be certain that this is the truth of objective reason, speculation must be based on the fact of universality. Truth is not merely something individual. It must become a common possession of other individuals.

Speculation is an act, and this fact brings us back to will. We left the will aside trying to describe its essence through thinking. But thinking has brought us back to will because "to think" (*"speculare"*) means to make universal acts consistent with the essence of will, with its objective reason. And so, thinking, according to Hegel, turns out to be an act of will, and an act of the will turns out to be thinking. These two powers of one spirit meet in act. Only action is the proper "place" where freedom is manifested. Man as a volitional and thinking spirit must be active to be able to know his own essence i.e. freedom. Action reveals to him the truth about his freedom.[41] "By their fruits ye shall know them."[42] Hence the truth about the freedom of man is not contained in the statics of his form, but in the dynamics of his act.

But in order for an act to reveal the truth about freedom, in order for a will to be will and for thinking to be thinking in an act, the human individual must perform an act of dispossession (*kenosis*) of its own subjectivity.

Man as spirit, as has already been pointed out, is an individual and a universal being and he acts as such according to caprice and subjectivity. But he is a rational being at the same time.[43] The essence of his will—freedom—is veiled by the form of will, by its appearance. Appearance reveals, but at the same time veils, the notion. Spirit veils its own truth before itself. In order to make an act, which would reveal to the spirit the truth of its own existence possible, the spirit must be dispossessed of its own subjectivity and particularity. Hegel compares the dispossessing of the spirit, which desires what is objective, to artistic creativity. When an artist creates a masterpiece his own particularity disappears, allowing what is to be revealed through beauty to be revealed indeed. The poorer the artist, the more he can be seen than his work.[44] An artist disappears, negating his subjectivity and individuality, but he regains himself in his truth through what he reveals in his work. The dispossession should not, however, be understood as a form of self-perfection in solitude. It should be understood only as resignation from one's own subjectivity and particularity for the sake of other individuals. An act which reveals and makes freedom real is always an act "for" and "towards" others.

When the self-conscious spirit makes its own freedom to be its content and aim, it elevates the outward world and makes freedom an independent being in it.[45] It is an independent being of an objective world. Therefore in searching for freedom, it must return to the outward world; which, in the meantime, became an objective world. The spirit withdrew from the outward world of bondage into itself. But in the outward, ages have already passed.[46] Within this time, the spirit, while becoming reconciled with itself, created through its acts an objective world of freedom.[47] This world is the existing world for the already existing spirit. The spirit must now relate to it. This relation is a metaphysical necessity, a consequence of the two aspects of the truth of the objective reason.

[41]Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* §124, p. 83.
[42]Hegel, *Logic,* §140, p. 199.
[43]Hegel, *Nürnberger und Heidelberger Schriften,* p. 258.
[44]Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* additions, §15, p. 230.
[45]Hegel, *Philosophy of Subjective Spirit,* Vol. III, §469, p. 233.
[46]*Ibid.,* Vol. II, §453, p. 63.
[47]*Ibid.,* Vol. III, §444, pp. 99-101.

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In the first place, a human individual as spirit exists not only in the inward but also in the outward world. It can withdraw from it into itself but it cannot isolate itself absolutely from it. This relation of the spirit to the outward world flows from the very essence of spirit, since the notion of freedom must fulfill itself in the outward world where freedom becomes true freedom.[48] In the inward world one can only find the notion of freedom — knowledge about it. Its truth, its idea is to be found in the objective world.[49]

Secondly, the relation to the outward world is necessary because this world contains the essence of will that was made actual by individuals throughout history; it contains the content of the essence for which the will searches. This world contains in itself a universal truth. It is a *"speculum"* (mirror) in which an individual is to find a reflection of the inner part of the truth of its own will. This is the truth in which every individual regains itself. All individuals constitute a community, "we"/"us" in it without at the same time experiencing any limitation. Objectivity means that such a relationship between individuals is based on truth; in truth, they are mutually reconciled and therefore free. It is a relation within a community. Community contains the truth of the essence of will i.e. freedom with which an individual wants to be reconciled. While becoming reconciled with itself it is also being reconciled with the community—the "place" of the truth of its freedom. This is why a self-conscious human spirit passes from its inward state into what is other (*in einem Anderem*), into the world of another self-consciousnesses to be at home (*bei sich Selbst*) in this world.

III

Freedom which was hidden in will is brought out and objectivized by law. Law, according to Hegel, has its roots in freedom. Freedom is a definition of law, and the system of law, i.e. the space, described by the law and governed by its rules, is the kingdom of freedom come true. It is a world of spirit created by the spirit itself.[50] Law, because of its objectivity, implies that every individual is respected by another as a free individual.[51] An individual whose freedom has been recognized is a person. The formula of the law could then be expressed in the following way: "Be a person and respect others as persons."[52] Hence, every action which limits someone else's freedom or does not recognize him as a free individual is unlawful. The development of the law corresponds to the three stages of the development of will on the objective side. It is a formal, moral and ethical will; and the law is the formal law of ownership, the moral law, the ethical law.

Let us now pass over immediately to the ethical life—the highest level of the development of the law. The ethical life is the place of objectivized freedom. The will which wants the law is a universal ethical will and possesses freedom in its universality. The sphere of lordship and bondage is the sphere of finite will, which has not yet acquired a general character. Now, being obedient to the law and finding itself in it, it is capable of overcoming the finite. At the same time, fear, which is a sign and a means of bondage, disappears. It is the fear of losing the finite in which individuals are immersed and on which they are dependent, that leads them to the state of dependence on someone else.

[48] *Ibid.*, Vol. III, 482, p. 267.
[49] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §§27-28, pp. 32-33.
[50] *Ibid.*, §4, pp. 20-21
[51] Hegel, *Nürnberger und Heidelberger Schriften*, p. 232.
[52] Hegel, *Philosophy of Right*, §36, p. 37.

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The world of the law is already a world devoid of fear and therefore a free world.

What is ethical constitutes the substance, a universal will of individuals that are related to it as accidents,[53] writes Hegel. In what does the accidentality of individuals and the substantiality of the ethical life consist? This ethical substance is nothing new for individuals. It is an objective good existing on the outside, the same good which also exists inside, in the notion of will; so that the will of an individual finds itself in the ethical substance[54] and possesses its actuality in it. Will cannot actually exist beyond it. In the same way an accident cannot actually exist beyond substance.[55] The manifestation of the ethical substance understood in such a way is community. "For ethical life," writes Hegel, "is nothing else but the absolute spiritual unity of the essence of individuals in their independent actual existence."[56] This is not, however, just any kind of unity. It is an unity such that individuals are not merely elements or parts of the community, but rather they fulfill completely the notion of community in themselves. This is so because the ethical law, which is an expression and a form of community, is also both an expression and an objectivization of the notion of individual will. For there is nothing in the ethical law that is not already contained in the notion of will. The scope of the content of the notion of will and the ethical life are identical. An individual is not, then, an element subordinated to a community.

To explain it more clearly, Hegel, in his early works, refers to the Arabs. Whenever the Arabs say that a given individual is the son of a tribe they mean that he is not a part of a whole, but he is the entire tribe.[57] Such a vision of community traces its origin back to the community of the Divine Persons, as the divine nature which expresses this unity is fully present in every individual constituting this community. Christ, for instance, remarks Hegel further, is not merely a part of God's nature, but the entire God.[58] The ethical community has its evolutionary forms. It is a family at first, then a society, and finally a state.

The reason of the state becomes present and realized in its laws. Hegel writes:

> In a state that is differentiated through itself on any rational principle, all the laws and social institutions which belong to it are simply a realization of freedom according to their own essential determinants. This being so, the reason that belongs to any citizen discovers in such institutions its own essential life: and, so long as such is not in revolt from those laws, proceeds with them as with its own kith and kin rather than a foreign adversary.[59]

Simultaneously, the same law manifests and fulfills the notion of state contained within the community of a nation. And so the state, creating and fulfilling the law, contains in the law its own notion. Freedom and rationality, an individual and a state, become reconciled in this law. In such a way an individual becomes reconciled with other individuals because the community of the state — the nation — is a community of individuals. In this true community all individuals must be free. Their freedom must be real-

[53] *Ibid.*, additions, §145, p. 259.
[54] *Ibid.*, §153, p. 109.
[55] Hegel, *Philosophy of Fine Art*, p. 204.
[56] Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*, p. 213.
[57] Hegel, *Early Theological Writings*, p. 260.
[58] *Ibid.*
[59] Hegel, *Philosophy of Fine Art*, p. 135, *Philosophy of Right*, §147, p. 106.

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ized. It is a necessity resulting from the objective reason. For whenever any individual is not free, we cannot speak about true community within a state.

Community is the condition of freedom. In this sense even the state, as a universal form in which various individuals aim at becoming joined in one,[60] is also a condition of freedom. Thus, a community introduced by the law is a place that manifests freedom and makes it come true. And it is only in such a community that a human individual, a finite spirit becomes reconciled with itself by being reconciled with others and vice versa; and so it is free. In his works written in Jena, Hegel said: "The unity of a person with others must indeed be treated not as a limitation of an individual's true freedom but as its extension. The highest community is the highest freedom."[61]

In order to answer this question of the essence of the freedom of a human individual, it is enough to explain the norms governing the laws of a state. The question arises, however, where does such a state exist? During Hegel's lifetime this type of state was far from being realized in any form even in the case of the Prussian monarchy. The question remained unanswered till the present time. Hegel's idea of the state is only a description of a certain absolute formal structure. It is not a description of a state that already exists but rather an idea of state. "In considering the Idea of the state," writes Hegel, "we must not have our eyes on particular states or on particular institutions."[62] In the same spirit Nikolaus von Thaden wrote to Hegel: "You have introduced the states as the actuality of the law, as realized freedom. Yet, for what state is it that your teachings create institutions? None of them seems to be worthy of such honour."[63]The idea of the state as Hegel remarks in consequence, is comprehensible only within the sphere of the absolute, within the sphere of the divine idea. This divine idea is given through religion. Religion, then, constitutes a foundation on which the state is based and from where it develops.

The state as such, the idea of the state, is the true actuality. But what is actual? Hegel writes in the Encyclopaedia: "God alone is the thorough harmony of notion and reality."[64] God is what is most actual.[65] Every being obtaining its truth is actuality, as long as it comes from this only source of actuality; this concerns the state as well. "Man must therefore venerate the state as a secular deity."[66] The state is a manifestation of the divine actuality. But it is religion first of all that is the manifestation of this actuality. Not only is the state connected with it but it also takes its existence from it. How should this be understood?

The ethical law of the state and its rational institutions are merely a realization of a religious principle hidden within the heart of an individual.[67] Religion is the temple of truth and freedom in God. The state is the temple of the same truth and freedom in the real world, therefore, the content of this actuality can be considered divine.[68] The temple of religion and the temple of the actual existence of the state is filled with the same truth

[60]Hegel, *Philosophy of Fine Art,* p. 103.
[61]Hegel, *Jenaer Schriften,* (Frankfurt aM: Surkhamp, 1971), p. 82.
[62]Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* additions, §258, p. 279.
[63]Nicklaus von Thaden, "Brief an Hegel 1821," *Materialen zu Hegels Rechtsphilosophie* (Frankfurt aM: Surkhamp, 1975), p. 27.
[64]Hegel, *Logic,* §24, p. 41.
[65]*Ibid.,§6, p. 9.*
[66]Hegel, *Philosophy of Right,* additions, §272, p. 286.
[67]Hegel, *Philosophy of History,* p. 335.
[68]*Ibid.*

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and freedom of the divine actuality. Depending on how much aware of this actuality the nation is, it has such a state, "A nation which has a false or bad conception of God, has also a bad state, bad government, bad laws."[69] According to Hegel, the idea of the state stands for such a legal form which fully realizes the idea of the community between individuals. And it is this word "community" which characterizes the true state as opposed to the false state which is only a gathering or a collection of individuals. The community of the state takes care of the realization of what is most universal, i.e. divinity. The community of the state is a projection of the community of the Divine Persons. So, finally, it can be understood only as the community of the Kingdom of God. At this point Hegel seems to be returning to his juvenile works. He writes that the Kingdom of God is the development of what is divine in man. It establishes relations in which one meets God by being filled with the spirit. Furthermore, it is a life in harmony with the entire Divine Being where all divisions vanish. The very same spirit pervades various individuals who are not so much equal as reconciled; they do not constitute a gathering but a community.[70] This is the inside of the religious temple of the truth and freedom of the divine actuality and at the same time the inside of the temple of an ideal state. Such a state, however, does not yet exist. The one which does, is merely a bigger or smaller outline of the divine temple. This is why the state that already exists must be constantly "abandoned" and transcended. It is because individual self-consciousnesses do not yet find true freedom in it. They are not allowed to experience reconciliation in the state. The state must be abandoned for two basic reasons.

A concrete state does not yet have a rational law or rational institutions because it has not yet reached the level of its idea. Even the most perfect individuals often cannot find the realization of their own individual will there, consequently, every concrete state alienates an individual. "Keeping the idea of humanity always in mind," writes Hegel, "I want to show that there is no idea of the state, for state is something mechanical and surely there is no idea of a machine. We consider an idea only what is the subject of freedom."[71] And since the state does not guarantee the freedom of an individual, it is not free itself. According to Hegel's principle: "it is only to a free person that someone else is free."[72] An individual abandons the state, then, searches for a place of free actuality, to be recognized there as free. So he leaves the temple of the state and enters the temple of religion. It is within the sphere of religion, that man liberates himself from his relation to the state. Having withdrawn into his inward world man can then escape the compulsion of lay authorities.

Secondly, an individual must abandon the state because its laws do not provide an answer to the question about the essence of man's will. An individual cannot apply here the criterion of formal truth. The formal definition of truth expresses a harmony between appearance and reality. It contains two elements, of which at least one must be true so that it could be a measure for the other one. Either the image of reality or reality itself must be true. In this case the elements which are being compared and coordinated are: the truth that an individual has about himself and the truth that the state has about the individual. An individual learning the truth of his own self-consciousness turns to the state so that by using its foundation of universality he can bring to the level of truth

[69]Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. I (New York, 1968), p. 247.
[70]Hegel, *Early Theological Writings,* pp. 277-78.
[71]Hegel, "eine Ethik," *Kleinere Schriften,* Ed. Franz Rosenzweig (Berlin, 1937), p. 231.
[72]Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion* vol. II, p. 93.

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what is only a hypothesis about himself. An individual is trying to find in the state a reflection of the truth of his own interior. But the state is not yet true, either. It turns out to be a distorting mirror. Consequently, both these elements are false. An individual cannot be a criterion to measure the veracity of the state, nor can the state be the measure of the veracity of an individual. These both need a true measure and foundation on which this unstable structure can be based. Only on such a foundation and in accordance with its standards is speculative recognition and the building of unity between an individual and the state, and thus between individuals, possible.

God alone is such a foundation. He is a synthesis, a unity between the thesis and antithesis; between an individual and the state. He is also the measure of the veracity of the state expressed in its laws. And so the question about the essence of an individual's freedom must be put aside until God himself becomes known. "God does not want for his children people of small hearts and empty heads, but those whose spirit, though poor in itself, is rich with the knowledge of God and those for whom knowing God is the highest value."[73]

Going beyond the state and abandoning it does not mean abandoning the state as such. In the movement towards a higher synthesis the state becomes cancelled only dialectically: it is denied in what is still contrary to the idea of state in it and, at the same time, preserved in the dialectical development of spirit. For there is no freedom in the real world beyond the community, having the form of a state. A human individual, then, does not leave the state but abides by it even amidst greatest perplexity and strongest negativity searching for a measure which would reveal its truth and bring it to its level. An individual leaves and at the same time remains. For it is not an escape into the world of stoical or skeptical illusion, the aim of which is merely the abandonment of contradiction.

> Spirit finds its truth only when, remaining in absolute perplexity, it manages to find itself. Spirit is a power not as something positive only, not when it overlooks, leaves negativity out . . . it is a power when it looks straight into the eyes of negativity and stops before it. Such a pause before negativity on the part of the spirit is this magic power which turns it into being.[74]

The human spirit does not find its freedom in the state. It does not feel at home itself there (*bei sich Selbst*). "Therefore, being entangled in the finite from all sides, it searches for a region of some higher, more substantial truth in which the opposite and the contradictory of the finite world can find their ultimate solution and freedom its fulfillment."[75]

IV

"This region of some higher substantial truth" to which the human being now turns is the region of the divine actuality. For only God is actual and free. Only He can recognize freedom in man.[76] God is a God of free people. Man, in turn, can only have such freedom in Him. "Freedom," writes Hegel, "can exist only where individuality is con-

[73]Hegel, *Reason in History,* pp. 16-17.
[74]Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit,* p. 19.
[75]Hegel, *Philosophy of Fine Art,* p. 137.
[76]Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion,* Vol. II, p. 222.

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sidered in the divine being . . . ; secular existence is temporal and moves within private interest. Hence it is relative and unjustified. Its justification can only be derived from the absolute justification of its universal soul, its principle. And this is justified only as determination and existence of the essence of God."[77] Knowing God and becoming reconciled with Him, is a basic task and requirement for the human spirit that wants to obtain freedom. This turning to God is at the same time another withdrawal into oneself, into man as such, because the Christian God reveals Himself in man himself. It is He who is the essence of the human spirit, of human self-consciousness. It is God who is reason dwelling in man. Human reason is the divine element in man, the essential content of his will. And so the question about the essence of an individual's freedom turns out to be the question about God Himself, and the knowledge about oneself—the knowledge of God. Human self-consciousness can be reconciled with God when it gets to know Him. And, of course, by becoming reconciled with Him it becomes reconciled with itself. It "reaches" the place of its own freedom.

According to Hegel, knowing God and becoming reconciled with Him, takes place in three ways: through beauty in art, through the feeling of love in religion, and through the truth in philosophy. "Where does spirit come from and where is it going to?" was Hegel's question. Beauty, love and truth—this is an ancient route leading to freedom between heaven and earth.

What does Hegel finally have to say about the freedom of an individual? Can we [at least] attempt an approximate definition? It seems that it would be the following: Freedom is a unity of the human and the divine self-consciousness, which is at the same time the unity of a self-consciousness with itself and with other self-consciousnesses; it is being at home oneself within the other (*bei sich Selbst sein in einem Anderem*)—i.e. being in God and at the same time remaining in the reality of the world of history and state.



[77]Hegel, *Reason in History*, p. 64.

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And so Hegel does not give a concrete answer to the question of what an individual's freedom is. His description is a description of structures, of the conditions indispensable for the existence of freedom. He writes what a state should be like to be a true state; what self-consciousness should be like to be true self-consciousness. He then points to the conditions of knowing freedom and the ways of searching for it. The structures described by Hegel unite, first of all, reason with freedom and freedom with reason. "Reason and freedom," wrote Hegel to Schelling, "remains our motto."[78] Furthermore, those structures reconcile subjective and objective freedom. But their greatest success is the reconciliation of subjective and political freedom. Hegel discovered a foundation on which both an individual and a state are based. This foundation is a rational will, will as power; the power of an individual's will and the power of the state. This is the greatest success of Hegel's political philosophy.

The state of freedom—the union described by Hegel is an absolute condition. We are only on our way towards it. Therefore one should constantly go beyond existing freedom in order to obtain the one which still is not here.

The stages of the development of a self-consciousness that tries to reach the freedom described by Hegel can also repeat themselves in concrete particular self-consciousness. A given self-consciousness can stop on any level of desire; it can be "free" with the fanatic freedom of a revolutionist, with the caprice of "Emperor," with the freedom of a stoic or sceptic; it can also constantly experience unhappiness. But all these stages are behind us in our history. There already came the time of dusk, and Minerva's owl is now flying; therefore, freedom must already be rational in itself. It cannot be an arbitrary, formal kind of freedom, which, by constantly favouring its own particularity, kills or violates other individuals. It must be a reflective freedom, basing its actions on the notion of its own will. And its actions must mean "being for ...", a dispossession of oneself, a "dying to oneself and regaining oneself." In such a way freedom is born. To exist for another, this is true dialectic.

But finally the questions arise: why did Hegel's philosophy shatter and its idealism break down? How was it possible for a totalitarian ideology to be born from it? The revolution took place at the most important point in Hegel's philosophy—at the point on which the whole construction of his system was based, i.e. in his concept of God. This was the only place where such a revolution could happen. There arose a doubt, clearly pointed out by Feuerbach, which is still vivid, a doubt whether the Hegelian God is not a contrivance of human reason, self-consciousness in a transcendental monologue with itself. It was in the name of God that false political Messiahs came out offering to create heaven on earth. It was at this point that the most tragic doubts arose. P. Ricoeur writes:

> It would seem to me that present day anguish may be discerned and understood in terms of the radical exigency formulated by idealism, notably that of Hegel: the hope is that our dreadful history is a ruse of reason heading toward higher synthesis. And here it is: anguish springs up at this precise point of our hope; a specific insecurity clings to history because we are not certain that it can bring about the coincidence of reason and existence, of logic and tragedy. A frightening possibility is discovered by anguish: what if Hegelian reconciliation were but a philosopher's contrivance.[79]

[78] *Briefe von und an Hegel,* Vol. I, (Hamburg: Verlag von Felix Meiner, 1952-53), p. 40.

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Perhaps Hegel's greatest critic Franz Rosensweig is right when he says that it is high time to move to the philosophy of faith and revelation through which only the One who brings salvation can come.

[79]Paul Ricouer, *History and Truth* (Evanston, 1985), p. 294.

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Notre Dame de Namur

The Evolution of Philosophical Ideas in France

Pierre-Philippe Druet

"Burn what you worshipped; worship what you burned."

1. "THE IDEOLOGY OF RUPTURE"[1]

DURING THE SUMMER of 1977 the "new philosophers" enjoyed the philosophical limelight.[2] Lively discussions revolved around B. H. Lévy, Gluckmann, Jambet, and M. Clavel. That is when the weekly *Le Nouvel Observateur*—facetiously—came up with a sort of test question, "Are you a new philosopher?" After having answered ten questions, the reader could compute his score and find out where he stood with regard to the new philosophical school. One of the questions was, "Among the following three masters, which one have you denied last year: Sartre? Althusser? Foucault?"[3] It might interest some to hear that the answer "Althusser" was worth three points and the answer "Foucault" zero. But this hardly matters. What does matter is the way the questions were labelled, and the use of the word "deny." For, by denying their predecessors and masters, the "new philosophers" displayed hardly any originality. It is a fact that "denying" seems to be the moving force behind the evolution of philosophical ideas in France.

This may sound rather harsh, yet it should be taken literally. The history of philosophy, of course, supposes that disciples do not merely echo their masters. A true disciple will at least try to "improve on" his master's thought. Plato did this for Socrates, Aristotle for Plato, Fichte for Kant. No break was involved. In France, on the contrary, ever since World War II, it is by dint of spectacular ruptures that "thought progresses."

Here are a few striking examples. In 1977, the *Magazine littéraire* published a special issue on "Twenty Year of Philosophy in France."[4] André Akoun wrote "The years 1956-1960 show us *an overturning of the whole philosophical universe. . . . This rupture* cast off into the night the ten preceeding years."[5] In December 1985, the same magazine

[1]This phrase is J. D'Hondt's in his *L'idéologie de la rupture,* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1978). This article was translated from the French by Joseph Donceel, S.J.

[2]See P. Ph. Druet, "The 'New Philosophy' in France", *International Philosophical Quarterly,* 18 (1978), 87-92.

[3]*Le Nouvel Observateur,* No. 664 (August, 1977), p. 46.

[4]*Magazine littéraire,* No. 127-28 (September, 1977).

[5]*Ibid.,* p. 13.

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came back again to "Ten Years of Philosophy in France."[6] This time D. A. Grisoni told us of a philosophical renewal made possible by "ruptures." Among these ruptures, May '68 was nothing less than "the putting at a distance that with which the 19th century filled our heads."[7] More recently even *Le Nouvel Observateur* presented the evolution of ideas over the last ten years under the title, "What about our intellectuals? The great wash."[8] Many cartoons enlivened the account: we see an Indian dusting off the bust of Lévi-Strauss, and a housewife "beating" Freud as if he were a rug. In the text, Edgar Morin, for example, speaks of the "collapse" of Marxism,[9] and François Furet declares, "Something fundamental has changed in French intellectual life. . . . We can see that the stage setting has revolved and shows us *its other side.*"[10] So the vocabulary always hinted at "revolution" rather than "evolution." The postwar French thinkers seemed to think only in front of a clean slate, or, if you prefer, amid the ruins of previous doctrines.

This is also true of Luc Ferry and Alain Renaut, whose book on the "thought of '68," stirred up a polemic last year.[11] Unlike Grisoni, whom we quoted above, these two young philosophers hold that the condition *sine qua non* of a return to philosophy is a radical rupture with the spirit of May '68. They claim that the "thought of '68" fed on an exaggerated antihumanism which destroys philosophy itself. They went so far as to call the great thinkers of the seventies, from Foucault to Lyotard, including Derrida and Bourdieu, *"philosophistes."*

This spate of ruptures creates a certain confusion. Who has broken with what and when? What rupture led to what progress? According to Ferry and Renaut, May '68 represented a peak of antihumanism, and crowned the era of the "death of the subject" (Foucault). So a philosophical renewal depended upon rejecting those nefarious ideas. F. Furet, however, who seems to favor a "return to the subject," believes that May '68 is its harbinger.[12] As for Grisoni, he praises Lyotard, whom Ferry and Renaut consider a pure product of May '68. Grisoni sees Lyotard as the bearer of a philosophical renewal which has nothing to do with the "subject."[13]

The case of Michel Foucault is typical.[14] In *Histoire de la folie* (1961), he begins his own original work by breaking with philosophy. Up until *L'archéologie du savoir* (1969), he built this work of his as a theory of discontinuity. His books tried to uncover the *épistemé* which subtended the discourse of an epoch; they did not try to explain the transition from one *épistemé* to another. Moreover, they analyzed *épistemé* as a system of differences and oppositions. This idea of discontinuity was to induce the Christian polemicist, M. Clavel, to say that only Foucault has permitted him to understand May '68 as a "cultural fracture."

[6]*Magazine littéraire,* No. 225 (December, 1985).

[7]*Ibid.,* p. 17.

[8]*Le Nouvel Observateur,* No. 1127 (June, 1986), p. 112-26.

[9]*Ibid.,* p. 116.

[10]*Ibid.,* p. 114.

[11]Luc Ferry and A. Renaut, *La Pensée 68: Essai sur l'anti-humanisme contemporain* (Paris: Gallimard, 1985), p. 293. Henceforth *La pensée 68.*

[12]*Le Nouvel Observateur,* No. 1127, p. 115.

[13]*Magazine littéraire,* No. 225, p. 17.

[14]On Foucault see A. Sheridan, *Discours, sexualité et pouvoir: Initiation à M. Foucault* (Bruxelles: Mardaga, 1985) (the original English was published by Tavistock); H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1982); A. Kremer-Marietti, *Michel Foucault: Archéologie et généalogie* (Paris: Le livre de Poche, No. 4036, 1985).

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But Foucault sets up the rupture in his very work. Thus, starting in 1971 (*L'ordre du discours*), he centered his analyses of the relations between discourse and power. Up until then, the latter, the aspect of power, had not been thematized as such. And, in order to take it into account, Foucault "dropped" the instrument patiently constructed in *L'archéologie du savoir.*

In an even more radical way Foucault was to admit the rupture at the interior of his own books. Everyone knows the chasm which separates the first volume of *Histoire de la sexualité, "La volonté du savoir"* (1976), from the two following, published in 1984. These two framed an inset which explained how this wide-ranging investigation had been recentered. And this is not Foucault's last rupture, since the commentators of his last book could speak of a "return to philosophy"!

2. A FEW STAGES ALL THE SAME[15]

Let us try to escape this fascination with the breaking out of novelty. Between 1945 and 1965, French thought evolved along a few main *axes.* I will consider three of them: the relation to Marxism, the relation to commitment (especially political), the relation to rationality and science. The following survey, besides being schematic, leaves a serious gap: we will be able to mention only the thinkers and trends which were "fashionable," and of which people spoke, and so we will have to omit the "eternal" philosophies, less popular at the time, such as that of Ricoeur and the hermeneutical school of Jankélévitch or Lévinas.

a) 1945-1956

At the end of World War II, emphasis naturally turned to the values of existence (the "hunger for living" and even the "fury for living"), to the values of action, of commitment, of politics. All these themes led back to a single one which encompassed them all, the theme of history. J. Hippolyte discovered in Hegel the first great philosopher of history. Phenomenology caused us to rediscover the "concrete world," the "living world," and corporeity. As for existentialism, it exalted creative subjectivity against the recent disasters which derived from mass ideologies.

The philosophers wanted "to do something new." Their themes and style were new: the arts, for instance, and theatrical expression. But this did not lead to frivolity. It was not enough to think history in its contingent and daily actuality; one had to make history. The philosopher of the fifties was committed. And the obvious commitment was one which led to the Communist Party, the animator of the Resistance against the Nazis, the representative of the Soviet liberator. It should be noted that the intellectuals' adhesion went to the party rather than to the doctrine, since Marxism hardly spread except as presented in Stalin's catechism, *Matérialisme dialectique et matérialisme historique,* translated into French in 1945.

b) 1956-1960

As everyone remembers, the year 1956 marked a dramatic crisis in the Communist world. Almost simultaneously, the Soviet people heard about Stalin's crimes and saw

[15] I rely on the materials already cited and on the recent histories of philosophy, for instance, T. Oriol, *Histoire de la philosophie* (Paris: Nathan, 1979).

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their armies invade Hungary in order to crush a people's insurrection. It became impossible for the French intellectuals to consider the Communist Party the party of freedom. Some of them left it; others remained in it; all of them felt the need of a precise diagnostic: How could the liberating doctrine *par excellence* lead up to a totalitarian practice similar to that of Nazism?[16]

In a way that fairly well converged, the French intellectuals were about to find the cause of this evil in ideology and in subjectivity. Pushed to the limit this explanation would turn into a caricature among some communists: Marxism is a sound doctrine which one individual, Stalin, has applied in a wrong way.[17] Misgivings about subjectivity induced some to look for a kind of knowledge which is certain, scientific, and free of all ideology.[18] Because of a questionable mixture, the perverse subjectivity of ideology was confused with humanism.[19] This gave rise to a crusade against "humanistic ideology" (a pleonasm, by the way) among Marxists and non-Marxists alike. The first great victim of this crusade was to be existentialism, "the philosophy of subjectivity." Moreover the death of Merleau-Ponty, in 1961, deprived this trend of its most subtle thinker.

c) 1960-1968

Together with subjectivity, commitment (especially political commitment) has come under suspicion. Henceforth the thinker must give up the platform and the stage and return to his study in order to "do science." His first objective will be the search for truth, a truth which can only be scientific.

Within the Marxist camp, Althusser's reign is declared.[20] He combines all the characteristics of the period. First, he justifies the scientific withdrawal of the thinker: theory itself is revolutionary praxis. Next, the Marxist intellectual undertakes to "save Marx," in whom he discovers an "epistemological break" between the humanistic and Hegelian thought of the early writings and the "scientific" point of view of the mature works. Finally, against Lukacs and the predominance of history, Althusser developed the synchronic and structural dimension on the Marxist analysis.

At the same time both the structuralist movement and that of the human sciences picked up strength. Both were intimately connected. For, as Lévi-Strauss continually emphasized, it is the structuralist method, deriving from phonology, which finally provides the human sciences with scientific standing. We must forget about philosophy which is powerless and/or ideological, and devote time and effort to anthropology, linguistics, psychoanalysis, or to the history of the sciences. This approach reveals a new

[16]We recognize the theme of the dramatic debates between Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Camus concerning the periodical *Les Temps Modernes*.

[17]The "new philosophers" will go to the other extreme. M. Clavel used to repeat, "Marx is Stalin; Stalin is the Gulag; therefore, Marx is the Gulag." See my article cited above.

[18]This desire to discover a knowledge which is certain explains why epistemology was so fashionable in France from this time on. There is no need to mention that in our paper we mean only the ideological misuse of this epistemology.

[19]Everyday French usage abets this kind of confusion. Recently the word "subjective" has often been used with negative connotations such as "partial," "arbitrary," "not objective". . . . On the other hand, French philosophy is not always very strict in the differentiated use of the concepts "subject," "man," "ego," and so on. Moreover, it does not always distinguish the different levels of the ego (psychological, ethical, ontological, transcendental).

[20]See J. P. Cotten, *La pensée de Louis Althusser* (Toulouse: Privat, 1979).

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rationalistic positivism, since its purpose is to discover, by means of the scientific method, the fundamental laws of reality which rule not only the earth (geology), but also society and the individual psychic life.[21] But at the same time, structuralism also wants to be anti-humanistic, in the sense mentioned above: the laws which rule man, for instance in their behavior or their discourse, are unconscious and transhuman. Foucault was about to strike it rich with the theme "the death of man."[22]

(Let us, by the way, note the extreme ambiguity of expressions such as "anti-humanism" and "death of the subject." To oppose subjectivism is not an anti-humanistic attitude. Man is more than a subject *simpliciter,* even as the subject is more than the empirical individual. And it is childish to evaluate in a few words the humanism or anti-humanism of Nietzsche, Marx, or Heidegger, the period's greatest luminaries.)[23]

d) 1968-1977

We will not try to probe the ultimate meaning of May '68.[24] It is enough to discover in it, among other things, a double refusal: a refusal of the philosophical and/or ideological void; a refusal of "power," of "domination," of "oppression." These two rejections explain the evolution of the following years.

True, structuralism continued to reign. When Sartre died (1980), the literary magazine, *Lire,* asked the French who would, henceforth, be their thinking masters (*maîtres à penser*): Lévi-Strauss and Foucault clearly topped this poll. But Foucault himself had shifted the axis of his reflections towards the critique of power. At the same time, the French thinkers seemed to discover Popper (the idea of the "open society"), Heidegger (the critique of technology), and Habermas (the deadly foe of instrumental reason). This gave rise to the formation of a kind of philosophical Left, violently opposed to every kind of power, which saw in rational discourse the subtle foundation of totalitarianism.[25] On the one hand, this reflection is positive: it has sensitized the *intelligentsia* to the totalitarian phenomenon, for instance, through the masterly analysis of H. Arendt. On the other hand, however, it has abetted the development of an anti-rationalism and an anti-scientism which is often a caricature. With the "new philosophers" this episode came to a head. Power, they claimed, is a radical evil, coextensive with the world and with history. Reason had become its accomplice, at least since Plato. Take Marxism as an example. Its totalitarian and barbarous practice derives from its theoretical claim of possessing absolute (social) knowledge. So the optimists should "bet on" another history and the pessimists should try to prevent, as long as possible, the unavoidable victory of the "red princes."

[21]See Claude Lévi-Strauss, *Anthropologie structurale* (Paris: Plon, 1958), especially the first part entitled *"Langage et parenté."*

[22]See *Les mots et les choses* (Paris: Gallimard, 1966), p. 398, for instance, "Man is not the oldest nor the most usual problem which faces human thought. . . . Man is an invention. The archeology of our thought can easily show that it was invented rather recently and that it may disappear very soon."

[23]Let us note that in their book, Ferry and Renaut consider *La pensée 68* as a simple radicalization ("in the French way") of German philosophical ideas. Thus Foucault, Derrida, Althusser, and Lacan are not only wrong in their anti-humanism, but they are not even original.

[24]For a summary of the different interpretations of May '68, see *La pensée 68*, pp. 63-103.

[25]J. M. Benoist, author of *Marx est mort* (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), is also the author of a work with the suggestive title, *Tyrannie du Logos* (Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1975). For a fine example of a "political" self-critique of philosophy. See Châtelet, Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, and Serres, *Politique de la philosophie* (Paris: Grasset, 1976).

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With the "new philosophers" we notice a double phenomenon: rejection of Reason, because it is totalitarian, but also a return to philosophy, in the form of ethics, and even of "metaphysics" (for instance, "ontology of the revolution").[26] Already in 1977, the *Magazine littéraire*[27] was speaking of these "human sciences."[28] Since the end of the seventies, the French thinkers rejected the anti-philosophical attitude of the structural current. Yet, as they mistrusted "theoretical terrorism," they were also opposed to a philosophy that would be "the Master's discourse" (*discours du Maître*). "Has the philosophical discourse, ever since Kant, been anything else then the Master's discourse?"[29] Here we recognize the problematic of André Glucksmann. We should give up the *Master thinkers* without giving up thinking. In other words, "the intellectual must be satisfied with being the putterer (*le bricoleur*) of what is least unjust, the artisan of what is most true."[30] This led to what I call "a minimal philosophy," which questions, is personal, fragmentary, and provisional.[31]

e) 1977-1985

This period of almost a decade today presents itself to us as the time of the "great wash." We were in fact witnessing a kind of Restoration which got rid of the remnants of the preceding decades in order to return to positions which are more classical, and even traditional.

Marxism was no longer the point of reference. At the end of the war, Marxism was the only "liberating" doctrine. Starting from 1956, and even more between 1974 and 1977, it was rejected in its Soviet form. It kept some credit, however, in its Maoist and Trotskiite version (May '68). Today, that is all over. Nay, the very idea of revolution sounds old-fashioned. The thinker who serves as a political reference is Tocqueville.[32]

Structuralism returned to its primary function of being a scientific methodology. The human sciences became more discreet, and no longer claimed to be substitutes for philosophy.[33] The latter, on the other hand, seemed to be less ashamed of its past and its methods. It no longer felt the need to wrap itself in linguistic, or psychoanalytic, or thermodynamic clothes before opening its mouth.

The commitment theme came up again strongly. But in the context of an institutional crisis, there is need not so much to join a party than to struggle in behalf of the great social and humanitarian causes: against totalitarianism, for human rights, against hunger, for the Southeast Asian refugees. The thinking remained marked by this image: Sartre and Aron together pleading for the "boat people" from Vietnam.

Rationality, however, did not come out of this adventure unscathed. Lyotard says in *La condition postmoderne*[34] that the "great narratives" which conveyed sense have col-

[26]This was the project of Jambet and Lardreau, *L'Ange* (Paris: Grasset, 1976).

[27]No. 127-28, p. 15.

[28]No. 225, p. 16.

[29]No. 127-28, p. 9.

[30]*Ibid.*, p. 64.

[31]A. Glucksmann, the subtlest of the new philosophers, in *Cynisme et passion* (Paris: Grasset, 1981) presents the following minimal basis for democracy: we cannot, of course, agree on what will constitute the citizens' happiness, but we can agree on rejecting that which is intolerable.

[32]And for the present time, Raymon Aron, at least among the outspoken neo-liberals.

[33]T. Todorov, *Le Nouvel Observateur,* No. 1127, p. 119.

[34]J. F. Lyotard, *La condition postmoderne* (Paris: Ed. de Minuit, 1979). See also by the same author, *Le postmoderne expliqué aux enfants* (Paris: Galilée, 1986).

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lapsed; that nowadays we think in "generalized, theoretical contest" (*une agonistique théorique généralisée*). The relativism of "everybody has his own truth" was not far off. The "minimal philosophy" corresponded to hedonistic, slightly selfish, individualism. It was not easy to see how such an attitude might provide a solid basis for the great humanitarian commitment mentioned above.[35] From this came the idea of a return to philosophy, a return of the subject, a return of humanism, and even a return of metaphysics.

3. THE PRESENT QUESTION

The problem faced by the *intelligentsia* today is very well stated by L. Ferry. What is at stake, he claims, is the "possibility of discussion,"[36] the very existence of dialogue. Dialogue supposes points of reference which transcend mere "language games," and which may be, if not universal, at least intersubjective. He puts it this way, of course, because of the "post-modern" context in which the substantialistic and universalistic certitudes of classical metaphysics have become unacceptable. This helps us understand the way in which A. Renaut formulates the problem:

> to know how, within the horizon of subjectivity which, however we may feel about it, remains ours, and which shows that we belong to modernity, to rethink supraindividual spheres of validity, to rethink values which might at least be *thought* of as 'valid for all,' and to constitute poles of consensus or intersubjectivity.[37]

Let us put the question in terms of practice. Post-'68 "theoretical leftism" held that the "formal liberties," the so-called "formal democracy," were nothing but snares, or even mild forms of totalitarianism. Nowadays, everybody condemned such excesses, such radicalism. A democracy, even a "formal" one, is better than the other political forms of government which the world shares. But how are we, in a strictly relativistic context, to demonstrate this superiority of democracy? Why, in a strictly individualistic context, should we struggle for it? Says F. Furet, "It is incoherent to speak of modern democracy like a nihilist or a pessimist, and to adopt the political position of a man of progress." The question posed by *Le Nouvel Observateur* points in the same direction: "Can we establish a philosophy of human rights without reference to the subject?"[38]

To that question Ferry and Renaut give a clear answer. We must: a) give up the anti-humanism of *"La pensée 68,"* i.e., understand that humanism is identical neither with modern individualism nor with the substantialistic metaphysics of the subject; b) return to Kant and to his central intuitions, that of the transcendental, in order to build with him objectivity on the basis of intersubjectivity;[39] c) develop this research of transcendental foundation in the domains of esthetics and of rights, domains which were "systematically rejected in their specificity by the different forms of *'La pensée 68'*."[40]

[35]See J. Julliard, *Le Nouvel Observateur,* No. 1135 (August, 1986), p. 35. It is worth noting that, in the following issue, the director of the weekly thought it is advisable to soften what Julliard had written, lest the intellectuals of the Left understand them as an invitation to keep quiet after the "mistakes" made by the leftist government. See also *La pensée 68,* p. 287.

[36]L. Ferry, A. Renaut, et al., "Y a-t-il une pensée 68?" in *Le Débat,* No. 39 (March-May, 1986), p. 51.

[37]*Ibid.*, p. 53.

[38]No. 1127, p. 115 and p. 120.

[39]L. Ferry and A. Renaut, *Système et critique* (Bruxelles: Ed. Ousia, 1984), p. 156-77, *"D'un retour à Kant."*

[40]Ferry, "Y a-t-il une pensée 68?" p. 53.

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To be sure, our two young philosophers deny that they wish a "Restoration," a return to the past. That is why they give "their" Kant a decidedly modern mien. According to them, Kantism is a philosophy of finitude which "accompanies" the withdrawal of the divine. God withdraws, we alone remain. In this context, knowledge and consciousness are no longer self-evident. Kant asks about their conditions of possibility. The answer is "that, in order to have representations, the subject must be a finite being: it follows that finiteness no longer looks like the sign of a lack with regard to omniscient knowledge which would be that of God, but rather like the very condition of knowledge." Hence the attention which Kant pays to historicity: to be finite means to be temporal and historical. "In the domain of science, as well as in that of ethics or of politics, the future looks, henceforth, like the horizon of human practice, and perfectibility like the driving force and the finality of every action. . . . Everything points toward the future. . . ."[41]

In this way, in one and the same time, two things are preserved: 1) the positive results of the critique of rationality (dear to '68), and 2) the condition *sine qua non* of a dialogue between men and of real ethical and political action. The critique of truth, in the sense of Absolute Knowledge, is perfectly legitimate in itself when it is not followed by a reflection on the regulating value which the exigencies of reason may, nevertheless, continue to have by way of an Ideal. Such a critique is marvelously attuned to the individualistic pathos which is so well expressed by the formula, "To each one his truth."[42]

4. A FEW CRITICAL REMARKS

This "return to the subject,"[43] suggested by Ferry and Renaut brings to mind a few critical questions. Let us first mention that these two authors are not the only ones who defend neo-humanistic positions. We are considering theirs rather than that of some others because it is clear, courageous, and it aims at real reconstruction.

Before we could agree with Ferry and Renaut we would have first to know: a) whether the diagnosis is correct, that is, whether *La pensée 68* really is the anti-humanism which leads to today's blind-alley, and to the conflict between theory and practice; b) whether the "Kantian" solution restores by right the genuine subject of which we have or would have need, and not merely the shadow or ghost of the subject.

a) The Diagnosis

We cannot here examine every step of the demonstration. A few general considerations will have to do. Ferry and Renaut were right in castigating some fashionable attitudes. The following points are clear: 1) structuralism means the end of commitment; 2) the critique of "master thinkers" does not justify the rejection of all rationality; 3) formerly philosophy was threatened with self-destruction as a result of a misplaced bad conscience. They have no trouble displaying wild declamations concerning "the gloom of humanistic metaphysics" (Derrida) or concerning the invitation to "render philosophy inhuman" (Lyotard). But their critique often borders on polemics. With regard to authors such as Foucault or Lacan, Ferry and Renaut do not look for the inter-

[41] *Ibid.*, p. 47.
[42] *La pensée 68*, p. 287.
[43] This is the title of the last chapter of *La pensée 68*, pp. 263-85.

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nal logic of their doctrine, nor do they even grant them the benefit of the doubt.[44] In the name of a conception of humanism, they blame these thinkers for their anti-humanism based on a totally extrinsic conception of the subject and of the individual. Thus when reading "death of man" in Foucault, they understand death of that subject who, for them, is the indispensable foundation of practical philosophy. We feel like answering with Paul Veyne, a friend of Foucault, "There is no return to the subject, since the subject has never gone away. Foucault did not put the subject back around 1984. In his book *Le souci de soi,* he continued his project of transcendental analysis of the historical constitution of the subject." Veyne goes on to emphasize that many people overlook the transcendental dimension of Foucault's thought. Like Kant, Foucault wishes to show that the world is neither the product nor the object of a sovereign reason. "Only, Foucault added that the transcendental itself is historical."[45]

We should, therefore, examine carefully all the critical analyses of our two philosophers. We readily admit that *La pensée 68* is guilty of terrible simplification, as when, for instance, they speak of *the* metaphysics and of *the* rationality, as if these were unique and homogeneous. But we cannot admit that one refutes that view by means of opposite conceptions which are too rough-hewn. "To suggest that a form of humanistic thought is the indispensable foundation of human rights is practically accusing Foucault of justifying genocide because he writes that man is but a ripple on the water."[46]

b) The Kantian Solution

The way in which Ferry and Renaut interpret Kantism is fashionable. It corresponds exactly to the anthropology and philosophy needed by our over-technologized world.[47] Our two authors do not care much for Heidegger's critique of technology nor for Habermas' critique of instrumental reason. But this is not a sufficient reason to do exactly the opposite and to align oneself—without saying so—with the demands of technology. For that is what we find here.

In the Kantism of Ferry and Renaut everything derives from the withdrawal of the divine. It leaves man facing the world. In his finitude man must affirm his power over himself and over the world. From the Renaissance on, he will do so by using the efficacy of scientific and technological knowledge, in which the criterion of truth no longer is correspondence, but pragmatism: it is true because it works.[48] Scientific-technological knowledge is what suits modern man because it makes no ontological claims. It is understandable that Kant, the "philosopher of finitude," reflects on the subjective conditions of possibility of Newtonian science and that he defends an ontological agnosticism. But

[44]This is the topic of the first part of the cited article in *Le Débat* in which Ferry and Renaut are interviewed by A. Finkielkraut and K. Pomian. Yet it is clear, for example, that Foucault was not a relativist and that "he believed that something like the truth existed, at least as that which allows one to make a distinction between the discourses, and to object to lies." (AA. VV. M. Foucault, Ed. Syros, 1985, p. 12).

Since this article was written a dozen or so works on Foucault have appeared which, without complacency but with objectivity, have put things in their place. All these works appeared in the few months between September and December 1986. Would this be a reaction to the Ferry's and Renaut's criticisms?

[45]In *Le Nouvel Observateur,* No. 1127, p. 112.

[46]*Ibid.*, p. 110. See, however, *La pensée 68,* pp.*288-89.*

[47]See P. Ph. Druet, "Les quatre questions fondamentales d'une philosophie de la technique," *Revue des Questions Scientifiques* 160 (1984), p. 435-59.

[48]See Ph. Roqueplo, *Penser la technique* (Paris: Ed. du Seuil, 1983), p.68ff.

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this affects his thinking, since notions such as "transcendental subject" and "regulating ideas," introduce pragmatism into philosophy itself. Hence follows an elimination of human nature, which nowadays technology renders concretely feasible by means of biotechnology.[49] This elimination is the last step towards a generalized pragmatism, denounced by Roqueplo and Hottois, which, according to Ferry and Renaut, grants paramount importance to the dimension of the future: a human being who is "perfectible" in a world indefinitely "transformable"; a subject defined by the demands of action; a set of values which it should at least be possible "to consider as valid for everyone"—all of these are notions dictated by the demands of the technological manipulation of reality, including human reality. Choosing the esthetic and juridical domains for the pursuit of relatively transcendent values points in the same direction. Since Plato, the field of esthetics and, for the Moderns, the domain of rights, stand at the apex of "technical" thought, as *savoir-faire,* as production.[50]

And what if it was that sort of thinking which avowed itself to be basically antihumanistic? Ferry and Renaut define the subject, as conceived by the Moderns, as autonomous and intersubjective consciousness, over against the independent and ultimately solitary "individual."[51] But what has this subject—concretely—become? Has it not seen its autonomy *effectively* swallowed up by rendering life dependent on technology? Moreover, in the history of philosophy, the only true descendant of Kant's subject is the subject of the early Fichte which will be accused by Hegel of having absolutized contradiction and which will hasten to disappear in the bosom of a philosophy of Absolute Knowledge.[52] In other words, the transcendental subject is so "light," so tenuous, that it must look for a metaphysical foundation, hence "regress" upstream from Kantism or else be content to "float" in the background of production, of the transformation of the world, of effective action. It is evident that such a subject cannot accomplish anything at all. And we will commend the structuralists for having "liquidated" it, just as believers praise the atheist for destroying the idols and the false images of God.

In short, the hypothesis is at least plausible that the "modern subject," in its Kantian version, did not have the means required for its autonomy. This subject of action, conceived in the technological way, has been swept away, rendered superfluous, by its own realizations. Structuralism is the philosophy of a world which has no *valid* subject.[53]

It seems evident to us that human dignity cannot be the object of simple convention and that it is impossible really to respect a human being who would be only a "ripple on the water." Man, however, whose dignity should be restored, is not the subject of post-Renaissance anthropocentric thinking. Not only does this subject dissolve in the transcendental, but it is incapable of true intersubjectivity, as is shown by the failure of Kant's and Fichte's political philosophy.[54] The human being whom we should recover

[49]See G. Hottois, *Le signe et la technique; la philosophie à l'épreuve de la technique* (Paris: Aubier, 1984), p. 119ff.

[50]See the work of J. Baudrillard and especially *Oublier Foucault* (Paris: Galilée, 1977). Ferry and Renaut provide for the notion of production in *Système et critique,* p. 163.

[51]Ferry, "Y a-t-il un pensée 68?" p. 50ff.

[52]P. Ph. Druet, *Fichte* (Paris: Seghers, 1977), p. 25-107.

[53]This assertion is not a defense of structuralism. Our critique of the "technologized" subject is also directed against notions such as "technology of the self" dear to Foucault.

[54]Druet, *Fichte.*

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is, rather, for instance, the person who is ontologically consistent, because he is always addressed by the Other, the person of whom Lévinas speaks. He would also be man as a being in nature.

It is true that Ferry and Renaut, far from ignoring Lévinas' ideas, highly praise them. They will not be happy that we find them here collaborating with the anti-humanistic project with which, so they believe, they are contending. Their mistake, however, was unavoidable as soon as they entered into the rupture-denial cycle. To *break* with one's predecessors, while remaining *within the same conceptual framework,* is to operate—in the etymological sense — a simple revolution. And it is well known that revolutions always bring one back in a new guise to one's starting point. Michel Foucault used to say, "To work means to think *something different* from what one thought before."

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Hudson On "Too Much" Evil

Keith Chrzan

IN HIS RECENT contribution to this journal Yeager Hudson considers a deductive argument from the quantity of evil our world contains to the non-existence of God.[1] His argument trades on the common perception that our world contains "too much" evil:

1. God's existence is consistent with some, but not "too much" evil;
2. The actual world contains "too much" evil;
3. Therefore God does not exist.

Citing human psychological peculiarities, Hudson purports that the above Deduction from the Quantity of Evil (DQE) necessarily degenerates into the more standard Deduction from Any Evil (DAE):

1. God's existence is compatible with no evil whatsoever;
2. Some evil exists;
3. Therefore God does not exist.

Hudson notes that successful defenses against DAE abound; therefore, since DQE collapses onto DAE, it fails as well. He goes on to suggest a full-fledged theodicy[2] against DAE implied by his attack on DQE. Unfortunately for Hudson, his effort to deflate DQE is either fallacious or trivial and the theodicy with which he refutes DAE conflicts with the argument by which he reduces DQE to DAE in the first place.

COLLAPSING DQE

Against DQE Hudson argues that "we are psychologically disposed to assume that any amount of evil which happens to exist is more than is justified. This means that we would complain that the world is unfair, no matter how much or how little evil existed."[3] He attempts to demonstrate this by predicting that if the quantity of evil in our world

[1]Yeager Hudson, "Is There Too Much Evil in the World?" *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 25 (1985), 343-48.

[2]"Theodicy" in the sense adopted by Hudson implies providing the actual reason God chose to create a world containing evil. "Defense," on the other hand, asserts only that possibly God had some good reason to allow evil to exist.

[3]Hudson, 345.

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suddenly decreased by half, we would before long consider even the remainder too much, and so on, *ad infinitum*. "Indeed, it does not matter how little evil there might be in the world, humans would undoubtedly find it to be too much and would argue that an all-powerful and all-good God ought not to allow so much."[4] Finally, Hudson envisions that even a world completely devoid of suffering would not escape our censure: "There would still remain distinctions of intensity of pleasure or degrees of experiences of satisfaction. Under these circumstances we would expect as much human complaining as ever."[5] As these complaints occur whenever a perceived evil exists, DQE just turns into oft-refuted DAE and disappears as an independently valid problem.

HUDSON'S THEODICY AGAINST DAE

The brief theodicy Hudson promotes centers on the proposition that evil is a necessary constituent of any world inhabited by beings capable of "gradations of awareness" and of moral awareness in particular.[6] If God wants creatures capable of moral discernment, he cannot do without at least some evil in his world; therefore the existence of some evil is consistent with the existence of God.

TWO MICRO PROBLEMS

Important to recognize is just how radically Hudson denigrates our capacity to judge value. Traditionally theodicists have considered human analytical capabilities unequal to the task of deciding precisely how much evil is "too much"; such decisions, the story goes, are simply "beyond our ken."[7] Hudson, however, makes a much stronger claim: he insists that, *necessarily*, humans will assert of any possible world that it contains "too much" evil. Not only are humans incapable of reliable moral analyses but they can come to only one verdict: "too much." The judgement of "too much" therefore, is meaningless, and Hudson sees arguments from the quantity of evil fall.

Clearly, however, Hudson errs about the illegitimacy of such human judgments. The very fact that he can articulate palpably incredible "too much" claims indicates that we can discern more from less valid instances of such claims.

Consider, for example, the inhabitants of two different possible worlds. Karl resides in world W. World W is a study in the variations of misery, resembling nothing so much as Dante's Hell. Each person suffers an unending alternation of hair-raising tortures. Some torments are marginally less horrible than others, so Karl and his fellow creatures can discriminate between degrees of pain.

Vince is more fortunate, residing as he does in world W*, a world most reminiscent of a hedonist's paradise. Vince and company can discern greater from lesser pleasures, but even their least satisfying delights (sometimes chosen for a change of pace) far exceed anything available in our world.

Karl thinks to himself: "Surely W contains too much evil—in fact it contains noth-

[4]Hudson, 345.

[5]Hudson, 345.

[6]Hudson, 346.

[7]Stephen Wykstra, "The Humean Obstacle to Evidential Arguments from Suffering: On Avoiding the Evils of Appearance," *International Journal for Philosophy of Religion*, 16 (1985), p. 88. See also M. B. Ahern, *The Problem of Evil* (New York: Schocken Books, 1971), pp. 49-50.

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ing but evil. God must not exist." If Hudson's psychology is accurate, Vince's thoughts are similarly anguished: "Surely W* could stand some improvement. It is not fitting of a wholly good God that he makes the most intense pleasures impossible to enjoy continuously. If I sometimes suffer lesser pleasures in place of greater pleasures, then God must not exist."

Obviously Vince's reasoning carries little weight. Just as clearly, however, Karl's logic is not so easily dismissed. Hudson wields Vince's trite complaint against all "too much" claims, even Karl's. He fails to recognize that Vince's gripe appears trivial only when compared to other, more valid, "too much" claims. Thus the relative triviality of Vince's atheism is evidence in favor of, not against, Karl's atheism.

Far from problematic, too, is how Hudson can insist upon humans' moral sophistication while denying their ability to discriminate even between "evil" and "non-maximal pleasure." He paints us as morally obtuse when he hopes to collapse DQE into DAE but he waxes eloquent on our moral awareness in his attack on DAE; he cannot have it both ways. Either our ability to judge good and evil is consistently flawed, in which case Hudson's theodicy fails, or our ability to judge is not so thoroughly unreliable and he cannot as easily dismiss DQE.

A MACRO OBJECTION

In focusing on DQE, however, Hudson attacks a straw man. He construes arguments from evil's abundance as logically watertight deductive inferences essentially involving the claim "In no possible world God inhabits does as much evil as exists in the actual world exist." If DQE was ever a prominent atheistic thrust, however, it has long since stopped being one. Moreover, many theodicists have already slain this straw man and they have done so by noting the atheist's palpable inability to prove deductively that God and "this much" evil cannot co-exist.[8] If Hudson attempts to refute only DQE, then he redundantly fends off a non-existent threat and his point is trivial.

Hudson's bid to disparage human moral judgement is novel only to the extent that it targets a more frequent and threatening atheistic endeavor, the Induction from the Quantity of Evil (IQE):

1. God's existence is consistent with some, but not "too much" evil;
2. Probably "too much" evil exists in the actual world;
3. Therefore God probably does not exist.

The promoter of IQE can agree with Hudson that one cannot *know* how much is "too much" evil, yet he can argue probabilistically that the amount we actually have is too great. To the extent that Hudson's argument oppugns IQE, however, it is also false.

That some "too much" claims are more valid than others can be illustrated in a second way. Suppose that the quantity of evil our world contains is X and that Y is the most the world could contain without soiling God's perfect goodness. Suppose further that our world can physically accommodate between 0 and 100 units of evil, so $0 < X < 100$ and $0 < Y < 100$. From our limited perspective, of course, humans can quantify neither X nor Y: we just do not know where the cut-off (Y) lies or even where X is in relation to

[8]See Alvin Plantinga *The Nature of Necessity* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 190-91, and Michael Peterson, *Evil and the Christian God* (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1982), p. 57.

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Y; we can only subjectively estimate such things. The more plentiful, pervasive and horrendous are the evils we know to exist, however, the closer to 100 we can believe X resides; the closer is X to 100, the more likely it is that X exceeds Y and the more justified is the claim "X > Y" ("too much evil exists"). The probability of the truth of "X > Y" increases as X increases, all else being equal. Thus Karl's case is visibly more powerful than Vince's, so Hudson's attack on human moral sensitivity is simply fallacious. Showing the absurdity of some "too much" claims does not oppugn all "too much" claims.

This analysis explains much debate concerning the prevalence of evil. Atheists can strengthen IQE by reciting the litany of evils (to increase the perceived value of X)[9] and by holding very respectful views of omnipotence, omniscience and moral perfection (to decrease the perception of Y). Similarly theodicists try to raise and lower their estimates of Y and X respectively.

Thus Hudson's collapsing argument is either trivial or false, depending upon whether he intends it against DQE or IQE. His attempt to subsume arguments from evil's quantity under DAE either fails in its own right against IQE and contradicts his theodicy as well or it succeeds only trivially against DQE.

[9]As Hume does in *Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion* and Voltaire in *Candide*.

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Colby Coll.

Response to Chrzan's "Hudson On 'Too Much' Evil"

Yeager Hudson

I WOULD LIKE to begin by thanking Mr. Chrzan for his thoughtful and courteous critique of my paper on evil. He has raised a number of interesting points. I shall attempt to respond to several of the most important ones.

Chrzan claims that my argument, which attempts to collapse what he labels DQE (Deduction from the Quantity of Evil) into what he calls DAE (Deduction from Any Evil), is either fallacious or trivial. In attacking DQE, he says, I am attacking a straw man, and, in fending it off, my argument is redundant and trivial. It is redundantly trivial, he charges, because "many theodicists have already slain this straw man," thinkers such as Plantinga and Peterson. But I should have thought that if it really were a straw man, they would not have considered it worth their time and effort to refute it. And if it is redundant and trivial to offer an additional argument where other arguments already exist, then it would seem that Aquinas' second, third, fourth, and fifth arguments for the existence of God are redundant and trivial.

Chrzan attempts to show that my argument is fallacious by arguing that "some 'too much' arguments are more valid than others" (I shall designate this claim SMV). He asks us to imagine two worlds, world W which "is a study in the variations of misery, resembling nothing so much as Dante's Hell," and world W* which is "most reminiscent of a hedonist's paradise." Karl complains of his world, "surely W contains too much evil—in fact it contains nothing but evil. God must not exist." [Of course it cannot be literally true that it contains nothing but evil.] And Vince complains of his, "surely W* could stand some improvement. It is not fitting of a wholly good God . . . God must not exist." Chrzan goes on to argue that "Vince's reasoning carries little weight," whereas "Karl's logic is not so easily dismissed."

Now this argument of Chrzan's, far from proving my position fallacious, nicely illustrates a point I attempted to make in my paper about the psychological rather than the logical nature of many arguments concerning evil. Karl's argument *seems* harder to dismiss and Vince's *appears* trivial because the poignancy of Karl's situation has been played up by references to Dante's hell and Vince's trivialized by the rhetoric of hedonism. Actually, Vince's argument carries just as much logical weight as Karl's. The form of the argument is:

1. God's existence is compatible with some but not too much evil.
2a. Karl: In W, too much evil exists.
2b. Vince: In W*, too much evil exists.
3. THUS (from 1 + either 2a or 2b): God does not exist.

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The soundness of the argument hinges, of course, on the truth value of the second premise. It has apparently been agreed all around that we cannot measure the quantity of evil with sufficient precision to judge whether or not too much exists in a particular world. Chrzan admits this explicitly at one point: "We just do not know where the cut-off . . . lies." And yet he asserts SMV. Surely he cannot have it both ways. And the fact is, one "too much" argument is not more valid than another. The argument stated above is valid just in case "too much" evil exists. It is invalid otherwise. And, as Chrzan admits, we cannot show that too much does exist. Thus the argument does not establish its conclusion.

There is a serious problem with SMV—the problem, namely, that it is a false claim. I have argued in my paper that humans are inclined to be very much impressed with their own personal troubles or inconveniences and to complain that they are more than an all-powerful, all good God should have permitted. It is a familiar point in moral philosophy that the wealthy and powerful are no happier in their circumstances of luxury and ease than are the poor in their hovels who do not miss the plenty they have never had the opportunity to experience. We complain about the hardships we experience or those which come forcefully to our attention and find fault with God on their account. Chrzan's feeling that Vince's argument is trivial and Karl's more valid illustrates our tendency to be impressed by graphic representations of suffering. Chrzan even points out that "atheists can strengthen" one form of their argument "by reciting the litany of evils" but does not seem to notice that his own tendency to accept SMV appears to have been strengthened by reciting a litany of evils presumed to exist in Karl's world.

It just isn't true that some "too much" arguments are more valid than others—even if we leave aside the point that a deductive argument is either valid or invalid and does not admit of degrees of validity. Evidently, what Chrzan means by SMV is that some instances cited to support the second premise, the claim that there is too much evil in some world, are more plausible or more acceptable than others. But even this claim is not very convincing. Chrzan attempts to support his SMV claim by asking us to imagine that the quantity of evil which our world "can physically accommodate" [whatever that might mean] is 100 units, that it contains x units, and that y units is the greatest quantity compatible with God's goodness. He then argues that although we cannot know whether $y>x$ or $x>y$, the larger x is, the more likely it is that $y>x$, i.e. that there is too much evil. But even though we might admit that x is a larger number in Karl's world than in Vince's, we don't know whether the difference is on a magnitude of 10 to 90 or of 3 to 4.2. Likewise, we have no idea where y falls on the imaginary scale and thus no notion of how close x is to y or in which direction it lies. Postulating a number scale when it is admitted that we cannot assign any remotely plausible values is just another use of rhetoric to increase our psychological readiness to say "too much." I do not mean to suggest that Chrzan is deliberately using psychological or rhetorical devices to mislead us. Quite the contrary, I believe that he is arguing honestly and seriously. But I also believe that the psychological tendency I have pointed out, namely, to find any amount of evil which affects us or which makes its way forcefully into our consciousness to be too much, has resulted in Chrzan's SMV claim. We just do not know how much evil is too much to be consistent with God's goodness. And as long as this is true, there is no more weight to Karl's claim than to Vince's. Neither claim will support DQE. And since SMV has turned out to be false, it cannot undermine my argument to collapse DQE into DAE.

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Not only does Chrzan maintain that his argument in support of SMV refutes my collapse of DQE to DAE; he also claims that it threatens IQE (Induction from the Quantity of Evil). If we take SMV as meaning that some claims that there is too much evil in the world are more plausible or, in some inductive sense, more weighty than others, then we get two inductive arguments of the following form:

1. God's existence is compatible with some but not too much evil.
2a. Karl: In W, probably too much evil exists.
2b. Vince: In W*, probably too much evil exists.
3. THUS (from 1 + either 2a or 2b): God probably does not exist.

Chrzan's claim seems to be that the argument using 1 and 2a to reach the conclusion is a stronger inductive argument than the argument using 1 and 2b. The reason is that 2a is a stronger or more plausible premise. Actually, without any sense of the magnitude of quantities which might be involved, an argument which purports to show that a difference of quantity is sufficient to make a conclusion more probable is not legitimate. Suppose someone tried to show that experimental drug Q is effective in treating some disease by pointing out that in the experimental group who took the drug, 10 more people survived for two years than in the control group. If it turns out that the experimental group consisted of 20 patients and the control group consisted of 20, we would say that the findings were impressive indeed. But if the experimental and control groups turned out to consist of 20,000 patients each, we would suspect that 10 was not a very significant number. Now despite the dramatic way in which Karl's world and Vince's world have been described, we have no idea whether Karl's world was twice as evil as Vince's or only .2% worse since we do not know the range of possible quantities of evil. Lacking any such scale, the so-called IQE carries little more than rhetorical weight. To be sure, it *seems* as if Karl's plight makes God's existence less probable—just as it *seems* as if the survival of 10 patients for two years makes it probable that Q is an effective treatment. Anyone acquainted with how inductive reasoning or scientific method works will see at once that it may very well be seeming only. Thus SMV turns out to mean only that some "too much" arguments *seem* more valid—or rather, some "too much evil" claims *seem* more plausible. This is just another way of putting one of the points I was making in my paper: we are psychologically disposed to be very much impressed by troubles which befall us or by misfortunes presented to us in particularly graphic ways, and thus are inclined to see them as "too much."

I will conclude with a brief response to Chrzan's critique of what he calls my "theodicy." He suggests that I radically denigrate the human capacity to judge value because I claim that in any possible world we will necessarily assert that it contains too much evil. It certainly is not my intention to denigrate our capacity to judge value—indeed, I hold that it is this value discriminating capacity of persons which is the locus and creative source of all the created value which exists in the universe. But it is the value discriminating and value creating activity of mankind's which also explains the existence of evil in the world, because it turns out that at least a measure of what humans will judge to be unsatisfactory, and thus will call evil, is a necessary condition for the existence of any created good.

What I am claiming is that intrinsic value exists only in the conscious experience of persons. This means that the only created thing in the world which is good in itself is the

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value-appreciating and value-creating conscious activity of persons. But conscious persons in order to be conscious necessarily experience gradations of awareness and some of their experiences are less satisfactory than others. When we fail to notice the necessity of this variation and the inevitability of states of awareness which are less satisfactory, we call the less satisfactory, however major or trivial, evil. Similarly, when we are not aware that such variations of conscious experience are necessary conditions for any consciousness at all, we tend to complain that some at least of the less agreeable instances in our experiences or some of those most graphically represented to us from other person's experiences might surely have been avoided by an omni-God.

This is what leads to our tendency always to judge "too much evil." But this is not to denigrate our capacity to make moral judgments. Rather, it is to recognize both that our judging and appreciating capacity creates all the created value there is and that its existence is possible only if there are also conscious experiences which we will regard as evil. And this constitutes at least a part of the answer to the question of how an omni-God can be morally justified in allowing evil to exist. The answer is that the existence of some of what humans will characterize as evil is a necessary condition for the existence of any created good.

The major thrust of Chrzan's criticism is contained in his SMV claim and we have seen reason to conclude that it is false. Chrzan does not claim that either DQE or DAE proves that God does not exist. What he apparently does want to assert is that claims based on the problem of evil may be able to support an inductive argument which would make the existence of God improbable. But that position also depends on the SMV claim, and thus falls along with it.

I have benefitted from Mr. Chrzan's comments on my article although I do not agree that he has shown my position to be trivial or fallacious. It is not always easy to express one's meanings with clarity in the confines of a brief journal article. I appreciate his thoughtful challenges and the opportunity to attempt to articulate my arguments a little more clearly, an attempt in which I hope in some measure to have succeeded.

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BRIEFER BOOK REVIEWS

John Wyclif: *Treatise on Universals.* A. Kenny, tr., I. Mueller, ed., and P.V. Spade, intr. London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1985. Pp. li + 184. $56.00.

The late 14th century is a philosopher's Amazon Basin: one of the last remaining tracts of true *terra incognita,* rife with exotic flora and fauna and rumors of lost cities. Kenny, Mueller and Spade have sallied into one of the century's least-known corners and brought back a tantalizing artifact. Wyclif was a broadly Scotist realist, who maintained his position with imagination, logical skill and dialectical verve against the flood-tide of 14th-century nominalism. The *Treatise on Universals* is an elaborate statement and defense of Wyclif's ontology. The book explores at length the nature of universals and the logical, ontological and even theological implications of admitting their reality. But it also considers individuality, essence and existence, mereology (of a sort—see below) and a number of other metaphysical topics. Beyond this, God qualifies as a universal in two of Wyclif's senses of that term (1), and so philosophical theology figures prominently in the *Treatise.* Such topics as the relation of free will to divine causality, the nature of divine ideas and whether God can annihilate the world are discussed at length. Even Trinitarian considerations pop up repeatedly.

This multitude of subjects is one factor which makes the *Treatise* difficult reading. There are others. The *Treatise*'s structure is not obvious, and its argument presents little in the way of a guiding thread to follow. The book's language can be rather technical, and following extended arguments couched in 14th-century logical terminology is often not easy. In addition, Wyclif's theories of identity, distinction and predication dictate attaching very different meanings to occurrences of "is" and "same," and sometimes the *Treatise*'s arguments are made hard to interpret by Wyclif's failure to specify which of his several senses of "is" and "same" he is using at key junctures. Further, much of the book is given over to argument and counter-argument with unnamed opponents. And finally, some of Wyclif's views are simply baffling—for instance, his reiterated insistence that "any group of two men, three, four and indeed all men is . . . a single person . . . all men collectively form one aggregate human person" (64).

Despite all this, the *Treatise* is worth the effort it exacts of the reader. It of course casts light on the philosophical concerns of a period which is little known and deserves to be better known, one whose rigor, precision and concern with logic make it surprisingly contemporary. But some of Wyclif's arguments and views may appeal to contemporary ontologists, logicians and philosophical theologians who hold no brief for things medieval: they seem at once surprising novelties for their time and of genuine philosophical interest.

Let me offer just one example of this. (I do so tentatively; I do not know Wyclif's other work, and so I may be misreading him.) It is common to contrast ontologies of facts, states of affairs or other quasi-propositional entities with ontologies of things or substances. And most medieval philosophers stand firmly within the substance-tradition. Wyclif states that a universal is "a form, a truth or state of things capable of being signified by a complex" or proposition (19, cf. 20,23). He holds that we can express the natures of universals either in concepts or in propositions, but gives priority to their expression in propositions (20,21). This suggests that Wyclif takes universals to play the role of facts or states of affairs. Wyclif's arguments for the reality of universals reinforce this suggestion. These arguments frequently turn on the truth of existentially quantified propositions like "some moment is in being" (25; cf. 52,57,70-71). According to Wyclif, there must be something in reality to render such propositions true, and as (say) "some moment is in being" follows from, but does not entail, any proposition asserting the existence of a particular. That in reality to which "some moment is in being" corresponds must be distinct in some way from any par-

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ticular moment and yet involved in each (52). Wyclif asserts that "every such truth—there being a man, there being animal, and so on—is man or animal, or to speak more properly, humanity and animality. And every such thing is a universal" (54, cf. 26). In other words, these arguments support the existence of universals because these are conceived to correspond to propositions, and so to play the role of states of affairs.

Unlike other medievals, then, Wyclif seems to feel the lure of an ontology of states of affairs. But like other Scotists, Wyclif also holds that universals do not exist save as attributes of particulars which instance them. Thus he in effect tries to do justice to the data which lead some toward states of affairs without embracing Platonism and within the confines of an ontology of substances and attributes. If this is what he is up to, Wyclif's attempt may deserve our attention.

Spade's introduction is exemplary. Clear, thorough and illuminating, it sets forth Wyclif's theories of identity, distinction and predication, which are explained in the treatise's first chapters and used constantly thereafter. As I have indicated, despite the labors of Spade and Kenny, Wyclif is not an easy read. But he will be a worthwhile one to anyone with an interest in later medieval philosophy, and his ideas may well deserve a wider audience.

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Brian Leftow

Contemporary Jewish Philosophies. By William E. Kaufman with a Preface by Jacob Neusner. Lanham: University Press of America, 1985. Pp. 276.

In *Contemporary Jewish Philosophies* (hereafter CJP), rabbi and philosopher William E. Kaufman attempts to re-invigorate contemporary Jewish philosophizing by summoning it to uphold the standards of Mordecai Kaplan's pragmatic rationalism. For Kaufman, the Jewish philosopher's task is to clarify the Jewish theologian's use of language, by holding it to three standards. The first is *inner consistency:* a Jewish theology must be conceptually self-consistent. The second is *empirical reference:* theology is meaningful only if it "deals with something that (is) . . . experienced or capable of being experienced." The third is *pragmatic value:* theology must show how its concept of God would "render life more meaningful, more worthwhile," fostering our "nobler impulses," and generating hope (p. 21).

Kaufman believes that this work of clarification will ultimately help improve the quality of Jewish life, as well as of professional theology. Until now, he argues, modern Jewish theology has failed to serve the Jewish people because it has eschewed clarity in its fascination with dogmatic irrationalisms, expressed in the dialectic of religious existentialism and religious transcendentalism. Such irrationalisms fail to respond to the contemporary crisis of meaning. He believes our century, like Saadya's tenth century, is "an age of moral, spiritual and intellectual confusion" (p. 5), in which the Jew is bewildered by a plethora of theological options. The number of options is not the problem, he says, but, rather, the confused manner in which the options are presented. If we could simply clarify the meaning of these options, then the "reflective contemporary Jew" would be able to choose among them.

I doubt that philosophy can itself exert such a profound influence on popular practice, or that Jewish philosophy itself can be invigorated by such efforts of the will alone. Nonetheless, philosophers will appreciate Kaufman's efforts on their behalf, and the University Press of America is to be applauded for reprinting this book, now with a smartly written preface by Jacob Neusner. The book is particularly valuable because so few studies of this kind have found their way into print. It is important and challenging reading for the educated layperson, and it will work well as a text for courses in Jewish philosophy.

CJP offers a clear and concise introduction to what Kaufman calls the ten "Jewish thinkers in the twentieth century [who] best illustrate the theological options open to the contemporary Jew." He divides the thinkers into two camps, existentialists and transcendentalists. He then summarizes each thinker's argument and evaluates it, according to the three standards of clarity we have listed earlier. In brief, here are his conclusions.

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The *existentialists* are united by their concerns to return the isolated modern Jew to Judaism, while preserving the integrity of the individual's experience. Franz Rosenzweig appears here as a Schellingian, whose route of return is an "absolute empiricist's" critique of Hegelian idealism. Kaufman finds Rosenzweig's "New Thinking" still burdened with much of the idealism he wants to dispel. Martin Buber appears as a disciple of Feuerbach's, whose notion of "I and Thou" Buber develops into a theology of encounter. While admirably consistent, says Kaufman, this theology lacks a publicly displayed empirical referent. More seriously, it fails to offer an adequate guide to life after the Holocaust. Kaufman devotes attention to Richard Rubenstein's post-Holocaust nihilism, because it represents the kinds of question subsequent thinkers must answer. Eugene Borowitz and Emil Fackenheim attempt to meet this challenge through fideistic attempts to renew a Covenant Theology. According to Kaufman, however, Borowitz's appeal to tradition remains inconsistent with his existentialism; and Fackenheim's otherwise compelling notion of the "Commanding Voice of Auschwitz" fails to speak to the modern individual's experience.

The second set of thinkers offer theologies of *transcendence,* guided by some persistent trust in the power of mind to remove the individual from the conditions of alienation. Kaufman admires Leo Beck's affirming, from out of his very experience of the Holocaust, the human individual's capacity for self-transcendence. He believes Beck's optimistic doctrine of ethical monotheism is weakened, however, by its vagueness and, thus, lack of empirical reference. Abraham Heschel suggests that our experience of mystery discloses the "transcendent meaning beyond mystery" (p. 150). This is faith seeking understanding, and Kaufman is impatient with the "studied indifference to inconsistency" that accompanies Heschel's working within a hermeneutical circle. Kaufman admires the boldness of both Arthur Cohen's and Jacob Agus' arguments that the capacity for human self-transcendence, or faith, has an objective correlate in a personal God. He faults them both, however, for abandoning empirical reference, by overextending a philosophic essentialism (Agus) or a project of imaginative construction (Cohen).

Kaufman argues that Mordecai Kaplan's philosophy of Reconstruction "contains the promise of future Jewish thought" (p. 214). It alone speaks creatively to the idiom of American Jewish life —democracy and naturalism—by redescribing Judaism as an evolving civilization, organic, self-perpetuating and responsive to changing conditions, and by redescribing God as the power, or cosmic process, that makes for salvation. And, with some revision, it alone fulfills the three criteria of philosophic clarity.

While intelligent and worthy of consideration, Kaufman's conclusions are burdened by an optimistic rationalism which, in a recent conversation, he says he has tempered his latest work. Perhaps he might then accept the following revision of his argument. He has, for good reason, distinguished the philosophic and theological elements of Jewish philosophy. The task of Jewish philosophy is to clarify Jewish theology's use of language, and this is to hold theology to the standards of what Charles Peirce calls "the three grades of clarity" (a reasonable prototype for Kaufman's three criteria for philosophic critique). The task of Jewish theology is to clarify the meaning of religious practice. But whose business is it to hold religious practice up to any single set of standards? According to nine of the post-Kantian Jewish thinkers Kaufman considers, the standards for evaluating Jewish practice are ego-logical, which means they are founded in the individual's cognitive or emotional experience. According to classical rabbinic practice, however, these standards are socio-logical, which means they are founded in the cultural-linguistic norms that inform Jewish social life. Kaplan recognizes this difference and attempts to redirect Jewish philosophy to what the Christian theologian George Lindbeck calls a "cultural-linguistic approach," as opposed to the cognitivist or emotivist approaches of the post-Kantians. The crisis in modern Jewish life, however, is not going to be resolved that simply.

First, Kaplan's *foundational* use of the cultural-linguistic approach is itself *ego-logical.* By definition, socio-logical standards cannot be founded in any individual theology. Cultural-linguistic theologians must disclaim any normative voice of their own, hoping instead to help language and history speak for themselves. Second, modern language and history, in fact, speak by way of a

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dialectic of dogmatic rationalisms and irrationalisms. Such speech is a symptom of the periodic dissolution of socio-logical standards. It is unlikely that any effort of the individual will, no matter how well intentioned, will remove this burdensome fact from our midst, or that any individual effort of theological reconstruction will accelerate the process of socio-logical repair. In these times, therefore, it is all the more important for the theologian to "be still," in Isaiah's words, and to allow God to speak. In Jewish tradition, God has spoken by way of the destruction of particular socio-logical standards as well as by way of their repair.

Colgate University

Peter Ochs

The Idea of the Good in Platonic–Aristotelian Philosophy. By Hans-Georg Gadamer; trans. with an Introduction and Annotations by P. Christopher Smith. New Haven and London: Yale University Press; 1986. Pp. xxxi and 182.

This book is an important addition to the steadily growing number of Gadamer's works available in English. In it, we see Gadamer at his best, that is engaged in the practice of interpreting important texts from the philosophical tradition, and also at his most controversial, employing some of the original hermeneutical insights which he formulated theoretically in *Warheit und Methode* (1960). Consequently, *The Idea of the Good* has a double significance: it offers a suggestive and provocative reinterpretation of some of the most basic issues regarding the relationship of Aristotle's thought to Plato's, while at the same time affording us an opportunity to see the leading notions of Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics illustrated and tested in their application.

To take one example, the subject matter of this essay constitutes an instance of what Gadamer refers to in *WM* as *Horizontverschmelzung,* "fusion of horizons," and illustrates the philosophical significance of that notion in two senses. First, Gadamer argues that the genuine differences between the "positions" of Plato and Aristotle have been overemphasized and exaggerated (for example, by Werner Jaeger) because they have been construed and analyzed in terms of comparison and contrast between the "statements" of each at different "periods" of their development. But such comparisons and contrasts are abstracted from the context of the "unitary effect" (*Wirkungseinheit*), the continuous line of questioning and thought, that underlies Plato and Aristotle's logos-philosophy as a whole. This approach, Gadamer contents, obscures their organic relation within a living tradition, their shared common ground, so to speak, upon which both stand and which originally makes possible comparative judgments about the stances they take individually. The larger implication of Gadamer's approach here is that we need to re-examine what we think we are doing when we speak about the "relationship" between major figures in the philosophical tradition, since the meaning of what a thinker says cannot be abstracted from its effective history within the tradition in which it is embedded. Similarly, the relation between thinkers cannot be construed primarily as comparison and contrast between elements of a "position" which can be ascribed to each of them prior to and independent of their relation, presuming a relation genuinely exists at all. Simply put, for Gadamer, the *relatio* is ontologically prior to the *relata.*

The notion of a "fusion of horizons" takes on a second significance as exemplified in *The Idea of the Good.* It also demands that the horizon of the subject matter, the question of the Good which, Gadamer argues, is effectively the same for Plato and Aristotle, be fused with the horizon of the interpreter, who has access to that subject matter only by taking it up as a question to be asked for him or herself, and who can understand what the text(s) means only by applying and "proving" the truth-claim it makes in his or her own existential situation. The implication of this for Gadamer is that the recovery of the "unitary effect" of Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy, particularly regarding the Idea of the Good as that toward which all nature as well as human existence universally strives, can provide contemporary thought with a renewed foundation and point of departure for its concern with the problem of "ethics." In a time when ethical thinking finds itself hemmed in by the conflicting demands to provide normative judgments in more and more special-

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ized areas of application on the one hand, and to accommodate a heightened pluralism of basic beliefs and attitudes about human well-being on the other, Gadamer can be viewed as calling for a return to the idea of the Good as an ontological question, one which this study, in perhaps its most controversial move, views as central to both Plato and Aristotle, despite Aristotle's apparently firm insistence that it has no place in matters of practice. Such a view has immediate and important consequences for our assessment of contemporary efforts to recover a basic sense of direction in ethics. Such a sense of direction is available, Gadamer contends, only where ontology has prepared the way.

There is much to be criticized in this study, if by "criticism" we mean questioning further not only what it says, but even more, what it leaves (necessarily) unsaid. As Smith warns in his very helpful Introduction, we should not "expect one continuous, systemmatically conclusive line of argument here." This is, at best, to understate the point, and although it is replete with nuggets of glittering interpretive insight, students of both Platonic and Aristotelian scholarship will, I expect, find much to signal caution in accepting Gadamer's broader conclusions. More importantly, however, one cannot help but wish that Gadamer had more fully developed the characterization, upon which his argument ulimately turns, of Plato as a poetic and "mystic" thinker, and Aristotle as a cautious, conceptual one. Suffice it to say that I myself am thoroughly in agreement with this view and regard it, at least in its sweeping and suggestive implications for our understanding of the way in which philosophical language works upon us, as opening up a path upon which contemporary philosophy can advance into its proper future. Nevertheless, it is a bold stroke which ideally should be worked out in much more careful terms. But such a criticism can be made of Gadamer's work as a whole, and in so doing we encounter its greatest strength: that in striving genuinely to engage great texts of the philosophical tradition and allowing them to make their claim of truth upon us, Gadamer lavishly provides us with occasions to think for ourselves more fruitfully.

A final word about Smith's contribution to this book. First, his translation only confirms his position, already well established by his renderings of the essays in *Hegel's Dialectic* (Yale, 1976) and *Dialogue and Dialectic* (Yale, 1980), as a reliable and resourceful mediator of Gadamer's thought for English-speaking readers. Beyond this, the careful craftsmanship exhibited in his Annotations and Introduction reveal his deep personal familiarity with and understanding of Gadamer's way of thinking, derived first and foremost from his ongoing conversations with Gadamer. If we take Gadamer's view of philosophy as a "human experience" in which there is "no progress . . . but only participation," then it will be clear that Smith is well-qualified to guide others toward participation in Gadamer's work.

I enthusiastically recommend this difficult and challenging book as one that rewards all efforts to understand the important claims it makes on its readers.

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Philosophy in Russia: From Herzen to Lenin and Berdyaev. By Frederick C. Copleston, S.J. Notre Dame: Search Press, 1986. Pp. x + 445.

Frederick C. Copleston, the renowned historian of philosophy, has turned his attention to Russia. The book treats selected Russian philosophers from Chaadaev (not Herzen, as the sub-title implies) to Lenin and Berdyaev, and includes chapters on Soviet philosophy and on philosophers in emigration. The study of Russian philosophy, Fr. Copleston rightly observes in his introduction, presents particular problems because Russian philosophy is mainly derivative, dependent on Western sources, and was socially committed, imbued with political content. Purely theoretical inquiry never flourished in Russia and the most important intellectual developments occurred outside formal academic philosophy. Hence Fr. Copleston's study includes such primary political thinkers as Alexander Herzen, Peter Lavrov, George Plekhanov, and Lenin and such writers as Lev Tolstoi, Fedor Dostoevsky, and Constantine Leontiev. The most interesting chapters are those

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which treat philosophers who were searching for a Slavic Christian world view, such as Peter Chaadaev, Ivan Kireevsky, and Vladimir Soloviev.

Chaadaev's "Philosophical letter" (1836) stimulated the Westernizer-Slavophil debate of the 1840s and after. Because of the extremely negative attitude to Russia's past expressed in it, Chaadaev was often considered a Westernizer but, as Copleston shows, he was not simply a Westernizer, for he did not share the Westernizer's antipathy to religion. Influenced by the "traditionalists" (sometimes call the ultramontanes) Joseph de Maistre and Louis de Bonald, he was extremely sympathetic to Catholicism, which he credited with unifying Western Europe and with inspiring the West with the idea of progress. Chaadaev's vision of the world and of history was a moral and a Christian vision, Fr. Copleston argues, intended not only for Russia but for all humankind.

Ivan Kireevsky, the Slavophile, sought an integral theory of knowledge that would put all man's separated powers into one whole. An anti-rationalist, he believed that reason was inadequate to be the sole judge of truth and that the hypertrophy of reason has been at the expense of other human powers such as imagination and poetry. Wishing to develop a philosophy which would be faithful to the Orthodox spirit without being Theology, Kireevsky called for "new principles" which would involve the response of the whole person, the thinking, acting, feeling, human being, but he did not actually work them out, for he was basically "feeling his way." Like all the Slavophiles, and like Soloviev after him, Kireevsky was critical of western individualism, advocated *Sobornost'* (organic unity in which the parts retain their individuality), and maintained that *Sobornost'* could only be achieved in society.

Vladimir Soloviev, Russia's greatest philosopher, was also a poet and a visionary. Insisting on the practical relevance of philosophy, he tried to express Christian truth in philosophical terms, argued the need for new mystical knowledge, and speculated on complex theosophical and metaphysical themes such as "Godmanhood" and "Sophia." "Total unity" or "All-unity" is his central idea. As Fr. Copleston describes his world-view: "Metaphysics tries to understand reality as a unity, while moral philosophy and social thought show how the egoism of individuals can be overcome and unity restored. Theoretical knowledge, therefore, knowledge of the structure of reality, is oriented to practical knowledge and, finally, to actual restoration of unity between human beings and between them and the divine Absolute. Thus the synthesis at which Soloviev aims at goes far beyond some intellectual reconciliation between science, philosophy, and religion. An intellectual reconciliation or harmony is indeed envisaged, but the ultimate aim is to establish a unity in life, including social and political life" (p. 215). He opposed socialism as materialism, and was anti-capitalist and anti-individualist. Stating that "just as the church is collectively organized piety, so the state is collectively organized piety" (p. 233), he desired to improve the conditions of human existence, and opposed coercion. He was just as intent as the radicals to transform human society and to create a new man. Soloviev was one of the very few Russians of his generation to speak out against anti-Semitism and was somewhat of a Judaeophile, but Fr. Copleston does not discuss this.

Fr. Copleston's sympathy for Russian thinkers who sought to develop a Slavic Christian world view leads him to idealize Dostoevsky and Tolstoi. He considers Dostoevsky an advocate of a Christian and personal socialism of human freedom, and of universal brotherhood, despite his "expressions of prejudice" against Jews, Poles, Germans, Catholics, socialists and the entire West in *Diary of a Writer.* Copleston seems unaware of Dostoevsky's prediction of an eventual alliance between the Internationale and the Pope. His discussion of Tolstoi stresses his moral message, but slights the writer's cruel treatment of his wife and son, and passes over Tolstoi's editing of *The Gospels* to delete passages which conflicted with his own doctrine of non-resistance to evil, such as Jesus' statement on bringing humanity "not peace but a sword," and Jesus chasing the money changers from the temple.

Surprisingly for an author interested in the search for a Slavic Christian world view, Fr. Copleston merely skims the religious renaissance of the early twentieth century, the formative years of the philosophers in exile treated in Chapters 13 and 14, and ignores entirely its leader and chief

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proselytizer, Dmitri Sergeevich Merezhkovsky and his wife Zinaida Gippius. Yet it is they who started the Religious Philosophic Society of St. Petersburg (mentioned on pp. 203-4), with the aim of reconciling the clergy and the intelligentsia; and they were the founders of *New Path* (Novyi Put), a showcase for the new religious tendencies in literature and painting. The debates between clergymen and intellectuals in the Religious Philosophic Society, partly because of their novelty, attracted a wide audience, made interest in religion intellectually respectable and helped divorce religion from its association with reaction. V.V. Rozanov's most vitriolic attacks on Christianity (treated on pp. 195-200) were first made there. He attacked Christianity as worship of death because of its emphasis on celibacy and virginity. All the same, Christianity was central to him; probably realizing this, the Church never tried to excommunicate him as it did Tolstoi. Rozanov's views on Jews and Judaism typify a classic love-hate syndrome and are extremely complex and contradictory but it is an error to imply, as Fr. Copleston does (p. 198), that Rozanov considered the Old Testament life-denying. Fr. Copleston's discussion of Lenin's one philosophical work *Materialism and Empiriocriticism* obscures the fact that Lenin's main reason for writing it was to refute "God-Building," the "left Bolshevik's" answer to "God-Seeking" and religious revival and, on p. 305, confuses "God-Building" with "God-Seeking." Fr. Copleston is apparently unaware of the towering influence of Nietzsche on Russian intellectuals of the early 20th century, including Frank, Shestov, and Berdyaev. The religious renaissance was, in many respects, the response of Russians who sought to show that Nietzsche's critique of Christianity was wrong.

This is a fine overview. The main ideas of Russia's leading thinkers are clearly described. The inclusion of background material on socio-political, intellectual, and religious trends makes the book particularly useful to non-specialists. Fr. Copleston contributes a fresh perspective to the populist thinker Peter Lavrov's rejection of determinism and analyzes the epistemology of George Plekhanov (the founder of Russian Marxism) and his views on history, morality and art. The chapters on philosophers in exile (who, except for Berdyaev, are not well known in the West) lucidly treat their main ideas, focusing on Lossky's and Frank's epistemology and ontology, Shestov's anti-rationalism and Berdyaev's personalism. Should the book go into a second edition, I would suggest a chapter on Solzhenitzyn as another philosopher in exile, to complement the chapters on literature in the prerevolutionary period.

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Epistemology and Cognition. By Alvin I. Goldman. Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1986. Pp. 437. $27.50.

Goldman's overarching aim in this book is to redirect the field of epistemology. Epistemology, according to Goldman, is an interdisciplinary subject, and thus is not the exclusive province of *a priori* philosophy. Specifically, Goldman argues that cognitive psychology has an essential role to play in a theory of justified belief. (Goldman's earlier argument for this view is found in "Epistemics: The Regulative Theory of Cognition," *The Journal of Philosophy* 75 (1978), 509-23). The alliance between epistemology and psychology is recommended for at least three reasons: first, epistemology is interested in the psychological processes of belief-formation and belief-revision, and only cognitive psychology is able to provide detailed characterizations of such processes: second, traditional *a priori* epistemology has relied on overly simple schemes for the classification of our cognitive states; third, in prescribing certain sorts of intellectual conduct, epistemology must take account of our actual psychological capacities. In opposition to Quine's radical proposal to naturalize epistemology, however, Goldman maintains that epistemology is nonetheless an evaluative, or normative, discipline, and not a purely descriptive one. Goldman's basic proposal is simply that we should take into account the findings of cognitive psychology in order to formulate psychologically realistic epistemic rules for the appraisal of our cognitive processes. This is a far cry from Quine's controversial recommendation that we replace epistemology with empirical psychology.

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Part I of the book lays the foundations of Goldman's epistemology by characterizing the nature of belief, knowledge, justification, and truth; it also supports the view that substantive epistemological evaluations require information from cognitive psychology. Part II illustrates how cognitive psychology actually contributes to epistemology; it thus includes chapters dealing with recent psychological work on the nature of perception, memory, mental representation, reasoning, and acceptance. This review will focus on the most basic and original feature of Goldman's epistemology: its theory of justification. The reason for this focus is that Goldman provides a developed account of justification; he does not develop a positive account of intelligence or of rationality in general.

We can begin to understand Goldman's theory of justification by considering his view (p. 4) that the notion of justification is directed mainly at beliefs, and that the evaluation of beliefs derives from an evaluation of belief-forming processes. (As suggested below, Goldman's focus on the epistemic relevance of belief-forming processes, rather than individual belief-states, is far from trouble-free.) While Goldman does not give a detailed account of cognitive processes, he suggests that a belief-forming process is a determinate kind of causal chain by which a belief is formed (p. 85). Further, he contrasts belief-forming *processes* with belief-forming *methods*: the former are unlearned, psychologically basic processes that are causally executed rather than applied; the latter are acquired methods such as algorithms, heuristics, and statistical techniques. Correspondingly, Goldman distinguishes between two levels of justifiedness: primary justifiedness resulting from the use of approved processes, and secondary justifiedness resulting from the use of approved methods (p. 93). Justifiedness resulting from approved methods is said to be secondary, on the ground that the use of correct methods is sufficient for justifiedness only if the methods are properly acquired via the use of right cognitive processes (pp. 90-92, 110). We are thus led to ask about the conditions for right, or justified, belief-forming processes. Specifically, what factual circumstances make a belief-forming process epistemologically right, or justified?

Goldman plausibly objects in principle to any answer that ultimately uses a further term of epistemic appraisal, such as "rational" or "epistemically permissible" (p. 23). We need *non*-evaluative conditions if we are to preserve the natural assumption that normative properties in general, and epistemic features in particular, supervene on purely factual states of affairs. Goldman explicates the notion of epistemic rightness (or justifiedness) in terms of a rule framework, on the ground that the notion is captured in a language of permission that calls for a rule formulation (p. 59). However, Goldman's rules for epistemic evaluation are *non*-regulative inasmuch as they are not decision-guides for an agent to use in making doxastic choices, but rather are principles only for an appraiser to use in making general epistemic appraisals (p. 25-26).

The rule framework for Goldman's theory of justifiedness is provided by the following principle (p. 63):

> RF. A person's (*S*'s) believing *p* at time *t* is justified if and only if (a) *S*'s believing *p* at *t* is permitted by a right system of justification-rules, and (b) this permission is not undermined by *S*'s cognitive state at *t*.

Goldman distinguishes between belief-independent and belief-dependent justification-rules. The former permit beliefs to be formed independently of prior belief-states; whereas the latter do not. Belief-independent justification-rules might include rules that permit beliefs solely as a function of non-belief sensory states. But, of course, the pressing issue now concerns the criterion of a *right* system of justification rules.

It has been suggested already that, on Goldman's view, an acceptable rightness criterion for primary justification-rules must require such rules to permit only basic cognitive processes, and not methods. Another feature of such a criterion may be identified relative to the familiar distinction between consequentialist and deontological criteria of rightness. A consequentialist criterion states that rightness is a function of the consequences of conformity to certain justification-rules; a deontological criterion, in contrast, makes rightness a function of nonconsequential factors.

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Goldman's rightness criterion supports a version of rule consequentialism. More specifically, it represents *verific* rule consequentialism inasmuch as it requires that *true belief* be the value that justification-rules must promote if they are to be right. But Goldman's criterion does not require simply the maximization of the *number* of true beliefs, since the excessively liberal process of believing every proposition one can entertain might produce the largest set of true beliefs for a person; rather, it makes rightness of justification-rules a function of the *ratio* of true beliefs produced by the permitted belief-forming processes. Regarding the specific ratio that must be met, Goldman's position is somewhat latitudinarian. Of course, it does require that "a justificationally permitted process must be one that yields a high truth ratio, higher—perhaps appreciably higher—than .50" (p. 103). But beyond this general requirement, Goldman's position is vague, due to the alleged vagueness in the ordinary concept of justifiedness (p. 106). Yet it should be noted that Goldman endorses a resource-independent ratio criterion, i.e., a criterion that requires a truth ratio without restrictions due to the limitations of the human cognitive system. In doing so, Goldman plausibly allows for the initial seriousness of skeptical challenges to the view that we have justified beliefs.

Goldman's consequentialist criterion for a right system of justification-rules, then, is (p. 106):

> CJ. A system of justification-rules, *R*, is right if and only if *R* permits certain (basic) psychological processes, and the instantiation of these processes would result in a truth ratio of beliefs that meets some specified high threshold (greater than .50).

A basic question facing any criterion like CJ is whether the rightness of a system of justification-rules is determined by its truth ratio in the actual world alone. Or, more generally, what set of possible worlds is relevant to the rightness of a system of justification-rules?

Goldman endorses what he calls *normal-world chauvinism*, the view that rightness is determined by a sufficiently high truth ratio in normal worlds. Goldman explains the view as follows (P. 107):

> We have a large set of common beliefs about the actual world: general beliefs about the sorts of objects, events, and changes that occur in it. We have beliefs about the kinds of things that, realistically, can and do happen. Our beliefs on this score generate what I shall call the set of *normal worlds*. These are worlds consistent with our *general* beliefs about the actual world. (I emphasize "general," since I count worlds with different particular episodes and individuals as normal.) Our concept of justification is constructed against the backdrop of such a set of normal worlds. My proposal is that, according to our ordinary conception of justifiedness, a rule system is right in any world *W* just in case it has a sufficiently high truth ratio *in normal worlds*.

Goldman grants that his notion of normal worlds is vague, but he finds this acceptable on the ground that our ordinary notion of justifiedness is similarly vague. Furthermore, Goldman is content with the assumption of his view that the meaning of "justified" is fixed by our mere (i.e., perhaps false and unjustified) beliefs of a general sort about the world. In sum, then, we now can state the core of Goldman's theory of justification as follows:

> A belief-forming process is justified if and only if it is permitted by a system of justification-rules that permits only cognitive processes that would be reliable (i.e., have a high truth ratio) in normal worlds.

Yet at times Goldman gives an even simpler, rule-independent statement of his view: "Justification-conferring processes are ones that would be reliable in worlds like the presumptively actual world, that is, in normal worlds" (p. 108). The latter statement does not invoke a series of justification-rules; but Goldman's official view does appeal to a system of such rules.

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Let us turn now, for purposes of evaluation, to some critical issues facing Goldman's reliabilist theory of justification. The first worrisome issue concerns Goldman's assumption that the truth ratio of a belief-forming process is effectively invariant across various normal worlds. Recall that normal worlds are possible worlds *consistent* with our general beliefs about the actual world. Conceivably, there is a possible world that is consistent with all our general beliefs about the actual world, but that does not feature the reliability of a particular belief-forming process that is highly reliable in all, or at least almost all, other normal worlds; for consistency does not guarantee reliability. Let's suppose that the reliability is not featured in the world in question because in that world there is a single, narrowly relevant factor that makes the truth ratio of the relevant belief-process an even .50. Surely this is a possibility, but is it sufficient to preclude justification for the beliefs due to the process in question? Goldman's account implies that it is, yet this implication seems to be an excessive requirement. For, after all, virtually all the other normal worlds preserve the needed reliability, and the single slightly wayward normal world in question demotes the truth ratio only to .50. A less excessive requirement would be that only a specified high percentage of the normal worlds need preserve reliability.

A second troublesome issue arises from the undeniable anthropological fact that all humans do not uniformly share the same general beliefs about the actual world; that is, normal worlds for certain humans are *ab*normal for others. Here we need only recall the animism of various primitive tribes or the idealistic mysticism of various religious communities. The existence of radically divergent sets of general beliefs among humans does not commit us simply, on Goldman's view, to the innocuous view that different groups will *count* different beliefs as justified. Rather, we are evidently committed to the bothersome view that the contemporary animist, for instance, will *be* epistemically justified in believing his animism, so long as a relevant belief-process underlying his animism would be sufficiently reliable *in his normal worlds,* which, of course, are arguably a very far cry from anything like the actual world. Thus, it is plausible to suppose that a relevant belief-process reliable in the animist's normal worlds is *not* reliable in our (i.e., "Western intellectuals' ") normal worlds, given the radical difference between the two sets of worlds. (I presume that anyone reading this review, or Goldman's book for that matter, may be characterized broadly as a Western intellectual, at least in the sense of being in basic agreement with the main assumptions of modern macro-physics; the animist, of course, is not a Western intellectual in this sense, given his view that every thing has, and is controlled by, a spiritual soul.)

We are thus apparently led by Goldman's view to countenance relativistic principles of justification each of which is right due to various general beliefs about the actual world. A basic principle of justification for the animist is: Animist A is epistemically justified in believing p at time t if and only if A's believing p at t is permitted by a system of justification-rules that permits cognitive processes that would result in a high (i.e., greater than .50) truth ratio of beliefs *in the animist's normal worlds.* In contrast, a basic principle of justification for the Western intellectual is: Western intellectual S is epistemically justified in believing p at time t if and only if S's believing p at t is permitted by a system of justification-rules that permits cognitive processes that would result in a high truth ratio of beliefs *in the Western intellectual's normal worlds.* Given these principles, the system of justification-rules that is right for the animist will be different, it seems clear, from the system of justification-rules that is right for the Western intellectual. The right system for the animist will permit cognitive processes that would be reliable in the animist's normal worlds; whereas the right system for the Western intellectual will permit cognitive processes that would be reliable in the Western intellectual's normal worlds. And there is good reason to believe, given the radically divergent sets of relevant normal worlds, that those right systems will conflict in the sense that what is permitted by one will, at certain points, be prohibited by the other. Furthermore, we now are left with epistemological standard relativism by Goldman's position; for we now have the view that one system of justification-rules is right for one person or culture, while another is right for another person or culture. But Goldman aimed to provide a *non*-relativistic epistemology (p. 70). The worry here is not, of course, that two people, or groups of people, can be justified in believing conflicting things. Given that evidence and thus the having of justification are perspectival, in the

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sense of being relative to a person and a time, we must allow for the variability of justification from person to person. The worry, rather, is that the criteria or standards of justification are allowed to vary from person to person. Such relativism is worrisome because it allows for a case where two equally intelligent people have relevantly similar sensory evidence and believe the same proposition on the basis of that evidence, but where one of the persons is unjustified in believing that proposition while the other person is justified in believing it.

Of course, it might be countered on Goldman's behalf that *our* general beliefs, and not the animist's, determine the justificationally relevant normal worlds for *everyone.* This reply seems effective, but is unacceptably *ad hoc.* Why is epistemic justification a function of our (i.e., Western intellectuals') mere general beliefs? That is, what is epistemically special about our mere general beliefs? Why are they more privileged, from an epistemic point of view, than the animist's mere general beliefs? Lacking answers to such questions, the proponent of Goldman's account might wax liberal, and grant the community-relativity of viable concepts of epistemic justification: the animists have theirs, and we have ours. However, this move risks undue splintering of the concept of *human* knowledge. Or, at least, it raises the issue of *whose* concept of epistemic justification is appropriate to the concept of human knowledge. Goldman, in any case, does not raise such questions.

The problem at hand is due, of course, to Goldman's basic assumption that epistemic justification is a function ultimately of *mere* general beliefs. Mere general beliefs seem to vary in a way that epistemic justification does not. Thus, in making epistemic justification a function of mere general beliefs, Goldman seems not to provide for the needed constraints on such justification. The constraints set by Goldman's reliabilism seem inadequate, given that reliability-defining normal worlds are determined by mere general beliefs, and that mere general beliefs need not satisfy any epistemically relevant constraints. A symptom of this inadequacy is that Goldman's reliabilism evidently allows for epistemically justified belief that is *un*likely to be true in the actual world; witness the implications of the theory for animism as held by the contemporary animist. Such a symptom, it seems, will characterize any theory that makes justified belief a function of unjustified belief. Furthermore, it is not clear that the reliabilist can gain any real mileage by requiring that the general beliefs in question be reliable; for the relevant notion of reliability is being defined, in effect, in terms of those general beliefs. Given the present considerations, then, we should hesitate to prefer reliabilism over the traditional evidentialist view that justification is a function of the evidence actually available to a person.

Overall, then, *Epistemology and Cognition* relies on a reliabilist theory of justification that prompts some troublesome questions. However, I want to stress that the book is filled with important epistemological distinctions and arguments independent of reliabilism, and that, therefore, the book makes a major contribution to contemporary epistemology. I have focused on some difficulties for the book's reliabilism, but this is not intended to detract from the fact that all students of epistemology can learn much from the comprehensive and original work.

Loyola University of Chicago *Paul K. Moser*

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An Analysis of Dōgen's "Casting Off Body and Mind"

Shigenori Nagatomo

1.1 INTRODUCTION

IN THIS ARTICLE, I shall offer a philosophical analysis of Dōgen's experience of "casting off the body and the mind" *(shinjin totsuraku)* by examining an experience of "just sitting" *(shikan taza)* with a primary emphasis upon its epistemological aspect. In this examination, my concern is not of articulating a particular event of Dōgen's experience, but rather its general meaning.

The linguistic expression, *"shinjin totsuraku,"* is expressive of an event that is marked off from the everyday event. It was, therefore, an extraordinary experience for Dōgen. Philosophically, this may be taken to mean that there are transformations, in the process of "just sitting," from a *provisionally dualistic* tendency which characterizes the everyday mode of existence to a non-dualistic stance which is achieved in Dōgen's experience of "casting off the body and the mind."[1] It follows from this that what is cast off is the functions of the body and the mind operative in the everyday body-image. While interpreting the experience of "casting off the body and the mind" in this manner, I shall advance a thesis that the judgement operative in, and generative of, this experience may be characterized as "attunement" in which the act aspect of this judgement is *somatic* in character in contrast to the intellectual judgement in which the act aspect of the judgement is *cogito* allegedly divorced from the body. This will be examined in light of the experience of "felt inter-resonance" *(kannō dōkō)*.

1.2 TRANSFORMATION OF SYNTHETIC FUNCTION

Although, generally speaking, there are a number of individual variations of what triggers an occasion for satori, there is agreement that it must be experienced as a relaxed, perhaps even ecstatic, period "after the extreme tension."[2] In Dōgen's case, we are told that the release came upon *hearing* the words spoken by Nyojō. This kind of altered response to stimulus in reaching satori is not unusual.

[1]YUASA Yasuo, "Contemporary Science and An Eastern Mind-Body Theory," delivered at The Joint Japanese-French International Conference held at the University of Tsukuba, Japan, in November, 1984.

[2]TAZATO Yakumu, *Shidōsha o Kitaeru Dōgen Zen no Kenkyū*, (Kyoto: PHP Kenkyujo, 1983), p. 30.

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We know from the Zen tradition, for example, that Kyōgen Shikan had a great satori upon hearing a stone hitting bamboo. Under normal circumstances, however, without a prolonged period of sitting via a process of sedimentation, this kind of event cannot be an occasion which triggers a satori. Among other things, this suggests that the meditator's readiness to activate auditory perception is unusually heightened at a time immediately prior to satori experience. Of the five sensory organs, the ears are more open to the external world in a deepened sitting than the remaining senses, and hence are most susceptible to stimulation. The manner of responding to sounds coming from the external world, however, is set off from a direct reaction to the sounds, since the meditator is in the deep state of "non-thinking" *(hishiryō)*, which I interpret to be a *somatic* negation in the sense that the body's readiness to respond to external stimuli is arrested through the process of sedimentation. In the meditator's initial phase of "non-thinking," he receives the sounds via auditory perception, but he *is not moved* to respond to them. As he advances deeper into the mode of "non-thinking," however, the sounds he hears could occasion the breaking of the barrier between hearing sounds and sounds that are heard. Alternatively, this might be expressed as follows: the auditory affectivity in its readiness for operation is initially brought to zero in an advanced stage of "non-thinking," but the suppressed affectivity bursts into full operation upon being triggered. At such time, the meditator *feels* that there is no difference between hearing the sounds and the sounds that are heard. That is, he achieves a oneness with them. We may consider this a practical consequence of what Dōgen calls "transforming the body upon turning the brain" *(yakushin kainō)*.

This does not mean, however, that among the five sensory perceptions, only the auditory perception is accentuated, although it would seem that it functioned to occasion satori in Dōgen's case. For example, Reiun is said to have had a satori upon *seeing* the blossomings of a peach tree,[3] which suggests a heightened visual perception. Generally speaking, however, it would be reasonable to assume that the synthetic center for all five sensory perceptions is brought to a heightened affective mode—the "synthetic center" which Aristotle calls the organ of "common sense" *(sensus communis)*, and which he regarded as common to all sensory perceptions.[4] In order to substantiate the contention that the synthetic function for all of the five sensory perceptions is *heightened* in samadhic awareness via its affective mode, we shall now examine Dōgen's analysis of the confirmatory experience of Dōzan, the first patriarch of the Sōtō line.

Referring to Dōzan's confirmatory experience, an experience in which he is said to have attained satori by "hearing the voice with the eyes," Dōgen writes:[5]

> In studying the first patriarch's expression of "hearing the voices with the eyes," the eye is the organ [through which] the voices of insentient beings preaching dharmas are heard. The eye is the presencing voices of the insentient beings preaching dharmas. You ought to study your eyes extensively. Because *hearing* the voice with the eyes is the same as hearing the voice with the ears, they are yet different. You should not

[3] *"Keisei Sanshoku,"* in *Dōgen*, ed. TERADA Tōru, Vol. 1 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1980), p. 292. Hereafter, abbreviated as *Dōgen*.

[4] See Aristotle's *De Somno et Vigilia*, Chap. 2, 455a–22, and *De Anima*, 431a 20–431b.

[5] *"Mujō Seppō,"* in *Dōgen*, vol. 2, p. 69.

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> understand that there is the organ of the ears in the eyes, nor should you understand the eyes and the ears stand in the relation of interchangeability, nor should you understand the voice presences in the midst of the eyes (emphasis added).

Ordinarily, our ear is the auditory organ, but what Dōgen claims in this passage is that one can also hear with the eyes! Many are tempted to dismiss the latter as Zen nonsense, for most of us have not heard of, let alone witnessed, such a seemingly confused experience, and, therefore, would regard it as an improper use of the language, a semantic confusion, or at best an attempt to be metaphorical. I, however, interpret it to be an instance of synesthesia, in which there is indeed a "confusion," and an exchange of sensory faculties.[6] Needless to say, it is a "confusion" insofar as we take the five sensory faculties to have their own fixed, and determinately assigned functions without potentially interacting with each other. According to Dōgen, this notion of exclusive function arises because ordinary people "have not clarified on their own the extreme limit of [their] body and mind."[7] What the above quotation implies is that the five sensory faculties do not have fixed and determined functions; but rather these functions can be modified or interchanged. Hence, this allows flexibility in such a way that sensory perceptions can be interacting among the functions of sensory perception, when the body and the mind are brought to "the extreme limit" in the practice of just sitting. If this does indeed take place, "confusion" is an inappropriate word to describe the synesthesia which is said to have occurred, for example, in Dōzan's experience of satori.

This special use of synesthesia to describe an experience of satori will become clear when we recognize that the perception of the eye can be different from, and yet be the same as, that of the ear. Dōgen demonstrates that he is not unaware of the difference in function between the eyes and the ears as they operate in our everyday existence, when he states: "Since hearing the voice with the eyes is the same as hearing the voice with the ears, they are yet *different*" (emphasis added). What is affirmed as the "same" must be the somatic act of hearing in samadhic awareness, where "somatic act," in sharp contrast with *cogito* as act, indicates the whole involvement of a person, while the "difference" must mean the individual function of each sensory organ. Since, however, Dōgen does not elaborate on the "mechanism" of synesthesia, we may derive, instead, its philosophical meaning by way of Aristotle's concept of *sensus communis*, as a way of approaching an understanding of Dōgen's experience of "casting off the body and the mind."

As Aristotle points out in his discussion of *sensus communis*, there is a synthetic function *common* to all five sensory organs. This synthetic function, in normal and natural circumstances, must serve as a guide to direct a stimulus to a specified sensory organ, which implies that there must be an individual circuit unique to a specific sensory organ. (Indeed, this function of directing is part of the larger function of what is referred to as the empirical ego which forms a *center* for our perceptual, everyday consciousness.) In light of this, it would appear that the circuits for the eyes and the ears, for example, are separate in normal, and natural

[6]See, for instance, Lawrence E. Marks' "On Colored-Hearing Synesthesis: Cross-Modal Translations of Sensory Dimension," in the *Psychological Bulletin* (May, 1975), pp. 303–27.

[7]"*Mujō Seppo*," in *Dōgen*, vol. 2, p. 67.

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circumstances, and this prevents an auditory perception from entering into the circuit of visual perception, and vice versa. This must be the case with respect to all of the five sensory perceptions. If in fact it were otherwise, there would be "confusion." These individual circuits, in my understanding, account for the meaning of the difference between the eyes and the ears. But in Dōzan's case, in the case of synesthesia induced in samadhic consciousness, the separation of the circuits must break down, allowing him to establish an interaction between otherwise closed circuits, or to create a link between them. Perhaps more accurately, by breaking down the circuits which normally separate the two sensory perceptions, a new circuit via a harmonization of all sensory perceptions is created which allows interaction between the closed, separate circuits of all of the five sensory perceptions. When this harmonization is actually lived, the meditator feels that his everyday sensory, *somatic* self is indeed "cast off." The term which Dōgen uses to describe this lived experience is no-body *(mushin)*, meaning that there is no lived feeling of one's own object-body which is opposed to the mind, where the "object-body" is that body which we objectify through our senses.

The preceding analysis of Dōzan's confirmatory experience via synesthesia should *not* suggest that every case of confirmatory experience of satori is obtained via synesthesia. The value of this type of analysis, however, lies in leading us to a general analysis of the *act* aspect of the synthetic function. Consequently, we must take the position that the act aspect of synthetic function is more significant than an analysis of the alteration of sensory circuits. We can, for example, imagine that the creation of a new circuit via the harmonization of all sensory organs would affect the manner in which synthesis functions, when, for example, it is a synthesis of judging the sounds as sounds. Insofar as the sounds are identified as sounds regardless of which sensory organ is employed, the power of recognizing the external stimuli (i.e., the synthetic function), in general, must not be impaired, while at the same time, the mode or manner employed in recognizing these external stimuli must be transformed.

What, then, is the mode of synthesis operative at the moment when "casting off the body and the mind" occurs? It is worth while to point out that the *manner* of recognizing an external stimulus must be radically different from the one operative in a normal, natural situation. Most importantly, what distinguishes this type of perception from everyday, normal perception is the degree of *affectivity*. In the extraordinary experience of "casting off the body and mind," the synthetic function is charged with a power much stronger than the normal, everyday power in creating a new circuit which harmonizes all sensory perceptions, since the power which would otherwise be used in the activation of the sensory organs is reserved via a process of sedimentation. This infusion of power occurs partly because the activation of perceptual consciousness is lowered in samadhic awareness, and hence the power of synthesis is also weakened prior to the experience in question, without, however, losing its synthetic function. If the power of synthesis is unfortunately lost, pathological phenomena (e.g., Zen sickness) would be experienced. Because of this contingency, the practice of "just sitting" has its threatening side.

The power of synthetic function which we have been discussing is *a form of judgement*. Consider the following simple, everyday example. Upon seeing a

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flower, we immediately recognize that it is a flower, "immediately" in the sense that the judgement takes place *without* the intervention of reflection. To recognize a flower in this manner requires a form of judgement, a pre-reflective judgement which can, however, be realized reflectively by taking a subject-predicate form. To use Husserl's terminology, it is pre-predicative judgement; a pre-predicative or pre-reflective judgement, since the judgement takes place spontaneously, and without thinking. If the judgement is pre-predicative or pre-reflective, it is moot, however, whether the act of judgement is solely rooted in *cogito* as Sartre, for example, would have it. Merleau-Ponty, avoiding the use of the term, "pre-reflective," has employed the term "bodily intentionality," contending that since consciousness is incarnate, it is more primary than pre-reflective *cogito*. Considering a "perspectival" givenness of every perception, which presupposes a bodily presence relative to the thing perceived, it would seem that some aspect of the body is involved in forming a "pre-reflective" or "pre-predicative" judgement. I shall argue in later sections that a form of judgement is somatic in character and that it is achieved via an *attunement*.

So, when we ask the manner or the mode of the synthetic function which is operative in "casting off the body and the mind," we are concerned with articulating the mode of "judgement." In this article, I would like to advance the thesis that it is a somatic act that performs a "judgement" in the experience of "casting off the body and the mind," in contrast with *cogito* as act, and since it is a somatic act, there is no involvement of an intentional glance, which is, after all, the function of the empirical self, and which is "cast off" in samadhic awareness. In this sense, it is misleading to say that the somatic act "performs" a judgement, for "performance" may imply an intentional act. The somatic act must be taken as a performance without intending; as a performance "without thinking," in the sense in which T. P. Kasulis uses *hi-shiryo* as "non-thinking."[8] We use the term "somatic" in recognition of the point of its origin as well as of its intrinsic features. It is induced by means of the practice of "just sitting," which is a modality of one's somaticity. To be more specific, the judgement in question is charged with affectivity which is rooted in the somaticity of a person. I contend, however, that the somatic act in performing a judgement may better be characterized as an instance of "attunement" in which the somatic act and what is judged form a *harmony* between them. We shall see shortly how this interpretation bears out Dōgen's experience of "casting off the body and the mind" when we deal with "the felt inter-resonance" *(kannō dōkō)*. The important point to bear in mind at this juncture is that the act aspect of the synthesis in samadhic awareness is somatic in character, and the "judgement" that is formed is an "attunement." We shall now examine how the concept of the somatic act emerges from Dōgen's further elaboration of "hearing the voice with the eye."

Dōgen writes:[9]

> Simply make it your express business to learn "hearing the insentient beings preaching dharmas" with your eyes. The gist of the first patriarch's expression is that "the ear has difficulty encountering the insentient beings preaching dharmas." The eyes hear the voices, and furthermore one's pervasive body *(tsūshin)* hears voices and the entire body

[8]T. P. Kasulis, *Zen Action/Zen Person*, (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1981), pp. 73ff.
[9]"*Mujō Seppo*," vol. 2., p. 70.

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(henshin) hears the voices. Even if you cannot somatically investigate hearing voices with the eyes, you ought somatically to appropriate *(taitatsu)* and cast off "the insentient beings are capable of hearing the insentient beings preaching dharmas."

There are three significant points in the latter half of the above passage to which we would like to turn our attention, and upon which we would like to elaborate. By enlarging upon these three points we can demonstrate that the use of the term, "somatic act," is appropriate in referring to a mode of judgement (via an attunement) which, we claim, is operative in samadhic awareness as it has been sedimented within a person *qua* meditator. The first of these points is Dōgen's assertion that "the entire/pervasive body hearing the voices" is more important than "the eyes hearing the voices," which suggests that the synthetic function as it operates in our everyday existence, i.e., Aristotle's *sensus communis*, is radically altered. The second point is Dōgen's conviction that this expansion of sense perception is necessary in practice in order to experience that "the insentient beings are capable of hearing the insentient beings preaching dharmas." And the third point is that, in order to experience that "the insentient beings are capable of hearing the insentient beings preaching dharmas," Dōgen urges the aspirant to achieve what he calls "somatic appropriation" *(taitatsu)*. We shall examine the first and third points now, since they are interrelated, and reserve our analysis of the second point for later when we will deal with "the felt inter-resonance," since the third point is a logical consequence of the first and second.

The first question we will explore is the experiential meaning of Dōgen's contention that "the entire/pervasive body hears the voices" as it is related to "the eye hearing the voices." We have taken "the eye hearing the voices" as an instance of synesthesia, and have concluded that it means the creation of a new sensory circuit via the harmonization of all sensory perceptions. What seems to follow from this observation, however, is that there is still a boundary of sensibility set forth by means of the sensory organs. That is, the lived feeling of one's body extends as far as the sensory organs are functionally capable. Alternatively, this may be understood as a transformation of one's body-image, where the body-image is an awareness of one's relative spatial location lived from within so that it is more or less marked off by the delineation of the boundary of one's skin. In contrast, I would like to interpret "the entire/pervasive body hearing the voices," to be among other things, a lived feeling of spatially expanding the limits of the body-image of one's *everyday* lived body, since these limits are imposed by the function of the everyday mind, and in this case, by means of the function of the sensory organs. These limits represent a physical delineation of the body. I advance this interpretation of an expansion of one's body-image in consideration of the following: the term, *"henshin,"* translated as "the entire body," indicates the spatial spread of a lived body, and the term, *"tsūshin,"* implies a permeation within this spatial spread. In Dōgen's own words, "The total body *(zenshin)* is a total mind. There is no obstruction when one becomes a total body."[10] When these terms are translated into experience, they suggest that the lived body is transformed into an affective sensorium in its paramount sense of the term; its scope becomes broader than the one embraced

[10] *"Ikka Myoju,"* in *Dōgen*, vol. 1, p. 105.

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by the everyday experience, and its power of synthetic function becomes keener and more intense. When the body in this sense is achieved, it seems reasonable to refer to its enactment as a "somatic act."

Dōgen claims that this somatic act is effected by means of "somatic appropriation" *(taitatsu)*. Somatic appropriation is an achievement term, specifically designating the existential project of "just sitting" in its consummate form. Now, that which is somatically appropriated in the present context, is the lived feeling of spatially expanding the limits of our everyday lived body—the limits that are imposed upon the body by means of the functions of the five sensory organs. The somatic act, then, is that which issues from the somatically appropriated body and mind. Accordingly, we can for now think of the somatic act as an enactment of what is somatically appropriated, which, as we shall see shortly, forms the basis for making a judgement via an attunement.

1.3 TRANSFORMATION OF AFFECTIVITY.

In the preceding analysis of "casting off the body and the mind," we have concerned ourselves with an elucidation of the epistemological aspect, namely, the sensory perception and its transformation. The purpose of this discussion has been to prepare the ground for a better understanding of a mode of judgement (via an attunement) which, we contend, is operative in samadhic awareness. This was, in fact, an analysis of what Nyojō meant in part by the phrase *shinjin totsuraku*, namely, to "discard the five kinds of desires (related to the five sensory organs)."[11] We must now turn our attention to an affective aspect of the experience of "casting off the body and the mind," for it is a major contributing factor in the formation of judgement by means of attunement.

Logically, the concept of affectivity requires that affectivity be grounded in the bi-lateral interplay between what does the affecting and what is being affected. In fact, to eliminate one of the terms in this formula renders the concept of affectivity vacuous. "Bi-lateral interplay" may be understood to be a dynamic exchange in the role in "affecting" and "being affected" due to a mutual permeation, i.e., that which does the affecting can be turned into that which is being affected. This is to say that in order for x to be an affective agent, it must be both active and passive, both "affecting" and "being affected." Generally speaking, when a person is situated in space, a person *qua* body and his surrounding ambiance reveal an instance of this bi-lateral inter-relationship.[12]

As traditional Western epistemology conceives it, our sensory perception is a salient example of this affectivity, "salient" insofar as the capacity of the sensory organs permits us consciously to "take note of" or to "recognize" the feature(s) of the ambiance. As we have already observed, we carry out this function in our everyday existence pre-reflectively, or to use Husserl's terminology, we perform a pre-predicative judgement. When we base our epistemology on sensory perception, a function of the body which is naturally given, and when we view it as functioning solely within the range of its natural endowment, whatever is outside of the range of its capacity to perceive is disregarded as admitting of no

[11]TAKAZAKI Jikidō, *Kobutsu no Manebi: Dōgen*, (Tokyo: Kadokawa Shoten, 1974), pp. 49–52.

[12]For example, a choice of a "quiet" place for sitting is a demonstration of Zen's wisdom of affectivity.

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knowability. This is, for example, what Kant proposed in his first critique when he recognized "sense intuition," directly connected with the sensory perception, as the sole window to the external world. In making this move, he disregarded the subtle aspects of the phenomenon of affectivity obtaining between a person *qua* body and his ambiance; for example, he left no room for the features which are revealed in samadhic awareness. Moreover, he thought only of a *lateral* relationship between the sensory organs and the ambiance, by absorbing everything experiencible within the obvious and salient function of the sensory organs. Needless to say, for Kant the human body was a thing-in-itself which was denied its own knowability.

When we turn our attention to Dōgen's scheme, however, this is not the case. In our analysis of affectivity we will make certain to consider both of the qualities of "affecting" and "being affected" in a person *qua* body. We have seen an instance of "bi-lateral interplay" in Dōgen's statement "the entire/pervasive body hears the voices," in which the inter-relationship of affectivity is obtained between "the entire/pervasive body" and "the voices." The difference between the body according to Kant and the body according to Dōgen is that in Dōgen's scheme, the entire human body is capable of being affected, not simply the physical form *(rūpa)*. Moreover, we can trace "that which does the affecting" in a person *qua* body back to the function of *saṃskāra* as ground out of which "affecting" comes forth, though its power to give rise to "affecting" appears only dimly to our everyday empirical ego. Since the power of *saṃskāra* is generated beneath the empirical ego, most of the time we are unaware of its origin, unless we encounter an extreme situation. Since the empirical ego is the sole performer in our everyday consciousness, our sensory perceptions are also interlaced with, and activated by, the power of affectivity coming from *saṃskāra*. In light of the preceding observation, the practice of "just sitting" is a method of transforming the manner through which this interlacing and activation of *saṃskāra* functions. By "just sitting," the nature of affectivity is also transformed both in respect to one's body and his ambiance, or in respect to both "affecting" and "being affected." This is, for example, the reason why Nyojō thought that *"shinjin totsuraku"* meant, at least in part, to "discard the five kinds of desires (related to the five sensory organs)."

Insofar as epistemology based upon sensory perception is concerned, it would be adequate to stop at our analysis of the affectivity as it bears upon sensory perception. From Dōgen's point of view, however, this is inadequate since it does not carry us any closer to truth. One must go deeper than an analysis of affectivity as it relates to sensory perception, to the ground that supports the foundation of sensory perception. This leads up to an analysis of a special kind of affectivity, namely, "the elimination of the five kinds of barriers *(gogai)*." In Nyojō's understanding, this affectivity constitutes half of what he meant by *"shinjin totsuraku."*[13] The five kinds of barriers mentioned here are (1) avarice *(musabori)*, (2) anger *(ikari)*, (3) a darkening of mind and a heaviness of the body, as in sleep *(konchin suimin)*, (4) restlessness and annoyance *(tōkai)*, and finally (5) doubt *(tamerai)*. For the purpose of our present analysis, we can view these dark

[13]Nyojō's criterion for *shinjin totsuraku* was to remove at least one of these "barriers." Since there is no indication in the text which one of these barriers Dōgen "cast off" when Nyojō recognized Dōgen's confirmatory experience, I shall treat them generally as a form of negative affectivity.

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emotions, collectively as negative affectivity, by which is meant that all are generally not conducive to the realization of the state of being a true person. Or to use Zen terminology, the negative affectivity prevents a person from showing his "original face."[14] In light of the concept of somatic appropriation, we may say that negative affectivity is transformed into a positive force in such a way that the "original face" or "authentic self" is somatically appropriated. The claim here is that negative affectivity "clouds" the proper functioning of both the mind and the body, and must be eliminated. The belief that it is possible to eliminate negative affectivity is founded upon Dōgen's contention that this negative affectivity is not an essential but an "accidental" property of beings, that is "accidental dust." Moreover, this is implied in his more general thesis that everything undergoes generation-extinction, for nothing in his scheme has an essential property which persists through time. Also, this is a practical goal of eradicating "the root of all mental functions," although the "root" in the present context is specified as "negative affectivity."

If *shinjin totsuraku* is understood in Nyojō as the elimination of negative affectivity, we can surmise that Dōgen's own experience of "casting off the body and the mind" must have transformed the manner in which negative affectivity functions in his everyday existence as it relates to the somatic act of synthetic function. Since negative affectivity does not have its origin in the "transparency" of everyday consciousness, but rather is issued from the body, particularly from the function of *saṃskāra*, the transformation which Dōgen underwent must involve the region deeper than that of the empirical ego. In order to substantiate this observation, let us cite a few interpretations of this topic offered by Dōgen commentators. AKIYAMA Satoko, a depth-psychologist, supports this interpretation when she argues that a partial meaning of Dōgen's confirmatory experience is to "abandon the unconscious psychological self."[15] The term, "unconscious psychological self," though it is derived from a different conceptual model than that of Dōgen, may be equated with *saṃskāra* insofar as both do not readily surface to our everyday consciousness. Similarly, UMEHARA Takeshi observes that the experience in question is "a state of freedom in which one has left behind all of the human captivations *(toraware)* (or "negative affectivity" in our terminology) of his body and mind."[16] From Nyojō's point of view, to leave behind "All human captivations" likely means to eliminate the five kinds of desires and five kinds of barriers. In contrast, while TAKAHASHI Masanobu recognizes Nyojō's sense of eliminating the desires and the barriers, he interprets the experience in a more restricted but yet more concrete sense, namely, that it involves attaining a state of freedom by casting off the *dominant* force which has taken root tenaciously deep in the individual mind. It is not inconsistent to view this dominant force as having some bearing on "the five kinds of desires and the five kinds of barriers,"[17] since what Takahashi means by "the dominant force" is a binding "hang-up" which takes a particular configuration in each individual, and which

[14]I include "doubt" *[tamerai]* in this category, because psychologically speaking, it is a vacillation of the indecisive attitude of mind.

[15]AKIYAMA Satoko, *Satori no Bunseki* [An Analysis of Satori] (Tokyo: Asahi Suppansha, 1980), pp. 90-91.

[16]UMEHARA Takeshi, in *Kobutsu no Manebi: Dōgen*, p. 272.

[17]Takahashi, *op.cit.*, p. 68.

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prevents him from attaining a state of freedom. This interpretation reflects Nyojō's other articulation of *shinjin totsuraku*, namely, to eliminate *at least one* of the five kinds of desires and/or one of the five kinds of barriers.[18]

It must be apparent from our discussion that there are significant differences in interpretations by Akiyama, Umehara and Takahashi. One camp of interpreters (Akiyama and Umehara) claims that it is the negative affectivity in its entirety which is an object of elimination, while the other (Takahashi) claims only that there is a specific negative affectivity. This difference should be interpreted as a difference in the degree to which negative affectivity can be purged through the experience of "casting off the body and mind." In other words, there is an infinite "depth" to this experience, understanding the "depth" to mean a power of transforming the meditator. If we take the elimination of one of the five kinds of desires or five kinds of barriers as an initial stage, we can take the total elimination of desires and barriers as the ultimate goal of the aspirant. What is certain, however, is that all three commentators mentioned above agree that Dōgen's experience of "casting off the body and the mind" refers to a region which is deeper than the empirical ego, and hence the transformation which occurs as a consequence of the "elimination" of negative affectivity, must alter the nature of the region in which the empirical ego functions. Furthermore, we can surmise that as a result of this, there must be fundamental change in the region of the empirical ego with respect to the act aspect of synthetic function, i.e., somatic act must undergo transformation as well. But what does the general or the specific transformation of negative affectivity into its positive counterpart mean in relation to the act aspect of the synthetic function? And what is the epistemological implication of this transformation?

The experience of "casting off the body and the mind" is a somatic transformation of negative affectivity into positive affectivity. This is why, for example, satori is described most of the time as a euphoric, and even an ecstatic, experience; it is "dharma bliss." In this sense, the transformation yields an unequalled level of energy which had otherwise been undiscovered and untapped, in our everyday existence—a consequence of the removal of the "binding," dominant force which had taken root deep in the psyche (or, broadly speaking, the mind). Once this transformation has taken place, in proportion to the extent of the transformation, the affectivity becomes charged with a power and an acuteness which would otherwise have been unknown. Sensory perception, empowered and refined by positive affectivity, becomes capable of detecting "subtleties" which had previously gone undetected. The status of the external world does not change, for the stillness of samadhi "does not disturb a speck of dust, nor does it distort a phenomenon *(sō)*,"[19] but the manner in which it appears goes through a radical modification. According to our interpretation, this occurs in the immobility of samadhic awareness because "the entire/pervasive body" has turned into an affective sensorium in its paramount sense of the term.

At the same time, through the transformation of negative affectivity into positive affectivity, the empirical ego is released from the "bonds" which had unknowingly constrained the meditator's sense of himself and circumscribed his frame of reference. The energy which wells up from the depths of his being

[18]TAKAZAKI Jikidō, in *Kostustu no Manebi:Dōgen*, pp. 49–52.

[19]*Bendowa* in *Dōgen*, vol. 1, p. 14.

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shatters the high ground of the empirical ego. And the empirical ego, to use Deutsch's terminology, becomes "unbound;"[20] it has "emptied" itself. In thus becoming "unbound," the empirical ego realizes that the selectivity operative in everyday perception, is "all too human"; it is no longer a selectivity infested with, and motivated by, the ego-desire. It enters into the domain of objectivity—an objectivity which has been achieved through the eradication of subjectivity. Once he is unbound, the person *qua* body has a lived feeling of spatial spread and permeation, from which a somatic act shoots out as an instance of synthetic function in judgement via an attunement.

In order to see how this somatic act characterizes the mode of judgement which obtains in the experience of "casting off the body and the mind," we shall now refer ourselves to an analysis of the "felt inter-resonance" *(kannō dōkō).*

1.4 FELT INTER-RESONANCE

Tamaki notes insightfully that the experience of "casting off the body and mind" is an instance of what I rendered here as "the felt inter-resonance."[21] Using Tamaki's observation as a point of departure, then, we will analyze the experiential meaning of the "felt inter-resonance" with a view to bringing out more clearly the sense of somatic act which forms, as I contend, a mode of judgement via an attunement in samadhic awareness. The corresponding Japanese term for "felt inter-resonance" is *kannō dōkō*, which is made up of the four characters, *kan* (feeling) + *nō* (response) + *dō* (paths) + *kō* (to intersect). The rendition for this Japanese term as "felt inter-resonance" is purposely epistemological, as well as phenomenological. Both of these terms, "epistemological" and "phenomenological," should be understood in the broadest sense as designating a description obtaining in samadhic awareness. This approach is guided by our overriding concern, namely, to elucidate the epistemological perspective brought forth by means of somatic transformations via the practice of just sitting.

Traditionally, the term, *"kannō dōkō,"* has been given an ontological interpretation. For example, in *Dōgen: Meicho*, Tamaki explains that the term means "an intersecting of paths between the feeling of sentient beings and buddhas' response," in which there is said to be an interpenetration between the self's existential ground and the transcendent Buddha.[22] Since Tamaki does not clarify what he means by "transcendent," we shall take the liberty of interpreting this term in two senses: first, in the sense of being outside of, and going beyond our everyday consciousness, and secondly, in the sense of designating the things external to this consciousness, namely, the shaped things, abundant and stimulating, in the natural world. When applied to Tamaki's explanation, the first sense of the term suggests that that which is "transcendent" does not appear to everyday consciousness which has not been transformed into samadhic awareness via a process of just sitting. In turn, this means that it does appear, however, to samadhic awareness; and therefore, from the elevated perspective of samadhic awareness, what is experienced to be "transcendent" in everyday consciousness

[20]Eliot Deutsch, *Personhood, Creativity and Freedom*, (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1982), pp. 35–55.

[21]TAMAKI, *Meicho: Dōgen*, p. 15.

[22]TAMAKI, *op.cit.*, p. 15.

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can no longer be regarded as "transcendent," but is ordinary. It follows from this that once samadhic awareness is in effect, the second sense of the term also requires a re-definition, for the manner in which the shaped things in the natural world relate themselves to samadhic awareness is believed to be significantly altered. In order to capture this sense of modification, I propose to render the term, "*kannō dōkō*," as "felt inter-resonance." For the purposes of our interpretation, this translation is advantageous, since it casts in clear relief the characteristics of affectivity obtaining between the somatic act and the natural world, which will enable us to specify in more concrete terms a mode of judgement via an attunement. If this approach is on track, an "ontological" interpretation of the experience of "*kannō dōkō*" should also be implied.

With this preliminary interpretation of "*kannō dōkō*" we shall now turn our attention to Dōgen's experiential account of what we call "the felt inter-resonance." Describing a lived feeling in samadhic awareness, Dōgen writes:[23]

> If a person sits properly in samadhi even for a time, with the three karmic activities [of intention, speech, and action] imprinted in the buddha-seal, the entire dharma-world all becomes buddha-sealed, and the entire space becomes exhaustively satori.

The three basic karmic activities of intention, speech, and action characterize, in the Buddhist view, the basic mode of being a person as he relates himself to the other beings and to the things of the world. When these basic activities become commensurate with those of buddhas, i.e., a melding of experience which the meditator immediately realizes himself, this realization, it is claimed, extends to beings other than himself and extends its influence to those beings. In Dōgen's own words, "the entire space exhaustively becomes satori." For him to assert this, there must be a lived feeling within a meditator's body-image which reveals that his inner world envelops and extends to the entire space, the world of shaped things, with the intrinsic qualities of this lived feeling bridging the gap between them. Such a world is bright and shining. When this occurs, the meditator feels that "a subtle, intimate path of mutual assistance"[24] is established between the beings in the natural world and himself, which is something totally other than the way in which the shaped things had appeared before. Moreover, this lived feeling has nothing to do with the meditator's own intentional perception because it occurs in "the stillness of samadhi [and] beyond [human] fabrication."[25] That is, he has somatically appropriated the mind which opposes the working of the body, and the act aspect of synthetic function has become a somatic act. Hence, there is no fabrication on the meditator's part: he simply feels wondrous and blissful. According to Dōgen, this lived feeling is not restricted to a spatial spread but also includes all temporalities. He writes;[26]

> Even though sitting in *zazen* involves just one person for a time, it performs buddhas' teachings and offers his guidance all of the time, throughout past, present, and future in an inexhaustible dharma-world, since it *subtly intermingles* with a myriad of dharmas and is perfectly in touch with all temporalities (emphasis added).

[23] "*Bendōwa*" in *Dōgen*, vol. 1, p. 13.
[24] "*Bendōwa*," vol. 1, p. 14.
[25] "*Bendōwa*," vol. 1, p. 14.
[26] "*Bendōwa*," vol. 1, p. 15.

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The lived feeling of spatial spread as well as "being in touch with all temporalities" is due to the meditator's lived feeling of "subtly intermingling with myriad dharmas." This "subtlety" refers to a dynamic moment concurrent with an arousal of feeling which usually escapes our notice. Moreover, this "subtlety" is closely tied to the rhythm of breathing. The "subtle intermingling with myriad dharmas" may, therefore, be interpreted as follows. The breathing during meditation establishes a certain relation between the meditator and the natural world through its in-coming and out-going psycho-physical energy in the form of vital breath *(ki)*. The vital breath comes in from the natural world and it returns to the natural world from the meditator. When meditation deepens, this bi-lateral exchange between the meditator and the natural world creates a harmonic rhythm and a rhythmic harmony through "a subtle, intimate path of mutual assistance." When this interdependence is lived, the meditator can be said to have entered into a consummate state of meditation, perhaps identical with what Dōgen calls "the immobile sitting," in which the meditator is said to "think of not-thinking." "Think of not-thinking" goes beyond "the measure of thinking," although it does not exclude it. The "immobile sitting" goes beyond "the measure of thinking," precisely because "a subtle, intimate path of mutual assistance" is created independent of "the measure of thinking."

When this consummate state of meditation is firmly established, an "inter-resonance" emerges in the invigorating lives between the meditator and the shaped things of the natural world. The meditator *qua* body is *attuned* to the natural world through a complete consummation of the somatic appropriation. Once this "inter-resonance" is achieved, the shaped things, either sentient or insentient, begin to present themselves to samadhic awareness as being intimate with the being of the meditator. Hence, Dōgen observes:[27]

> At such a time, the land, the trees and the blades of grass, the walls and fences, the tiles and the pebbles in the dharma-world of ten directions all perform the work of buddhas . . . Those *co-habitating* with them, and speaking *the same language*, are mutually endowed with the limitless buddha efficacies (emphases added).

That is, there emerges a sense of complete "inter-resonance"—a bi-laterality between the meditator and the natural world in which they are mutually responsive to each other. The meditator has achieved an affective state to such an extent that he feels that the shaped things in the natural world are no longer foreign to him, for he realizes that he has been intimately "co-habitating with," and "speaking the same language" as, the shaped things in the natural world. "Co-habitation" may be taken as a description of the meditator's intimate "being-in" the natural world, while "speaking the same language" refers, among other things, to his acquisition of a natural rhythmic, vital breath, through which the insentient beings (which include the entire range of organic, vegetative life in Buddhism) express themselves. It is the *resonance* of this vital breath that becomes the means of communication, since the root of all languages is grounded in the resonance of vital breath. Elsewhere, Dōgen states, "A language of the total lands is intimate with . . . the mind, and the words; it is closely intimate with them, without any fissure."[28] In light of this explanation, the statement we observed

[27] "*Bendōwa,*" vol. 1, p. 14.

[28] "*Yuibutsu Yobutsu*" in *Shōbōgenzō* ed., NAKAMURA Sōichi, (Tokyo: Seishin shobo, 1976), vol. 4, p. 405.

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previously becomes intelligible: "the insentient beings are capable of hearing the insentient beings preaching dharmas." Since the meditator has acquired "the same language" as the insentient beings, he can comprehend and appreciate their "speech," which is filled with the invigorating energy of life.

These two lived feelings, "co-habitating with" the insentient beings, and "speaking the same language," give rise to a bi-laterally intimate feeling which, Dōgen believes, is unified by features of the lived experience in deep samadhic awareness. He writes:[29]

> If you sincerely practice [just sitting], putting the four elements and five skandhas in full operation, you will attain the way. If you sincerely practice, putting the trees and blades of grass, the walls and fences in their full motions, you will attain the way. For "the four elements and five skandhas" and "the trees and the blades of grass, and the walls and fences" participate in the *same* [practice], sharing the same nature *(dōsei)*. They share the same mind and life, *(dōshin dōmei)* and the same body and momenta *(dōshin dōki)*.

Attaining to the way in Zen Buddhism is equivalent to attaining satori; it is a realization of buddhahood. The "sameness," therefore, between a person *qua* body and the insentient beings with respect to their body, mind, life, nature, and momenta refers to the concept of "buddha-nature"; a pervasive force or energy which a Buddhist believes is present in each and every being in the world. Dōgen says, "seeing the mountains and rivers is seeing the buddha-nature."[30] Accordingly, the body, mind, life, nature, and momenta come to be characterized in terms of buddhahood as bearing the seal of buddha-nature. They are buddha-body, buddha-mind, and so on. These elements are characterized by a single unifying concept of buddha-nature, for Dōgen held a firm belief in the "right buddha dharma." Moreover, this buddha-nature acted as the frame of reference for Dōgen's philosophical-religious experience, and he practiced accordingly. During the early stages of the process in which just sitting is cultivated, Dōgen must have had a series of hallucinatory experiences of a buddha-image appearing before him. For Dōgen, it was a natural connection to make between the buddha-nature and the elements of body, mind, life, nature, and momenta, and, therefore, he characterizes these elements in terms of it.

We may detect a "metaphysical" or an "ontological" overtone in the way in which Dōgen identifies a "sameness" in both the human being *qua* body and the insentient beings with respect to their mind, body, life, momenta, and nature. Indeed, Dōgen's language easily lends itself to a metaphysical interpretation. For example, we can argue that, since a "sameness" exists in the human being *qua* body and the insentient beings, and this "sameness" grounds their beings metaphysically, there is in essence no difference between them. If we remove the term "metaphysical" from this characterization, it is not intrinsically in disagreement with Dōgen's own understanding. That is, if we continue to assume, as we have throughout this article, that this "sameness" is a lived feeling derived from a deep meditative state as a felt inter-resonance, it is evident that the term "metaphysical," meaning "going beyond *physis*," is inappropriate to describe "the same-

29 *"Hotsubodaishin,"* in *Dōgen*, vol. 2, p. 212.
30 *"Busshō"* in *Dōgen*, vol. 1, p. 45.

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ness" which is said to exist between the human body *qua* body and the insentient beings. If, however, it is necessary to identify linguistically this "sameness," we may use Yuasa's terminology, and call it "metapsychical,"[31] since the sameness of mind, body, life, momenta, and nature are disclosed in a deep meditative experience of "casting off the [everyday sense of] the body and the mind."

Having briefly examined Dōgen's experiential account of "felt inter-resonance," we are now in a position to articulate characteristics of the somatic act which give rise to the experience of felt inter-resonance.

1.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS.

As we have demonstrated, the experience of "casting off the body and the mind" transforms the negative affectivity to a positive one. As a consequence of this transformation, the entire body pervasively becomes an affective sensorium in the paramount sense of the term, and this is simultaneously accompanied by a transformation of the body-image. The body-image that we have in our everyday existence is lived from within the boundary of the skin. In the process of transformation which occurs through "casting off the body and the mind," this body-image is changed into a lived feeling which expands beyond the physical limitation of the skin to embrace the shaped things of the natural world. Somatic act is an act that issues from this transformed image of one's body, from the body as an affective sensorium. Accordingly, a "vector" of the somatic act expands in proportion to the depth of the somatic transformation which acquires a positive affectivity.

Through a somatic transformation, the somatic act is charged with the positive affectivity, and this positive affectivity yields a powerful, yet subtle energy which is generated in the depths of the empirical ego. Moreover, this energy influences the in-coming and out-going vital breath by bringing it into harmony. The movement of the in-coming and out-going vital breath is bi-lateral, and moves from the person *qua* body to the natural world, and vice versa. An intrinsic feature of the somatic act, then, is charged with the energy of harmonization, and this energy we have termed the power of "attunement." Accordingly, the somatic act functions in proportion to the degree to which it is endowed with the power of "attunement." This was the meaning of "depth," and consequently, the "depth" of the experience is a measure of this degree of attunement.

The attuning power that is present in the somatic act is generated, *inter alia*, by the bi-lateral movement of the in-coming and out-going vital breath that joins the person *qua* body with the natural world. Through this bi-lateral movement, a certain affectivity is established between the person *qua* body and the natural world. This affectivity we have termed "the felt inter-resonance," and the experience of "felt inter-resonance" owes its genesis to the transformed body-image which accompanies a heightened, positive affectivity. The concept of affectivity is bi-lateral and constituted by the affecting and being affected. This may be interpreted that when affectivity obtains, there is an exchange of the respective qualities or features between that which is affecting and that which is

[31]YUASA Yasuo, *Jung to Kiristo Kyo* [Jung and Christianity], (Kyoto: Jinbun Shoin, 1978), pp. 268–76.

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being affected. Moreover, affectivity takes place only when what is affecting and what is being affected share, in some sense, *common* qualities or features. This is a logical requirement for the affective experience to obtain. The somatic act as affecting reaches the shaped things in the natural world and a target of somatic act in the natural world is in turn felt to reach the depth of being, i.e., somatic act as being affected.

In this respect, the somatic act is a function of synthesis, which relates a person *qua* body to the natural world, and the somatic act is a basic connecting link between them. Being a synthetic function, it may also be considered an act of judgement. This judgement, however, does not originate in *cogito* or in the empirical ego. For this reason, if we understand the "intentional" to mean that an act is issued from *cogito* or the empirical ego, it is not intentional in character. Rather, the somatic act has its origin of function in the "depth" of empirical ego, in the somaticity of a person. Accordingly, the "act" is said to be somatic. The term, "depth," as it is used in the phrase, "the depth of empirical ego," is employed in order to suggest a dimension of awareness which is brought forth by means of somatic transformations via the practice of just sitting.

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Porphyry, Life of Plotinus, 8: on Philosophic Thinking

Paul Plass

IN THE EIGHTH CHAPTER of his biography of Plotinus Porphyry provides the following account of Plotinus' actual method of working:

> When Plotinus had written anything he could never bear to go over it twice; even to read it through once was too much for him, as his eyesight did not serve him well for reading. In writing he did not form his syllables correctly; he paid no attention to spelling but was wholly concerned with thought *(nous)*, and to our surprise he went on in this way right to the end. He completed his thought from beginning to end and then in writing what he had arranged in his mind, he would put it down continuously as though copying from a book. Even if he was talking with someone and keeping up the flow of conversation, he stayed with his thought *(skemma)* so that he could at once meet his necessary part in the conversation and keep his own reflection *(skepsis, dianoia)* unbroken. When the person he had been talking to was gone, he did not go over what he had written, because his sight (as I have said) did not suffice for revision. He went straight on with what came next, keeping the connection just as if there had been no interval of conversation between. In this way he was present at once to himself and to others, and he never relaxed his attention to his self except in sleep: even sleep he reduced by taking very little food—often not even a piece of bread—and by his constant turning in contemplation to his intellect *(nous)*.[1]

To this we can add a remark from the next section. After describing Plotinus' involvement in administering the property of friends' children and in their education Porphyry says that "though he protected so many people from daily cares and worries, he never relaxed his intentness on his mind *(nous)* except during sleep (9.17)."

We have here a restrained preview of the remarkable powers which in the later biographical tradition dramatize the metaphysical prowess of Neoplatonic philosophers. But how much even here is literal, how much exaggeration for rhetorical or philosophic purposes? How specific are these details and how far can they be pressed? Perhaps Porphyry mentions them simply because they are interesting and true; some details in the *Life* may well have had no more significance than that, e.g., the story about Plotinus' late weaning (3.1f). But Neoplatonic biography would not often be concerned about merely interesting bits of information, and many details seem selected to make a philosophic point. Plotinus' clairvoyant discovery of a thief (11.1f), for example, exemplifies *Ennead* II.3.7.9: "One can

[1]Armstrong's translation (modified), *Plotinus* (London: Heinemann, 1966), vol. I.

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see the character of a man, his possibilities and dangers, by looking at his eyes or some other part of the body." In the absence of more information it is difficult to know how much Porphyry wants to say, but it is useful to sort out some of the ways in which Plotinus' "schizophrenia" might fit into Neoplatonic theories of mind.

Apart from the remarks about orthography at the beginning of the paragraph, the account distinguishes three main stages:

(A) Plotinus would think a problem through and then put his thought on paper.
(B) He could carry on a conversation while keeping his train of thought unbroken.
(C) When the conversation stopped, he could pick up where he had left off writing without reviewing what he had already put down.

(A) and (B) deal with two distinct activities (in addition to thinking): writing and talking. Only when we come to (C) do we realize that there is, in fact, a connection between (A) and (B): the conversation evidently interrupts the writing. Moreover, resumption of writing (in C) goes with resumption of thinking about the problem, and the train of thought (in B) is not unbroken in the sense that it proceeds independently on a higher plane while Plotinus is also carrying on a conversation. It is unbroken, rather, because when the conversation came to an end, Plotinus could pick up his interrupted thought without referring to what he had written. Porphyry's point is that he could work out a complex argument in his mind; then as he recalled it he put it in writing without hesitation and without regard to spelling. If he was interrupted while doing so, he could hold in mind the point of the argument to which he had come and resume writing without using the text to prompt his memory.

There is something anti-climactic about this. Unless the interruption is supposed to be lengthy, it scarcely seems worth mentioning. Perhaps Porphyry is suggesting a kind of total recall which allowed Plotinus to write a highly detailed, almost verbatim reproduction of what he had thought out earlier.[2] In any case, what makes it disappointing is Porphyry's own statements that "in this way he was present at once to himself and to others," that "he never relaxed his intentness on mind" and that he "constantly turned in contemplation to intellect." At first sight such language seems to refer to Mind, i.e., to a level of thought and awareness notably different from ordinary consciousness because it is intuitive. An intrusion of that into daily life would help set Plotinus off as a philosopher, and that is certainly Porphyry's intention. But he, in fact, describes Plotinus' higher level of thought in discursive terms rather than in terms of intuitive Mind: it is *dianoia*, is "completed from beginning to end" and "arranged" in his mind, and it involves memory.

If we are deprived of information about an unusual mental state of Plotinus, we are at least compensated by information about what philosophic thinking ordinarily meant. One of the most striking and original features of Plotinus' psychological

[2]Memory was always an important philosophic tool; cf. *Republic* 486D; *Phaedrus* 274C ff.; below, n.7. Because of its importance for rhetoricians, when memory failed sorcery was suspected; P. Brown, *Religion and Society in the Age of Augustine* (London: Faber and Faber, 1972), p. 133. For the oral tradition among Platonists cf. H. J. Kramer, *Der Ursprung der Geistmetaphysik* (Amsterdam: Schippers, 1964), p. 295, n.404. Plotinus himself did not begin writing until relatively late in his career, and then his style often reflects live discussion (cf. Porphyry, *Life* 13). His memory in effect allowed him to take notes (the *Enneads*) on his own discussions. For recording of live discussion, see A. Bielmeier, *Die NeuPlatonische Interpretation* (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1930), 30 ff.

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theory is his recognition of unconscious mental processes. In many passages he indicates that ordinary consciousness is absent on the plane of Mind. Intuition is a grasp all at once of the entire content of Mind as a single perfect system, each of whose parts is present to every other part so that each is all. Subject and object fall together, and it is not surprising that our ordinary self would recede or vanish in such a state. Since Mind is atemporal, it is always active independent of our usual awareness (I.4.9).[3] Hence as a man can be healthy, wise and handsome without being aware of it, so he can be happy even when asleep, drugged or ill, and by the same token he can be thinking even when he is conversing or doing anything else. There are, as we saw, difficulties in supposing that Porphyry had this in mind. In the first place, he describes Plotinus' thinking as discursive. What is more, if it were intuitive, Plotinus would in that respect be no different from anyone else, since all men have a timelessly active share in Mind. Finally, he notes that Plotinus' attention to mind decreased while he was asleep, but Mind is immune to interruption.

Plotinus also speaks of *discursive* unconscious processes. We may act bravely without being aware of our action or may read well when we are not conscious of reading, and an artist works best when he does not think of what he is doing (I.4.10.24f). Other more important functions of soul can similarly be looked at in terms of an autonomous "reflex." The physical activity of celestial souls and of the world soul is sustained by such a process (IV.8.8.13f). A. Smith has suggested that this is a state of "quasiconsciousness" analogous to but distinct from the intuitive state of Mind, and with reference to the passage in the *Life* he concludes that "it is in this way, we may feel sure, that Plotinus was present at the same time to himself and to his friends."[4]

The place of quasiconsciousness in the hierarchy of mental activities is not entirely clear. In the case of reading or handicraft it seems to lie below conscious discursive deliberation and is much like a function of blind "nature." Celestial quasiconsciousness, too, is from one point of view an aspect of lower nature, dealing with the requirements of the material universe. At the same time, it does so by allowing celestial souls to exercise "untroubled care" of the bodies they govern. This is an activity which proceeds without discursive consciousness, just as the mechanical sides of craftsmanship or reading do. Yet as an immediate reflex of intuition, freedom from discursiveness is also a mark of soul's higher life. What is more, soul at this level still functions discursively to the extent that some celestial souls can recognize each other's bodies (IV.3.18.19f; IV.4.5.15f). This puzzling state of affairs is in some ways different from Plotinus' behavior as that is described by Porphyry. It is true that insofar as human souls attain celestial

[3]For multiple levels of thinking and consciousness cf. Armstrong, "Elements in the Thought of Plotinus at Variance with Classical Intellectualism," *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, 93 (1973), 15 ff.; G. O'Daly, "The Presence of the One in Plotinus," *Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei*, Quaderno 198 (1974), 163 ff. On intuition see A. C. Lloyd, "Non-Discursive Thought—an Enigma of Greek Philosophy," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 70 (1969–70), 261 ff.

[4]A. Smith, "Unconsciousness and Quasiconsciousness in Plotinus," *Phronesis* 23 (1978), 299; cf. Smith, *Porphyry's Place in the NeoPlatonic Tradition* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1974), p. 26. J. Rist ("The One of Plotinus," *Review of Metaphysics* 27 (1973), 78 ff.) also cites Porphyry's account and connects it with *Ennead* 1.4.13 (also quoted by Smith). But that passage makes a distinction between discursive thought and the greatest *mathēma*, and whether *mathēma* is intuitive knowledge of Mind or grasp of the One, Porphyry is not talking of either.

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quasiconsciousness it can be interrupted because they may fall; on that score there is a direct fit with Plotinus' "descent" from thinking to conversing. But the splendid descriptions of quasiconsciousness in the *Enneads* suggest that it is in fact different from anything attainable on earth. It is very close to intuition (IV.4.6ff), while Plotinus' thinking is as discursive as the social conversation which interrupts it or the writing which records it. Celestial quasiconsciousness may after all be what Porphyry has in mind, but it is more probable that quasiconsciousness is only *like* what he is thinking of. The complexities of trans-earthly states of consciousness aside, he may simply be distinguishing two aspects of ordinary discursive thinking as it figures in the life of a philosopher of Plotinus' caliber. He can, on the one hand, meet usual social obligations as well as anyone else as occasion demands. At the same time, he preserves a firm hold on a train of thought amid daily distractions, thanks to mental discipline developed through reflection.

Yet intuitive thinking is not entirely irrelevant, because it has another side—a side which admits (or overlaps with)—a certain discursive element. In intuition the content of Mind is seen as one perfect system, but it is also possible to know a part of Mind, e.g., a science or part of a science. This discursive phase of knowledge is closely associated with soul, which is essentially timeless and whole as Mind is but also grasps things by parts and in succession. The precise relationship between the two modes is not always clear because of the ambivalent status of soul straddling the two realms.[5] From one point of view, soul in its highest phase simply *becomes* Mind, from another, it preserves an independent status in the intelligible world. Plotinus leaves the boundary line fluid in order to take account of the complex nature of mental processes, which do not divide into discursive and intuitive with absolute precision.

The account of dialectic in I.3.4 is a good example. Dialectic is the science that can speak about the class of each thing and the interrelation of all things. In doing so it "stops wandering about the world of the senses" and settles in the intelligible world, where it weaves Forms together, and after going through all of them returns to its starting point to remain quiet in contemplation, since it has now reached unity. This describes several phases of the higher life of mind detached from ordinary concerns, yet in some ways still tied to discursive consciousness. As dialectic approaches unity it becomes progressively more abstract or universal and less discursive. We may suppose that aside from full intuition the dialectician correspondingly becomes more abstracted, remote and reserved in his general manner. It is this attitude which is described by Porphyry—closer to ordinary consciousness than are intuition or any of the soul's quasiconscious states.

That is the philosophic background of the situation portrayed in the *Life*. Plotinus' mental habit reflects the way in which his mind is active on a high level of abstraction but one still short of full intuition and different from quasiconsciousness. His thinking remains essentially discursive yet does involve unusual qualities: intense concentration and discipline, detachment, keen memory. But

[5]Cf. Armstrong, "Eternity, Life and Movement in Plotinus' Accounts of Nous," in *Le Neoplatonisme* (Paris: CNRS, 1971), 71 ff; "Tradition, Reason and Experience in the Thought of Plotinus," *Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei*, Quaderno 198 (1974), 183 ff.; "Elements . . ." (above, n. 3), 17 ff., (some reprints in *Plotinian and Christian Studies*, London, Variorum, 1979).; H. Blumenthal, *Plotinus' Psychology* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971), pp. 100 ff.

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Porphyry is not describing something which calls ordinary consciousness into question; it is "ethical" rather than metaphysical, a subtle preoccupation which marked Plotinus' attitude toward other activities as well. His writing became a "copying" that was odd because it was careless and immune to improvement.[6] His ability to coordinate a completed train of ideas to *careless* writing and retain it intact through conversation suggests a certain dissociation from ordinary activities, though he was entirely responsive to the demands of daily life. His indifference to sleep and food was another example of the same thing.[7] In each case we can see him preserving a noticeable distance from normal activities but doing so in such a way that he can function effectively. Union with the One is a most drastic departure from ordinary consciousness, and Porphyry reports that during their association Plotinus reached it only four times. Union with Mind in intuition is less spectacular. In fact, Porphyry says nothing about how often Plotinus or he himself attained that, and though Plotinus has splendid accounts of the vision, it was perhaps closer to what we might call an occasional "insight" than to extraordinary "experience," if we use experience of the One as a standard. It is at bottom a luminous sense of the coherence of everything. But aside from such special moments, *noēsis* is neither intuition nor quasiconsciousness; it is disciplined, systematic reflection, and the intense concentration required for that is what Porphyry seems to be describing.[8]

[6]For a discussion of this passage cf. D. O'Brien, "Comment Écrivait Plotin?" in *Porphyre: La Vie de Plotin* I (Paris: Urin, 1982), 344, 360.

[7]Several of these behavioral oddities recur in Marinus' biography of Proclus (extraordinary memory: 4;5;9;20; restricted diet and sleep: 12;13;19;22;24). Proclus could apparently think, i.e., "be intent on mind and God," in his sleep (24); upon awakening he would compose hymns or meditate and then write down his thoughts after he had risen.

[8]Cf. R. Harder, *Plotins Schriften*, V[c] (Hamburg: Meiner, 1958), *ad loc*: "Es handelt sich hier um jene lucide Präsenz einer hoheren Wachheit, wie sie den wenigen hochentwickelten Intelligenzen zu allen Zeiten eignet."

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Looking for Abraham: Kierkegaard and the Knight of Anxiety

R. Z. Friedman

I.

THE OBJECT of Kierkegaard's critique in *Fear and Trembling* is the modern attempt to synthesize faith and reason in rational morality. In this view the principle of religious life is nothing more than the Golden Rule or its philosophical equivalent, the categorical imperative. Holiness is understood to be moral perfection. The autonomy, indeed the hegemony, of reason is accepted, and faith, divested of a connection to revelation, is understood as either the performance of moral actions or the holding of certain beliefs which underlie the possibility of those actions. Kierkegaard's aim in *Fear and Trembling* is to unravel this synthesis and to present faith and reason as thesis/antithesis which must be understood to confront the human subject as an "either/or." In *Philosophical Fragments* and *Concluding Unscientific Postscript* this line of argument is expanded; there Kierkegaard argues that faith, rather than reason, is truth for the human subject or "existing individual."

Kierkegaard chooses Abraham to lead the attack against the rationalization of faith and religion. If the synthesis of morality and religion holds, Kierkegaard argues, then the commands of God ought to conform to the principles of rational morality; but they do not. God commands Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, to perform an act which, according to the moral law, is murder. The synthesis collapses into an either/or. Either God or Isaac. Either the divine law or the moral law. Whichever way he chooses, however, Abraham is lost. If he puts the moral law above all else, he denies God; if he chooses to obey God, he commits murder. Kierkegaard compares Abraham's situation to that of Agamemnon, who must choose between divine support for his armies at Troy and the life of his daughter Iphigenia. He takes the life of the child, Troy falls to his soldiers, but Agememnon is murdered by Clytemnestra, Iphigenia's mother. As Kierkegaard sees it, Agememnon is lost from the beginning, locked into a universe in which failure and punishment are as unavoidable as death. Agememnon is the tragic hero; his achievement is the courage he displays as he moves towards his fate.

Is Abraham, like Agememnon, lost? He would be, Kierkegaard believes, but for a dialectical surprise. The unraveling of the synthesis of divine command and rational morality provides for the "liberation" of faith from reason, and this, in turn, established an option for Abraham of which Agamemnon could not have availed himself. Kierkegaard sees Abraham's choice as being not between two

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moral commands but between a moral command and a religious command, between reason and faith. As Kierkegaard understands it, the trial of Abraham is not the choice between God and man rationally comprehended, but between, on the one hand, God and man rationally comprehended and, on the other, God and man comprehended through faith. Abraham chooses faith, and by virtue of this he may hope that Isaac's fate will not be that of Iphigenia and that his fate will not be that of Agamemnon. By virtue of faith Abraham is saved from the contradictory demands and negative judgments of rational morality and, consequently, from tragedy.

There is an ironic turn in Kierkegaard's argument, a turn which is the subject of this paper. Kierkegaard develops faith over and against reason, the Knight of Faith against the Knight of Infinite Resignation, Abraham against Agamemnon. But when the dialectical dust settles it appears that Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith is closer to the Knight of Infinite Resignation than he is to the Abraham of the biblical narrative. Kierkegaard's recurring themes of endless trial of the will, the impossibility of determining the existence of God, the remoteness of God from man, the emphasis on uncertainty and striving, and the central role of self-knowledge, all indicate a view inconsistent with the biblical Abraham. Abraham, I fear, is lost after all.

I will begin, in Section II, with a consideration of certain modern and Socratic aspects of Kierkegaard's anti-modern position. The tragic dimension of Kierkegaard's Abraham, the Knight of Faith, is explored in Section III. In Sections IV and V, I demonstrate that the Genesis account does not allow for an absolute relationship to the absolute, a teleological suspension of the ethical, or an either/or between faith and reason. Following this I will elaborate on the trial of Abraham with reference to Jonah and to the concept of binding. In conclusion, I will argue that Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith is the Knight of Anxiety.

II.

Against the view that one can begin a demonstration with moral premises and conclude with religious conclusions, that one can begin with reason and end with faith, Kierkegaard argues that morality and religion come to a parting of the ways. The move from morality to religion, from reason to faith, cannot be made by way of a reasoned analysis in which the religious conclusion is shown to follow logically and inevitably. Rather, the moral and rational claim to ultimacy must be put aside. In other words, Kierkegaard explains, there is a teleological suspension of the ethical—a purposeful putting aside of the ethical and rational, a preliminary to the leap of faith, the decision to accept or embrace religion and faith. This view, so obviously and self-consciously anti-modern in its tone and content, contains important elements of the modern philosophical position on religion which Kierkegaard is so eager to undermine, and, more importantly, I think, for the general character of Kierkegaard's position, it contains a great deal which is Socratic. Kierkegaard says of Socrates that he "was the most interesting man who ever lived, his life the most interesting life ever led."[1] It is this Socrates, I believe, who is closer to the model of the Knight of Faith than is the biblical Abraham.

[1]Soren Kierkegaard, *Fear and Trembling*, ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), p. 83.

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First, let me briefly introduce some of the modern elements which I believe are to be found in Kierkegaard's position. For Kierkegaard, the conflict of philosophy and religion is not between reason and revelation, as it was for the mediaeval philosophers, but between reason and faith. Religion's claim to what is usually called metaphysical knowledge has already been abandoned, a project initiated by Spinoza and brought to fruition by Kant. Faith, for Kierkegaard, is bound up with action, choice, the will, that is, with the practical as opposed to the theoretical. The human subject comes to God by way of the needs of his practical existence, particularly his experience of his own life as unhappy and unresolved. But coming to God does not mean knowing His essence, any of His attributes or properties, or, indeed, even being able to demonstrate His existence. Again Kierkegaard gives us the modern approach in a distinctly Kantian vein;[2] there is no knowledge of the existence of God either by intuition or by demonstration. Like Kant's, Kierkegaard's religious view involves a basic scepticism: God is the paradoxical entity separated from the human subject by a paradoxical relationship. As a result of this religiously motivated scepticism the human subject is understood, ironically, when one considers the religious motivation of this move, to be left to deal not with God but with himself. Kierkegaard's approach focuses not on the object, God, but on the subject who thinks, acts, and chooses and who must resign himself to the realization that he will never get beyond himself to the object. This scepticism and the emphasis on the will, are, I think, distinctly modern. Abraham is Kierkegaard's choice to carry the day for an understanding of faith which does not fall prey to assimilation by rational morality but which yet remains consistent with the modern program involving scepticism, willing, and a concern for the self. Kierkegaard's interpretation of Abraham and faith may ultimately have to do with what Kierkegaard believes is to be learned more from Socrates than from Abraham.

Kierkegaard's indebtedness to Socrates is very great. From Socrates, according to Kierkegaard, comes the notion of the subjective relationship,[3] the subject's commitment to an object of whose truth he is ignorant, and the shift of emphasis from the existence of the object to the subject's perception of the object, the subject's inwardness or psychological development. In the *Postscript* Kierkegaard argues the case for subjectivity and elevates subjectivity above objectivity because of the former's power to enable the subject to achieve self-knowledge, that is, to know himself as what Kierkegaard believes him to be, an unresolvable tension between the finite and the infinite.[4] The case for Christianity, as I understand it, cannot be made by appeal to the existence of God and the fulfillment of His promise of eternal happiness, for neither can be objectively determined. Nevertheless, there is a subjective demonstration; the human subject can evaluate the effects which this relationship may have on him and he can consider these effects in two ways: Does the relationship to this problematic God

[2]I have developed the Kant-Kierkegaard connection in another context, "Kierkegaard: First Existentialist or Last Kantian," *Religious Studies*, 18 (Spring, 1982), 159–70.

[3]Soren Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, trans. David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie as *Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript* (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1941), p. 37.

[4]My analysis here draws heavily on the *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, pp. 115–92. These pages constitute the heart of Kierkegaard's attempt to develop a view of religion which is philosophical while elevating religion above philosophy.

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contribute to or diminish the subject's knowledge? And does the relationship contribute to or diminish the subject's ability to live authentically in terms of what he knows about himself? Now Christianity fulfills these conditions more effectively than Greek philosophy because it produces a greater degree of psychological tension in the subject, and consequently it produces a greater degree of personal development and self-knowledge. Christianity's ability to produce heightened tensions is rooted in the fact, as Kierkegaard sees it, that, while Socrates understood himself to be paradoxically related to the Good, the Good is not itself a paradox, while, in the Christian context, God is understood to be a paradox, the infinite who has become finite. Christianity is superior to Greek philosophy because it produces a more intense form of subjectivity. Christianity wins the game, but it is Socrates' game, i.e. self-knowledge. Faith is understood as an element of this self-knowledge. Abraham seems to be a more intense version of Socrates, but Socrates appears to be the real model for the Knight of Faith.

III.

Kierkegaard's Knight of Infinite Resignation is the morally responsible individual located in a morally defined universe who, despite his exaggerated expectations with regard to morality—that it will keep him from evil and lead him to benefit—is nevertheless delivered over to moral contradiction, to failure, and to punishment. His moral perception of the world is shattered, but the Knight of Infinite Resignation chooses to endure. He is the tragic hero. Agamemnon is a variant of this figure. In *Fear and Trembling* Abraham is developed in contrast to Agamemnon. For Abraham, according to Kierkegaard, the moral universe has been set aside in favour of the world of promise, where hope replaces fate, and where possibility replaces necessity. It is possible, Abraham believes, that his action—so obviously at variance with the moral good—will yet produce good both for himself and for Isaac.

Yet I find Kierkegaard's Abraham to be a strangely tragic figure. He does not "walk with God" as one who is at one with himself, nurtured, and enriched by the involvement of God in his life. Kierkegaard has the romantic's distrust of resolution, synthesis, inner peace, and his Abraham is a Knight, the individual who has his life in conflict and struggle. This is a struggle which he can never resolve, for by virtue of the Knight's existence he cannot achieve a standpoint which would allow him to determine the existence of God. It is a struggle which he can never win although he is always capable of losing, always capable of descending into the 70,000 fathoms of water. Kierkegaard's Abraham may love God but it is himself with whom he must deal. Turned in on himself, condemned to trial, eternally removed from success but always on the brink of failure, Kierkegaard's Abraham, the Knight of Faith, is a tragic hero.

Faith, in Kierkegaard's view, may serve only to magnify the tragic dimensions of life rather than to offer a real alternative to them. Agamemnon was certain of his fate, Kierkegaard believes, but Abraham cannot be certain, for the God who offers him promise and hope may not exist. If God exists, Abraham is saved; if not, Abraham is lost. But he would not be lost in the way that Agamemnon is lost. Agamemnon goes to his fate confident that what is uncertain is not his fate but whether he will accept his fate bravely and well. The rules of morality and justice

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are beyond him; only his will and his capacity to endure are within his control. Abraham would be lost in a far more profound way. If God does not exist, the rationale for his sacrifice would be unfounded. Agememnon, after all, was victorious at Troy; Iphigenia did not die for nothing. But that would not be the case for Abraham. Isaac would have died in vain, and Abraham would have sacrificed all for a fantasy of the mind. In a sense, then, Abraham's situation is even more tragic than that of Agamemnon. Agamemnon cannot be wrong. He cannot hope to escape his fate, but he cannot be wrong about the sacrifice. Iphigenia is dead, but the army is victorious. Abraham, however, may well be wrong. Agememnon has no reason to be "anxious" but Kierkegaard's Abraham has every reason to be. In this sense, faith magnifies the tragic.

While the Knight of Faith struggles with himself, God becomes remote. God is not understood to be present to consciousness. If He exists, He exists noumenally, beyond consciousness, not phenomenally or present to consciousness. If He exists, He exists as the finite-infinite paradox related to the subject through a paradoxical relationship. God, who is understood to be the source of man's existence, has left man to sort out his existence for himself.[5] The problematic, and at best distant, God and the questioning self are central to Kierkegaard's understanding of the Abraham story. It is difficult, however, to understand how, given this view of the distance between man and God, Kierkegaard can make sense of the fact that Abraham is said to be addressed by God. How could Abraham be addressed by this paradoxical and remote God? The Abraham story, as I shall argue, does not make sense unless one assumes that, at least within the context of the story, God is directly present to Abraham and has a prior involvement with him. Quite simply, Kierkegaard's analysis does not explain how Abraham can be addressed by God or why Abraham does not simply dismiss this command out of hand.

The remoteness of God is not an accidental aspect of Kierkegaard's position. It is the remoteness of God which makes His existence uncertain and this, in turn contributes to inwardness in the relationship which the subject establishes with God. This, in turn, accentuates the psychological development of the subject which culminates in the subject's knowledge and acceptance of himself. Kierkegaard's Socratic program of self-knowledge requires an uncertain and remote God. This point helps to make clear a rather surprising aspect of Kierkegaard's position. As I have pointed out, the subject's choice for faith is without foundation in terms of the needs of objective knowledge. It is not without foundation, however, from the standpoint of the needs of subjective knowledge. The individual needs God because it is the confrontation with God, the relationship with Him, which enables the individual to achieve self-knowledge. Although it appears on the face of it to be the antithesis of Kierkegaard's intention, I think that in Kierkegaard's analysis the status of God is something like that of a Kantian postulate. While not a postulate of practical reason, God may well be a postulate of Socratic-Christian self-understanding. "I affirm God not because I know Him or because I am theoretically certain that He exists, but because I cannot know

[5]Louis Mackey writes that "Kierkegaard's rhetoric drives the individual, not to an encounter with Absolute Reality and Power . . . but only further back into his own inwardness." "The Loss of the World in Kierkegaard's Ethics," in *Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Josiah Thompson (Garden City: Doubleday, 1972), pp. 266–88.

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myself except by way of my relationship with Him; hence I affirm Him." Like Kant's postulated God, Kierkegaard's God is a subjective need but an entity never known by the subject. He is necessarily remote from the subject.[6]

The purpose of Abraham's trial is not to determine the extent or magnitude of Abraham's fidelity to God but to determine the source of Abraham's fidelity. Is it a commitment to the autonomy and supremacy of reason or is it a commitment to the word of God because it is the word of God? The difference, in Kierkegaard's view, is between "being rational" and "having faith," between being virtuous and being holy. Abraham chooses faith, but the having of faith, as argued above, does not bring Abraham closer to God. It may enable him to become a certain kind of person but he is as remote from God as ever. The choice for faith only brings Abraham to the next choice, where he must again try himself in terms of faith and reason. Faith, for Kierkegaard, is not the performance of moral actions, as it is for Spinoza, or a particular way of holding a judgment based on the needs of practical reason, as it is for Kant. The individual who professes faith is a Knight, one who does battle with, or who has his life in terms of, the struggle of the will. He recognizes that his life is this struggle, the endless task of confronting and choosing in terms of the either/or of faith and reason. The choice, however, once made, disappears with the moment. Each new moment requires a new choice, and the will, free, and undetermined by those decisions which the individual has made in the past, must again declare itself. But then the content of faith becomes the choice for faith. The Knight may choose hope and promise, as Kierkegaard assures us, but he does not actually live in hope and promise. He does not get beyond the choice.

For Kierkegaard, the life of faith is the continuous re-enactment of the trial of Abraham. In Kierkegaard's view, Abraham's trial becomes Abraham's life. This is the undoing of Kierkegaard's analysis, for his Abraham becomes the Knight of Neverending Trial. Like the Knight of Infinite Resignation, the tragic hero, his task is to prevail, to endure, to keep himself from the seductive influences of reason and objective certainty, and to choose that which reason must find to be paradoxical and absurd. Abraham's thoughts on the way to Moriah are, no doubt, very different from those of Agamemnon as he journeys home from Troy, but they are men cast from the same mould: Agamemnon locked into a moral machine, Kierkegaard's Abraham locked into the endless trial of the will. Their choice is not to challenge and conquer but to prevail and endure. The Abraham of the biblical narrative is lost after all.

IV.

Kierkegaard brings to the Abraham story an appreciation for art and literature and a keen psychological sense. Kierkegaard's Abraham is fresh, tangible, and heroic—a Knight well-equipped to challenge Kierkegaard's readers. The Knight does, it seems, carry the day for much of Kierkegaard's program: that morality does not exhaust religion, that reason does not exhaust faith, that the Golden Rule or the moral law cannot be the principle which expresses man's relationship to

[6]"God is *deus absconditus*," Josiah Thompson writes in "The Master of Irony," "never present always absent, an inhabitant of dark places, God the spider." In *Kierkegaard: A Collection of Critical Essays*, p. 161.

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God, that risk and uncertainty rather than moral certitude and historical optimism are integral to religious life. Kierkegaard's Abraham makes Kierkegaard's point, but there is much in the Genesis account that Kierkegaard misses and distorts. Perhaps most striking in this regard is Kierkegaard's interpretation of the trial of Abraham as the life of Abraham; one moment of trial becomes an allegory for life as neverending trial. One must look at the trial of Abraham from within the broader life of Abraham as that life is related to us in Genesis. Although Abraham is tried, his life is clearly not one of trial. Abraham's relationship to God is not "an absolute relationship to the absolute," and Abraham does not "teleologically suspend the ethical." Furthermore, the choice which Abraham makes is poorly comprehended if understood as an either/or between faith and reason.

One cannot begin the biblical account with the statement in Genesis 22:1 that "after these things God tested Abraham," and then tell the story only to the point where Abraham does indeed appear intent on carrying out the command. This is, of course, precisely what Kierkegaard does. But the trial or test occurs within a specific context and to fail to appreciate that context is to fail to understand the significance of the test itself. The account of Abraham as it bears on the test begins no later than the statement in Genesis 17:16 that God will cause the aged and barren Sarah to conceive a son by Abraham. Isaac, then, who will be the sacrifice Abraham is commanded to make, is the product of God's intervention in the natural order of things, an intervention which appears to be rooted in the Covenant that God makes and reaffirms with Abraham.

Isaac is the product of God's intervention and a fulfillment of His promise to Abraham. Isaac is not a Hebrew Iphigenia. He is not simply the child of the main protagonist; he is a gift of God. Consequently, Isaac's role and status in the story is very different from that of Iphigenia. She is sacrificed as "payment" for the services which the gods are called upon to perform to insure that Agamemnon's army will be successful at Troy. Isaac is not a fee for divine services yet to be rendered. Indeed, while Iphigenia must die if her nation is to triumph, if Isaac dies then the nation not only loses but disappears. By withdrawing the son God would be withdrawing the means of supporting His promise to make of the descendants of Abraham a numerous and great people.

Abraham's conception of the divine command must be very different from that of Agamemnon. Indeed Kierkegaard points out that Abraham, by choosing to suspend the ethical and choosing faith, may hope that God will yet somehow fulfill his promise both to him and to Isaac, and that both may yet live, an option which is not possible for the pagan Agamemnon. But it is more helpful for an understanding of the biblical narrative to point out that Isaac, the product of divine intervention, stands in a different relationship both to God who commands the sacrifice and to his father who must carry it out. It is also helpful to point out that Agamemnon is not 'tested' as such. He is not subjected to a trial; his loyalty is not in question, or rather his loyalty is not an issue for the gods. His willingness to sacrifice his daughter is a function of his desperation. Abraham is tested. His loyalty is in question. Abraham does not offer Isaac to God, and God does not offer Abraham a specific reward for his compliance. The test, not some desired consequence, is the issue. And the test is not so much of Abraham's fidelity to God as an exploration of the character and source of that fidelity. When the test has been completed Abraham's knife is stilled, a ram is provided for the sacrifice,

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and God renews his promise to Abraham, "Because you have done this . . . I will indeed bless you. . . ." Unlike the gods' demands of Agamemnon, the divine command to Abraham is a test, and the test is preceded by the fulfillment of a divine promise (which provides the child for the test) and is followed by the reaffirmation of that promise.

Abraham's situation is different from that of Agamemnon. Isaac's is different from that of Iphigenia. But, most important, God is different from the gods. Agamemnon's gods are only marginal to his story. They exact their price, but the power and drama of the story lie with Agamemnon as his actions spin a web which must eventually ensnare him. In the biblical account, God is very much at the center of the test. It is Abraham's relationship with God which is the issue. It is God who tests Abraham, and He is very much a part of the power and the drama of the account. Will God really demand the death of the child? If He does, then what can be said about Him? Must He diminish His credibility in order to assert His power? The reader, of course, waits to see what Abraham will do, but also to see what God will do. God tries Abraham and the reader tries both.

The relationship between God and Abraham depicted in the biblical account is not the absolute relationship to the absolute that Kierkegaard asserts it to be. The source and thrust of Kierkegaard's position is clear. In the accepted or conventional understanding of religious life, that view against which Kierkegaard is arguing, the human subject is expected to obey divine commands because those commands conform to the rules of rational morality. In this view, as Kierkegaard understands it, the relationship between man and God would have to be: "I will perform or comply with only those divine commands which conform to reason." In this view, the subject has an absolute relationship to reason but only a conditional relationship to God, and God is understood to be God conditional upon His identity with reason.

It is unlikely that one could build a plausible interpretation of the God of the Abraham narrative which would include the notion that He is absolute. The notion of perfection which is part of the idea of the absolute would be incompatible with this Being who, as we see, so freely chooses, who seeks to test Abraham, and who, it would seem, does not know what Abraham will do, and who is moved to save Isaac. But regardless of whether or not God is the absolute, it is quite clear from the text that Abraham's relationship to God is not absolute and that God does not demand that it be so. Obligation to the command of God might be construed as unconditional if the test of Abraham were considered as a completely self-contained teaching. But it is not. The story starts earlier and ends later than this trial. The command to sacrifice Isaac must be seen against the backdrop of God's promise and the birth of Isaac. Abraham's relationship to God is not the relationship of the Kantian moral subject to the categorical imperative—which, it seems, is the schema which Kierkegaard has in mind when he develops the idea of an absolute relationship to the absolute. Unlike the categorical imperative, which commands with no regard to promise or actual benefit, the God of the Abraham narrative commands against the backdrop of the fulfillment of what He has already promised. The test is the middle episode in a series of three. The first episode is the promise of Isaac and the fulfillment of that promise in the birth of Isaac. The third and last episode is the termination of the test and the renewal of God's promise to Abraham. The command that constitutes the test may not be

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about the bestowing of benefit, but it occurs within a context in which there is not only the promise but the bestowing of benefit.

Abraham's willingness to do what God commanded him to do is bound up with the fact that God has already kept his promise to him. God renews His promise to Abraham because Abraham has kept his promise to God because God has kept his promise to Abraham. This says something about the underlying structure of the biblical account. It is not trial and the challenge of the will to effect an absolute relationship; rather, it is a matter of promises made, promises kept, promises tried, and promises made. The test may be phrased as follows: "Abraham, since you have benefitted from the relationship I have established with you, I want to determine whether this relationship is one which you accept because it benefits you. So let me put it this way, would you obey my command to sacrifice Isaac, to remove with your own hand that which is most precious to you and the fulfillment of the promise that binds you to me?" The test is an attempt to explore an aspect of Abraham's relationship with God, namely whether a relationship predicated on the production of good is to be accepted only when good is produced or whether such a relationship must also involve an element of fidelity which is independent of whatever good is actually produced. Obligation, or the absolute relationship to the absolute, must be seen in the biblical narrative in terms of benefit, and this, in turn, introduces a conditional element in the biblical understanding of man's relationship to God.

V.

Kierkegaard assures the readers of *Fear and Trembling* that the Abraham narrative reveals a teleological suspension of the ethical, a decision to set aside the whole framework of morality—its rules, i.e., the categorical imperative, its sources or foundation, i.e. reason—in the name of another framework, that of religion, which has its own rules, i.e., divine commands, and its own source, i.e., faith. It is only the setting aside of the ethical and the choice for the religious that allows Abraham to escape ethical condemnation and to hope that Isaac will be preserved. Without the teleological suspension of the ethical, Abraham's act—to take the life of his child—becomes rather like Agamemnon's, which, according to Kierkegaard, is marked by the necessity of choosing among moral evils and, therefore, necessarily and unavoidably of choosing a course of action which is morally evil. It seems to me, however, that there is not a teleological suspension of the ethical in the Abraham narrative.

The ground of the possibility of there being a teleological suspension of the ethical is that there be two codes of conduct with separate and distinct foundations such that one can be set aside for the other. Kierkegaard's idea of a suspension requires a rational morality over and against a divine morality. But the narrative does not give us any reason to believe that Abraham subscribed to anything other than the view that commands are all of one kind and that they are derived from God who is not subject to a law or rule outside of Himself. There does not appear to be any place for an independent rational morality in the biblical narrative. Abraham is presented as the father who loves his son and would not want to expose the child to harm, let alone to allow himself to be the instrument of the child's death, but these are surely what we would call Abraham's feelings for

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his son and not ethical responsibilities as such. There is no reason to believe that Abraham had what can be called an obligation to Isaac which was founded in some source other than, and independent of God.

Ironically, the whole thrust of Kierkegaard's analysis with regard to the suspension of the ethical is directed against those who see in the biblical narrative but one ethic, namely a rational ethic, albeit one clothed in metaphor and imagery. Kierkegaard is arguing against those who hold that obligations to God are nothing more than obligations to man and that faith is nothing more than either the performance of moral actions or the holding of certain beliefs which make these actions intelligible, that is, that there is only one command, the moral law, and only one foundation, reason. Against this view, Kierkegaard argues that there are two kinds of obligation, the moral law and reason, which perhaps hold sway within the context of social relationships, and divine commands the adherence to which is based on faith. Against those who find only a rational ethic in the biblical story, Kierkegaard argues the case for the presence of a divine ethic in addition to the rational one. But the narrative, I think, indicates the presence of only a divine ethic. There is, then, no teleological suspension of the ethical, for Abraham recognizes no ethic which he might suspend.

Does the Abraham narrative reveal an either/or between faith and reason? The either/or which Agamemnon confronted could only be a choice between contradictory ethical commands, while Abraham could take the ethical as a whole and set it aside in favour of the religious, a choice which carries with it the hope that the contradictory demands of the ethical would be resolved at this higher level. Kierkegaard sees in the test of Abraham the choice to deny reason and what reason would have us accept, namely, that we ought not to take the life of another human being, that the human person does not survive the disintegration of the body, that there are no unseen intelligent forces operating in the universe which act contrary to the laws of nature, and to affirm faith and what it would have us accept, namely that we should do what God wills regardless of the demands of the ethical, that the soul is immortal, that God is the Author of Nature and can do with Nature as He will. I see no reason to believe, however, that a choice of this kind is to be found in the Abraham narrative.

The issue of the test is not whether Abraham believes in God or whether he affirms the existence of God, but whether he will obey God's command. His choice concerns not what he will believe but what he will choose to do. At no point in the narrative is there even a hint of suspicion with regard to Abraham's belief; it is his loyalty, his fidelity to God in the face of his love for his son which is the issue. It is hard to believe that Abraham could have doubted that God exists, for as I have pointed out, Isaac is clearly presented in the biblical narrative as the result of God's intervention. Surely part of the drama and power of the story comes from the fact that the child Abraham is commanded to sacrifice is himself the gift of God. The reality of the child to be sacrificed is proof of the existence of the God who commands the sacrifice. The issue is not whether Abraham believes in God but whether he will obey the command. In this regard Abraham's test resembles that of Jonah. Ordered to Nineveh to prophesy against the wickedness of that city, Jonah runs away. Jonah does not question, let alone deny, God's existence. If he did not believe that God exists he would not have sought to flee from Him. It is rather surprising that Kierkegaard has missed the splendid

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psychology of the human being who acknowledges God yet flees from Him, but it does seem that Kierkegaard's analysis fails to appreciate this aspect of the biblical depiction. One cannot explain Abraham through Kierkegaard's faith/reason distinction. If one wishes to invoke this distinction one would have to say that Abraham had "good reason" for his choice to obey God. Isaac is that good reason.[7] There is no juxtaposition of reason, knowledge, and experience against paradox, action, and the unseen.

VI.

Kierkegaard rescues Scripture from those who, like Spinoza, dismiss it as moral teaching which, while containing an element of universal truth, is, nevertheless, poorly reasoned and imaginatively presented, and those who, like Hegel, believe that Scripture is a primitive statement which, while true, is yet superseded by literary and philosophical forms more pure and conceptual. Kierkegaard reads and presents Scripture (and here I draw on a general interpretation of *The Concept of Anxiety* as well as *Fear and Trembling*) as what might be called the ontological imagination of man. From a human point of view, which does not exclude some higher or divine point of view, Scripture is the re-creation not of the temporal origins of man but of the fundamental, ontological conditions of the human subject who re-experiences this dimension of his existence in a way that makes possible a life lived with a degree of clarity, of self-knowledge and authenticity unmatched by the philosophical tradition of the Greeks (and this despite the greatness of Socrates). The task of Scripture is to inform, but, more important, to possess, to transform the lives of those who read it and to enable them to live their lives in terms of that which is most fundamental to them, that is, that they are a synthesis of the eternal and the temporal, the infinite and the finite.

Scripture, in Kierkegaard's analysis, is an interpretation of the existential conditions of human existence expressed in a literary and imaginative mode. This mode is not required, as Maimonides and other defenders of Scripture believe, as an imaginative form necessary to reach people of limited intellectual ability. It is necessary, Kierkegaard believes, because thought is inadequate to the task of paradox, to the task of changing the life of the subject, because it does not understand the nature of the subject and the role which passion plays in his life. Art in general, Kierkegaard would argue, and Scripture in particular, emerge and develop in those contexts in which thought fails, those contexts in which the soul of man, still caught in the upward movement engendered by his nature as finite and infinite, still seeks to transcend existence, if not to understand it then to enable him to live in it. Thought at its limits gives birth to religious art, the imaginative depiction of man dealing with the questions of his existence and living in terms of his inability to answer them.

The logic of Scripture, as Kierkegaard understands it, is that it moves to that which is most fundamental, and what it finds at this level is what we, after Kant, call antinomies—positions each of which is understood to be true but which are, nevertheless, in contradiction with each other. Abraham is bound by the moral

[7]Louis P. Pojman makes an interesting and compelling case for the "rationality" of Abraham's choice in Chapter 4 of his work, *The Logic of Subjectivity: Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion* (University: Alabama Univ. Press, 1984).

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law to respect the life of his son as an absolute limit to his conduct. Yet he is also bound to God in such a way that that relationship can accept no limits. In Kierkegaard, the antinomy becomes the crucible out of which comes the transformation of the subject, a transformation which establishes both a higher degree of self-knowledge and a more authentic life. Abraham, as he is presented in *Fear and Trembling*, is the "synthesis," not in the sense that he includes the thesis and antithesis within him, but as one who lives the antinomy. Confounded by what he does not and cannot know, yet forced to choose, Kierkegaard's Abraham suspends the ethical, and with it reason, and leaps, that is wills rather than argues, his way to faith. This is the person Kierkegaard places at the centre of faith and religion. It is in the subtle, highly dialectical, phenomenological account of the psyche of this individual that Kierkegaard's great and original powers as a thinker are best displayed.

This figure, however, is not Abraham, at least not the Abraham of the Genesis story. It is more like the Socrates of the *Apology* who, although proclaiming ignorance and even appealing to the Delphic Oracle for support, nevertheless recognizes that the charge which constitutes his trial requires that, informed or not, he must act. The Abraham of the biblical narrative is one who, as I have noted, knows that God is, knows that God has made a promise to him, and knows that at least part of that promise has been kept. Abraham must now choose to act not because he stands to gain from the act but because God wants him to act, and act so that He might determine the ground of Abraham's fidelity. The issue of the trial is that of choice and the grounds for choice. The issue is not knowledge of God or of the existence of God. Abraham is, I think, closer to Jonah and the choice which Jonah must make, whether to flee from God's command, than he is to Kierkegaard's Abraham, who must, in keeping with Kierkegaard's romanticized Socratic model, seek to obey a command from an entity the existence of which is in question. Against Kierkegaard's model of the one who does not know but must act, we have the model of the one who knows but would disobey, or perhaps flee as Jonah did, hiding from a God whose existence he does not deny.

Abraham is a very complicated figure, and Kierkegaard, who sees in him the Socratic paradigm of having to admit ignorance while recognizing the demands of action, misses the Abraham who is revealed in the biblical text—the man who might well disobey what he understands to be the truth. The Jonah parallel is, I think, compelling, because it depicts not only an individual who hears the command of God and chooses to disobey, but an individual who, in flight from God's command, is pursued—his ship subjected to a storm, he is tossed by fearful sailors into the sea, and his flight ends in the belly of the whale. Jonah can disobey God but he cannot escape or prevail against Him. Can Abraham disobey? Obviously yes, for if he could not there would be no purpose to trying him. Jonah believes that one can flee God, but perhaps Abraham knows what Jonah will eventually learn (for we remember Jonah for his fate and Abraham for his choice), that one cannot flee. Disobedience in this case is not an act against a moral rule for which the penalty is that one is judged to be morally wrong, but an act against the way things are, against "reality," and the penalty in this case is that one's act is pointless and futile.

Like the Jonah story, the trial of Abraham makes the case for both the reality of choice and the futility of disobedience. The trial is known in Jewish sources as

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akedat Yitzhak, the binding of Isaac, and binding is an extremely useful metaphor here. Abraham binds Isaac to God. In so doing Abraham binds himself to God. In the termination of the sacrifice God binds himself to Isaac and to Abraham. The trial, in this view, is an exploration on the part of the participants of their relationship with each other and an affirmation of that relationship. In binding Isaac Abraham chooses to bind himself to God but this choice may only express the acceptance of a prior condition of Abraham's existence, namely that he is already bound to God. The binding of Isaac, then, is the recognition, the acceptance, the active embrace of what Scripture takes to be the fundamental condition of human existence, that man is bound to God. In the binding of Isaac Abraham chooses his destiny, but it is a destiny which he cannot deny.

VII.

Kierkegaard's "author" of *Fear and Trembling* tells his readers that he cannot understand Abraham and would not be capable of doing what Abraham did.[8] The author, in Kierkegaard's view, reveals the dilemma of the modern reader who honestly thinks that what separates him from Abraham is some piece of knowledge, some key in a vast historical puzzle or some proposition in a demonstration which, when comprehended would indeed enable the reader to understand Abraham and to do what he did. What separates the modern reader from Abraham in Kierkegaard's own view, however, is not a piece of knowledge but an act of will. Abraham does not know any more than we do. Our situation is his situation. What separates Abraham from Kierkegaard's modern readers, in Kierkegaard's view, is courage, not wisdom. But this underestimates the situation of Kierkegaard's readers and of Abraham as well. Abraham does not choose in a vacuum. One cannot forget that the child to be sacrificed is himself the fulfillment of God's promise and therefore tangible proof of God's relationship with Abraham. If we, Kierkegaard's modern readers, were in Abraham's situation we might, in fact, have chosen as he did, and if Abraham were in our situation he might feel, not the fear and trembling that Kierkegaard imputes to him, but the more prosaic puzzlement and hesitation that we feel. The biblical test suggests that it takes courage to obey God, but it does not suggest that affirming the existence of God is an act of courage.

Abraham is Kierkegaard's challenge to the modern reader, but Kierkegaard's Abraham may be less a challenge than a reflection of that reader. Kierkegaard's Abraham knows no more than we know, but he does what we would never do. Although, unlike us, Kierkegaard's Abraham possesses courage, like us he lacks wisdom. Kierkegaard has perhaps succeeded in giving us a view of ourselves, peering uneasily out at a vast universe which we understand to be ordered but silent and indifferent to our needs, confronting a reality which is absent or, at best, hidden. Metaphysics has failed and cannot in principle succeed; physics may succeed in describing but not in explaining the world. And so psychology becomes the Queen of the Sciences. What is left is the self and its uncertainty. Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith is certain only of his uncertainty, and this becomes his guide. He is certain that in placing the uncertain God at the centre of his life he will insure that uncertainty will be at the centre of his life, that he will live "on the

[8] *Fear and Trembling*, p. 37.

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edge." Kierkegaard's Abraham is man on the edge; he is the Knight of Anxiety. He is not "whole of heart and secure in (his) grasp on life,"[9] but an anxious Knight whose lot is trial and struggle. Rather than challenging us through the presentation of Abraham, Kierkegaard gives us the anxious selves we know ourselves to be. He has found us in Scripture, but has lost Abraham.

[9] I borrow this description from R. G. Collingwood who uses it, in another context, in his *Speculum Mentis or the Map of Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1963), p. 35.

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Rationality and Mysticism

Richard H. Jones

DO STANDARDS of rationality vary in different historical and cultural contexts? Or is there only one way of thinking which qualifies as being "rational"? The study of mysticism offers an opportunity to address these questions in a way which in at least one important respect is superior to the history of science or cultural anthropology, namely, the narrow range of allegedly cognitive experiences that is mysticism's central experiential focus. The term "mysticism" has been used to refer to everything from mythology to metaphysics. But in this article, the term will refer only to the values, action-guides, and belief-commitments constituting those ways of life oriented around experiences (both sensory and introvertive) which lessen the sensory and conceptual structuring of ordinary experiences and thereby allegedly permit an insight into the nature of reality. Examples will be presented from a variety of systems developed around the range of these experiences.

The discussions that have become important since the work of Walter Stace concerning the distinctions drawn between types of mystical experiences and of the role of concepts in mystical experiences will not be entered into here.[1] Instead this article will be based on the position that the experiential component of some mystical experiences may remain constant regardless of the historical or cultural setting, and that all mystical experiences have an experiential component with many features in common, regardless of whether cultural structuring informs the experience itself or is independently applied (consciously or unconsciously) after the experience itself by the experiencer. In this situation, the historical and cultural variations in mystical interpretative systems can then be studied as human constructs bearing directly on the issue of whether there is one standard of rationality or many.

The general topic of "rationality" can be broken down into four somewhat more manageable subtopics: the possibility of understanding other cultures (translation), the structure of reasoning when operating unconnected to facts (logic), the interaction of reasoning and factual claims (styles of reasoning), and the problem raised by the comparison of competing beliefs (relativism). As will become apparent, these subtopics are integrally interwoven and so cannot be totally separated.

The issues will be approached first by setting out problems posed by philoso-

[1]For suggestions of appropriate distinctions concerning mystical experiences, see Ninian Smart, "Interpretation and Mystical Experience," *Religious Studies* 1 (1965), 75–87, and Richard H. Jones, "Experience and Conceptualization in Mystical Knowledge," *Zygon* 18 (1983), 139–165.

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phers and anthropologists concerning any alleged universal rationality, and then discussing what mystics themselves say, if anything, about the issue and what bearing the comparative study of mysticism may have upon them.

TRANSLATION AND INCOMMENSURABILITY

If different languages involve different standards of rationality, how is translation possible? Conversely, if translation between languages is possible, must there not be only one standard of rationality? Both vocabulary and grammar present potential difficulties. Concerning vocabulary, different languages contain different categories for ordering experiences and thus contain different inventories of what constitutes reality. If there is no neutral vocabulary to express each conceptual system, then the different systems are incommensurable (i.e., lacking a common ground into which systems can be translated without loss).[2] It may not be that all terms gain their meaning from the doctrinal system in which they are embedded as a whole; instead, most terms may be easily translated. Nevertheless, it is not possible to define all high-level theoretical terms of one belief-system in the vocabulary of another. This problem is broader than that between different natural languages since it also encompasses the problems of translating one metaphysical or scientific theory into terms of another (e.g., "sun" in the Ptolemaic and Copernican systems does not mean the same thing although the referents are the same). Both the dimension of meaning (the sense of terms) and the referential dimension of terms (the range of application) present problems. Benjamin Whorf advances a thesis concerning grammar which would produce a further problem for translation: there is an "implicit metaphysics" in the grammatical structure of different languages such that the background linguistic system shapes ideas, not merely voices them.[3] Thus in "Standard Average European" things (objects) predominant while in Hopi events do; mutually untranslatable languages are thereby produced.[4]

[2]See Thomas S. Kuhn, "Commensurability, Comparability, Communicability," in P. Asquith and T. Nickles (eds.), *PSA 1982*, Vol. 2 (East Lansing: Philosophy of Science Association, 1983), pp. 669–688. If terms are incommensurable, no equivalents within another system could be found for them in principle. Philosophical systems have survived translation (e.g., Greek thought into Arabic, a non-Indo-European language, and later translated a second time into Latin) with the basic ideas remaining intact. So, too, bilingual speakers accept European translations of Islamic and Chinese philosophical works. There may be, however, core theoretical terms for which English placeholders are merely being substituted.

[3]Benjamin L. Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality*, John B. Carroll, ed. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1956), pp. 212–213. Whorf believes perception differs between speakers of uncalibratable languages (since observation is theory-laden), but certain obvious difficulties arise: just because the Hopi classify all flying objects together by one term does not mean that they cannot visually differentiate airplane pilots from flies. It is doubtful that concepts from all levels of a belief-system enter into the process of structuring experiences. In addition, there is the danger of attributing too much literalness to expressions; e. g., while English speakers refer to "a flash of lightning" instead of the Hopi expression of the event "flash" *(Reh-pi)*, this does not mean that the English speakers think that lightning exists apart from the flash or that lightning could do something else. How much of the language's structure or the origins of a term's meaning can be attributed to modern speakers, as language and knowledge evolve, is not clear; nor is it clear how an etymological history affects our perception.

[4]Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality*, p. 147. Whether there is a "standard average" Indo-European language is questionable. For example, a translation of the English phrase "The pot is blue" into Sanskrit would produce an expression containing an abstraction without a verb, more literally reading "(There is) blueness of the pot." Furthermore, what exactly is meant by an "implicit

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Basic problems can be raised as to whether untranslatability can determine the general issue of rationality. First, if conceptual systems are incommensurable, this does not help decide whether the holders of any of them are rational or not. We could not tell which systems were rational from this fact alone. Rationality involves more how the terms are handled than whether they can be mapped from one language into another language. Second, even if different languages cannot be translated, still speakers of different languages can understand each other. Thus Thomas Kuhn thinks that holders of different scientific theories can understand each other, compare the theories, and genuinely discuss the differences. So too, Whorf is able to express in English how the Hopi see the world; the expressions may be awkward, but he is not bound by the grammar of English. Our native language may contain our habitual categories for dissecting the world; these categories, however, have not presented an absolute barrier in understanding others or in the development of science. Thus, untranslatability would not present a barrier to determining if the other speakers were rational.

The study of mysticism can illustrate the above problems. For example, the rapid failure of the *ko-i* method of translating Indian Buddhist texts into Chinese by substituting Taoist terms for Buddhist ones highlights the problem of the incommensurability of terms central to highly developed doctrines in various mystical systems. This presents difficulties not only for advocates of "perennial philosophy" but also for translation more generally. Translating core concepts such as *"puruṣa"* from Sāṃkhya-Yoga and *"ātman"* from Advaita Vedānta with the English word "self" does not circumvent the problems involved in removing highly refined concepts from the context which gives them meaning. Even when two mystical systems use the same term from within one language-group (e.g., *"ātman"* in Advaita Vedānta and in Buddhism), each mystical system still may use it with a unique sense and reference. "Self" may seem a convenient shorthand for the further explanations that are necessary when discussing concepts from a particular doctrinal system, but it is misleading as a translation without an explanation since various Western philosophical and unphilosophical ideas will be read into the term. Many terms may be incommensurable with any contemporary English terminology (e.g., *karman* or *nirvāṇa*) and thus remain in the original, transliterated form when texts are translated; others may require explanations for whatever English placeholder is conveniently substituted (e.g., "wisdom" or "insight" for *prajñā*). Explaining the terms is possible in English even if they are not translatable in a convenient one-to-one fashion into any contemporary European language.

The Whorfian idea of an implicit metaphysics within a language is not supported by the fact that very different mystical systems have been conceived by speakers of the same language (e.g., Advaita Vedānta and Sāṃkhya-Yoga in Sanskrit). The variety of explicit metaphysics statable in the same language renders at best

metaphysics" in language is not clear. Whorf concedes that there is no "correlation" between culture and language but that these are only "affinities" (pp. 138–139) and that science is not caused by grammar but merely "colored" by it (p. 221). But very different metaphysical systems are statable in the same language (e.g., Platonic and Aristotelian thought); and even if Newtonian space-time is implicit in Standard Average European, still scientists were able to develop relativistic theories of space and time. Thus, speakers of the same language may have very different frameworks. How different explicit metaphysical and other highly theoretical frameworks could be possible if there were an implicit metaphysical system (controlling beliefs to some extent) inherently within any language is not clear.

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unhelpful this notion of an implicit metaphysics forcing certain concepts or producing one mystical system as the most natural reflection of a language's grammatical structure. Highly specialized sets of categories and uses of terms unique to particular mystical groups often develop. So too concepts behind terms evolve (e.g., "*brahman*" evolving through Vedic texts to Advaita Vedānta) rather than remaining fixed. Languages may present natural ways of looking at the world and experiences, thereby making certain responses to culturally-invariant mystical experiences seem natural and also affecting the cross-cultural adaptation of religions.[5] But while accentuating different aspects of the world may affect the formation of ideas, historically this has not prevented the creation of fundamentally different systems within one language (even contemporaneously). Nor has it prevented the understanding of those systems by others both inside and outside that language.

The problems which incommensurability and grammar present for translation do not address the basic problem which mystics find with language—that language by its nature objectifies a reality which is not in fact distinct from the speaker nor divisible into separate, independently existing parts.[6] The metaphysics implicit in language in this sense is common to all languages rather than varying with different language-groups. Thus mystics could not devise new languages without this problem remaining. Furthermore, mystics still find language useful, i. e., they can use the particular language present in their culture without projecting whatever divisions it makes onto the actual nature of reality. In this fundamental sense, no language is more "mystical" than any other. Mystics can utilize any given language for the particular metaphysical systems they devise. Since this approach involves the underlying issue of how concepts work rather than issues of specific concepts and grammars, translation is not a fundamental problem in this regard.[7] Nor can the issue of the mystics' view of how language works be easily related to the issue of rationality. That is, the writings of mystics can clearly illustrate the problems of translation discussed above because of the experiential component common to mystical systems, but whether the mystics' attitude toward language

[5]The effect of classic Chinese ideograms on Chinese thought and on the adoption of Buddhism is a major theme in Hajime Nakamura's *Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples*, Philip P. Weiner, ed. (Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1964), pp. 177–195. But see Joseph S. Wu, "Chinese Language and Chinese Thought," *Philosophy East and West* 19 (1969), 423–434, and Henry Rosemont, Jr., "On Representing Abstractions in Archaic Chinese," *Philosophy East and West* 24 (1974), 71–88.

[6]For an explication of this view, see Richard H. Jones, "A Philosophical Analysis of Mystical Utterances," *Philosophy East and West* 29 (1979), 255–274 (hereafter, "Mystical Utterances").

[7]Practical problems in translation remain. Any translation may lose the particular connotations of a given language, although of interest here is only whether the cognitive content is lost in the process of translating. In addition to the incommensurability of terms discussed above, the symbolic use of language which mystics employ to point beyond the original references of words to the mystical referent, presents difficulties of its own. Most broadly, this presents a problem to speakers of the same language—that of the unenlightened trying to understand the enlightened's words. Whether the enlightened are addressing the listeners in their native languages or not, the enigmatic sayings of such texts as the Indian *sūtras* are still enigmatic, requiring extensive commentary. Thus, texts such as the *Tao te ching* have produced so many translations, not because of any possible indeterminancy of translation, but because the texts themselves are open to very different interpretations by classical and modern thinkers. Some texts also may be deemed untranslatable for normative reasons unconnected to this problem, as with the *Qu'rān* being considered by Muslims to be untranslatable because Arabic is the language in which the book in heaven is written.

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is rational, irrational, or expresses an alternative standard of rationality cannot be determined without looking at the other issues involved in discussing rationality.

LOGIC AND PARADOX

Basic to the idea of rationality are the notions of consistency and coherence. That is, part of being rational relates to the structure of one's beliefs rather than to its content—rational systems of belief must be non-contradictory, both in small segments and as a whole. Thus, logical relations become central to the notion of rationality. In particular, certain principles of logic are deemed necessary to rationality: identity, non-contradiction (nothing can be both x and non-x), excluded middle (everything is either x or non-x), and truth-preserving inference (if A is true, what is "deducible" from A alone is also true).[8]

Just as all physical objects tacitly obey the law of gravity, are these principles of logic implicit in any language or any communicable system of thought even if the speaker is not aware of them? Or are the principles embodied in the grammar of certain languages only? Whorf asserts that these "laws of correct thinking" are not universal but only reflect the background character of Indo-European languages.[9] Others would argue that logic is not the reflection of a particular language but is merely an explicit articulation of the rules by which any language works.[10] Thus, it is possible to find examples of ideas which can be consistently stated in one symbol-system but not in another, although each symbol-system in itself still operates by these same rules of logic.[11] A third position is that we must assume that other belief-systems are not incoherent or inconsistent—we must impute rationality, for otherwise no understanding is possible.[12] This last position appears

[8]Attention here will be focused primarily upon the first three principles because deduction is more problematic. For example, the justification of deduction itself involves a deduction. See Susan Haack, "The Justification of Deduction," *Mind* 85 (1976), 112–119.

[9]Whorf, *Language, Thought and Reality* (n. 3 above), p. 211. If this is correct, it should not be surprising that J. F. Staal has found that the law of contradiction is formulated and adhered to in Sanskrit grammar and Indian logic (and in some but not all Indian philosophical schools). See his "Correlations Between Language and Logic in Indian Thought," *Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies* 23 (1960), 109–122, and "Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought: A Comparative Study," *ibid.* 25 (1962), 52–71. In particular, Staal notes the operation of Sanskrit's negating particle which he claims has correlates in all Indo-European languages.

[10]J. F. Staal, "Negation and the Law of Contradiction in Indian Thought: A Comparative Study," *ibid.*, p. 71. It should be noted that Whorf showed no new "logic" in the strict sense discussed here in any American Indian language or gave any evidence of incommensurable natural logics. Similarly, classical Chinese, a non-Indo-European language, can handle the classical Aristotelian propositional forms (contra Nakamura). See Y. R. Chao, "Notes on Chinese Grammar and Logic," *Philosophy East and West* 5 (1955), 31–41, and Chad Hansen, *Language and Logic in Ancient China* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1983), pp. 10–23.

[11]See Jones, "Mystical Utterances" (n. 6 above), p. 265. The fact that systems of logic can be created which explicitly deny one or more of the principles of logic is not relevant to the issue of whether natural languages can operate without implicit adherence to these principles. Zeno's paradoxes are evidence that we can conceptualize situations in such a way that everyday experiences appear incomprehensible.

[12]Martin Hollis, *Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). Also see his "The Limits of Irrationality" and Steven Lukes, "Some Problems about Rationality," in Bryan R. Wilson (ed.), *Rationality* (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970), pp. 194–220. Anthropologists usually persist until they can make sense of such

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to impose dogmatically an answer to what should be an empirical question concerning alternative standards of rationality. Nevertheless, it can be rightly asked whether we would ever accept inconsistent translations or whether we would instead persist until attaining a translation which makes sense to us (thereby fulfilling the basic principles of logic) before rejecting or accepting another belief-system for other reasons.

All of these positions concerning logic raise problems for the claim that we can empirically answer the question of whether logic is universal or culturally bound. The study of mysticism can contribute to this discussion, however, since mystical writings are often taken to be the paradigm of irrationality: it is often claimed that because mystics place soteriological goals (related to the meaning of life or to the end of suffering) in a central place in their ways of life, they are uninterested in such mundane concerns as logic. Or it is claimed that mystical experiences transcend all duality and, hence, transcend logic. Mystics are said to feel unconstrained by logic or to delight in paradoxes. And it is certainly true that other considerations keep logic from being a topic of major concern to mystics. While mystics may be familiar with the thought of contemporaneous thinkers who deal with laws of argument, the most likely reaction is that of *Chuang tzu* to the sophists of his day—to play off their work to reveal its limitations.[13] Thus, if mystical works can be understood as implicitly conforming to the principles of logic, this would be some *prima facie* evidence that any belief-system communicable to other people may be logical and, hence, that logic is indeed universal rather than Western (although the possibility that commentators are merely imposing their own order on the mystics still cannot be ruled out).

To show that mysticism and logic are not incompatible, it first must be understood that logic applies to statements, not to experiences or alleged realities. No experience or reality, mystical or otherwise, is itself "logical" or "self-contradictory." Rather only claims about the mystical made while mystics are operating in the realm of distinctions are logical or illogical. The issue thus becomes whether mystics implicitly follow the canons of logic or not in their statements.

It is undeniable that enlightened mystics can resort to arguments structured by "Western" logic if the occasion demands it, even when mystical topics are being discussed. In the *Milindapañha*, the Buddhist monk Nāgasena addresses questions often reflecting a concern with the direct violation of the principle of non-contradiction in the form of two-pronged dilemmas. For example, he reconciles the apparently conflicting statements that the Buddha claimed to have no teachers and to have five teachers by asserting that no teacher of the Buddha instructed the enlightening knowledge and thus he had no teacher of that (*Mlp* 235–236). Many passages also implicitly involve the principle of excluded middle in the form, "if x, then y; if non-x, then non-y." We may not find all the reconciliations convincing, but this is not to deny the logical skeleton tacitly in the structure of the argument.

Other sorts of argumentation can also be shown to be not illogical. To focus

claims as the Bororo's assertion, "We are red macaws." See Dan Sperber, "Apparently Irrational Beliefs," in Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (eds.), *Rationality and Relativism* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), pp. 152–153.

[13]See A. C. Graham (trans.), *Chuang-tzu: The Inner Chapters* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1982), pp. 9–14.

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simply on the Buddhist tradition, various strategies are open to the charge of irrationality. The skillful means *(upāyakauśala)* employed by the Buddha in leading listeners to enlightenment, and the distinction between conventional truth *(saṃvṛtisatya)* and absolute truth *(paramārthasatya)* may be thought at best to reflect logic as a means to an end and, therefore, of no final significance. But giving a provisional answer to listeners unprepared to understand the ultimately correct answer or distinguishing between levels of truth is not to assert contradictory claims. The issues are whether the claims in their context are logical and whether any ultimate claims can be stated in a non-contradictory manner. And in terms of these issues, these Buddhist strategies are not *per se* illogical.

One Buddhist strategy which has been accused of being irrational, or of proposing an alternative to two-valued logic, involves the "four alternatives" *(catuṣkoṭi)*. This strategy consists of rejecting any answer to certain questions—claiming that none "fit the case" *(upeti)*—even though the proposed alternative answers exhaust the logical possibilities. Thus in response to the question of whether a Buddha exists after death, the Buddha rejects with the answer "Not so" *(mā h'evam)* the alternatives that a Buddha exists, does not exist, both exists and does not exist, and neither exists nor not exists (*Majjhima-nikāya* I.485–487). This appears clearly to violate the principle of non-contradiction, and numerous attempts have been made to show that it does not.[14] (Indeed, so many different applications of symbolic logic to this strategy have been proposed in order to show its rationality that these applications are especially open to the charge that we are imposing our logic upon other belief-systems.) Another option which does not ascribe too much sophistication to early Buddhists is to view the Buddha here as concerned only with ending attachments and not with logic.[15] The Buddha is simply stating as strongly as possible that no terms which might be taken as referring to an independently existing entity are applicable to a Buddha after death. The four alternatives would then be an instance of skillful thinking used when thinking of an object or of its absence would be misleading to the unenlightened. The style of reasoning is different from that of modern Western thinkers, but the strategy is not illogical for assuming that it would be misleading to describe x by predicate y or by the denial of y because either way the listener would still be thinking in terms of y.

Other Buddhist strategies are also implicitly logical in structure. For example, Nāgārjuna is often assessed as using logic (without advancing any substantive views of his own) to destroy the views of others. Whether this assessment is correct is open to question, but at least it can be shown that Nāgārjuna's argumentation readily conforms to the principles of logic, whatever the ultimate

[14]Two recent entries in the series in which authors survey the literature and propose their own views are F. J. Hoffman, "Rationality in Early Buddhist Fourfold Logic," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 10 (1982), 309–337, and V. K. Bharadwaja, "Rationality, Argumentation and Embarrassment: A Study of Four Logical Alternatives *(Catuṣkoṭi)* in Buddhist Logic," *Philosophy East and West* 34 (1984), 303–319.

[15]Of course, this may be just another instance of forcing other belief-systems to be rational. But see Bharadwaja, *ibid.*, and Richard H. Jones, "The Nature and Function of Nāgārjuna's Arguments," *Philosophy East and West* 28 (1978), 492–494. Only if the Buddha elsewhere were concerned with theoretical issues of logic would one be led to think that this was his concern here; however, the Buddha only manifests a concern with ending suffering.

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purpose or valuation of this argumentation.[16] In general, as J. F. Staal concludes, the idea of Buddhist irrationality does not withstand examination.[17]

Examples of ways of arguing could be presented from other mystical traditions, but it may be more profitable simply to turn to the matter most fundamental to mystics' supposed irrationality—their use of paradox. Paradox is not an inadvertent inconsistency, but is, instead, the conscious use of self-contradiction. It can be used as a soteriological device whose purpose is to free the listener from thinking in terms of distinctly existing entities. Zen *kuans/koans* are examples of deliberately absurd statements, some of which are paradoxical, employed as part of religious training. To be effective for the listener, this strategy must presuppose that the listener accepts the applicability of the principle of non-contradiction to mundane matters—otherwise there would be no need for a special paradoxical strategy, when it comes to the mystical, to direct the listener's mind away from the mundane. The issue at hand, however, is whether the cognitive content of paradoxical statements can be stated consistently, if the occasion calls for it, or whether self-contradiction is dictated by the nature of mysticism.

Probably all mystical paradoxes can be given non-contradictory interpretations.[18] Each paradox must be examined to determine the proper method for defusing the apparent conflict. The most common resolution is to interpret the apparently conflicting claims as referring to two different subjects and thus not actually conflicting. These interpretations would be open to the charge of imposing logical order on true paradoxes, if mystical statements in principle had to be self-contradictory because of the experiences or realities involved. That is, if, when the human mind attempts to comprehend the ultimate, our concept-systems all fail, then Tertullian's *"credo quia impossible"* would be the only proper response. From the mystics' point of view, any statement made in any language will involve distinctions, and, thus, could not mirror a reality which is free of all distinctions.

The problem with the mystics' position on paradox, however, is that it itself is another instance of the problem which mystics find with language in general: just as mystics can use a language without projecting its distinctions onto reality, so here they should be able to speak of the mystical without such a projection. Because the mystical is "wholly other" than the mundane, the unenlightened may be especially susceptible to being misled when the mystical is discussed, and thus paradox may seem the natural way of speaking about it. But words need not reflect the subject to which they refer in a one-to-one manner to make meaningful

[16]For a different assessment of Nāgārjuna's program, see Jones, "The Nature and Function of Nāgārjuna's Arguments," *ibid.* For an exposition of the logical structure of one of his arguments, see that article, pp. 500–501, note 6. Far from denying that Nāgārjuna's arguments are logical, their logical nature is always central in recent evaluations of his thought. See, e.g., Guy Bugault, "Logic and Dialetics in the *Madhyamakakārikās*," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 11 (1983), 7–76.

[17]J. F. Staal, *Exploring Mysticism* (Berkeley/Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1975), pp. 49, 54. Elsewhere, he concludes that the principle of non-contradiction is explicitly formulated and strictly adhered to in another Indian mystical tradition, Advaita Vedānta. ("Negation and the Law of Non-Contradiction in Indian Thought: A Comparative Study" [n. 9 above], p. 68.) Staal also concludes that all Asian "mystical doctrines in general are rational." (*Exploring Mysticism*, p. 40.)

[18]See Jones, "Mystical Utterances" (n. 6 above), pp. 264–268 for examples and a theory of the place of paradoxes in mystics' use of language. See also Richard H. Jones, *"Vidyā* and *Avidyā* in the *Īśa Upaniṣad*," *Philosophy East and West* 31 (1981), 79–87.

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statements about it. And since logic (and hence paradox) is a matter of language rather than a matter of experiences and realities, paradox is not required by the nature of any experiences or the realities. In these circumstances, the possibility of non-contradictory interpretations of apparent paradoxes should not be ruled out. Thus, if some statements by mystics do not tacitly follow the principles of logic, it may very well be because of considerations unrelated to the issue of the possible rationality of mystical belief-systems, not because they are inherently irrational.

STYLES OF REASONING AND UNIVERSAL REASON

The step beyond the logical structure of arguments is to look at full arguments themselves. Rationality involves more than logic—it involves the use of factual claims and the relation between beliefs in justifying one's beliefs. It may be that the mental steps each person subjectively employs in reasoning are unique to that person, but are there common (and hence objective) standards in the process of reasoning? Do people in different cultures reach different conclusions merely because they argue from different premises and have different values or interests, or do they actually "think" (reason) in different ways? That is, are there criteria of proper reasoning applicable in any context or are there in fact alternative criteria? And as a counterpart to the problems mentioned above, would we be able to recognize and acknowledge standards of reasoning which were truly completely different from our own?

The standard of rational thought in the West is often thought to be the certainty of logical deduction and mathematical proof. But problems have been advanced concerning both such basic logical operations as *modus ponens* and completeness in mathematics (e.g., by Godel's theorem). More generally, no proof is final even in mathematics—"the proofs of one generation are the fallacies of the next."[19] Concerning the application of standards of proper reasoning to more clearly factual matters, natural science is taken to be the paradigm of rationality. The nature of science, however, does not fit an empiricist image. No set of neutral sense-experiences determines the choice between competing theories in a simple manner. Not only is there no one "scientific method," but standards of reasonableness appear to vary with different theories rather than to be timeless.[20] Rationality thereby comes to involve not merely coherence of beliefs or holding one's beliefs open to criticism, but what is "plausible" in light of underlying beliefs and values; metaphysical issues related to the nature of reality become intertwined with the standards of rationality. What is accepted as a "rational," "natural," or "logical" explanation becomes tied to the cultural beliefs of a particular historical period about the nature of the world. Because of the absence of a neutral algorithm determining a choice between competing scientific theories, the currently most popular models of rationality stress both the need to weigh various factors important to science and the role of community in decisions in the

[19]Morris Kline, *Mathematics: The Loss of Certainty* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 318. On mathematical proof, see pp. 313–320.

[20]For an overview of post-empiricist theories of the nature of science, see Frederick Suppe (ed.), *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977, second edition), Introduction.

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evolution of scientific ideas.[21] Science is seen more as a human activity than as a mechanical reading of nature. Argument becomes more a matter of persuasion rather than of compulsion. This lack of factors compelling a decision between competing theories and the role of a "conversion" in a scientist's final decision do not introduce "irrationality" into the core of what is usually taken to be the most rational of activities, but rather redefine what exactly "rationality" is.[22]

An image of rationality which encompasses the historical context of reasoning, the role of judgment and choice, and the role of communal decision-making does not require that all thought be deemed rational. Some people may go beyond reasonable disagreement and adhere to beliefs for which there is no experiential basis, which is adhered to despite all evidence and argument to the contrary, and which cannot be accounted for by any coherent explanation. Not all non-scientific activity falls into such irrationality. Western philosophy and legal decision-making are kinds of activity which can be rational in the above sense although they are not natural sciences.

Turning to activity in other cultures, are there features of reasoning common to different cultural contexts which indicate that rationality is a universal component of belief-systems, or does the study of other belief-systems indicate that rationality is in fact tied to certain beliefs about the world? To Paul Feyerabend, the self-proclaimed Dadaist of philosophy, there are many canons of rationality, no privileged class of good reasons, and no restrictive preferred paradigm.[23] On the other hand, E. E. Evans-Pritchard in describing Zande witchcraft—a cultural system which most modern Western thinkers would find absurd—indicates that the Azande use patterns of inference which follow the same logical rules as we use in reasoning.[24] So too, in Indian philosophy all schools accept some form of inference *(anumāṇa)*. The Nyāya employ a syllogism which, although not Western in form, obeys Western rules of deduction. The premises employed by these non-modern groups do not affect this structure. What are the limits to rationality in such a situation?

The study of mysticism is valuable in this regard. If in their various styles of reasoning mystics reveal a fundamentally different way in which facts are handled or in the application of reason to facts, they would be exhibiting an alternative standard of rationality or a form of irrationality. This possibility is heightened by the mystics' own sense that their cognitively central experiences transcend language and, hence, reason. In the words of Ernest Nagel, a "consistent mystic cannot hope to establish his claims by argument" since "argument involves the use of analytic reason, and on the mystic's own view reason is incapable of penetrating to the substance of reality."[25] An argument can be made that mystical experiences, like all experiences, underdetermine theory, and, therefore, mystics

[21]See Thomas Kuhn, "Objectivity, Value Judgment, and Theory Choice," in his *The Essential Tension: Selected Studies in Scientific Tradition and Change* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), pp. 320–339.

[22]See Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).

[23]See his *Against Method: Outline of an Anarchistic Theory of Knowledge* (London: New Left Books, 1975).

[24]E. E. Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic Among the Azande* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), p. 139.

[25]Ernest Nagel, *Logic Without Metaphysics* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956), p. 390.

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must provide arguments for their particular interpretations.[26] But more to the point of the present issue, mystics can consistently claim both that reason is no substitute for any experience and that reason can be part of an enlightened way of life (since distinctions are present outside of mystical experiences even after enlightenment). Advancing an argument, perhaps involving reference to mystical experiences, to establish the superiority of one mystical position would then not be inconsistent with being a mystic or evidence of irrationality. Being a mystic would not necessarily be an alternative to being a philosopher.

With regard to the styles of reasoning in mystical texts, one notices that many texts do not appear argumentative in nature. For example, many texts are poetry (partially because of the need to use symbolic language to point to the non-mundane) which is of value to followers, but which is free of any arguments. On the other hand, many texts explicitly are arguments in support of certain positions and against other traditions. For example, the *Yoga-sūtras* and the *Brahma-sūtras* contain only summary statements, but the classical commentaries contain full arguments. Śaṃkara's commentary on the latter contains arguments against the Sāṃkhya-Yogins and the Buddhists which point out the inconsistencies and conflicts with general experience which appear when their doctrines are examined from an Advaitin point of view. The approach is "rational" by the standards discussed above. It is also worth noting that no appeal is made to mystical experiences as a means to correct knowledge *(pramāṇa)*. Indeed, in most classical mystical texts, there is no appeal to special experiences as a basis of an argument. Thus, for example, Plotinus's *Enneads* is similar in style to classical Greek philosophical texts, even if the topics and premises are not the same.

Mystics reflect the concerns of their culture but are not necessarily irrational. Thus, Meister Eckhart, standing in the Medieval scholastic tradition, agrees that reason can find proofs for truths revealed in scripture (although God dwells beyond the limits of the mind).[27] In Buddhism, argument *(tarka)* is rejected as a means to enlightenment, but the Buddha does produce arguments. Appeals to ordinary experiences and conceptual analysis are the basis for arguments in favor of the no-self doctrine *(an-ātman)*. Other means of arguing are also employed as aids to the religious quest. Neither skillful means nor the four alternatives discussed above are in principle irrational. Conditioning one's teachings to the level of understanding of the listener is not irrational if some teaching is advanced as the final truth. (Here, the cycle of rebirth, the role of *karman*, and the end of the cycle are not ultimately denied.) So too dismissing some questions unanswered, while other questions are dealt with in other ways (*Dīgha-nikāya* III.229; *Aṅguttara-nikāya* I.197, II.46), is not irrational if the teachers have reason to believe that the listeners will be misled by any answer.

In the *Milindapañha*, Nāgasena, in response to very Western-style questions concerning the consistency and plausibility of Buddhist doctrine, answers, not with analogies of attribution or proportionality as were popular in the West, but with similes. For example, the material components of what we take to be a distinct person, "name and form" *(nāmarūpa)*, are said to arise together and to depend upon each other just as a yolk and egg-shell do (*Mlp* 49). Arguing by

[26]See Jones, "Experience and Conceptualization in Mystical Knowledge" (n. 1 above), pp. 146–150.

[27]Edmund Colledge, O.S.A., and Bernard McGinn (trans. and eds.), *Meister Eckhart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises, and Defense* (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), pp. 26–29.

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simile is usually not very convincing. At best, similes give other instances which make the problematic aspects of the situation in question seem at least plausible. Sometimes this is very valuable in itself, as in explaining that monks do not love their bodies but care for them during the quest for enlightenment, just as they care for unwanted wounds to ensure their continuing health (*Mlp* 73–74). Or sometimes the simile is very closely parallel, as with using the parts of a chariot to explain the idea that names of persons have no independent referent (*Mlp* 25–28). But similes usually do not provide any reason for believing that there is a connection between the matter to be explained and the simile employed (e. g., using the inference of the existence of deceased warriors from the presence of weapons to justify inferring the existence of the Buddha from the presence of teachings attributed to him) (*Mlp* 329–330). This severely limits this style of reasoning, although it does not make it irrational. Indeed, it reveals a concern with relations and an awareness of the problematic aspects of claims none of which is at all irrational. Mystics may not deal with claims we find problematic (as when Nāgasena explains by simile how rebirth works (*Mlp* 72) but does not deal anywhere with the basic claim of rebirth itself) or may rely on beliefs which we do not accept, but this does not make the structure of their reasoning irrational.

Often mystics appeal to self-evidence or to an article of faith. Śaṃkara finds reasoning to be an unstable foundation for understanding matters that should be realized from scripture *(śruti)*; philosophers constantly contradict each other (*Brahma-sūtra-bhāṣya* II. 1. 10–11). To the objection that this is itself an instance of reasoning, Śaṃkara replies merely that the Vedas, being eternal, provide the necessary knowledge. This defense involves a premise undefended in this passage concerning the Vedas and is ultimately circular.

Śaṃkara's response may appear irrational and dogmatic, but it should be noted that even in science a degree of dogmatism about the fundamental belief-commitments of a theory (e.g., Newton on forces) may be necessary to research. In addition, science as an enterprise is not merely a trial and error method in empirical matters: science as an approach to reality has metaphysical presuppositions (e.g., reality is objective and can be physically analyzed into discrete entities and processes without distorting its nature), and scientists are no more open-minded about the metaphysics underlying their enterprise than are mystics about theirs. Indeed, a circularity similar to that in mysticism has been attributed to science: empirical evidence is created by a procedure which quotes as its justification the very same evidence it has produced.[28] Similarly, Clifford Geertz sees religious systems in general as defining a reality which believers use in turn to justify the systems themselves.[29] Circularity in one enterprise, of course, cannot be justified by circularity in another, but it may be that some circularity or assumptions cannot be avoided at a basic metaphysical level of any enterprise. To say that fundamental beliefs are irrational because of circularity may require condemning the more basic aspects of natural science, and thereby undercut the metaphysical basis of the paradigm of rational activity. Thus accepting some circularity at a basic level as rational may be the lesser of two evils. To fulfill the standards of rationality in this situation, all that may be possible is to open one's presuppositions to some criticism and examination, as Karl Popper suggests[30]—if

[28]Feyerabend, *Against Method* (n. 23 above), p. 44.

[29]Clifford Geertz, *Islam Observed* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), pp. 17; 97.

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one can accomplish the often difficult task of revealing one's presuppositions as presuppositions. Mystics can be as critical in their context as scientists can be concerning the metaphysical dimension of science. Mysticism differs in degree only, because it involves total ways of life. Thus its fundamental belief-commitments are more encompassing than those of the limited concerns of science and are correspondingly harder to uproot and discuss critically.

Mystics do not always see the nature of their reasoning in a way that philosophers unconcerned with soteriological goals do. Often both mystical and non-mystical thinkers do not admit (or perhaps even see) the active role of their premises. Thus, for instance, Nāgārjuna's attempted *reductio ad absurdum* of his opponents' views relies in part on views of his own.[31] But the point for the issue at hand is that the mystics' styles of reasoning do not reveal a unique "logic" to mystical thought. Mysticism is not science, since it has different concerns and values. Nevertheless, the primary contemporary philosophical image of science suggests a rationality whose nature would not exclude as irrational how mystics deal with their experiences and beliefs. The premises with which mystics work differ from the paradigm of Western rationality, but mystics do not "think differently." They too deal with highly complex systems of beliefs, and for the issue of standards of rationality, there is nothing unique about mystics' reasoning. Their concerns are different, their premises may mix factual and evaluational elements, they may differ in the experiences taken to be cognitively supreme, and they may weigh different cognitive considerations differently. But, as the examples discussed in this section suggest, how mystics handle these elements is not necessarily irrational in this regard. Mystics cannot be condemned as irrational simply because they do not have the same concerns as scientists or any other group.

A complete justification of the rationality of mysticism would also have to justify the premises with which mystics operate. That is not being dealt with here. Rather, all that is being argued is that mystics handle their premises within their accepted frameworks in a rational manner. The beliefs accepted and the way they are handled are interrelated, but the rationality of the latter may be apparent without showing the rationality of the former. In addition, there are limits to rational argument about matters of ultimate belief-commitments. For example, Ludwig Wittgenstein speaks of the lack of a single ground for a network of belief.[32] Debating the basic premises of one's ways of life may not prove especially profitable with respect to the issue of rationality. Subjecting such premises to examination and criticism may at best be of only limited value in this regard since the criticism may be ultimately circular, and the basic commitment will remain ultimately non-logical.

[30]See, e.g., Karl R. Popper, "Towards a Rational Theory of Tradition," in his *Conjectures and Refutations* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 120–135.

[31]For a defense of this position, see Jones, "The Nature and Function of Nāgārjuna's Arguments" (n. 15 above).

[32]Ludwig Wittgenstein, *On Certainty* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), paragraphs 166, 559. For one application of this idea, see Norman Malcolm, "The Groundlessness of Belief," in Stuart C. Brown (ed.), *Reason and Religion* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1975).

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RELATIVISM

The last point leads naturally to the issue of whether any set of premises is more rational than another or whether all sets must be treated as cognitively equal. This is the issue of cognitive relativism: each way of life or system of beliefs internally sets its own standards of truth and rationality; these systems conflict; there is no independent, external standard by which to judge one system against another; and, therefore, at least certain competing belief-systems each can claim to be equally good.[33] Relativism goes a step beyond the topics discussed above by expanding the theory-dependent nature of what is "reasonable" to a denial that there is any way to adjudicate between competing belief-systems. Not all relativists think that all belief-systems have an equal claim to acceptance, or that every criterion of rationality is completely dependent upon a particular system—some criteria may be culturally invariant,[34] and by these criteria not all systems are equally good. Relativists, however, deny all forms of absolutism (the theory that there exists some absolutely certain basis for knowledge which provides a universal, theory-independent criterion for truth and rationality). Non-relativists may believe that truth is only a goal which we can never completely reach or may be skeptics concerning whether any particular claim is ultimately correct, but they do believe that there are claims about the world which are in principle true or false independent of individual belief-systems. Relativists, on the other hand, view truth and falsity and rationality as internal to belief-systems, and thereby are often charged either with denying any real truth at all or with irrationality. Holders of different belief-systems accept their systems as the most rational or the best reflection of reality and also produce arguments justifying their choices, but no such system (including the relativists' own) has any special status—none can be ranked as more rational or closer to reality by any theory-independent criteria. Any idea, it is claimed, which may make, say, magic as acceptable as modern science appears to question whether any truth or knowledge is possible at all. It is feared that cognitive relativism is the epistemological equivalent of a moral relativism which would require its adherents to tolerate violence and torture in other cultures. Only with the comfort of an absolute standpoint (such as some assume is provided by science) is there any point to attempting to justify one's beliefs at all.[35]

The characterization relativists' opponents give them is not necessarily accurate. Relativism does not follow merely from the fact that there are many different belief-systems. Nor does it follow from the need to examine concepts within their context in order to understand both them and what constitutes a justification for

[33]Not only are there competing positions on whether relativism is reasonable or not, there is no one universally accepted definition of exactly what "cognitive relativism" is. See, e. g., the various essays in Hollis and Lukes (eds.), *Rationality and Relativism* (n. 12 above); Jack W. Meiland and Michael Krausz (eds.), *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral* (South Bend: Notre Dame University Press, 1982); I. C. Jarvie, "Rationality and Relativism," *The British Journal of Sociology* 34 (1983), 44–60; and *The Monist*, 67 (July, 1984).

[34]See Robin Horton, "Tradition and Modernity Revisited," in Hollis and Lukes (eds.), *Rationality and Relativism* (n. 12 above), pp. 201–60.

[35]For a reply to the charge that relativism is self-refuting (i. e., that it cannot be stated consistently without becoming a form of absolutism), see Jack W. Meiland and Michael Krausz (eds.), *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral* (n. 33 above), pp. 31–32.

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the system's holder. Rather relativism involves the additional premise that there is no way to adjudicate between all competing systems, and that, therefore, there is no way of telling if at least some of these conflicting systems are no better than others. Conceptual relativity (the view that different cultural groups produce different social constructions of reality by ordering their experiences according to differing concepts) and perspectivism (the view that there is a plurality of complementary frameworks each of which reveals something of reality that others miss) do not preclude the possibility of absolute claims about reality, and, hence, do not, by themselves, entail cognitive relativism. Similarly, the incommensurability of terms or the evolution of standards of rationality does not preclude comparison, and so does not entail relativism. Relativists can concede that communication between holders of different belief-systems is possible—translation of most concepts may be possible, with only the most theoretical core concepts producing a relativism of total belief-systems. Advocates of a non-thorough-going relativism may even concede that there is a context-independent "human nature" which produces a core of culturally-invariant simple beliefs; only total belief-systems would then be relative. Furthermore, no relativist need deny that there is a reality existing independently of all conceptual systems, but they do deny that that reality determines one system or set of systems as the uniquely accurate picture of reality.[36]

The situation relativists see for belief-systems is comparable to having a series of conflicting map projections with no possibility of building a globe—there is no way of providing information independent of the projections and no absolute standpoint (the world "as it is in itself") from which to compare the projections. Each projection represents reality in a particular way; the projections share some features, but are incommensurable since there is no way to get to reality free of conceptual systems. The distinction here between "reality in itself" and "reality as conceived" is important to relativism: there is no theory-neutral way to reconstruct phrases like "really there,"[37] and comparisons between belief-systems are always comparisons between conceptions of reality. Thus, in the view of relativists, belief-systems cannot justify themselves against the world or theory-neutral experience, and thus there is no non-circular way of justifying the foundations of our ultimate beliefs about reality.

Mysticism cannot contribute to a resolution of the issue of relativism. Nelson Goodman finds mysticism to be a form of absolutism in that mystics hold that there is one definite way the world is, although this way is not captured by any description.[38] Indeed, mystics do adhere to an absolutism: mystical enlightenment

[36]In Roger Trigg's characterization, relativism concerns the denial of any objective reality rather than the relation between conceptual systems and the lack of objective standards to determine truth. See his *Reason and Commitment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), *Reality at Risk: A Defense of Realism in Philosophy and the Sciences* (Totowa, N.J.: Barnes & Noble Books, 1980), and "Religion and the Threat of Relativism," *Religious Studies* 19 (1983), 297–310. For criticism of his characterization, see J. Kellenberger, "The Slippery Slope of Religious Relativism," *Religious Studies* 21 (1985), 39–52.

[37]Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1970, second edition), p. 206. For criticism of the distinction between reality and reality as conceived, see Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual System," in Meiland and Krausz (eds.), *Relativism: Cognitive and Moral* (n. 33 above), pp. 66–80.

[38]Nelson Goodman, "The Way The World Is," *The Review of Metaphysics* 14 (1960), 55.

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involves a frame of reference which consists in part of implicit knowledge-claims concerning reality that are considered by the enlightened to be immune to correction. Thus, if relativism is taken to be a form of irrationality, mysticism cannot be criticized on this point. In addition, although many mystics would deny any final and complete description of the mystical reality, mystics are concerned with truth. For example, the Buddha uses skillful means to lead followers to enlightenment, but he is not concerned merely with what works. Instead he is concerned with that subset of knowledge which is useful in attaining a particular soteriological goal. Falsehoods may be temporarily helpful to certain listeners on the path, but nothing in the Buddha's total teaching suggests that there are no doctrines which are the final word on certain subjects related to the cycle of rebirths. Similarly, there are components of the experienced world (the *dharmas*) even if they are impermanent; and for all Buddhist traditions "dependent origination" *(pratītya-samutpāda)* is the ultimately correct description of the relation of these dependent, impermanent components of the experienced world. More broadly, mystics do not adhere to a solipsism which would make reality dependent upon an individual—reality is not an object distinct from the experiencer, but it is not reducible to any experiencer's individual existence either.

The doctrines which mystics advance are usually held to be the highest statable truth. Mystics who have produced writings have been aware of other doctrines, both mystical and non-mystical. They have been aware of criticism and other options, and they have responded. Central doctrinal concepts may be incommensurable between different mystical traditions, but mystics do believe that they can understand mystics from other traditions. Debates occur between rival teachers in many cultures, although there is a very real possibility that teachers are merely talking past each other rather than genuinely debating common issues. Mystics do not normally reject other mystical traditions totally, but instead rank mystical doctrines into a hierarchy with one particular doctrine at the top. The hierarchy may be arranged historically (indicating an evolution of doctrine) or by means of some other criterion. But the result is the same: the mystic making the ranking places his or her sect's teaching alone at the top. Doctrines from both within and outside the mystical tradition in question are included, the doctrines from within the tradition being both the teachings of other sects and the doctrines taught to the less spiritually advanced which are to be corrected by the final teachings. The popular Middle Eastern and Indian simile of the blind men describing an elephant has the implication that all rival belief-systems are equally valid. This, however, does not reflect how mystics usually see their own doctrine—theirs is uniquely the most complete or best answer attainable, not merely one among equals.

If mystics see themselves as absolutists, the comparative study of mysticism raises doubts concerning absolutism in mysticism. The commonality of the experiences and any reality involved permits comparison of the mystics' belief-systems even if core concepts are incommensurable. The problem which becomes apparent is that the different mystical ways of life conflict with respect to beliefs, values, and goals.[39] Reality may be open to direct mystical experience, and mystical experiences may be open to descriptions at a basic experiential level,

[39]See Jones, "Experience and Conceptualization in Mystical Knowledge" (n. 1 above) and "Must Enlightened Mystics Be Moral?" *Philosophy East and West* 34 (1984), 273–293 for examples of differences in beliefs, values, and goals.

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which descriptions are neutral between competing belief-systems. Nevertheless, there appears to be no set of culturally invariant criteria for the level of fundamental belief by which to judge the relative superiority of one mystical system over another.[40] The criteria which each mystical tradition employs to make judgments concerning both experiences (including non-mystical and different types of mystical experiences) and the views of other traditions are internal to that tradition. Each tradition will characterize facts, problems, and solutions differently in varying degrees. In addition, the experiences themselves, as with all experiences, underdetermine any total interpretation and thus do not verify any one complete theory. The fundamental premises of a belief-system will be open to examination, but ultimately there will be no non-circular way to justify them. In light of this, it is difficult to speak of any one set of highly-laden doctrinal mystical concepts as "corresponding to reality." Each existing mystical belief-system can in principle be internally coherent and can handle all the experiential data. The concepts from different traditions may have the same referent, but the characterization of "reality" and of the final nature of any experiences will reflect highly intricate belief-systems, and we are left with no theory-neutral way to decide between the competing characterizations. Judgments of the superiority of one tradition over another by any means of ranking will be normative. Similarly, the view that all mysticism is the same, as adherents of perennial philosophy claim, will involve judgments not deducible from mystical experiences or the various mystical traditions themselves.

Thus, mysticism cuts both ways on the issue of relativism: mystics themselves espouse absolutism, while the comparative study of mysticism presents *prima facie* evidence against absolutism. It may be that both absolutism and relativism are points of view which are not themselves the results of empirical study but instead represent stances taken prior to any such study. Tying rationality to either point of view may also represent an *a priori* judgment.

CONCLUSION

Cross-cultural studies of rationality have a certain inconclusiveness about them because we cannot eliminate the possibility that we are merely assuming the rationality of other people. The above examination of mysticism's bearing on the subissues of rationality, however, leads at least to the conclusion that there is a very real possibility that mystical thought is rational. Not everyone may be rational, nor may anyone be totally rational; but the obvious instances of mystical strategies which, on the surface, appear to be irrational can be seen upon closer examination to be rational. The survey of examples from mystics in this paper may not be comprehensive enough to warrant broad generalizations, but it should present difficulties for any generalizations about the "mysterious Oriental mind" or other characterizations of mystics from any culture which present mystics as operating irrationally or with inscrutable alternative standards of rationality.

[40]Those non-mystical systems of thought which deny the significance of mystical experiences compete with mystical systems on a fundamental metaphysical level, thereby raising the issue of whether there is a common standard by which to evaluate this class of systems against the class of mystical belief-systems.

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St. Mary's Coll.

Toward a More Comprehensive Conception of Human Reason[1]

Vincent M. Colapietro

DESPITE DIFFERENCES in emphasis and terminology, many of the debates among philosophers today "have a single concern and focus: to determine the nature and scope of rationality."[2] Hilary Putnam goes so far as to say philosophy "is almost coextensive with [the] theory of rationality."[3] But, as he also notes, it is not an easy thing to give "a sane and human description of the scope of reason."[4]

Putnam reaches this conclusion after examining what he takes to be the two conceptions of rationality which have dominated analytic philosophy. It will be helpful to sketch here Putnam's critique of these conceptions, for his critique will provide us with the first steps toward formulating an adequate account of human rationality. That is, we might read the conclusions of his critique as suggestions regarding several of the minimal requirements for such an account of reason.

Putnam states that in analytic philosophy the main attempts to articulate a theory of rationality have come from philosophers of science.[5] The two most influential philosophies of science of the twentieth century, "certainly the two that have interested scientists and non-philosophers generally, the only two the educated general reader is likely to have even heard of," are logical positivism and the historicist position defended by Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*.[6] At the center of positivism is a commitment to some form of the principle of verification ("The meaning of a statement is its method of verification"). At the heart of Kuhn's historicism is a particular interpretation of scientific revolutions or paradigm shifts; according to this interpretation, a post-revolutionary perspective is *incommensurable* with the pre-revolutionary perspective which it has replaced.[7]

[1]This paper is a revised version of a talk given to the Philosophy Department of Pennsylvania State University (University Park, PA; April, 1986). The revision of the original paper was greatly facilitated by the thoughtful criticisms and generous encouragement of those in attendance at this colloquium.

[2]Richard J. Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism* (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1983), p. 2.

[3]Hilary Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1982), pp. 104–105.

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 103.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 105.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 114.

[7]Thomas Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolution* (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1975), p. 111.

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For the logical positivists, "the 'scientific method' exhausts rationality itself, and testability by that method exhausts meaningfulness."[8] For Kuhn, it is crucial to distinguish between periods of normal science and times of scientific crisis. In periods of normal science, proceeding *rationally* essentially means doing the done thing—operating in accordance with the dominant paradigm within a given disciplinary matrix. In periods of scientific crisis, however, what ought to serve as a paradigm for a discipline is precisely what is in question. The struggle to articulate a new paradigm obviously cannot be explained in terms of the old paradigm. It is for this reason that Kuhn introduces the notion of a non-paradigmatic rationality.[9]

Logical positivism attempts to define human rationality in terms of the institutionalized norms of the successful sciences. It is arguable that "ordinary language" philosophy tries to attain the same goal in terms of the institutionalized criteria of everyday discourse. Putnam proposes "to call *any* conception according to which there are institutionalized norms which define what is and is not rationally acceptable a *criterial* conception of rationality."[10] The logical positivists, Wittgenstein (at least on one interpretation), and some of the ordinary language philosophers espouse some form of this criterial conception.

Kuhn proposes an alternative conception of human rationality. He argues, in effect, that the criterial conception is incomplete since it does not consider those times of crises in which the institutionalized practices of a particular science are threatened by anomalies. During these times of crisis, reason has to be seen operating outside of any established norms or institutionalized criteria. No account of rationality is adequate if it fails to recognize "the manner in which different cultures and historic epochs produce different paradigms of rationality."[11] If we recognize this, then (according to such thinkers as Kuhn, Feyerabend, and Foucault) we should accept a notion of non-paradigmatic or non-criterial rationality. It might also be called an *anarchistic* notion.

Putnam claims that the two dominant philosophies of science of the twentieth century—logical positivism and Kuhnian historicism—are self-refuting.[12] It should be no surprise, then, that neither positivism nor historicism provides us with an adequate conception of human rationality. Both the criterial and the anarchistic conceptions are fundamentally inadequate: they cannot account for the actual activities of human agents.

The way in which Putnam attempts to show this is as follows. In opposition to the positivists, he notes that no philosophical position (including any position on rationality) can be verified in the manner required by the verification principle. That is,

> if it is true that only statements that can be criterially verified can be rationally acceptable, that statement itself cannot be criterially verified, and hence cannot be rationally acceptable. If there is such a thing as rationality at all—and we commit ourselves to believing in *some* notion of rationality by engaging in the activities of

[8]Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, p. 105.
[9]*Ibid.*, p. 113.
[10]*Ibid.*, p. 110.
[11]*Ibid.*, p. 113.
[12]*Ibid.*, p. 114, cf. 124.

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> *speaking* and *arguing—then* it is self-refuting to *argue* for the position that it is identical with or properly contained in what the institutionalized norms of the culture determine to be instances of it.[13]

The positivists give us a philosophy which leaves no room for the rational activity of philosophical inquiry itself. This becomes apparent when we realize that "arguing about the nature of rationality (the task of the philosopher *par excellence*) is an activity that presupposes a notion of rational justification wider than the positivist notion," that is, wider than institutionalized criterial rationality.[14]

While Putnam takes the verification principle to be the Achilles' heel of the positivist position, he takes the incommensurability thesis to be the Achilles' heel of the Kuhnian perspective. "The incommensurability thesis is the thesis that terms used in another culture . . . cannot be equated in meaning or reference with any terms or expressions *we* possess. As Kuhn puts it, scientists with different paradigms inhabit 'different worlds'."[15] But Putnam replies,

> if this thesis were really true then we could not translate other languages—or even past stages of our own language—at all. And if we cannot interpret organisms' noises at all, then we have no grounds for regarding them as thinkers, speakers, or even persons. In short, if Feyerabend (and Kuhn at his most incommensurable) were right, then members of other cultures, including seventeenth-century scientists, would be conceptualizable by us only as animals producing responses to stimuli (including noises that curiously resemble English or Italian).[16]

The criterial conception is unable to make sense out of the *self* as speaker when the self is engaged in philosophical discourse. In contrast, the anarchistic conception is unable to make sense out of the *other* as speaker when the other is rooted in another culture.

The conclusion of Putnam's critique is that neither the criterial conception nor the anarchistic conception of rationality provides a satisfactory account of our rational practices; neither gives a sane and human description of the scope of reason. What also becomes evident from this critique is that two minimal requirements for a satisfactory account of human reason are (a) such an account must leave room for the activity of articulating a theory of rationality and (b) such an account must leave room for the possibility of genuine communication among different cultures. In the words of Whitehead, "[p]hilosophy destroys its usefulness when it indulges in brilliant feats of explaining away."[17] When an account of rationality explains away the possibility of giving an account of rationality or the possibility of communicating with those who are profoundly different from us, it has certainly destroyed its usefulness.

I would like at this point to turn from the two conceptions of rationality discussed by Putnam to the views of Popper and Rorty. It would be plausible to

[13] *Ibid.*, p. 111.
[14] *Ibid.*, p. 113.
[15] *Ibid.*, p. 114.
[16] *Ibid.*, pp. 114–115; cf. p. 122.
[17] Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (New York: Free Press, 1978) (Corrected Edition), p. 17.

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suggest that Popper and Rorty can be fit into Putnam's discussion of the two conceptions of human reason: Popper can be seen as an adherent of the criterial conception, while Rorty can be viewed as an advocate of the anarchistic conception position. While such an interpretation *may* have its merits, it fails to bring into focus what is distinctive and important in Popper and Rorty. Thus, I shall contrast Popper and Rorty not so much to illustrate Putnam's distinction between criterial and anarchistic conceptions of rationality as to present a different sort of contrast.

Popper and Rorty represent profoundly different approaches to philosophy. According to Popper, "there exist not only genuine scientific problems, but genuine philosophical problems.[18] He insists "a philosopher should philosophize: he should try to solve philosophical problems, rather than talk about philosophy."[19] For him, a discipline lacking in problems is one devoid of interest. In opposition to this view, we have the position of Rorty, for whom the whole of philosophy appears to be a metacritique of philosophy itself.

Not only do Popper and Rorty represent different approaches to philosophy; they hold conflicting conceptions of reason. Popper attempts to explain reason in terms of criticism: we exhibit our reasonableness by our willingness to criticize our own beliefs as well as the beliefs of others. In contrast, Rorty tries to illuminate reason by reference to conversation: we manifest our commitment to reason through our devotion to dialogue. Indeed, the devotion to dialogue becomes, for Rorty, the pragmatic equivalent to the commitment to reason. Can either criticism or conversation carry the weight which Popper and Rorty, respectively, put upon these notions? Can they provide us with an adequate account of human rationality? This is the focal question of the present paper. After presenting the positions of Popper and Rorty, I shall return to it.

According to Putnam, "[w]e can only hope to produce a more rational *conception* of rationality or a better *conception* of morality if we operate *within* our tradition (with its echoes of the Greek agora, of Newton, and so on, in the case of rationality, and with its echoes of scripture, of the philosophers, of the democratic revolutions, and so on, in the case of morality."[20] In what follows, I hope to offer a more reasonable account of reason precisely by operating *within* this tradition. In attempting this, I am simply following in the footsteps of Popper and Rorty, both of whom present their accounts of rationality as distillations of what is best in our tradition. Of course, the problem with any such distillation is that some essential elements may have been removed from the final product.[21]

POPPER'S CRITICAL RATIONALISM

Popper formulated his account of rationality in the context of *both* his theory of knowledge and his critique of totalitarianism. It should be recalled that he is the author of *The Open Society and Its Enemies* and *The Poverty of Historicism*, as well as *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* and *Conjectures and Refutations*. For him, reason is not so much an innate faculty as it is an acquired attitude. This

[18]Karl Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (New York: Harper, 1968), p. 73.

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 68.

[20]Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, p. 216.

[21]Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1979), p. 33.

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attitude is acquired through our interactions with others: "we owe our reason, like our language, to intercourse with other men."[22] We are not born reasonable, but become reasonable through participation in the give-and-take of argumentative discourse.

Popper maintains that, while such an attitude is best exemplified in the ongoing debates of scientific investigators, it has practical significance for the political lives of ordinary persons. Moreover, just as the ideal of *episteme* or absolute knowledge is an obstacle to the acquisition of human knowledge, so our visions of utopia or absolute harmony are impediments to the amelioration of human suffering: the ideal of absolute knowledge inevitably leads to scepticism (the despair of ever really knowing reality)[23] and our visions of a perfect society eventually lead to violence (the despair of ever reasonably harmonizing conflicts). In Popper's own words, "the attempt to make heaven on earth invariably produces hell."[24] It is no exaggeration, then, to say that Popper's logic of scientific discovery and his defense of the open society have a shared objective—a description of the nature and scope of rationality.

Even so, Popper confesses: "I have a deeply ingrained fear of big words, such as 'rationality.' What I fear is being impressed by them, or impressing others with them. Yet I do think, at the same time, that men are capable of adopting a rational attitude, or an attitude of rationality, and that this capability is of the utmost importance."[25] It is of the utmost importance for us not only as investigators of natural and social phenomena, but also as participants in political and economic life.

What is this attitude of rationality? What, according to Popper, does it mean for us to be rational? In *Unended Quest: An Intellectual Autobiography* Popper states: "There is no better synonym for 'rational' than 'critical'."[26] In this same work he asserts " 'rational belief' . . . consists in giving preference to what is preferable in the light of critical arguments."[27] We cannot *justify* our theories; we, however, can justify our preferences for one theory as opposed to others. We do this through criticism. Thus, in the "Postscript" to *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* Popper announced that he rejected all attempts at the justification of theories, and that he replaced justification by criticism. In replacing justification by criticism, he has broken with what he takes to be the dominant approach to human rationality.

> Previously, most philosophers had thought that any claim to rationality meant rational *justification* (of one's beliefs); my thesis was, at least since my *Open Society*, that rationality meant rational *criticism* (of one's own theory and of competing theories). Thus traditional philosophy linked the ideal of rationality with final, demonstrable knowledge (either proreligious or antireligious: religion was the main issue) while I linked it with the *growth of conjectural knowledge*. This itself I linked with the idea of a

[22]Karl Popper, *The Open Society and Its Enemies* (Princeton: NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971), Volume II, p. 225.

[23]*Ibid.*, II, p. 231.

[24]*Ibid.*, II, p. 237.

[25]Karl Popper, *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, ed. Paul Arthur Schilpp, II (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Press, 1974), p. 1085.

[26]Karl Popper, *The Unended Quest* (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Press, 1982), p. 87.

[27]*Ibid.*, p. 145.

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> better and better approximation to truth, or of *increasing truthlikeness or verisimilitude*. According to this view, finding theories which are better approximations to truth is what the scientist aims at; the aim of science is knowing more and more. This involves *the growth of the content of our theories*, the growth of our knowledge of the world.[28]

In short, the ideal of rationality is the growth of conjectural knowledge, not the attainment of absolute knowledge.

In *Conjectures and Refutations* Popper describes human reason as "man's power to grow, to transcend himself, not only by the imaginative invention of myths . . . but also by the rational criticism of his own imaginative inventions."[29] According to this description, it would appear that reason encompasses a creative as well as a critical function. Popper, however, does not seem to be willing to acknowledge the creative function of human reason. There are even occasions when he appears explicitly to deny reason any creativity.[30] The main thrust of Popper's approach to human reason, then, is to place creativity outside the scope of rationality; reason is essentially critical, not creative. This appears to me to be a deficiency in his account of rationality, a point to which I shall return in my critique of Popper and Rorty.

The realization of our power to grow by the critical shifting of our imaginative inventions depends upon training in the tradition of reason. This critical tradition traces its roots back to ancient Greece: according to Popper,

> the Greek philosophers invented a new tradition—the tradition of adopting a critical attitude towards the myths, the attitude of discussing them; the tradition of not only telling a myth, but also of being challenged by the man to whom it is told. Telling their myth they were ready to turn to listen to what their listener thought about it—admitting thereby the possibility that he might perhaps have a better explanation than they.[31]

The admission of this possibility is essential to the attitude of rationality. As Popper puts it, rationality, "is an attitude of readiness to listen to critical arguments and to learn from experience. It is fundamentally an attitude of admitting that 'I may be wrong and you may be right, and by an effort, we may get nearer to the truth.'"[32] To be rational is to recognize that everybody with whom we communicate is a potential source of insight and information; this recognition establishes, according to Popper, the "unity of mankind."[33] Another way to express this unity is to affirm that, underlying our deepest differences, we possess a common humanity. The adoption of rationalism in the sense in which Popper defends it implies that "there is a common medium of communication, a common language of reason; it establishes something like a moral obligation towards that language, the obligation to keep up its standards of clarity, and to use it in such a way that it can retain its function as the vehicle of argument."[34] The various languages of humankind are, in some measure, reducible to the common language

[28]Popper, *Logic of Scientific Discovery*, pp. 149–150.
[29]Karl Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations* (New York: Harper, 1965), p. 383.
[30]E.g., Popper, *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, p. 1087.
[31]Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, pp. 126–127.
[32]Popper, *Open Society*, II, p. 225; emphasis omitted.
[33]*Ibid.*
[34]*Ibid.*, II, p. 239.

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of reason: "mankind is united by the fact that our different mother tongues, insofar as they are rational, can be translated into one another."[35] The possibility of such translation implies the potential unity of human reason underlying the actual diversity of human cultures.[36]

As we have noted, to be rational entails being open to the viewpoints of others, even when these viewpoints contradict our own position. This attitude obviously "presupposes a certain amount of intellectual humility."[37] It is the sort of humility exemplified by Socrates. In fact, Popper goes so far as to say: "I regard myself as a disciple of Socrates, and I am deeply aware of my, and more generally our, *lack* of knowledge. This seems to me to be a direct consequence of my critical attitude, which I identify with my rational attitude."[38]

The intellectual humility exemplified by Socrates should guide us in how we conceive rationalism itself. According to Popper, there is an excessive and uncritical rationalism, on the one hand, and a modest and self-critical rationalism, on the other. By excessive or uncritical rationalism, Popper means a *comprehensive* rationalism—a rationalism which demands an argument for all of our beliefs, including our belief in reason. This rationalism "can be described as the attitude of the person who says 'I am not prepared to accept anything that cannot be defended by means of argument and experience.' "[39] In contrast to comprehensive rationalism, critical rationalism "recognizes the fact that the fundamental rationalist attitude results from an (at least tentative) act of faith—from faith in reason."[40] Popper describes this act of faith in reason as "irrational": It is, in principle, impossible to give a rational defense for the rational attitude. "So rationalism is necessarily far from comprehensive or self-contained."[41] In fact, "[i]rrationalism is *logically* superior to uncritical [or comprehensive] rationalism."[42] But self-critical or modest rationalism is *morally* superior to all forms of irrationalism.

The choice between irrationalism and rationalism is not a matter of taste but a question of morality. This is so because the choice concerns not a private affair but other persons and their lives.[43] What ultimately moves Popper to commit himself to rationalism are his abhorence of violence and his recognition of the humanity of others. Critical rationalism is based on an irrational faith; even so, its faith in reason, however irrational, is not only a faith in one's own reason, but also—and even more—a faith in the reason of others.[44] "Rationalism is therefore bound up with the idea that the other fellow has a right to be heard, and to defend his arguments. It thus implies the recognition of the claim to tolerance, at least of all those who are not intolerant themselves."[45]

[35]*Ibid.*

[36]Putnam, *Reason, Truth and History*, p. 117–119; Alastair MacIntyre, "Relativism, Power and Philosophy" in *Proceedings and Addresses of the APA* (September 1985; vol. 59, no. 1).

[37]Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 356.

[38]Popper, *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, II, p. 1084.

[39]Popper, *The Open Society*, II, p. 230.

[40]*Ibid.*, II, p. 231.

[41]*Ibid.*

[42]*Ibid.*

[43]*Ibid.*, II, 357, note 10.

[44]*Ibid.*, II, p. 238.

[45]*Ibid.*

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Popper underscores the fact that "the link between rationalism and humanitarianism is very close."[46] Our commitment to reason entails a recognition of the unity of humankind: insofar as we are *all* human, we in principle possess the capacity to communicate with one another (however difficult this might turn out to be in practice). In this capacity resides our only hope of avoiding the use of violence and also of approximating the ideal of truth.

In summary, then, let me simply say that, for Popper, while the basis of our commitment to rationalism is an irrational faith, the result of this commitment is a critical attitude to our own beliefs as well as the beliefs of others. Early in his investigations Popper hinted that the attitude of reasonableness is related to the power of speaking. In more recent writings, he has developed more fully the equation of rationality with our ability to use human language in an *argumentative* way.[47] But it is precisely at this point—the point of defining rationality in terms of argumentation, in terms of a mode of discourse which is committed to the possibility of consensus—that we hear the challenge of Richard Rorty. Let us now turn to this challenge.

RORTY'S DECONSTRUCTIVE TURN

Popper is operating *within* a tradition which goes back at least as far as Descartes; this becomes evident when we realize that he is attempting to offer a *theory* of knowledge as though such a theory were possible and useful. In contrast, Rorty is reacting *against* this tradition; indeed, his task is nothing less than a deconstructive critique of the entire epistemological tradition. Hence, he is not offering an account of rationality in the same way that Popper is; while Popper is attempting to say what rationality is, Rorty is endeavoring to show why all such attempts to define the nature of Rationality are essentially misguided and always futile. Nonetheless, Rorty himself offers within this deconstructive critique a positive characterization of human reason. No doubt, this positive characterization is a romantic reaction against the Platonizing tendency of traditional Philosophy—the tendency to discover the essence of some of the more honorific terms in human discourse. That is, this characterization is not intended as another account of Rationality; rather it is intended as a description of reason which explodes the pretensions of trying to define the essence of Reason.

In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* Rorty describes his project as an attempt to move away from epistemology to hermeneutics. But he is "*not* putting hermeneutics forward as a 'successor subject' to epistemology, as an activity which fills the cultural vacancy once filled by epistemologically centered philosophy."[48] He is *not* proposing "hermeneutics" as "the name for a discipline, nor for a method of achieving the sort of results which epistemology failed to achieve, nor for a program of research." Rather Rorty sees hermeneutics as "an expression of hope that the cultural space left by the demise of epistemology will not be filled—that our culture should become one in which the demand for constraint and confrontation is no longer felt."[49]

[46]*Ibid.*, II, p. 240.
[47]Popper, *The Philosophy of Karl Popper*, II, p. 1086.
[48]Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, p. 315.
[49]*Ibid.*

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It is in terms of the contrast between epistemology and hermeneutics that Rorty suggests two opposed ways of conceiving human rationality. According to him, "[t]he dominating notion of epistemology is that to be rational, to be fully human, to do what we ought, we need to be able to find agreement with other human beings. To construct an epistemology is to find the maximum amount of common ground with others."[50] In contrast, the fundamental orientation of hermeneutics is to abandon this search for a common ground. In other words,

> For hermeneutics, to be rational is to be willing to refrain from epistemology—from thinking that there is a special set of terms in which all contributions to the conversation should be put—and to be willing to pick up the jargon of the interlocutor rather than translating it into one's own. For epistemology, to be rational is to find the proper set of terms into which all the contributions should be translated if agreement is to become possible. For epistemology, conversation is implicit inquiry. For hermeneutics, inquiry is routine conversation. Epistemology views the participants as united in what Oakeshott calls an *universitas*—a group united by mutual interests in achieving a common end. Hermeneutics views them as united in what he calls a *societas*—persons whose paths through life have fallen together, united by civility rather than by a common goal, much less by common ground.[51]

In light of this passage, we may distinguish between an epistemological and a hermeneutic conception of reason. In terms of this distinction, Popper defends an epistemological conception of reason, while Rorty himself endorses a hermeneutic one.

Hermeneutic rationality entails possession of the Socratic virtues—"willingness to talk, to listen to other people, to weigh the consequences of our actions upon other people."[52] But it sees these Socratic virtues as *simply* moral virtues. Yet in what are these virtues grounded? And to what is the conversation which these virtues make possible directed? The way Rorty answers these questions runs thus:

> [T]he conversation which it is our moral duty to continue is *merely* our project, the European intellectual's form of life. It has no metaphysical nor epistemological guarantee of success. Further (and this is the crucial point) *we do not know what 'success' would mean except simply 'continuance.'* We are not conversing because we have a goal, but because the Socratic conversation is an activity which is its *own* end.[53]

Rationality in the hermeneutic sense is a commitment to conversation in its Socratic form. This conversation is grounded in our way of life and directed toward the continuance of itself. This does not mean that it is either groundless or pointless—unjustified or purposeless. Rather it means that it is culturally warranted and, from the perspective of those who truly participate in this culture, intrinsically valuable. This conversation is a form of life which rests not on any "deep" metaphysical foundation but on our shared cultural heritage; it is the

[50] *Ibid.*, p. 316.
[51] *Ibid.*, p. 318.
[52] Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), p. 172.
[53] *Ibid.*

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project of those "people who have read and pondered Plato, Newton, Kant, Marx, Darwin, Freud, Dewey, etc."[54] But surely this project has a more stable basis than simply this cultural prop? Rorty insists that it does not. We can either accept the contingent character of all human starting-points or attempt to evade this contingency.

> To accept the contingency of starting-points is to accept our inheritance from, and our conversation with, our fellow-humans as our only source of guidance. To attempt to evade this contingency is to hope to become a properly programmed machine. . . . If we give up this hope, we shall lose what Nietzsche called 'metaphysical comfort,' but we may gain a renewed sense of community. Our identification with our community—our society, our political tradition, our intellectual heritage—is heightened when we see this community as *ours* rather than *nature's*, shaped rather than found, one among many which men have made. In the end . . . what matters is our loyalty to other human beings clinging against the dark, not our hope of getting things right.[55]

In passages such as this, what becomes apparent is that a deeply moral vision animates what appears to be an inescapably nihilistic project.[56] If this is so, then there is an important respect in which Rorty's commitment to reason as conversation is remarkably similar in character to Popper's commitment to reason as criticism. As we have seen, for Popper, our ultimate commitment to the rational attitude is not based upon reason; it is based on a hatred of violence and a concern for others, especially others who are suffering. It is based on respect for persons, especially the personhood of others. For Popper, to be critical entails being open to others as persons, as potential sources of insight and information and as actual centers of intention and sensibility. The ascription of personhood to others involves, among other things, seeing these others as beings who can be harmed by my actions and also ones from whom I can learn as an equal.

Rorty no less than Popper urges us to adopt his particular conception of human reason because of *moral* considerations: only if we interpret reason as conversation do we conceive it in a way which guarantees respect for persons as such. "To see keeping the conversation going as a sufficient aim of philosophy, to see wisdom as consisting in the ability to sustain a conversation, is to see human beings as generators of new descriptions rather than beings one hopes to describe accurately."[57] In contrast, to see philosophy as inquiry rather than conversation and, thus, to see the closure of conversation rather than its continuance as the highest achievement of human reason, "is to see human beings as objects rather than subjects, as existing *en-soi* rather than as both *pour-soi* and *en-soi*, as both described objects and describing subjects."[58]

Rorty readily admits that he has not offered an "argument" for defining rationality in terms of conversation; at most, he (again according to his own admission) has removed some obstacles to appreciating such a definition. Yet, is the life of conversation so powerless that it cannot speak in its own defense? Moreover, is the ideal of an open-ended, all-inclusive dialogue nothing more than

[54] *Ibid.*, p. 173.
[55] *Ibid.*, p. 166.
[56] Bernstein, *Beyond Objectivism and Relativism*, p. 204.
[57] Rorty, *Philosophy and Mirror of Nature*, p. 378.
[58] *Ibid.*

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a bias of *our* culture, where we are defined in terms of our past? It is now time to turn to these and other questions in order to answer the focal question of the present paper: Can either criticism or conversation carry the weight which Popper and Rorty, respectively, put upon these notions? Can they provide us with an adequate conception of human reason?

CRITICAL REMARKS

Despite their fundamental areas of disagreement, it is possible to discern important points of convergence between Popper and Rorty. I shall develop my critique of their positions principally in reference to these points of convergence. In particular, I shall focus upon three common themes. First, neither Popper nor Rorty thinks that it is possible to offer a rational defense for the reasonable life (i.e., for the critical attitude in the case of Popper and the European project or Socratic conversation in the case of Rorty). Second, both assume that reason is to be defined in terms of some form of discourse. Third, both are guided by the insight that to be rational involves being open to some form of what might be called *otherness*.

My first point of criticism is simply that reason can say more for itself than either Popper or Rorty admits. In this connection we might recall several rhetorical questions posed by Justus Buchler: "Must reason be acclaimed inarticulately and without its saying something in behalf of its own essence?" Is rationality ultimately only a personal policy or, if more than that, simply a local bias?[59] I think it is more than either a personal policy resting on an irrational faith or a local bias inherited from our particular culture.

As we have seen, Popper maintains that it is, in principle, impossible for the rational attitude to be justified by a rational argument, "for only those who are ready to consider argument or experience, and who have therefore adopted this attitude already, will be impressed by them."[60] In other words, "no rational argument will have a rational effect on a man who does not want to adopt a rational attitude."[61] But it is not at all clear why this should be seen as defining the limits of human rationality rather than indicating a limitation of the irrational person.

It would certainly be unreasonable to demand that reason accomplish the impossible—persuade those who refuse to listen to argumentation. Just as blindness does not imply an absence of color, so deafness to reason does not imply a defect on the part of rationality. While the irrational person may often be someone to fear, that person is always someone to be pitied.

Perhaps even more to the point is that to request that the critical attitude defend itself on rational grounds is a request made from *within* the rational perspective. Anyone who demands such a defense of reason wants to stand outside of the perspective of rationality, while *simultaneously* remaining inside it; this is patently incoherent.[62] It is not that the attitude of reasonableness rests on an

[59]Justus Buchler, *Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment* (New York: Dover Publications, 1979), p. 168.

[60]Popper, *The Open Society*, II, p. 230.

[61]*Ibid.*, II, p. 231.

[62]Roger Trigg, *Reason and Commitment* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1977), p. 149.

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irrational faith but that any demand for a justification of reason rests on an incoherent assumption—that one could prove reason to be impotent in its own defense while, at the same time, rejecting the idea of proof. Hence, the very request for a justification of reason is always made from within the framework of reason. As soon as one opens one's mouth to refute the claims of reason, one has, in effect, conceded defeat.

When Bertrand Russell was once asked how he would disprove solipsism, he inquired: Who is asking? Analogously, when we are requested to establish by argument the perspective of reason, we should ask: Who is making this request? If it is someone who is unwilling to listen to argument, then we ought not to waste our breath; if, however, it is someone willing to listen, then the issue has already been decided. The moment we speak or even think, we are always already within the perspective of reason. Such is my critique of Popper on this point.

Rorty identifies himself as a pragmatist. Near the conclusion of "Pragmatism, Relativism, and Irrationalism" he concedes that if the traditional philosopher (who is the main target of Rorty's deconstructionist critique) gets beyond hurling such epithets as "irrationalist" and "relativist" at the pragmatist, "he raises a question which the pragmatist must face up to: the *practical* question of whether the notion of 'conversation' *can* substitute for that of 'reason.' "[63]

> When the pragmatist says 'We have to take truth and virtue as whatever emerges from the conversation of Europe,' the traditional philosopher wants to know what is so special about Europe. Isn't the pragmatist saying, like the irrationalist, that *we* are in a privileged situation simply by being *us*? Further, isn't there something terribly dangerous about the notion that truth can only be characterized as 'the outcome of doing more of what we are doing now'? What if the 'we' is the Orwellian state? When tyrants employ Lenin's blood-curdling sense of 'objective' to describe their lies as 'objectively true,' what is to prevent them from citing Peirce in Lenin's defense?[64]

According to Rorty, the pragmatist's first line of defense is to say, with Habermas, that truth defined as "the outcome of doing more of what we are presently doing" applies to *undistorted* conversation, while the Orwellian state is the paradigm of distorted discourse. But, unlike Habermas, the pragmatist must not go transcendental and offer principles. Since the pragmatist must above all else reject the impulse to jump outside of the conversation in order to provide a transcendental justification for open dialogue (indeed, it is precisely this rejection which defines the pragmatist in Rorty's sense), the pragmatist "must remain ethnocentric and offer examples. He can only say: 'undistorted' means employing *our* criteria of relevance, where *we* are the people who have read and pondered Plato, Newton, Kant, Marx, Darwin, Freud, Dewey, etc."[65]

Notice that Rorty is defining *us* principally, if not exclusively, in terms of our past. It is precisely at this point that he betrays one of his deepest insights—namely, the insight that to be rational we have to be open to the unforeseen novelties of the future rather than imprisoned within the particular forms of the past. Indeed, what is perhaps most likely to attract individuals to Rorty's

[63]Rorty, *Consequences*, p. 172.
[64]*Ibid.*, p. 173.
[65]*Ibid.*

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hermeneutical conception of human rationality is that it encourages open-ended and inclusive conversation; more than this, it defines rationality in terms of a commitment to such conversation. Rorty's insistence upon being ethnocentric, however, is anything but inclusive, while his definition of the European community in terms of a reflective encounter with its literary past is anything but prospective.

What enables us to prevent tyrants from citing Peirce's pragmatism in Lenin's defense is Peirce's own distinction between the method of authority and the method of science.[66] As Peirce notes in "The Fixation of Belief" cruelties always accompany the method of authority; "and when it is consistently carried out, they become atrocities of the most horrible kind in the eyes of any rational man."[67] Just as the method of tenacity is unable to maintain itself against the social impulses of human beings, so too the method of authority cannot withstand, in the long run, the force of these very same impulses (5.378; 5.381). In the most priest-(or police-) ridden states some individuals will be found who can put two and two together (5.381).

> These men possess a wider sort of social feeling; they see that men in other countries and in other ages have held very different doctrines from those which they themselves have been brought up to believe; and they cannot help seeing that it is the mere accident of their having been taught as they have, and of their having been surrounded with the manners and associations they have, that has caused them to believe as they do and not far differently. (5.381)

What are the intrinsic limits to the wider sort of social feeling which emerges even among individuals who are under the terrible yoke of tyrannical authority? According to Peirce, such feeling knows no limits. Thus, it makes possible passionate identification with the infinite community of human inquirers. To quote Peirce once again: "man is not whole as long as he is single . . . he is essentially a possible member of society. Especially, one man's experience is nothing, if it stands alone. If we see what others cannot, we call it hallucination. It is not 'my' experience, but 'our' experience that has to be thought of; and this 'us' has indefinite possibilities" (5.402, n. 2). It is when *we*, defined inclusively rather than ethnocentrically, are truly open to the possibilities of the future, rather than imprisoned in the patterns of the past, that our conversations are most likely to avoid distortion.

It is reasonable to suggest that Rorty, in effect, advocates the *a priori* method, the method of fixing beliefs by what appears to be agreeable to reason (5.382).

[66]By the method of tenacity, Peirce means "taking as answer to a question any we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything that may disturb it" (5.377). By the method of authority, he means creating an institution "which shall have for its object to keep correct doctrines before the attention of the people, to reiterate them perpetually, and to teach them to the young; having at the same time power to prevent contrary doctrines from being taught, advocated, or expressed" (5.379). This method of citation (e.g., 5.379) is explained in the very next note.

[67]Charles Sanders Peirce, *The Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce*, Vols. V and VI, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press, 1934–35). All references to the *Collected Papers* will be given in the body of the paper, according to the standard practice of Peirce scholars (i.e., the first number refers to the volume, the second to the paragraph; thus, 5.379 refers to volume 5 and paragraph 379).

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Peirce claims that the failure of this method is most manifest: "It makes of inquiry something similar to the development of taste; but taste, unfortunately, is always more or less a matter of fashion" (5.383).

Rorty, however, might insist that to see our European project as the development of taste—or the continuance of the conversation—puts matters in proper perspective. After all, it is not the scientific investigator but the literary critic who provides Rorty with his paradigm for the role of the philosopher. Rorty is preoccupied—perhaps obsessed—with debunking what he takes to be the pretentions of philosophers. This is certainly behind his proposal to replace philosophy-as-inquiry (i.e., as the quest for truth) with philosophy-as-conversation (the kibitzing of dilettantes). The philosopher ought to see himself as an informed dilettante—as a polypragmatic, Socratic intermediary among various discourses—not as a cultural overseer who knows everyone's common ground—as a Platonic philosopher-king who knows what everybody else is really doing whether *they* know it or not.[68]

Rorty might insist that even if the concern of philosophy is not the pursuit of truth but only the development of taste, philosophy can still be an interesting voice in the ongoing conversation of European culture. For him, to live humanly is to converse creatively; it is not to see truly. Indeed, he maintains the very notion of truth as a depiction of reality ought to be abandoned. In this he was anticipated by William of Baskerville, a fourteenth century Sherlock Holmes who had the miraculous advantage of being acquainted with Peirce's semeiotic but the offsetting disadvantage of being committed to Ockham's nominalism. Of course, I am referring to the central character in Umberto Eco's *The Name of the Rose*. Near the end of this novel we hear William saying to his companion Adso: "Perhaps the mission of those who love mankind is to make people laugh at the truth, *to make truth laugh*, because the only truth lies in learning to free ourselves from insane passion for the truth."[69] It is as though the very idea of truth were tyrannical—that truth is a tyrant.

But is truth a notion we can relinquish without destroying something essential to our humanity? In response to Rorty and William, it is important to insist that truth is one of the few non-tyrannical or non-violent means we have for fighting tyranny and oppression; it is also important to distinguish between the truth as an ideal and the truth as an alleged possession of any finite individual or even finite community. Truth as an ideal is not to be ridiculed, but reverenced; still, our feeble and fallible efforts to attain this ideal occasionally ought to be the target of humor, if only to remind us of our feebleness and fallibility.

I fully agree with Peirce's commonsensical insistence that human thinking is intrinsically oriented toward the real world in which human beings live and work, play and suffer. But, as he notes, the

> action of thinking may have other results; it may serve to amuse us, for example, and among *dilettanti* it is not rare to find those who have so perverted thought to the purposes of pleasure that it seems to vex them to think that the questions upon which they delight to exercise it may ever get finally settled. . . . This position is the very debauchery of thought. (5.396)

[68]Rorty, *Philosophy and Mirror of Nature*, p. 317.
[69]Umberto Eco, *The Name of the Rose* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Jovanovich, 1983), p. 490.

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The ideal of closure in the long run is intended to insure openness in the meantime. Thus, projecting the closure of conversation in the indefinite future does not mean succumbing to the comforts of consensus at any present time; it means meeting the *challenge* of consensus. This challenge is anything but comforting; it requires nothing less than an abiding willingness to transcend oneself, to think and even to act differently than one presently does. In contrast, irrational persons exhibit "an exaggerated loyalty to their own principles, i.e., a heartfelt and rather intolerant religion whose divinity is their past mental selves" (6.181). Truly rational persons do not make idols of their past mental selves; they accept the challenge of consensus with a full awareness that this may entail a radical transformation of their present beliefs. Acceptance of this challenge leads not to using "truth" as a weapon to tyrannize others, but to project "truth" as an ideal to aid us in transforming ourselves. As James no less than Peirce insisted, truth is an ideal and, as such, it beckons us on; it lures us beyond where we presently stand. There is nothing tyrannical in the way in which the ideal of truth exerts its influence; in fact, this influence is the paradigm of non-tyrannical power—it not only respects but truly enhances the nature of the beings it influences.

My second line of criticism concerns an implicit assumption held by both Popper and Rorty. Rorty himself observes that: "In every sufficiently reflective culture, there are those who single out one area, one set of practices, and see it as the paradigm human activity."[70] Is this not, however, what Rorty has done in making conversation *the* metaphor for both rationality and philosophy? While Rorty attempts to deconstruct the entire philosophical tradition of the West, does he not espouse one of the most basic assumptions of this tradition—namely, that reason is definable in terms of some form of discourse? Is not Justus Buchler a far more radical thinker than Richard Rorty when he challenges the logocentric accounts of human reason so dominant in western thought? According to Buchler, "the problem of reason has been taken too often as the problem of the limits and forms of discourse. . . . In such a light, it is easier to understand the misgivings of the irrationalists."[71] The artist standing before a canvas, questioning both herself and the materials of her medium, is no less a *rational* being than the scientist engaged in an investigation. In short, the realm of discourse does not exhaust the limits of rationality; these limits encompass our actions and artifacts as well as our discourses.

Popper as well as Rorty tries to define reason in terms of a form of discourse. In this respect, both of their accounts of rationality are inadequate because they are too narrow. I do not have the time now to develop this criticism; let me simply suggest that an adequate account of human reason cannot confine itself to the domain of discourse.[72]

Let me turn from this criticism to my third and final point. This also has its basis in an assumption which is shared by Popper and Rorty. Unlike the assumption that reason is definable in terms of some form of discourse, I take this assumption to be correct. Yet, while Popper and Rorty are truly guided by this presupposition, they are insufficiently aware of its meaning or importance.

[70]Rorty, *Philosophy and Mirror of Nature*, p. 366.
[71]Justus Buchler, *Nature and Judgment* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1966), p. 97.
[72]*Ibid.*, pp. 93ff.

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For all their differences, Popper and Rorty are both guided by the insight that to be reasonable is to be open to that which is other than oneself (other than one's own beliefs, one's own language, one's own tradition, one's normal ways of speaking). To some degree, they develop this insight in a similar way. After all, Popper speaks of the attitude of reasonableness entailing being open to what others have to say, while Rorty speaks of the Socratic virtues which include the willingness to talk and to listen to others. In the main, however, they develop this insight in exactly opposite ways. Popper develops it in such a way as to stress the constraint of reality on our ways of thinking. He notes that: "Theories are our own inventions, our own ideas; they are not forced upon us, but are our self-made instruments of thought. . . . But some of these theories of ours clash with reality; and when they do, we know that there is a reality; that there is something to remind us of the fact that our ideas may be mistaken. And this is why the realist is right."[73] Reality is here portrayed as that which forces itself upon us as something other than we often suppose. Because of his reluctance to include creativity within the function of reason and his readiness to acknowledge the force of reality upon our thinking, we may say that for Popper reason involves constraint without creativity.

In contrast, because Rorty recognizes only conversational constraints and, thus, denies any pressure of reality on the conversation of mankind, we may say that for him reason entails creativity without constraint. We are always free to speak in ways *other than* the familiar or dominant modes of discourse. Not only are we free to speak in these ways; given the right set of circumstances, it is inevitable. "Given leisure and libraries, the conversation which Plato began will not end in self-objectification—not because aspects of the world, or of human beings, escape being objects of scientific inquiry, but simply because free and leisured conversation generates abnormal discourse as the sparks fly upward."[74]

When Rorty speaks of normal and abnormal discourse, what he is especially interested in distinguishing between are routine and creative discourse. His opposition to the epistemological tradition must be seen in reference to his commitment to creative conversation. To repeat, for Rorty, to live humanly is to converse creatively. Inquiry, however, is routine conversation, uncreative discourse; it is conversation in which the ways of speaking have hardened into the crust of convention.[75] The social function of the edifying philosopher (in contrast to the systematic philosopher) is to break this crust—to generate new ways of speaking, to create abnormal forms of discourse.

My own position is that if rationality entails being open to what is other, then it involves being open to *both* the constraints of reality and the challenge of creativity. Reality is what is *other than* what you or I or any other finite individual or even any finite group of such individuals happen to think. Creativity is the capacity to bring forth the novel and the novel is that which is *other than* anything which has existed previously.[76] In opposition to Popper, I would insist that to view

[73]Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations*, p. 117.

[74]Rorty, *Philosophy and Mirror of Nature*, p. 389.

[75]*Ibid.*, p. 379.

[76]Carl R. Hausman, "Creativity and Rationality" in *The Creativity Question*, ed. Albert Rothenberg and Carl R. Hausman, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke Univ. Press, 1976) p. 344.

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reason as the power to disclose the constraints of reality does not require us to exclude creativity from the essence of reason. In opposition to Rorty, I would argue that to see reason as the capacity to articulate *novel* vocabularies, to generate *new* metaphors, does not demand abandoning the ideal of truth. The *new* and the *true* are not necessarily exclusive of one another.

In fact, a faithful depiction of reality places the highest demands on creativity. In short, human *inquiry* is a creative enterprise; to insist that it is destructive of creativity is to manifest a blindness to the self-transcending character of this creative endeavor. It is not just free and leisured conversation which generates abnormal discourse as naturally as the sparks fly up; disciplined and creative investigation does so as well. What underlies Rorty's demand to replace inquiry with conversation is an impoverished notion of human inquiry, a view of inquiry as routine and, thus, uncreative discourse. In truth, inquiry in pushing toward a more adequate depiction of reality inevitably pushes toward more novel forms of depiction. There is no need to sacrifice reality on the altar of creativity, however much the apostles of post-modernity, following Nietzsche, insist that we must.

As we have observed, both Popper and Rorty appear to be guided by the insight that to be reasonable is to be open to what is other. Nonetheless, both of them fail (although in different ways) to see the full scope of this fundamental insight. Popper does not adequately recognize that rationality entails accepting the challenge of creativity; to be rational, however, is to devote oneself to seeing things from truly novel perspectives, in ways *other than* those which have become familiar and normal. In contrast, Rorty does not satisfactorily admit that rationality involves accepting the constraints of a reality which envelops the conversation of mankind; nonetheless, to be rational is not only to admit the possibility that there is more in heaven and earth than is dreamt of in our philosophies, but also to acknowledge the reality of that which, to some extent, constrains our thinking and, to a far greater extent, eludes our grasp. It is to admit reality as both something met with in experience and aimed at in inquiry.

The highest perfection of human reason is radical openness to whatever in its initial appearance may seem to be absolutely other. An approximation to such perfection can be illustrated in reference to tradition. A tradition is rational to the extent that it is open to the influences of other traditions. While we always operate from *within* a particular tradition, it does not follow that we are necessarily imprisoned within its particular perspective. The rationality of any tradition may be defined, at least in part, by the ability of that tradition to transcend its own particularity. The capacity of a tradition to do this is best understood in terms of its capacity to confront sympathetically that which is initially *almost* wholly unintelligible and, if necessary, to incorporate within itself that which is essentially different. This is captured in the commonsensical equation of reasonableness with open-mindedness.

In light of what has been said above, it seems appropriate to say that human reason is a creative and self-transcending drive toward greater inclusiveness—a drive toward inclusion of what confronts it as other. This means overcoming the apparently irreducible otherness of any actually encountered other. Perhaps this is what Peirce had in mind when he said "reasonableness consists in association, assimilation, generalization, the bringing of items together into an organic whole. . . . In the emotional sphere this tendency toward union appears as Love; so that

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the Law of Love and the Law of Reason are quite at one."[77] For Peirce, "growth only comes from love" (6.289). "Love, recognizing germs of loveliness in the hateful, gradually warms it into life, and makes it lovely" (*ibid*). If the law of reason is one with the law of love, then reason is a drive toward the overcoming of oppositions, especially those conflicts in which the self feels compelled to maintain itself by denying or even destroying some other. Rationality involves the capacity to confront the apparently irrational as though it might turn out to be a friend. That which violates my understanding of things must not be ignored; rather it must be explored. For whatever threatens to destroy my interpretation of reality also promises to deepen it.

Rationality is the drive to overcome the distance between self and other, without losing sight of the reality of difference or even opposition. Perhaps the greatest challenges to rationality so understood come from our cosmic situation, on the one hand, and our political situation, on the other. Rationality, as openness to the other, implies openness to the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, no less than to the followers of Marx, Lenin and Stalin. That is, to be truly rational is to be open to the possible presence of the divine other and also to the actual humanity of our deepest foes. If we close our ears to the possibility that the world speaks with a divine voice or to the actuality that our enemies speak with a human voice, we fail as rational creatures. The work of reason, accordingly, involves nothing less than to question the world in such a way as to open ourselves to the possibility of the divine and to question our enemies and ourselves in such a way as to open ourselves to the actuality of their—and our—humanity. Such work involves the humility to accept the constraints of reality and the creativity to see the contours of those constraints.

[77]Philip P. Wiener (ed.), *Charles S. Peirce: Selected Writings* (New York: Dover Publications, 1966), p. 332.

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Fordham Univ.

History, Insight and Judgment in Thomism

Gerald A. McCool, S.J.

OVER A decade ago, Bernard J. F. Lonergan addressed the Montreal meeting of the Jesuit Philosophical Association (JPA) on "Insight Revisited."[1] Although that lecture has become something of a classic in the intervening years, it was not the first which Father Lonergan delivered at a meeting of the JPA. Back in 1949, at the height of the New Theology crisis, he spoke to it at Boston College. On that occasion the topic of his remarks was "The Natural Desire to See God."[2] That lecture, as we know, also caught the attention of a larger audience in its published form. Again, since the meetings of the JPA always coincide with the American Catholic Philosophical Association (ACPA) Convention, a number of its members were in the audience in 1969 when Lonergan gave a very significant lecture, "Natural Knowledge of God,"[3] at the ACPA Convention.

Those lectures dealt with central themes of Lonergan's philosophy and theology: insight and personal self-appropriation, man's natural desire to see God, and the relation between philosophical and theological reflection in the converted Christian's response, through knowledge and love, to the universe and its God. In them we recognize themes common to many of the distinguished philosophers in the Neo-Thomist movement: the relation between unreflective self-awareness and the knower's objective knowledge of himself and of his world; the drive of the conscious and free spirit to the Infinite Goal of its knowledge and love; and the correct understanding of St. Thomas as a Christian philosopher. Common as these themes were in the Neo-Scholastic movement, individual representatives of that movement did not always agree in their interpretation of the significance of those themes in St. Thomas' own thought. In fact, their differing interpretations led to very strong disagreement among the Thomists in their understanding of how a contemporary disciple of St. Thomas should approach contemporary philosophy and theology. So great had the disagreement become that, by the time of Lonergan's talk on the natural desire to see God to the JPA at Boston College, it had culminated in the painful and dangerous New Theology crisis in France.[4]

[1] "Insight Revisited," *A Second Collection*, ed. by William F. J. Ryan, S.J. and Bernard J. Tyrell, S.J. (Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1974), pp. 263–278.

[2] "The Natural Desire to See God," *Collection*, ed. by F. E. Crowe, S.J. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), pp. 84–95.

[3] *A Second Collection*, pp. 117–33.

[4] For an excellent discussion of these disagreements and their influence on the New Theology crisis, see Robert F. Harvanek, S.J. "Philosophical Pluralism and Catholic Orthodoxy," *Thought* 28 (1953), 21–52 and "The Unity of Metaphysics," *Thought* 28 (1953), 375–411.

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THE JUDGMENT IN NEO-THOMISM

Lonergan's doctoral dissertation, which appeared later in book form under the title *Grace and Freedom*,[5] had shown at the very beginning of his career that Lonergan intended to be his own man in his interpretation of St. Thomas. As Gilson had done, he based his own understanding of St. Thomas' thought on a careful exegesis of the original text, guided by the results of contemporary historical scholarship. When, in his study on operative grace, Lonergan abandoned both the Molinist and the Banesian accounts of St. Thomas' theology of grace and freedom, it became clear that, in Lonergan's mind, a philosopher became an authentic disciple of the Angelic Doctor through his personal appropriation of St. Thomas' own mind and not through fidelity to one or other of the traditional Neo-Scholastic schools. This was true whether the school in question was the Suarezian, favored by his own order, or the traditional Thomistic school of the classical Dominican Commentators: Cajetan, Banez, and John of St. Thomas.

In this declaration of independence Lonergan aligned himself with Gilson and broke decisively with the more traditional Thomists, of whom Jacques Maritain was the most influential and, many would argue, the greatest. For, although Maritain was neither unaware of history nor blind to its significance in contemporary culture, the speculative integration of knowledge, worked out in *The Degrees of Knowledge*, was a contemporary development of the epistemology and metaphysics which he had taken over from Cajetan and John of St. Thomas.[6] The fact that Gilson and Lonergan were devoted to modern scholarship in the study of St. Thomas, and that they shared a commitment to the uniqueness of St. Thomas' original metaphysics of matter, form and existence, did not mean, however, that they had a great deal in common in their interpretations of Thomas. They were very far apart both in their understanding of St. Thomas' Christian philosophy and in their vision of the contribution which a metaphysics inspired by it could make to contemporary philosophy and theology.

The Neo-Scholastics all agreed that truth was found in the judgment, and, for the Neo-Thomists among them, judgment meant more than the union of a universal form with a concrete sensible subject. It was an act of affirmation in which the *est* of the judgment was the intentional correlate of the *esse* which placed the composite of matter and form in existence. This did not mean, however, that the Neo-Thomists were of one mind in their epistemology of the act of affirmation. Maritain, for example, was perfectly willing to admit that truth was found in the judgment. Nevertheless, in *The Degrees of Knowledge* he argued that the mind's grasp of being and of the necessary first principles, which ruled the act of affirmation, occurred in the conceptual "eidetic intuition of being."[7] Consequently, despite Maritain's personal devotion to Bergson and his brilliant exploita-

[5]Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., *Grace and Freedom* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971).

[6]For a detailed account of the influence of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas on Maritain's epistemology, see Gerald A. McCool, S.J., "Jacques Maritain: A Neo-Thomist Classic," *The Journal of Religion*, 58 (1978), 380–404.

[7]Jacques Maritain, *Existence and the Existent* (New York: Pantheon, 1948), pp. 22–34. For the relation of the judgment to Maritain's "eidetic intuition of being" see Oliver Lacombe, "Jacques Maritain Metaphysician," *The New Scholasticism*, 46 (1972), 18–31.

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tion of pre-conceptual knowledge in *Art and Scholasticism* and in *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry*, his commitment to the Thomism of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas made the epistemology of *The Degrees of Knowledge* an epistemology of the concept. The metaphysical wisdom which integrated speculative and practical knowledge owed its universality and necessity to the conceptual "eidetic intuition of being" which arose in the heart of the affirmation and was raised to the state of metaphysical clarity in the third degree of conceptual abstraction.[8]

Neither Gilson nor Lonergan agreed with Maritain in his epistemology of the concept and the judgment. For Gilson, the mind's grasp of being did not occur through a conceptual "eidetic intuition." On the contrary, the intuition through which being was grasped was quite distinct from the abstraction of the concept. The intuition of being was due to the mind's immediate grasp of the intelligibility of being in the sensible object presented to the human knower in the phantasm. The intuition of being, therefore, was not due to the concept. On the contrary, it was due to the act of affirmation through which the human knower placed a sensible object in existence. In Gilson's interpretation of St. Thomas, the epistemology of the judgment of existence, together with the unique metaphysics of matter, form, and *esse* grounded upon it, were the two hallmarks of authentic Thomism. No philosopher or theologian could proclaim himself an authentic disciple of the Angelic Doctor unless he clearly understood the importance of the *esse* grasped through the judgment in St. Thomas' epistemology and metaphysics.[9] When judged by this criterion, neither Cajetan nor Banez could qualify as authentic Thomists.[10] And, although Gilson never said so, the same charge of inauthenticity could also be brought against the epistemology and metaphysics of Maritain's *The Degree of Knowledge*. Among the Neo-Thomists, then, the relation between concept and judgment in Thomas' philosophy of knowledge had become the litmus test of authentic Thomism.

INSIGHT AND THE JUDGMENT

Bernard Lonergan did not object to making a correct understanding of the judgment the norm for a proper understanding of St. Thomas' philosophy of knowledge and being. For, both in his account of St. Thomas' philosophy of knowledge in his *Verbum* articles,[11] and in his major speculative work, *Insight*,[12] he defended the position that being is reached through the judgment, and, in his own cognitional theory, the distinction between conceptualization and affirmation in cognitional process corresponds to the distinction between form and existence in the known object.[13] Nevertheless, although the connection between the judgment and the metaphysical structure of reality was as important to Lonergan as it

[8]Jacques Maritain, *A Preface to Metaphysics* (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1948), pp. 43–5; 58–9.

[9]Etienne Gilson, *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 214–19.

[10]Etienne Gilson, *The Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas* (New York: Random House, 1956), pp. vii–viii.

[11]Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., *Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas* (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967).

[12]Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J., *Insight* (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1957).

[13]"Cognitional Structure," *Collection*, pp. 221–39.

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was to Gilson, the nature of the judgment and the role assigned to it in the two philosophies of knowledge and being were by no means the same. Some of the difference between them could be attributed to the indirect influence of the Maréchalian Thomism which Lonergan had picked up "by osmosis" as a student of theology.[14] But, although Maréchalianism might account for the difference between Lonergan's epistemology and the epistemology of Gilson and Maritain, it could not account for the uniqueness and originality of his own philosophy of knowledge. In Maréchalian Thomism the mind's grasp of being in the judgment is attributed neither to the concept nor to an intellectual intuition of being in the imagined object. On the contrary, it is explained by the reference of the abstract conceptual object to the Infinite Goal of the mind's natural dynamism in the vital act of affirmation.[15] Thus Lonergan's use of the transcendental method in his philosophy of knowledge, and the role he assigns to the mind's pure desire to know in his cognitional theory, could fairly be attributed to the influence of Maréchalian Thomism. Nevertheless, Lonergan's account of the judgment goes far beyond the epistemology of Maréchal.

Lonergan's remarkable advance over Maréchal was due to his rediscovery of the act of insight in St. Thomas' philosophy of knowledge. In the *Verbum* articles Lonergan claimed that none of the accounts of the process of conceptualization and affirmation offered by the Neo-Thomist commentators did justice to the richness and originality of St. Thomas' own philosophy of knowledge.[16] None of the Neo-Thomists had noticed that in St. Thomas' philosophy of knowledge a pre-conceptual conscious act of insight intervened between the presentation of the experiential datum to the intellect in the phantasm and the formulation of the abstracted essence in the concept. Nor had any of them remarked that a second, essentially distinct, act of insight intervened between the formulation of the essence in the concept and its affirmation of the concrete experienced subject in the judgment. Failure to observe the two-fold act of insight in the cognitional process as it moves from the phantasm to the affirmation was a very serious oversight indeed, since it resulted in a notable misunderstanding of St. Thomas' theory of knowledge.

For one thing, it led to a false account of the act of affirmation. Reflecting on the whole process, that is, on experience, on the intelligent grasp of the intelligible form or quiddity in the concrete datum, and on the formulation of the abstract essence in the concept, the human knower saw, through a second act of reflective insight, that all the conditions required for a truthful affirmation of the synthesis had been fulfilled.[17] In St. Thomas' account of human knowledge, as *Verbum* had shown, the mind's prior question, *quid est?* received its answer through an act of intelligent insight into the datum presented in the phantasm. The subsequent question, *an est?*, received its answer in the act of reflective insight through which

[14] "Insight Revisited," *A Second Collection*, p. 265.

[15] For a clear account of the diversity between Gilson's and Maréchal's epistemology of the judgment see Joseph Donceel, S.J., "A Thomistic Misapprehension?" *Thought* 32 (1957), 189–198.

[16] "Insight Revisited," *A Second Collection*, pp. 266–67; *Verbum*, pp. 218–19.

[17] *Verbum*, pp. 192–93. See also *Insight*, pp. 315–16.

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the knower became aware that the conditions required for a true and evident judgment had been fulfilled.

Conceptualization, therefore, could not be a purely natural process whose only conscious element was its term, the concept. On the contrary, conceptualization was a conscious process in which the mental word of the concept emanated from an originating act of insight. It was not just an intelligible process, a natural movement from potency to act, which one could explain in purely metaphysical terms, it was an *intelligent* process, a genuine intellectual emanation. Nor was the judgment concerned with the synthesis of universal form and concrete subject explained by the mind's conversion to the phantasm. Judgment had as its proper function the conscious *position* of a synthesis already made in the process of experience, intelligent insight, and formulation of the concept. Once the synthesis had been made, the subsequent question, *an est?*, arose. And when the knower saw in the act of reflective insight that no further relevant questions remained unanswered, he could safely give the answer, "yes, it is." Proceeding intelligently from the act of reflective insight, the second complex mental word of the judgment then placed the synthesis of experienced matter and intelligible form in being.

Lonergan would not have made this remarkable discovery if he had done no more than try to understand the metaphysical language in which St. Thomas had presented his philosophy of knowledge. But he had done much more. He had attempted to "appropriate the mind" of the Angelic Doctor himself. In practice this meant that, while reading St. Thomas' text, Lonergan had heightened his own consciousness. In other words, he had concentrated his attention on his own mental operations as he raised and answered the questions, *quid est* and *an est*. By doing so, he became aware of the two-fold act of insight as it occurred in his own mind. Once Lonergan had done this, St. Thomas' account of conceptualization and judgment, which he had before found puzzling, made perfect sense. In *Verbum*, therefore, Lonergan had not only rediscovered St. Thomas' authentic philosophy of knowledge, he had also begun to practice for himself what he would later call "cognitional theory." First heightening his consciousness in order to understand it, he had formulated the results of his insight into consciousness in clear, abstract, explanatory concepts.

Lonergan, therefore, could argue that, although the language which St. Thomas himself had used in his explanatory formulations was Aristotelian, the uniqueness and power of the Angelic Doctor's philosophy of knowledge should be attributed to its basis in Aquinas' own cognitional theory. When later Scholastics forgot that fact, they also overlooked the two-fold conscious act of insight in Aquinas' philosophy of knowledge. That was why they tried to explain Aquinas' account of conceptualization and affirmation on the basis of strictly metaphysical causality. Inevitably, therefore, their own philosophy of knowledge ceased to be the authentic philosophy of the Angelic Doctor. Clearly then, by the time the *Verbum* articles had been published, Lonergan no longer accepted Neo-Thomistic epistemology, even the Maréchalian epistemology, whose account of the concept and judgment was based almost entirely on the metaphysics of finality and motion. He had already worked out a different epistemology of the judgment whose basis was the cognitional theory which he had rediscovered in the works of the Angelic Doctor.

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In later years Lonergan made this cognitional theory, centered on the two-fold act of insight, the foundation upon which his own philosophy and theology were built. Lonergan's own epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy of God, not to mention the method which he proposed for theology, require this cognitional theory to justify their validity.[18] The four Lonerganian fundamental precepts for doing philosophy and theology (be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible) demand it.[19] The criterion proposed in *Insight* for objective evidence, namely, reflective insight's grasp that no further relevant questions need be asked, is verified through the exigences of the pure desire to know. And this desire, which Lonergan calls the notion of being, manifests itself to the knower as he appropriates the structure of his unified act of knowledge in the process of asking questions and finding answers to them.[20] The same heightened conscious self-appropriation which verified the knower's intelligent and reasonable self-affirmation as a contingently existing knower also provided the objective evidence which verified Lonergan's heuristic concept of being.[21] For, once the cognitional structure of human knowledge had been appropriated, intelligently understood, and reasonably affirmed, it was clear that being could be identified neither with what the senses experienced, nor with the intelligible essence formulated in the concept. Consequently, being could be identified neither with the "already out there real" of the empiricists, nor with the "purely inside the mind" conceptual intelligible of the idealists. As the goal of man's unrestricted pure desire to know, being could be defined only through the cognitional structure of the conscious intentional finality, that is, through the "notion of being," which headed toward it. Being, therefore, was whatever could be intelligently understood and reasonably affirmed.

Evidently, then, Lonergan's reappropriation and affirmation of the structure of human knowledge in his cognitional theory led to a radically different account of the judgment from those which Gilson and Maritain had given. There was no intuition of being in the phantasm. Neither was there any eidetic intuition of being in the concept. Furthermore, despite their common affirmation of the vital role of the mind's unrestricted drive toward being in the judgment, Lonergan's account of the relation between the judgment and being differed from that given by Maréchal. For Maréchal, the being which guaranteed the realism of the judgment was the Infinite Necessary Being, the term of the mind's unconscious natural desire. For Lonergan, on the other hand, the being which justified the realism of the judgment was the contingent existence of a concrete fact affirmed when the conditions required for its existence had been verified through an act of reflective insight. Concurrent with Lonergan's original account of the relation between the

[18]Bernard J. F. Lonergan, S.J. *Method in Theology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1972), pp. 13–20.

[19]*Method in Theology*, pp. 52–3.

[20]*Insight*, pp. 336–39.

[21]*Insight*, pp. 348–50; 356–57. Lonergan distinguishes carefully between the notion of being, man's conscious pure desire to know, and the heuristic concept of being. The concept of being is a heuristic concept because it defines the object of the pure desire to know through the cognitional operations through which it can be known.

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judgment and being, was an original account of objective evidence, grounded upon reflective insight and the exigences of the pure desire to know.[22] Thus Lonergan's reflective critical realism, based on conscious self-appropriation, differed notably from the immediate direct realism of Gilson and Maritain. Furthermore, although there was some affinity between Lonergan's self-appropriation of the knower and transcendental method, Lonergan could not be called a transcendental Thomist in the manner of Maréchal. For Lonergan's critical realism, unlike the realism of Maréchal, was not grounded upon the unconscious metaphysical, or logical, conditions of possibility for an affirmed *object*. In other words, Lonergan reflected upon the cognitional structure of the inquiring *subject consciously* evident to him as he asked and answered questions. Maréchal, on the other hand, sought the *pre-conscious* metaphysical conditions of possibility logically required for the coherent affirmation of an *object*.

From the beginning of the Neo-Scholastic movement in the nineteenth century, the modern disciples of St. Thomas had been aware of the distinction between unreflective self-awareness and its reflex thematization through the judgment.[23] All had laid great stress on the abstraction of the concept and, after the Neo-Thomists became dominant among them, on the affirmative moment in the judgment. The relation between sensation, concept, and affirmation in knowledge, and the relation between matter, form, and existence in being, was by no means unknown to them. In fact, that correspondence was one of the reasons why they believed that St. Thomas' epistemology should recommend itself to their contemporaries as a replacement for the rationalism, empiricism, and idealism then in favor.

As the Neo-Scholastics saw it, a genuine retrieval of St. Thomas' epistemology of self-awareness, conceptualization, and the judgment, should lead to a more accurate grasp of St. Thomas' whole philosophy and, at the same time, make an important contribution toward the solution of problems which empiricism, rationalism, and idealism could not handle.[24] Such had been the program which Gilson, Maritain, and the Maréchalian Neo-Thomists had undertaken in their own way.[25]

By the time Lonergan began his independent inquiry into St. Thomas' epistemology of the judgment in the preparation of his *Verbum* articles, Maréchalians and Maritainians were at loggerheads. They disagreed violently with one another in their understanding of St. Thomas' epistemology of the concept and the judgment, and the disagreement between them had a great deal to do with the New

[22]*Insight*, pp. 380–81.

[23]Joseph Kleutgen, S.J., whose influence on the drafting of Leo XIII's encyclical on Christian philosophy, *Aeterni Patris*, is well known, made a great deal of the role of the mind's self-awareness in the activity of judging. See Gerald A. McCool, S.J., *Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century: The Quest for a Unitary Method* (New York: Seabury, 1977), pp. 211–12.

[24]The retrieval of St. Thomas' authentic thought through historical research and dialogue between a restored, purified and developed Thomism and contemporary philosophy were two of the principal tasks which Leo XIII proposed to Christian philosophers in *Aeterni Pateris*. One of the more interesting results of Thomism's endeavor to perform them has been the retrieval of St. Thomas' own philosophy of insight, conceptualization, and judgment.

[25]Gilson had said comparatively little about non-conceptual knowledge. On the other hand, Maritain's treatment of non-conceptual knowledge in ethics, esthetics, and religious experience was remarkable, while, among the transcendental Thomists, Rousselot was unsurpassed in his account of *intellectus*. He had no rival prior to the publication of *Verbum*.

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Theology crisis which shook the Church in France a few years before the Second Vatican Council.[26]

A RADICALLY REVISED THOMISM?

In *Verbum*, and later in *Insight*, Lonergan proposed a radically new exegesis of St. Thomas' philosophy of knowledge. Was his exegesis fundamentally new and was it really as distinct from the Maréchalian philosophy of the concept and judgment as Lonergan thought it was? Did it justify a radical revision in our understanding of what St. Thomas' original and lasting contribution truly was? And does that new understanding change the way in which St. Thomas' philosophy can serve as an inspiration for the contemporary philosopher and theologian? Finally, does Lonergan's retrieval of St. Thomas' philosophy of the judgment suggest any fresh approaches to contemporary philosophical problems? These are some of the questions which the philosophical community can still raise, even though unfortunately Lonergan is no longer among us to answer them.

Questions as large as these can hardly be addressed in a single essay. We might make an approach to them, however, by a brief consideration of some major issues in twentieth century philosophy and theology: the integration of knowledge, the grounding of first principles, and the mediation of historical tradition. All of them were at stake in the New Theology crisis, the controversy which occasioned Lonergan's first JPA address on "The Natural Desire to See God." Lonergan's philosophy of the judgment has something new to say about each of them.

ST. THOMAS' INTELLECTUALISM AND THE INTEGRATION OF KNOWLEDGE

"Insight" is Lonergan's English translation for the act which St. Thomas called "*intellectus*" and which he opposed to "*ratio*," the conceptual form of knowing proper to discursive reason. For the Angelic Doctor, *intellectus* is a form of intellectual knowing different in its nature from *ratio* and essentially higher than it in its nature. *Ratio*, or discursive reason, depends upon *intellectus* which grasps reason's first principles in a flash of immediate knowledge. Divine and angelic self-awareness, and the human intellect's conscious grasp of its own activity, are the work of *intellectus*; for, unlike the *ratio* which abstracts concepts, *intellectus* can know the singular. Prudence and art, virtues of the practical intellect, enable the virtuous knower to judge correctly (by "connaturality") about individual actions or productions. They are primarily virtues of *intellectus*. This accounts for the significant connection which Thomas makes between the connaturality of the virtuous knower and his acts of *intellectus* when he treats of moral knowledge.

In the early years of the present century, Bergson's critique of rationalism called the Neo-Scholastics' attention to St. Thomas' use of *intellectus*. At the same time, Blondelian philosophy drew their attention to another neglected element in St. Thomas' thought, namely, the drive of the mind and the will to God as their ultimate end. Rousselot, as we shall see, linked these two elements closely together in his provocative interpretation of St. Thomas' intellectualism.

[26]See note 4.

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As we have already seen, Jacques Maritain also made *intellectus* an important element in his distinction and integration of knowledge. The grounding of speculative reason's first principles in *The Degrees of Knowledge* are attributed to *intellectus*; and the role assigned to non-conceptual knowledge in Maritain's esthetics, ethics, and religious philosophy are further signs of the importance which Maritain attributed to it. Indeed no one who has read with any care *Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry*, or *Integral Humanism*, can fail to see the significant place assigned to connaturality and *intellectus* in Maritain's philosophy of art and culture.

Despite that fact, however, and despite the continuing influence of Bergson on his own thought, Maritain's speculative integration of knowledge was carried out on the basis of Aristotelian science. The wisdom which judged and ordered human knowledge in *The Degrees of Knowledge* was clearly identified with Aristotle's *scientia rectrix*. In other words, it was the metaphysics whose first principles were grasped immediately by *intellectus* once the idea of being had been disengaged in its purity through the third degree of abstraction. Obviously, then, Maritain saw no conflict between St. Thomas' epistemology of *intellectus* and a Thomistic integration of knowledge by the speculative intellect through a deductive metaphysical *scientia rectrix*. Others might see problems with such an approach to the integration of knowledge, but Maritain and his followers were committed to it once they made the epistemology of Cajetan and John of St. Thomas their own.[27]

On the other hand, Pierre Rousselot, the first, and perhaps the greatest, philosopher associated with what was later called transcendental Thomism, united St. Thomas' intellectualism to the mind's drive to God.[28] The intimate connection between the two was one of the major themes of his classic, *L'Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas*.[29] St. Thomas was not a rationalist philosopher of the concept, Rousselot argued. He was an intellectualist because his normative ideal of knowledge was not the abstract concept of the discursive human *ratio* but the act of *intellectus* through which God and the angels grasped their own reality immediately. *Intellectus* was the norm for human, as well as angelic, knowledge, since the intellect of both man and angel reached the ultimate goal of its activity when it grasped both God and its own reality through *intellectus* in the Beatific Vision. So low, in fact, was St. Thomas' estimation of the concept's cognitional significance that it was fair to say that his epistemology was tinged with nominalism.[30] For St. Thomas, Rousselot claimed, it was the drive of the human mind towards its supreme act of *intellectus* in the Beatific Vision rather than the abstract concept—*ratio's* substitute for *intellectus*—which guaranteed the mind's hold on being and the first principles. The intellect was the faculty of being, Rousselot said clearly, because it was the faculty of the divine.[31]

In that case, it was the drive of the mind to the supreme act of *intellectus* Himself which linked the judgment of *ratio* to being. Far from attributing to the

[27]See note 6.

[28]It must be conceded, however, that transcendental method as such did not structure the work of Rousselot as it structured the work of Maréchal. Later Thomists in their tradition drew inspiration from both of their great predecessors.

[29]Pierre Rousselot, S.J., *L'Intellectualisme de Saint Thomas* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1924).

[30]*L'Intellectualisme*, pp. 94–5.

[31]*L'Intellectualisme*, p. v.

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concept the central role which Maritain assigned to it in his "eidetic intuition of being," Rousselot radically relativized it. The essence represented in the abstracted concept—*ratio's* feeble "miming" of the real grasped by *intellectus*—was at best an indirect and analogous representation of reality.[32] It followed, then, that *ratio's* imperfect and analogous concepts could never furnish the univocal middle term which Aristotelian science required for its valid deductive syllogisms.

Thus, as early as 1908, Rousselot had drawn the conclusion that St. Thomas' authentic and original philosophy of knowledge, whose normative ideal was the act of *intellectus*, demanded a relativization of the concept. So much so, in fact, that it excluded the use of Aristotelian science in history, and, by implication, in theology. Thomas' own use of Aristotelian science in his philosophy and theology was an historical fact. Philosophically, however, it should be regarded as no more than an unnoticed incoherence in the intellectualism which was the Angelic Doctor's great contribution to philosophy and theology.

From the opening years of this century, therefore, Neo-Thomists found themselves divided on a fundamental issue. One group, the Maritainians, were convinced that St. Thomas' epistemology of *intellectus* was quite compatible with the integration of knowledge through the Aristotelian science which St. Thomas had employed in his own theology and which, it was claimed, he had brought to the height of its perfection. Another group, Rousselot and the Neo-Thomists influenced by him, thought differently. As they saw it, St. Thomas' own philosophy of knowledge was incompatible with the use of Aristotelian method in history and theology. Hence a Thomism like that of Maritain, since it endeavored to integrate human knowledge on the basis of Aristotelian method, was incompatible with St. Thomas' own philosophy of knowledge.

LONERGAN AND THE INTEGRATION OF KNOWLEDGE

This disagreement reached its critical stage in the New Theology controversy which pitted the disciples of Maritain against the philosophical and theological disciples of Rousselot and Maréchal. The issue which provoked the violent explosion in Catholic philosophy a few years before Vatican II was whether or not St. Thomas' Aristotelian scientific theology was the only one which could be employed legitimately in Catholic theology. The disciples of Maritain affirmed that this scientific theology was the only legitimate one. The disciples of Rousselot and Maréchal defended a plurality of equally legitimate methods. Both sides appealed to the philosophy of the Angelic Doctor to justify their own position.[33]

When Rome intervened the issue was still deadlocked and the arguments employed focused on the legitimacy of several conceptual frameworks structuring several theological methods. The Maritainians argued that only one valid conceptual framework was possible, the Aristotelico-Thomistic, which structured *The Degrees of Knowledge*. The disciples of Rousselot and Maréchal replied that the mind's drive to God, which animated every judgment, could link the mind with being and the stable first principles of metaphysics, even though several diverse conceptual frameworks were used to structure human knowledge.

Can Lonergan's philosophy of conceptualization and affirmation contribute

[32] *L'Intellectualisme*, pp. 81–9.

[33] See note 4.

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anything to the resolution of this dispute? Does it throw any new light upon the integration of knowledge through a philosophy inspired by the Angelic Doctor? The answer, I think, is yes.

Maritain's epistemology of the "eidetic intuition of being" and the three degrees of abstraction, as we now know, was the epistemology of Cajetan and of John of St. Thomas. It was not the epistemology of the Angelic Doctor himself. As Lonergan showed in his *Verbum* articles, it suffered from what he stigmatized as "conceptualism," i.e., total unawareness of the role of the two-fold act of insight and the affirmation of the judgment. To a more limited degree, the same accusation could be made against Rousselot. For, although Rousselot had argued quite convincingly that St. Thomas was an intellectualist, his own discussion of *intellectus* was predominantly theological. As far as Rousselot was concerned, it was fundamentally St. Thomas' theology of the Beatific Vision and St. Thomas' theological angelology which provided the strongest arguments for the role of *intellectus* in St. Thomas' philosophy of knowledge. Nowhere, to my recollection, do we find any mention by Rousselot of the place of the two-fold act of insight in conceptualization and affirmation; and his most powerful arguments for the dynamism of the mind are drawn from the theology of the Beatific Vision or, in his philosophical articles, from the metaphysics of Maréchal.[34] They are not based, as are Lonergan's, on the self-appropriation of the knower.

Consequently, although Rousselot could see that St. Thomas' philosophy of *intellectus* invalidated Aristotelian method as the speculative integrator of human knowledge, he was unable to specify any other scientific method which could take its place. And, although he could see clearly that St. Thomas' philosophy of *intellectus* relativized the concept, his failure to observe how the act of insight pivots between the imagined datum and the formulated concept prevented him from seeing how St. Thomas could bridge the gap between the abstracted concept of the *ratio* and the insight of *intellectus*. For, if being is intelligently *understood* in the act of insight from which the concept emanates intelligently, concepts are more than a *mere substitute* for *intellectus*. They are an intelligent formulation of the intelligibility grasped concretely by insight in the phantasm. A philosophy grounded upon St. Thomas' cognitional theory, therefore, need not be "tinged with nominalism." More than a pre-conscious metaphysical drive to God links the judgment and its concept to reality.

Concepts may indeed be relativized but, through its grasp of the two-fold act of insight, the human mind can link their content to the intelligibility understood and verified in the data of experience. Once this link has been seen, the connection between scientific conceptual knowledge and the insights expressed through religious symbols, or the practical common sense judgments of morally virtuous men, can be determined with more precision than Rousselot believed to be possible.

The same epistemology of insight and concept, which enabled Lonergan to distinguish between the precise universal formulations of insight in scientific theory and the less rigorous formulations of common sense, enabled him to dispense with the distinction between the speculative and practical intellect and

[34]For the influence of Maréchal on Rousselot's philosophical articles see Georges van Riet, *L'Epistémologie thomiste* (Louvain: Editions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1946), pp. 308–13.

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their two-fold norm of truth. For, whether the human knower was making moral judgments in a common sense way, or formulating and verifying precise hypotheses, he was still formulating and verifying answers to relevant questions in conformity with the "right appetite" of the pure desire to know. He was never simply contemplating an essence through some form of Platonic "knowledge by confrontation." Knowing was always an acting, and even, in its way, a making, and connaturality had its role to play both in theoretical judgments of fact and practical judgments of value. Hence, both the dialectic between the drive of the pure desire to know and the influence of man's other desires in the diverse patterns of human experience, and the distinction between how scientific theory and common sense practicality formulated their insights, enabled Lonergan to integrate theory, symbol, speculative science, and practical moral knowledge more precisely, and yet more flexibly, than Maritain had done.

Much more could be said on this subject but enough has been said, I think, to show how Lonergan's retrieval of St. Thomas' epistemology of the judgment has contributed to the philosophical integration of knowledge. Lonergan has done more than confirm Rousselot's relativization of the concept. He has done much more than simply shown how, because of the two-fold act of insight, nominalism need not be the result of that relativization. He has shown how a method, based on St. Thomas' own account of human knowledge, could replace Aristotelian scientific method with a sounder and more flexible method for integrating knowledge. If Rousselot was correct in saying that St. Thomas' intellectualism was his original contribution to philosophy and theology, a method based on a reappropriation of St. Thomas' philosophy of the concept and the judgment might well be the Angelic Doctor's major contributions to modern thought.

THE GROUNDING OF FIRST PRINCIPLES

Another major issue in the New Theology controversy was relativism. Maritain's disciples claimed that, once a plurality of structuring conceptual frameworks was held to be legitimate, relativism in philosophy and theology must be the consequence. For, once the concept has been relativized, the judgment's grasp of being and the stable first principles of the speculative intellect which flow from it has been undermined. The absolute value of the metaphysical wisdom which judges and orders human knowledge can no longer be maintained. This argument was reasonable enough once we recall that, in Maritains's version of the traditional epistemology, inherited from Cajetan and John of St. Thomas, being must first be grasped conceptually through the "eidetic intuition" before the speculative intellect can grasp, through an immediate act of *intellectus*, the universal and necessary first principles which flow from it. Consequently, the mind's conceptual hold on being grounded the universal and necessary primitive judgments from which Aristotle's deductive science of metaphysics reasoned to its conclusions. This was the meaning of St. Thomas' claim that *ratio* depended on *intellectus* in the speculative intellect.

The counter-argument advanced by Thomists in the tradition of Rousselot and Maréchal also made sense, if one admitted the major thesis of Maréchalian Thomism. For, in the Maréchalian metaphysics of knowledge, the judgment's grasp of being and the universal first principles which guaranteed the unity of

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metaphysics did not depend on the concept abstracted from sense experience. On the contrary, it was grounded upon the reference of the abstracted conceptual object to Infinite Being by the pre-conscious dynamism of the mind. Since this reference occurred in the act of affirmation, relativization of specific and generic concepts need not entail relativism either in metaphysics or theology. Reference of the conceptual object to God in the affirmation was quite enough to secure the absolute unity of being and the necessary first principles required for the coherent affirmation of any subject.[35]

Such was the status of the argument when the controversy was brought to an abrupt end by papal intervention. Does Lonergan's retrieval of St. Thomas' epistemology of the concept and the judgment make any further contribution to an authentically Thomistic grounding of first principles? The answer, I would argue, is definitely yes. For, in the New Theology controversy, both the opposed groups of Thomists took it for granted that, in St. Thomas' epistemology, first principles were primitive judgments which followed upon an unconscious conceptualization of being. This was true whether the universal and necessary *ratio entis* was grounded upon an "eidetic intuition" or on the reference of an abstracted essence to Infinite Being in every objective judgment. In neither theory did a conscious act of insight have anything to do with either the abstraction of the concept or the affirmation of the object. The debate focused entirely on the metaphysics of knowledge, i.e., on the role of formal abstraction or pre-conscious finality in the objective judgment from which the idea of being arose.[36]

Lonergan's approach to the grounding of first principles is completely different. Its basis is not the metaphysics of pre-conscious causality but the cognitional structure of the act of knowledge consciously reappropriated by the reflective human knower. The dynamic finality which is intelligently understood and reasonably affirmed in Lonergan's cognitional theory is the intentional finality of the pure desire to know, the notion of being. It is the conscious drive to ask intelligent and reasonable questions which moves the knower from experience, through intelligent understanding, to reasonable affirmation. The activity which defines the pure desire to know, is therefore neither conceptualizing nor affirming; it is the activity of *questioning*. For, in Lonergan's cognitional theory, the notion of being is in its innermost nature a conscious spirit of inquiry. It is an intentional quest for the intelligible and the true. Confronted with a datum of experience which it does not understand, the intellect becomes aware of itself as a spirit of inquiry when, driven by its intentional finality, it raises the questions *quid est* and *an est*. For the intelligibility which answers the conscious relevant question *quid est* remains hypothetical until reflective insight verifies it in the datum in answer to the focused question *an est*. That is why the objectivity of the judgment which answers the two questions is guaranteed by the exigencies of the pure desire to know once those exigencies have been consciously appropriated by the knower.

The conscious drive to question, therefore, is the basis for the universal validity of the first principles. First principles are not primitive judgments from which other judgments flow. First principles are simply the thematization of the drive to

[35]See note 4.

[36]Maritain admitted that the mind grasped being in the judgment. Nevertheless, without the "conceptual eidetic intuition of being," which arose in the heart of the affirmation, the stable first principles required for the coherence of an objective judgment could not be grasped.

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understand whose exigencies will not be satisfied until no further relevant questions remain unanswered and which demand the affirmation of the object when reflective insight sees that none remain.

Concepts, judgments, first principles, and logical systems are all expressions of the demands of the pure desire to know which ceaselessly drives the inquiring mind from experience, through intelligent understanding, to reflective affirmation. Since the pure desire to know is unrestricted, the notion of being, which pervades and underpins all human knowledge, is a transcendental notion. Its control extends to judgments of value as well as to judgments of fact, and the decisions which flow from judgments of value must be in conformity with its demands. The classical first principle of ethics, therefore, good is to be done, is included among the four transcendental principles or precepts through which the understanding of its exigencies can be formulated: be attentive, be intelligent, be reasonable, be responsible.

If, then, the first principles of speculative and practical reason are grounded on the conscious drive of the intelligent, reasonable and responsible subject to understand, then, their grounding is prior to every focused question, to every judgment, and to every logical deduction. For the transcendental notion of being pervades and underpins every intelligent question and every reasonable answer. Human reasoning, therefore, does not proceed from immediately evident judgments as its ultimate first principles. In fact, in Lonergan's cognitional theory, *reasoning is prior to first principles*. Intelligent understanding is prior to reflective judgment. In its endeavor to answer the relevant questions which lead to insight, the intellect proposes hypotheses. But, if it does that, the intellect is *reasoning to understand*, and intelligent hypothetical understanding is prior to the reflective judgment which places the proposed intelligibility in being. It follows, therefore, that the logical order consisting of concepts, immediately evident judgments (first principles), and discursive reasoning, so often presented in the Scholastic manuals, in no way corresponds to the relation between concept and judgment, between discursive reasoning and first principles as found in St. Thomas' own philosophy of knowledge.

Lonergan's exposition of the grounding of first principles through the cognitional structure of the human knowledge animated by the notion of being, the pure desire to know, represents a great advance over the purely metaphysical grounding proposed by the Maréchalian Thomists at the time of the New Theology crisis. In Lonergan's cognitional theory, the transcendental precepts, expressing the exigencies of the unrestricted pure desire to know, provide the foundations which guarantee the unity of speculative and practical knowledge. Relativism is decisively excluded. On the other hand, the conscious emanation of the abstract intelligibility, formulated in the concept from the concrete intelligible form which insight grasps immediately in the datum, permits both a growth in insight and a progressively more accurate formulation of insight through a diverse range of concepts. Sets of concepts and the diverse systems of their formulation can constitute a range of diverse conceptual frameworks.

Nevertheless, such frameworks can be linked intelligently to one another through acts of direct and reflective insight, even though the concepts within them can not be related to another through a process of logical deduction. Once Lonergan had made that clear, he had shown that St. Thomas' authentic philoso-

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phy of knowledge did indeed allow for a plurality of conceptual frameworks without in any way compromising either the unity of metaphysics or the universal validity of the first principles. Furthermore he had shown *how*, through the two-fold act of insight, meanings formulated in the concepts of diverse frameworks could be intelligently controlled. By doing that he had vindicated Rousselot's claim that commitment to Aristotelian method in philosophy and theology was in no way required by St. Thomas' philosophy of knowledge.

THE JUDGMENT AND HISTORY

In the New Theology crisis the Maréchalian Thomists had argued convincingly *that* the philosophy of St. Thomas could allow a plurality of conceptual frameworks without falling into relativism. They had given no idea, however, of *how* the meanings expressed through a plurality of conceptual frameworks could be controlled. It was not easy to see then exactly how historical Christian revelation could be mediated though a plurality of different philosophies in diverse epochs without compromising the essential unity of faith. To show how this was possible was one of the tasks which Lonergan assigned himself in *Method in Theology*. The basis of the new method in theology which he proposes to replace St. Thomas' Aristotelian scientific method in the mediation of the Church's historical revelation is his cognitional theory. This is the theory, based on insight into insight, which Lonergan discovered in *Verbum*, developed in *Insight* and applied to theology in *Method in Theology*. A good deal could be said about it but further discussion of it cannot be attempted here.

Although Lonergan is no longer with us, his contribution to philosophy and theology will still provoke discussion for years to come. His proposal to make cognitional theory the "philosophical first" from which both epistemology and metaphysics should be derived is a challenging one. The nature of the metaphysics which he assigned it in the judging and ordering of knowledge will be the subject of considerable questioning. Just what is the relation of Lonergan's explanatory metaphysics of matter, form, and act to the philosophy of the Angelic Doctor? Can it really perform the function which Lonergan assigns to it in his philosophy of God and in his theology? Provocative as these questions may be, we cannot attempt an answer here.

The scope of our discussion is more confined. Its aim has been to show how, from the beginning of the Neo-Scholastic revival, the Neo-Scholastics' understanding of St. Thomas' philosophy of the judgment has shaped their own conception of what Thomism was and of the contribution which Thomism could make to modern thought. The progressive retrieval of St. Thomas' own philosophy of the judgment has been slow and painful. It has occasioned bitter controversy. The latest contribution to the progressive retrieval has been made by Bernard Lonergan. His work has been a remarkable advance over the earlier work of Rousselot and Maréchal. If, as Rousselot claimed, St. Thomas' philosophy of knowledge was his great and original contribution to philosophy and theology, Lonergan's retrieval of St. Thomas' philosophy of the judgment may call for a radical revision of our understanding of what it means to be a Thomist.

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Are There Types of Truth?

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RECENT DEBATES concerning metascientific issues leave a set of residual problems.[2] One of these concerns the metaquestion about the "types of truth." Existing theories of truth do not provide a satisfactory answer to this metaquestion.[3] In what follows I shall examine two possible approaches to the question, the logical and the epistemological, and then outline a dialectical synthesis (to use a much abused expression). I hope that the resulting reformulation of the *hypothesis of the types of truth* will evoke a renewed debate over this theme.

I. LOGICAL APPROACH TO THE QUESTION

From the logical point of view, there can be one, and only one, concept of "truth." This concept, adequately defined, must specify the logical requirements for assigning a truth-value to propositions (as truth-claims) about the world. And this *concept of truth* can be defined, in the context of the ideal language, as follows:

A proposition (p) is true *iff* its assertion is verifiable by some criterion (K) of evidence.

Symbolically:

(T1) $(\forall p)\ \text{True}(p) \equiv K{:}p$

(I use 'K:p' rather than the presumptive 'Kp,' as a verifiability sign.)

Correspondingly, one may formulate a logical definition of the *concept of falsity*, by substituting in the above definition, the predicate "False" for "True," and inserting the negation sign before the argument of the definiens:

(T2) $(\forall p)\ \text{False}(p) \equiv K{:}{\sim}p$

A proposition (p) is false *iff* its negation is verifiable by some criterion (K) of evidence.

[1]I acknowledge my indebtedness to philosophical colleagues in Scandinavian Universities, in particular, Dagfinn Føllesdal (Oslo), Anfinn Stigen (Oslo), Erik Stenius (Abo Academy), Hakan Törnebohn (Goteborg), G. H. Von Wright (Academy of Finland/Helsinki), and Johannes Witt-Hansen (Copenhagen).

[2]I am referring to such works as: M. Bunge, *Epistemology and Methodology: I–II* (Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel Co., 1983); Y. Gauthier, *Théorétiques: Pour une philosophie constructiviste des sciences* (Montréal: Le Preambule, 1982); M. Marković, *Dialectical Theory of Meaning* (Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel Co., 1984); N. Stockman, *Antipositivist Theories of the Sciences* (Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel Co., 1983); and Wg. Stegmüller, *Neue Wege der Wissenschaftstheorie* (Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 1980).

[3]See my commentary, "A Critique of Current Theories of Truth," *Philosophical Inquiry*, 4 (1982).

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Lastly, a proposition (p) is indeterminate *iff* there is no criterion (K) of evidence by which its assertion or negation is verifiable.

(T3) $(\forall p)$ Indeterminate (p) $\equiv \sim$ K:p

Three points are to be noted concerning the above formulations:

1) that these formulae are *epistemologically neutral* as to the possible kinds of propositions which might be true or false (or indeterminate).

2) that accordingly the symbol K designates the general class of the criteria of evidence, and not any particular kind of evidence.

3) that these logical definitions of truth/falsity merely assign "epistemic status" to propositions in the ideal language.

I interpret then, in the above light, the denotative expressions used by other epistemologists to depict the meaning of "truth," e.g., a proposition is true iff "what it means is the case" (Bergmann), or iff it "obtains" (Chisholm), or iff it "agrees" with the evidence (Bunge), etc., as simply assigning an *epistemic status* to propositions of the object-language in the metalanguage. Neither they, nor I, say anything about the *character* of the propositions themselves. Whatever else needs to be said about propositions, and some other things do need to be said, must be said in an extralogical context of discourse.

II. COMPARATIVE REMARKS ON THE TARSKIAN DEFINITION AND THE PROPOSED DEFINITION

What is the critical difference between the above definition of the concept of truth and the Tarskian definition?

The definition of the concept of truth proposed by Tarski originally was as follows:

(T4) $(x \varepsilon \text{True}) \equiv (x \varepsilon S)$

(where x is the name of the proposition, and S designates the formal system, within which x is assertible).

However, for various philosophic motives, Tarski subsequently proposed a modified form of the above definition as follows:

(T5) (x is true) $\equiv$ p

(where x designates in the metalanguage the name of the proposition p in the object-language).

Evidently, the two definitions (T4 and T5) are not identical in meaning.[4] Which definition did Tarski intend to represent his conception of truth? The tendency has been (at Oxford and elsewhere) to take T5 seriously as representing Tarksi's updated conception, while reverently relegating T4 to the pages of history as a formalist exercise. I disagree. In my view (and on this point I concur with Professor Wolfgang Stegmüller) the earlier formulation (T4) represents the important contribution of Tarski, and the later formulation (5) represents a bad compromise. The motive for the compromise was to *generalize* the formulation so as to extend the range of the definition *beyond* the formal system. The compromise, however, was a failure. And I will take a moment here to explain why. Whether or

[4]See A. Tarski, "The Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages," in *Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics* (Oxford, 1956), §8, Def. 23 et passim; and his popularized article, "The Semantic Conception of Truth," *Philosophy & Phenomenological Research*, 6 (1944).

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not T5 is actually *derivable* from T4, the fact remains that T4 is *presupposed* by T5. For, while T5 expressly suppresses the reference to the formal system (S), it assumes it implicitly as its context of discourse. But the suppression of the reference to the formal system (S) engenders a gross misreading, namely, since the expressions "p is true" and "p" are interchangeable, as the sign '≡' in T5 shows, then the *mere* assertion of a proposition can be taken as a sufficient indication of its truth. Such a misreading is warranted by T5 *prima facie*. And, consequently, one may infer that the predicates "true/false" are dispensable linguistic expressions. Some Oxford philosophers (as is well-known) have propagated this view;[5] and, since I have criticized it elsewhere, I will say nothing more here.

That the expressions "p is true" and "p" are not equivalent (since the latter occurs as the argument of the former) I take to be demonstrable. And this shows how bad the compromise was! The result of the compromise was the culprit-word "mere" in the misreading of T5 above. One can eliminate the "mere" by rendering explicit the formal context of discourse, i.e., by asserting the "p" *in the context of* the formal system (S). That changes the picture drastically since what was the arbitrary becomes the necessary. Thus the covert meaning of definition T5 affirms the overt meaning of definition T4, namely, that the Tarskian definition represents, not a definition of the concept of truth *in general*, but rather a definition of *mathematical truth*. In this light one may read the Tarskian definition as follows: A proposition (p) is true iff it belongs to the given formal system (S), i.e., iff p is at all assertible in S. The validity of this reading is corroborated, not only by the qualifier in the original German title of his own article (*". . . in den formalisierten Sprachen"*), but more importantly, by the fact that subsequently the Tarskian definition was successfully incorporated into the modern model theory.

The essential difference between the definition proposed in this article (T1) and the Tarskian definition (T4), with the above reading, is that, while T4 contains a special function (S), limiting the range of the definition to the field of formal/mathematical systems, in contrast, T1 substitutes a general function (K), whose range extends over the field of all possible true propositions. Are there, then, *other* special functions (besides S), which may be substituted for the general function (K) in our definition T1? This question represents a logical expression of the metaquestion of our inquiry, i.e., whether we can meaningfully speak of the "types of truth."

III. EPISTEMOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE QUESTION

If we take "knowledge" (as epistemologists of the realist persuasion do) to be "true belief based upon evidence," then we must assume the implicit relation of "truth" to "evidence." Is this assumption justified? Consider the character of epistemic propositions. Any epistemic proposition, of the form "p is true" (or "I

[5]E.g., A. J. Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 1946) pp. 88–89, writes: "To say that a proposition is true is just to assert it, and to say that it is false is just to assert its contradictory; and this indicates that the terms 'true' and 'false' connote nothing, but function in the sentence simply as marks of assertion and denial"; and, committing the same error, P. F. Strawson, "Truth," in *Philosophy and Analysis*, ed. Margaret MacDonald (Oxford, 1955) holds a similar opinion.

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know that p is true"), is answerable to the interrogative, "How do you know?" And the only possible answer is, "I know that p is true because of the ground g." This *ground for knowing the truth of* a proposition is the meaning of, and may be taken as the definition of, *evidence*. To trace the evidence for a proposition, *as a truth-claim*, is to verify it. The criterion of verifiability (not to say verification) thus involves a reference to evidence. This, then, is the implicit relation between "truth" and "evidence."

I assume here the *principle of evidence* (in its revised Bergmannian version), namely: (a) that a phenomenon may be named in the ideal language only if it is immediately intuited in perception, memory, or imagination; (b) that a concept may be named in the ideal language only if it is analytically definable or susceptible of concrete exemplification; and, lastly, (c) that the criteria of evidence, corresponding to the modalities of cognition, are field-dependent. The "modalities of cognition" remain to be explicated. But the validity of the principle of evidence is independent of the yet-undisclosed contents of this "open clause."

Now consider the following set of propositions representing truth-claims:

1a. My afterimage is a black spot.
1b. I see clouds in the sky.
2a. Water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit.
2b. Planets move in elliptical orbits.
3a. $(5 + 7) = 12$
3b. $N = \frac{n(n+1)}{2}$ (Gaussian Formula)
4a. Nothing is black and white all over.
4b. Every phenomenon has a cause.

What is the evidence for the truth of these propositions? One says that the evidence for Group 1 is provided by the immediate intuition of the observer; but, while *1a* can only be a private presentation, *1b* can be an intersubjective experience. And one says that the evidence for Group 2 is provided by experimental confirmation, which may involve direct verification (as in the case of *2a*) or indirect verification (as in the case of *2b*), and which may admit of "degrees of truth." The evidence for Group 3, however, is of a radically different order. Here the crucial factor is the assertibility of the given proposition in the context of the formal system *and* the availability of a deductive proof that this is the case. The difference between propositions *3a* and *3b* is that, while *3a* is provable by the laws of identity/contradiction alone, *3b* requires for its proof some other axiom (e.g. the axiom of mathematical induction) in addition to the laws of identity/contradiction. This explains the analytic character of lower-level, and the constructive character of higher-level, mathematical operations and structures and, accordingly, the irreducibility of the latter to the former. (I believe, to make a parenthetical observation, that Kant was right in stating that the propositions of mathematics are "synthetic a priori"—only he should have restricted that claim to higher mathematics and he should not have given a bad example, $(5 + 7) = 12$, from arithmetic!) Analogously, the evidence for the truth of Group 4 is entirely independent of experience, since it involves the logical analysis of the meanings of concepts (as in the case of proposition *4a*) or dialectical argumentation involving some transcendental category (as in the case of proposition *4b*). We say, then, that propositions of the form *4a* are *analytic a priori* because their negation would

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involve contradiction. But propositions of the form *4b* are to be described as *transcendental a priori* because they state *the a priori grounds for the assertibility of* empirical propositions about the world. This last group of propositions, then, represent logico-philosophic propositions (which we shall examine in greater detail below).

Clearly, then, the evidence and, accordingly, the criteria of verifiability for the truth of the above set of propositions vary widely. Do these propositions then, as truth-claims, represent different kinds of truth? The modalities of truth-claims correspond to the modalities of cognition; and the modalities of cognition correspond to the modalities of evidence. This much is obvious *prima facie*. What is less obvious is whether, epistemologically speaking, the modalities of truth-claims *also* represent different "types of truth." I argue that they do. As a ground for the hypothesis of the "types of truth" I suggest the fact that the modalities of truth-claims require different criteria of verifiability. This line of argument (to be elaborated below), whatever its shortcomings may be, has the merit of advancing beyond the global grouping of all propositions (à la Leibniz or Russell) into the two classes of *"vérités de fait"* and *"vérités de raison,"* a classification which is still adhered to in some circles.

IV. DIALECTICAL APPROACH TO THE QUESTION

We have seen that, in logical perspective, there is one and only one concept of truth; and that, in epistemological perspective, there are several distinct kinds of truth-claims. Is there, then, a relation between the one and the other? We shall see that, dialectically viewed, the logical conception provides the abstract matrix for the epistemological conceptions.

If the varieties of truth-claims (exemplified by the propositional groups 1, 2, 3, and 4) remain grounded in the modalities of cognition and evidence and, accordingly, require different criteria of verifiability, then they may be taken as epistemological entities which resist being *reduced* to each other *without also reducing* their corresponding modalities of evidence to each other. But the latter is impossible, ontologically speaking; and, consequently, the former is also impossible, epistemologically speaking, *on the assumption of* the realist position concerning the correlativity of the modalities of cognition to the modalities of evidence. This, then, is the reconstruction of the argument for the recognition of the existence of the "types of truth," as exemplified by the set of propositions as truth-claims, with their respective criteria of evidence and verifiability.

The hypothesis of the *types of truth*, then, may be stated as follows: That the range of propositional truth-claims exemplify distinct "types of truth," such that the epistemic status of each type is determined by its unique criterion of evidence and verifiability, according to the logical form of the general concept of truth (as represented by our definition T1), and susceptible of a logical elucidation of its special forms.

The types of truth, and their respective criteria of evidence and verifiability, are elucidated in the following.

1. Phenomenological Truth

A proposition (p) is phenomenologically true (∅-true) iff it is verifiable by the immediate intuition (I) of the observer.

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Symbolically: ∅-True (p) ≡ I:p

The phenomena of immediate intuition are self-presenting in the context of the perspective of the observer. The character of phenomenological truths is relatively subjective. E.g., A (at time *m*) says, "The cloud puff pictures a lion"; and B (at time *n*) says, "The cloud puff pictures an elephant"; or A and B (at the same moment of time) might describe their afterimages as having different intensities. This subjectivity of impressions and intuitions, however, does not vitiate the underlying objectivity of phenomenological truths. Anyone can see what I see, provided that they stand where I stand; but, of course, others rarely stand where I stand.

Examples of phenomenological truth are: propositions *1a* ("My afterimage is a black spot") and *1b* ("I see clouds in the sky"), aesthetic observation, and observation pertaining to the phenomena of the *Umwelt* and *Lebenswelt* (as may be seen in the works of Ingarden, Heidegger, Basave, and others).

2. Empirical Truth

A proposition (p) is empirically true (E-true) iff it is verifiable by experimentation (E), directly or indirectly, admitting of degrees of certainty.

Symbolically: E-True (p) ≡ E:p

Empirically true propositions are contingently true, regardless of the magnitude of their evidence (given their inherent vulnerability as shown by the Popperian hypothesis of falsifiability), since their falsity is incompatible only with experience. They also admit of "degrees of truth," because their truth-value (V) ranges between the minimum and the maximum of confirmation, in the context of the given cognitive system (S).[6]

Thus: $V(p/S) = 0$ (p is false in S)
$0 < V(p/S) < 1$ (p is partially true in S)
or $V(p/S) = 1$ (p is true in S)

This feature of empirically true propositions accounts, too, for the self-corrigibility of scientific theories.

Examples of empirical truth are: propositions *2a* ("Water freezes at 32 degrees Fahrenheit") and *2b* ("Planets move in elliptical orbits"); and, as we ascend from the level of the relatively concrete *(2a)* to the level of the relatively abstract *(2b)*, from direct to indirect verification, the "degree of truth" *approaches* certainty. "It may even be said," as Poincaré has remarked already, "that the object of science is to dispense with these direct verifications."

3. Mathematical Truth

A proposition (p) represents a mathematical truth (M-truth) iff it expresses a necessary relation between mathematical concepts and is verifiable by a demonstrative proof (D) in the context of the formal system (S), i.e., it is provable that p is assertible in (and hence belongs to) S.

[6]An adequate formalization of the hypothesis of the "degrees of truth" is given by M. Bunge, *Semantics II: Interpretation and Truth* (Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel Co., 1974), ch. 8 §3. Professor Bunge is one of the very few contemporary philosophers who has inquired into the possibility of the "types of truth;" and I hope to review his *Treatise on Basic Philosophy* (1974–1983) for this journal in the near future.

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Symbolically: M-True (p) ≡ D:p/S
≡ (pεS)

(This re-presents Tarski's definition.)

S, as a formal system, is characterized by internal coherence. In a coherent system, given its axiom set (e.g., Peano's Postulates) and given the truth of its existing set of propositions, there is no false proposition that can be derived from it, and consequently, any proposition derived from it must be true. Mathematical language, in this sense, represents a genre of the ideal language.

Within this M-Language, there are levels, two of which are especially noteworthy in this context: (a) the level of analytic propositions (e.g., proposition *3a* (5 + 7) = 12) for the verification of which the laws of identity/contradiction suffice; and (b) the level of synthetic propositions (e.g. proposition *3b:* $N = \frac{n(n+1)}{2}$, which cannot be proven by the laws of identity/contradiction alone, but in addition require some other axiom, in this case the axiom of mathematical induction).[7]

The intriguing question of the applicability of mathematical formulae to empirical data, when the truth-values of these formulae remain independent of the events of the external world, belongs to another line of inquiry.

4. Logico-Philosophic Truth

A proposition (p) represents a logico-philosophic truth (LP-truth) iff it elucidates an "invariant concept" or a "philosophic paradigm," and, it is verifiable by logical analysis or dialectical argumentation (AA), in the context of the ideal language.

Symbolically: LP–True (p) ≡ AA:p

I understand by "invariant concepts" those basic concepts whose meanings are *presupposed* in the contexts of the nonphilosophic discourses of other arts and sciences: (e.g. "truth," "meaning," "causality," etc.) By "philosophic paradigms" I understand those meta-models, constructed at a higher level of discourse, which are applicable to the lower-order models in the arts and sciences. And by "ideal language" I understand (as did Bergmann who introduced this idea into contemporary debate) the technical language of philosophic inquiry which meets certain criteria of adequacy.

A logico-philosophic proposition derives its truth, either from the meanings of its own concepts, or (constructively with the aid of logical/dialectical principles) from other LP-true propositions. For this reason alone philosophy must speak in the "ideal language" (versus the vague ordinary language). Hence all logico-philosophic propositions are a priori.

To say that a proposition is a priori is to tell half of the story. For here one must distinguish between two kinds of logico-philosophic propositions: (a) *analytic propositions* a priori (e.g. proposition *4a*: "Nothing is black and white all over"), whose truth is derived from the meanings of their concepts solely, and whose negation involves contradiction; and (b) *transcendental propositions* a priori (e.g.,

[7]The character of "synthetic propositions" in mathematics has been examined in an illuminating way by Johannes Witt-Hansen, *Om generalisation og generalisationsproblemer i de matematiske og historiske videnskaber* (On Generalization and Problems of Generalization in Mathematical and Historical Sciences) (København: Københavns Universitet, 1963), a work which unfortunately remains untranslated into the English language.

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proposition *4b*: "Every phenomenon has a cause"), whose truth-values are independent of experience, yet they state something about the logical/dialectical form of the world, indirectly, *by asserting the logical matrix for the possibility of the assertion of* empirical propositions about the world.

(I must observe, parenthetically, that it is only in the above light that one can understand the intent and the meaning of the highly paradoxical thesis proposed by Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* (2.182 and 2.19): "Jedes Bild ist auch ein logisches (Dagegen ist z.B. nicht jedes Bild ein räumliches.)" *and,* "Das logische Bild kann die Welt abbilden"—his own disclaimer at the end of the same treatise (at 6.11 et passim) notwithstanding—a thesis which has been usually ignored or rejected by Oxford philosophers, despite the light shed thereon by Erik Stenius, or perhaps because of the neo-Kantian light shed upon it.)

But I do not wish to dwell on the metaquestion of the character of philosophic propositions—even though it constitutes the "latent content" of the "manifest content" of every serious philosophic discourse—at any length here. On this point I have written on another occasion.[8] And it is clear that the validity of the analysis of the "types of truth," outlined here, remains independent of any preconception as to the nature of philosophic inquiry.

V. IMPORT OF THE HYPOTHESIS OF THE TYPES OF TRUTH FOR THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

The implicit complementarity of the "types of truth" has significance for a line of inquiry in the philosophy of science usually known as the logic of discovery. We may explore afresh the possible (and subtle) relations between these types of truth and their prehension. Is there, e.g., a cognitive nexus between phenomenological intuition and conceptual reconstruction? (Was Professor Jean Piaget of Geneva justified in remarking to me that the history of science should be rewritten *with* phenomenological/psychological notes on its margins?) However that may be, it appears imperative to assume an attitude of philosophic tolerance (even critical appreciation) toward the varieties of "phenomenological truths" disclosed in the humane studies (including literature and the arts) *in the context of* a comprehensive conception of the "philosophy of science."

From the historical fact that the programs for epistemological reduction have miscarried, one after another, one should learn a lesson. Recall the attempted reduction of LP-truths to M-truths by Descartes; or, conversely, of M-truths to LP-truths by Wittgenstein; and, again, the attempted reduction of E-truths to ∅-truths by Hume; or, conversely, of ∅-truths to E-truths by Carnap; and so on. Evidently, as seen from where one stands today, the old dichotomy of *"vérités de fait"* and *"vérités de raison"* provided a tempting framework for these reductive tendencies.

For realist epistemologists, however, among whom this writer includes himself, neither the Scylla of subjectivism nor the Charybdis of reductionism presents a serious obstacle any longer. That much should be evident by now. The remaining obstacle is methodological skepticism: E.g. *How can we be certain that our statements concerning "truth" are themselves true?* One answers this question

[8]See my article, "Conceptual Turn in Recent Philosophy," *Critica*, 17 (1985).

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by referring to the levels of metalanguage—λ_1, λ_2, . . ., λ_n such that each successive level provides an axiomatic justification for the preceding one: λ_2:λ_1, λ_3:λ_2, . . ., λ_n:λ_m—yielding a series of progressive solutions. The only residuum is the problem of the incompleteness of the series. To mistake the "incompleteness" for the "indeterminacy" constitutes the skeptic's blindspot. Incompleteness belongs to the termini, indeterminacy to a moment, of the continuum. The continuum itself manifests "epistemic levels" susceptible of cognitive representation. I take the reconstruction of the continuum, at the metascientific level, to be an ideal of every serious inquiry in "philosophy of science."

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Causation and the Self: Reply to Filice

Lois Frankel

IN A RECENT PAPER,[1] Carlo Filice argues that "the experience of sustained control over some of our activities" can provide grounds for favoring a substantial theory of the self (the view that persons are something over and above their experiences, thoughts, etc.) over a bundle theory (p. 137). The main piece of evidence Filice offers for his claim is the common experience of a continuous "causal contribution" to some effect. Such an experience may be found, for example, in the activities of juggling a soccer ball or fixing one's attention on one's breathing. Such experiences are contrasted with the experience of merely "triggering" an event which then proceeds without further participation by the agent. Filice claims that event theories of causation and bundle theories of the self allow only for such triggering activity, and thus that the experience of sustained causal activity points us toward substantial theories of the self and agent theories of causation.

It should be noted at this point that Filice seems to mean by an "event theory of causation" a theory which requires causes, at least, to be momentary, rather than enduring events. But not every event theory is that conservative; many admit events of various durations, and could conceivably count as a single event a sustained causal effort, whether mental or physical in nature. Filice is not, as I understand him, arguing against such broader event theories of causation, but only against those which insist on momentary events.

Filice's main argument, as I understand it, invokes the phenomenon of "controlled attention" to show that what is experienced is "not simply a succession of psychic states" (p. 140). He claims that "something seems to operate from behind and beyond this succession of states . . . it is this transcending something that appears to guide attention," and that when sustaining causal activity, one is "aware of oneself as the source of this energy" (p. 141). But Filice admits that all such experiences are grounds for believing in a substantial self *only if experience can be shown to be reliable in such cases*: this is the point at issue between Filice and a Humean account of the self.

Let us then examine Filice's argument that the experience of controlled attention is indeed a reliable indicator of the existence of a substantial person. It is not clear to me why Filice focuses on sustained experiences of *causation*, rather

[1] "Sustained Causation and the Substantial Theory of the Self," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 26 (June 1986), 137–45.

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than on experiences of continuity, pure and simple. The addition of causal elements opens the way for additional objections (which I will state later), without strengthening his case. First, he lists the phenomenological features of the experience: "continuity, sustainment, and will-like personal causation" (p. 142). Our experience, he argues, ought to be taken to be reliable because (1) it is common, rather than esoteric; and (2) we are able to distinguish (in the non-metaphysical way) sustained attention from discontinuous attention, and between "will-like personal causation" and "letting go"; and so any reason for doubt would have to be of a metaphysical sort. His argument concludes by stating that no metaphysical grounds for doubt can be detected, because (3) he, at least, cannot imagine a situation in which we could mistakenly believe our attention to be focused, continuous, and sustained, or in which we could mistakenly believe ourselves to be directing the flow of our attention.

Given that skepticism about the reliability of experiences of the type under discussion should be of the "metaphysical" sort, let us consider some Cartesian-style objections. Such objections are warranted because Filice admits, earlier in the paper (p. 142), that general doubts about the reliability of experience are legitimate, and argues that experiences of continuous, directed attention can withstand such doubts, because he cannot imagine any situation in which such experiences are non-veridical. I would like to suggest, to the contrary, that with little effort we *can* imagine such situations.

Granted that, in a non-metaphysical context we are able to make certain distinctions regarding our experiences, we still may be mistaken at times regarding their nature. Just as we can usually distinguish dreaming from waking, but sometimes, while dreaming, believe ourselves to be awake, it seems that we may occasionally mistake a discontinuous experience for a continuous one. In fact, we are very good at experiencing continuity where discontinuity exists. We do so every time we view a film, experiencing a series of still pictures as being in motion. Nor do I see much difficulty in the hypothesis that, while we think that we have paid attention to the fly on the wall for the past five minutes, our attention has actually gone off on its own part of the time, perhaps for periods so brief as to be unnoticeable. Our attention can easily wander without our noticing. Attention is frequently not where one thinks it is, as anyone can testify who has ever "watched closely" while a magician made an object disappear.

Let us consider Filice's third point: Can we "*think* that we, qua persons, are being will-like causative . . . in directing the 'flow' of attention, when in fact (at the time) we are not" (p. 142). Because Filice is claiming that our experience of continuous attention *and* our experience of continuous causation are reliable, I shall address his claim from both sides.

A counter-example to the claim that experiences of continuous causation (or indeed any form of agent-causation) are always veridical, may be found in a class of causal situations known as "pseudo-overdetermination": Suppose there are two occurrent events, C_1 and C_2, each capable of producing an effect E, but that C_1 pre-empts the causal efficacy of C_2. One who is unaware that C_1 occurs and pre-empts C_2 could mistakenly believe C_2 to be the cause of E, when in fact C_1 is the true cause. To apply this phenomenon to the situation at hand, recall B, who puts forth an effort to pay strict attention to her breathing, and indeed experiences her attention as continuously focused. Now let us suppose that B is nonetheless

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mistaken in her belief that she is the cause of this focused attention, because, unknown to her, she is the subject of an experiment. B is hooked up to apparatus capable of directing her attention anywhere the experimenter desires. It so happens that B's desire and the experimenter's desire coincide, but the experimenter *could* have focused B's attention on her breathing even had B desired to focus, say, on the Pythagorean theorem. B's effort in focusing is thus in this instance superfluous. Of course, in this example, B may still be correct in her belief that she is putting forth effort, even though mistaken in her belief that her effort is efficacious. Were this the only objection, Filice might still be able to conclude that there really is *something* continuous going on, even if it is not genuine causation.

One lesson of the above counter-example is that the issues of continuous attention and continuous causation are separable. It seems that it would be sufficient to prove the occasional existence of a persistent self if experiences of continuity could be shown to be reliable. But can even this be done? Let us again venture into the laboratory of the sinister scientist. Surely we can imagine a case where poor B is hooked to a machine which yanks her in and out of consciousness without her realizing it. Each moment of conscious experience is made to appear coherent and continuous with the last, but that continuity is a sham. The Humean's claim, that there is nothing but impressions, including false impressions of continuity and memory, can still be made.

Filice may well dismiss my counter–examples as fanciful, emblematic of Cartesian "hyperbolical doubt." Yet such doubt is employed by his Humean opponents, and must be either answered or shown to be inappropriate. Filice, as I see it, has done neither. Indeed, he has allowed the legitimacy of general doubts about the validity of experience.

Finally, we should note that the most Filice can claim, if his arguments succeed, is that there are intervals of continuous consciousness, or continuous selves of various durations. At best, he can claim that continuous selves exist *when* there is continuous consciousness. His arguments do not show that a substantial self survives discontinuities of consciousness. Thus Filice has not provided good reasons for believing in substantial selves or persons which persist for any meaningful length of time.

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Causation and the Self: Reply to Frankel

Carlo Filice

IN A RECENT PAPER appearing in this journal I argued that we have some *prima facie* phenomenological evidence for the substantial theory of the self.[1] Such evidence derives from our common experience of causally sustaining an activity—particularly some mental activity such as keeping one's attention focused on one's breathing. I argued that bundle theories have serious difficulties accounting for the seemingly lasting will-like power manifest during such experiences of (mental) sustained causation. This power seems to be directed by us, not simply triggered by some of our belief-desire-intention complexes.

One objection which I considered in that paper is that these experiences of mental sustained causation may be delusory. Phenomenologically we may seem to direct and sustain the flow of attention for a given protracted period of time, but could this not be a form of self-deception? Could it not be that all that goes on during such an experience is a succession of psychic events or states which include among them the epiphenomenal experience of directing one's attention? If so, no self need be postulated alongside the succession of psychic states.

Though I confessed to the lack of knockdown arguments against such Humean analyses, I went on to argue that in the case of controlled attention such possibilities are particularly far-fetched and even inconceivable. Specifically, I stated that one cannot coherently imagine situations wherein we genuinely *think* that we are being will-like causative (we experience sustained exertion of effort) in directing the "flow" of attention, when *in fact* at the time we are not the directing force.

I suggested that one reason why this kind of mistake is hard to conceive is that a person is peculiarly close to her attention. This closeness can be brought out by considering, in contrast, the distance between a person and her car, and the distance between a person and her body, respectively. No doubt person B can seemingly be in control of her car (hands at the wheel, foot on the gas pedal, etc.) when *in fact* someone else, through a clever mechanism, is directing B's car. No doubt, B can do everything necessary (normally) to move her arm up and down, and thus think that she is causing this up and down arm motion, when *in fact* someone else through a super-clever mechanism is directing B's arm. In both cases another agent can come between B and the respective behavior. That is, B and her motions can be separated.

[1]Filice, Carlo, "Sustained Causation and the Substantial Theory of the Self," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, June 1986.

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Can this also happen between B and her attention in cases when B is consciously holding her attention fixed on X?

Professor Lois Frankel thinks so. She claims that both the *felt continuity* and the *felt causal efficacy* of our focused effort to attend to X for a period of time *can* be mistaken impressions.

She makes an attractive case for her claim that the felt *continuity* of our focused attendings can be mistaken. I am less convinced by her second claim: that the felt *causal efficacy* of our focused attending can also be mistaken. I will look at each claim in turn.

CONTINUITY

Professor Frankel claims that our experience of continuity in our attending to X can be mistaken for three reasons.

Firstly, she points out that it is not so uncommon for us to experience continuity where discontinuity exists. This happens, for instance, in watching a film, when we mistake still pictures for moving ones.

This type of counter–example, however, conflates the continuity of the experience with the continuity of the *object* of the experience. The film may be discontinuous, but our attending to it need not be.

Secondly, she suggests that it is possible for us to *think* that we paid attention to the fly on the wall for the past five minutes when in fact our attention has wandered, "perhaps for periods so brief as to be unnoticeable."[2] For brief moments our attention can wander from where, at the time, we think it is (as happens when we watch a magician at work).

I grant that the continuity of our attending to X is hardly ever absolute. In particular, if X is a visual object, then to blink is to produce a discontinuity in our attending to X. Yet it still seems true that despite such brief interruptions one can be continuously and consciously striving to attend to X. And the issue is, after all, whether the sense of continuous, unrelenting effort to attend to X, and only to X, during a certain time can be mistaken.

Professor Frankel's third counter-example against the continuity impression is more serious, if rather far-fetched. She asks us to imagine person B being "hooked up to a machine which yanks B in and out of consciousness without her realizing it."[3] B might believe that she has been continuously focusing on X, when in fact this continuity is a sham.

This I suppose is possible. I am not sure this can happen without the subject's realizing it, but it might. Let us suppose that this possibility shows that no impression of conscious continuity is absolutely reliable.

Even so, I do not find that this calls into question the phenomenological datum of *sustained* causation. B may exert effort in a sustained manner without doing so in what is objectively a continuous manner. If, for example, this effort is aimed at attending to one's breathing, one can be said to *sustain* such an effort even if in fact one does so discontinuously and over a much longer period than one thinks (because one is yanked in and out of consciousness), and even if one mistakes

[2]Frankel, Lois, "Causation and the Self: Reply to Filice."
[3]*Ibid.*

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discontinuity in the object—the breathing—for continuity. In other words, the continuity issue is, in my view, quite secondary. On this point I find Professor Frankel to have misunderstood the main objective of my paper. She inverts my priorities by taking the continuity aspect as primary and the causal aspect as secondary and dispensable.

CAUSAL EFFICACY

Can the felt causal efficacy of B's effort to keep her attention focused on X (when B does in fact focus on X for a significant period of time) be mistaken? Can, unbeknownst to B, something *come between* B's effort to attend single-mindedly to X and B's attending to X? Can this intervening agent be the actual mover of B's attention, while B only *thinks* she is?

Professor Frankel maintains that this can happen. In her view all we need to do is

> suppose that B is . . . mistaken in her belief that she is the cause of this focused attention, because, unknown to her, she is the subject of an experiment. B is hooked up to an apparatus capable of directing her attention anywhere the experimenter desires. It so happens that B's desire and the experimenter's desire coincide, but the experimenter *could* have focused B's attention on her breathing even had B desired to focus, say, on the Pythagorean theorem.[4]

This counter–example is not convincing. Granted, B can be hooked up to a complex apparatus without her realizing it. B can be made to attend to some external object (as in *Clockwork Orange*). B can be made to have a succession of inner images, thoughts, sensations, etc. independently of her will (e.g., to hallucinate). Can B be made actively to attend to her own breathing ("from the inside")? Probably so, e.g., by hypnotic suggestion. What about the following conjecture:

(1) B is under the impression that she is actively directing her own attention and that it is she who keeps it focused on her breathing.
(2) Her attention is in fact being kept focused on her breathing.
(3) But it is the experimenter who is concurrently doing this.

Could this happen? Specifically, can B be under the *mistaken* impression of being in control of her attention?

Frankel's suggestion as to how this might happen is clearly inadequate. She proposes that, if B *desired* to focus on B's breathing, and if B's attention in fact turned out to focus on B's breathing, *then* B would think that B is *herself* directing her attention.

This, however, does not follow. B's desiring to focus on X is not sufficient for B to think that *she* is directing her attention on X. It is well known in action-theory that desire (and even intention) is not sufficient for the desired (or intended) act to be *attempted* (hence it is not sufficient for the accompanying *belief* that one has attempted the act). Thus, the fact that B desires to focus on X is quite compatible

[4] *Ibid.*

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with B's being *surprised* at her attention focusing on X. B may *desire* to focus on X and *realize* that *she* is not in control of her attention as it turns to X.

Frankel's own attempt may fail but the issue is of interest. Perhaps her counter-example can be supplemented. What we need is for the apparatus to induce B not only to desire but also to *try* (or to strive, or to exert effort) to focus her attention on her breathing, while, simultaneously, her attention is being forced to focus on her breathing by the experimenter. *Then* B would think herself in charge of her attention without being so. B probably can be made to *try* to focus on her breathing (perhaps, again, through hypnotic suggestion). Note that even so, B would be doing the trying though prompted by an externally injected desire. Suppose that B, thus prompted, *tries* to focus on her breathing and to maintain her attention focused there. Can the apparatus come between this trying and B's attention (without B's realizing that something odd is happening)? Can the apparatus produce a break in the causal path from the trying to the attention-fixing and substitute itself as the real cause of the attending to B's breathing?

I believe not. The coherence of this revised thought-experiment rests on the false assumption that one's effort (or one's trying) to attend is separable from one's attention—that the former can be had independently of the latter. On the contrary, a trying (an effort-exertion) to do X generally *presupposes* the turning of one's attention to doing X. B cannot try to drive without attending, at least to some degree, to the car and its potential motion. B cannot try to lift her arm without attending to her arm and its potential motion.

Naturally, driving and moving one's arm are success-verbs, whereas exerting effort or trying to do these things are not success-notions. Hence, in cases of trying one can misidentify *what* one is in fact doing. Perhaps in trying to drive a car, one is *in fact* operating a truck, or a car-simulator. Similar mistakes can occur in one's trying to lift one's arm. Consequently, one can be attending to something other than what one thinks.

What about trying to attend to one's breathing? If the above general observation holds, to try to attend to X implies attending to one's attending-to-X. But given the difference between actually attending to X and making the necessary effort to do so, one might, in trying to attend to X, in fact attend to Y. Might one, in addition, not be attending at all, but only seem to do so? No, for to try implies to attend (though at times we do use the word "try" rather loosely to apply to cases where there is no consciousness. For example, we might say of an unconscious person that she is trying to breathe, or of the weather that it is trying to rain. I am not concerned with these less stringent senses of trying, since my concern is with intentional agency only).

I conclude that *to try to attend* implies to attend, though to try to attend to one's breathing does not guarantee that one's breathing will be the object of one's attention. Nonetheless, whatever the actual object of B's attending, what is certain is that B would be attending to *something* in trying to attend to her breathing; and hence her attention would not have been stripped from her. Thus, the revised thought-experiment aiming at divorcing B's trying from B's attention has failed.

The lesson one garners, I suggest, is that the act of trying results from a mysterious union of attention and energy-release. An experimenter cannot manipulate B's attention without snuffing out B's trying. Thus, if what B is attending to

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is determined by something other than B, B would then not be under the impression of being in control of her attention.

In fact, I would think that as soon as the content of B's consciousness is determined *solely* by an outside force, B as a meaningful presence (B as agent) ceases to be there, and hence cannot be concurrently fooled. Why? The content of B's consciousness can *partially* be determined by an outside force while B-as-agent is "still there." This presumably occurred to Alex in *Clockwork Orange* when he is forced to see violent and pornographic films all the while he *resists* seeing these images. This attitude of resistance and his futile struggle against the consequent nausea constitute Alex's own input in determining the contents of his consciousness. He is not *completely* passive. To be completely passive would be simply to have the film's sequences as the only occupants of Alex's consciousness. At that point Alex (as agent) would be removed (not necessarily permanently). His would then be a purely Humean mind.

My contention is that the sense of inner agency is virtually indistinguishable from the self. The substantial self I wish to defend is a volitional entity—a power closely tied to attention and striving.

* * *

The truly difficult issue is whether this power can itself be subject to a Humean "passive" reconstruction. Let us reenter the lab of Frankel's experimenter. We have seen that B can be made to desire to focus her attention on X. We have seen that this would not suffice to produce in her a (false) impression of occurrent control over her attention (even if the focus of her attention were to be on X). We have seen also that such a *false* impression of agency vis-a-vis her attention cannot be produced by having B strive to focus her attention on X, while the attention flow is under the direction of the experimenter.

However, could B be made to have the impression of trying (to attend to her breathing) without B *in fact* being engaged in any trying? (Perhaps B can simply be fed a succession of proprioceptive breathing–images alongside this trying-impression. Would this not produce a feeling of B directing her attention?). Can B be made to feel herself exerting effort without in fact doing so?

I am not quite sure what to say of this. Firstly, the idea of B *having the impression* of trying to attend to X without in fact being engaged in this trying (hence the idea of attending without really attending) is quite baffling, if it is at all coherent. Is attending not like pain, in that to *seem* to attend *is* to attend (though one might mistake the object of one's attention)? It would seem so—at least excluding the ever-lurking dream possibility. Then, since trying implies attending, to seem to try/attend is to try/attend.

Even so, this would be an empty victory if it showed that B *could not* be induced to have a false impression of trying, but *could* be induced to experience genuine tryings at the experimenter's command. Would this latter possibility not wipe out the idea that trying and attending provide evidence for an inner substantial self? After all, these induced tryings would have nothing intrinsically active about them.

The victory would indeed be empty. But must one accept the idea of genuine trying externally produced? Granted that B can be induced to try to attend to X (through a post hypnotic suggestion, or in some other way). But in the hypnosis

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case it would presumably still be B who *carries out* the command and produces the exertion of effort. Can the hypnotist or the experimenter *carry out* B's *genuine* trying? This sounds quite contradictory, and I simply cannot conceive of it (though others might).

I conclude, not without some trepidation, that what seems to B to be a genuine exertion of effort, must be such (barring, again, the dream possibility); and I also conclude that the experience of sustaining or carrying out genuine effort still points at a non-Humean self.

I find it noteworthy that even if the preceding conclusion is wrong, one has to go to extreme imaginative lengths to conceive of ways in which our experience of sustained causation might be non-veridical. And such remote possibilities cast little doubt on ordinary experiences of sustained causation (as when one pushes a heavy object across the room).

* * *

Finally, I grant that even if episodes of sustained causation point to a self, they do not establish a *single* enduring self bridging such episodes and continuing beyond them. However, if the presence of a self can be established for some episodes of our lives, this would appear to be prima facie evidence for a single enduring self. After all, it is implausible that substantial selves are ephemeral creatures that pop in and out of existence.

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BRIEFER BOOK REVIEWS

William James. Selected Unpublished Correspondence, 1885–1910. Ed. by Frederick J. Down Scott. Columbus: Ohio State Univ. Press, 1986. Pp. x + 603.

As one whose study of William James has been strongly influenced by Ralph Barton Perry's *The Thought and Character of William James* (1935) containing some 500 letters of James, I find it difficult to appreciate another volume of about 500 more letters. All this, of course, is in addition to the original two volumes of letters edited by James's son, Henry, in 1920. What, then, can a reviewer say about Frederick Scott's edition?

First, concerning the contents of the volume: it covers the twenty-five year period from 1885, when James "came of age," to his death in 1910. The editor writes a general introduction, reviewing the main events of James's life. The book is then divided into 16 chapters, each spanning from one to four years. Each chapter is prefaced by two or three pages which serve to put the letters in context. The editor claims that two criteria were used in the selection of the letters: (1) to show the integration of James's talents, interests, and philosophy, and (2) to portray James as a pivot around which revolved the lives and works of many important men and women (p. 3).

If the first criterion is taken seriously, then the enterprise fails. An overwhelming number of the letters are merely newsy, chatty pieces, many hardly a dozen lines in length. Rarely does James enlarge upon his own intellectual ideas, and his comments about the writings of his contemporaries are brief and not very illuminating. One could not use these letters, as Perry did other letters, to gain further insights into the interests that were engaging James's attention at the time.

Is there, then, a place for the present collection? At the close of his Introduction, Scott notes that since 1975 a definitive edition of *The Works of William James* has been in the process of being assembled. This will include all of James's published and unpublished writings save his letters as such. Scott then adds that "the present edition may be viewed as a complementary and supplementary work to *The Works*" (p. 17). This should please any loyal Jamesian scholar whose admiration of and devotion to one of America's greatest philosophers will not be fully satisfied until everything written by James is available in print.

And yet there is an added justification for this volume. Anyone who has the patience to page through the letters cannot help but be touched by the human side of a great man that comes through in these letters. It is well known that James suffered greatly from a weak heart and frayed nerves. Time and again he expresses his regret and even frustration in not being able to do all that he would like to do. Yet what he did accomplish under trying circumstances is far more than many a healthy person could achieve—an active teaching career, ten major books, two series of Gifford lectures at the University of Edinburgh and the Hibbert lectures at Oxford, eight trips to Europe during these years, several trips across the United States, not to mention a voluminous correspondence.

In spite of his ailments, his letters reveal a buoyant, optimistic spirit and a deep concern for people. He wrote recommendations for such rising scholars as Ralph Barton Perry and he tried several times without success to obtain a permanent teaching position for Charles Sanders Peirce whom he called a real genius but a tragic personality (p. 289). He attempted to mediate differences between those who had had a falling out, for example, between

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Baldwin and Cattell, Münsterberg and Miller, Titchener and Scripture, and Schiller and Münsterberg. Occasionally James became a bit strident for he refers to Münsterberg's philosophy as "awful trash" and "rubbish" and his theory of mind as "absurd a priori dogmatism of Science" (pp. 198, 200). At times James appears pixieish if not chauvinistic. On hearing that one professor was going to a women's college, he asks, "*why*, I can't imagine, for I should myself hate to be under the petticoat regime" (p. 171).

Scott has accomplished a monumental task in adding footnotes to almost every letter and an extensive index of names. He identifies the persons to whom James is writing or whom he mentions and he provides a short biography of many famous people. James knew them all and indeed, as the editor notes, he was a pivot around which revolved the lives and works of many important men and women. In this, Scott's second criterion of selection is fulfilled.

This edition is truly a labor of love, if ever there was one. Perhaps its value can be summed up in the final sentence of what was probably the last letter written by James and addressed to Thomas M. Shackleford who had been Chief Justice of the Florida Supreme Court. After mentioning that he hears great praises for Shackleford and his wife, he asks that they "preserve a tender thought of yours affectionately, Wm. James" (p. 559). Clearly this volume of letters keeps alive the tender remembrance of an affectionate and caring man.

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Morals by Agreement. By David P. Gauthier. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986. Pp. 355; $39.50.

Morals by Agreement is the definitive presentation of David Gauthier's theory of "Morals"—though "Justice" might perhaps have been a better term. Many have attempted, of course, to argue for the rationality of morality. What is important and distinctive about this book is its rigorous adherence to the goal of showing this to be so in a thoroughly non-question-begging way: ". . . our concern is to validate the conception of morality as a set of rational, impartial constraints on the pursuit of individual interest, not to defend any particular moral code. And our concern . . . is to do this without incorporating into the premises of our argument any of the moral conceptions that emerge in our conclusions" (p. 6). Gauthier instead proposes to demonstrate that persons who are rational in a common and clear sense of the term which does not involve morality in any way must, by virtue of being rational, accept moral constraints.

The conception of rationality adopted is simply that of acting on one's (considered) preferences—the "maximizing" conception of rationality, a conception technically elaborated, along familiar lines, in the book. This conception, it should be noted, does not identify rationality with *self*-interest in the sense of interest "in the self, that takes oneself as object, but interests of the self, held by oneself as subject" (p. 7). Accordingly, these could be direct interests in other persons, either as individuals or groups. But action is rational, on this view, if it maximizes advancement of the interests one has, *whether* those interests are taken in any particular individuals, or in all, or solely in oneself. This conception of rationality, as Gauthier observes, "possesses the virtue, among conceptions, of weakness" (p. 8). It has a further virtue, that of being "almost universally accepted and employed in the social sciences." Weakness, however, is in my view the more important virtue; for the weaker our premises, the stronger and the wider the appeal of our results, if they can indeed be shown to follow from those premises alone. That is the interest of this remarkable book, and a very great interest it is.

There are four principal planks in the Gauthieran moral platform: (1) the theory of the

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market, the "morally free zone" in which all costs are fully internalized and no constraints are needed on straightforward maximizing behavior; (2) "Constrained Maximization", covering cases of the prisoner's dilemma type, wherein there is a conflict between individual pursuit of interests and general success in fulfilling them; (3) Minimax Relative Concession, covering the bargaining-game cases, in which there is a question of how to choose among optimal distributions of benefits; and (4) the "Lockean proviso," which is not restricted to the acquisition of property in particular but more generally applies to ways of pursuing advantage.

The background of the second is the well-known Prisoner's Dilemma problem: two parties are so related that each agent's best outcome is the other's worst, whereas their second and third choices are the same. If each tries for his best, both come out third best, whereas cooperation would get them both a better outcome. But cooperation requires at least one person to take the risk of the other's "defecting," e.g., by collecting his part of the bargain without paying the agreed cost. Gauthier argues that we must, if we are rational, be disposed to optimize rather than maximize in these situations—to choose the cooperative rather than the noncooperative strategy. For in so doing, interestingly enough, we shall end up better off—not in some esoteric coin, but in terms of the various utilities whose pursuit got us into the interaction in the first place. This striking solution, the Principle of Constrained Maximization, has already tickled many philosophical brains and will certainly continue to do so in years to come.

The bargaining problem occurs when there is a range of outcomes all of which are better for both parties than nonagreement would be, but where the division of the benefits between the parties is undetermined: anything from virtually all for A and none for B, to just the opposite would give an optimal outcome. If all we know is that each wants to maximize her share, what then should that share be? Here Gauthier proposes that our basis should be the entertainable claims of each, this being the difference between the maximum minus the minimum that agent could get compatibly with any voluntary exchange being made at all. His solution is the Principle of Minimax Relative Concession: ". . . each offers a concession no greater in relative magnitude than the minimax concession" (p. 145), this being the "maximum concession . . . with least relative magnitude required to bring about an outcome represented by a feasible concession point" (p. 142). On the assumption that all parties are equally rational, Gauthier deduces that this will in general be the point where the *proportion* of one's entertainable claim in the sense defined above is equal for all parties to the cooperative scheme in question. There is an elegant proof of this (pp. 141–46), involving a premise of equal rationality. A plausible premise, to be sure—but the argument will surely inspire much comment.

The "Lockean Proviso" concerns the starting point for bargaining and in general for all cooperative social interactions. Here Gauthier proposes a principle that "prohibits bettering one's position through interaction worsening the position of another" (p. 16). It is argued that the starting point for bargaining must be one in which all advantages initially gained through coercion are removed: this is claimed to be the *fair* starting-point (Ch. VII—introduced via a particularly interesting example suspiciously like that of contemporary South Africa).

Other chapters in this extremely rich book cover the theory of rational decision, some fascinating ideas about inter-generational justice, reflections on the "Ring of Gyges," and an extremely intriguing concluding one on the idea of the "liberal individual," who is more than a sheer economic maximizer but whose sympathies stem naturally from the foregoing rational structures.

Clearly present space does not permit adequate comment on such a work as this. In the judgment of this reviewer, we have here possibly the most important book on the fundamental theory of justice in the last couple of centuries: the state-of-the-art presentation of the basic ideas of liberalism. Not everyone will concur with that judgment, but it is a

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book which demands the careful attention of every serious student of these matters. It sets, indeed, a new standard of rigor and precision in moral philosophy—previous works strike one, by comparison, as floundering around in the dark. It will be interesting to see how critical reaction develops.

University of Waterloo, Ontario *Jan Narveson*

Death of the Soul: From Descartes to the Computer By William Barrett. Garden City: Anchor Press-Doubleday, 1986.

This is a book on *philosophy*, in the original sense of the word: the love of wisdom. The author is looking neither for erudition, nor for shrewd new insights, but for wisdom, for truths that may be lived. He rejects what "you could not possibly live" (p. xiii).

Two themes run through most of the work. The main theme, as the title shows, is the human soul. The soul taken here as roughly synonymous with the self, the I, the mind, consciousness. To deny that there is not mind, no substantial I, behind the appearances is a position that the author cannot "possibly live." He is shocked by the fact that science, a product of the human mind, ends up by denying the existence of this mind, that the science of mechanics, begotten by our mind, has slowly led up to the philosophy of mechanism which does away with the mind. From Descartes to the present age of the computer the author recalls the main stages of this development. He clearly adopts the position of those who not only "live" the reality of consciousness, but who also admit it explicitly.

But there is another theme in the book. A theme *"en sourdine"* as the French might put it. It is not emphasized, but it crops up time and again. A most important theme: the existence of God.

"My teachers, excellent men, were naturalists and rationalists, confident and at ease in their lack of faith" (p. 9). The author, obviously, is not. For him "the religious question is ultimately at the center of all philosophy, even if it be by the way of rejection" (p. 56). "We exist within the question of God. We cannot escape it: it is always there for us, however we may seek to forget or evade it" (p. 87). The alienation which sickens our modern world "will be healed only if the universe is believed to have some meaning in harmony with our own spiritual and moral aims—which means, in effect, the discovery or rediscovery of God" (pp. 90–91).

But the author seems to consider such rediscovery impossible, because of Kant. ". . . the most sensational impact of his thought was his destruction of the proofs of the existence of God. . . ." Kant has "demolished traditional rational theology" (p. 80). The author does not wonder why so many of the great philosophers, men like Fichte, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Bergson, and so on, continue to affirm God's existence. Does this not suppose that there are proofs of God's existence which Kant has not destroyed? Professor Barrett himself offers us in this very book most of the elements of such proofs.

"Perhaps our feelings have a metaphysical depth beyond that of the rational intellect. Perhaps they lay hold, however dimly, of something in the cosmos inaccessible to reason . . ." (p. 88). Philosophers, however, do not trust feelings. But the author offers us more than feelings. He insists frequently on our awareness of *finitude*. Chapter Six is entitled "The Finitude of Mind." For Hegel such a title is contradictory, since, for him, a limit is not a limit when we are aware of it. To know a limit, as a limit, is to be beyond it. A limit is really such only when unknown. So not only our feelings, but our intellect too is pointing beyond any limit, towards the Unlimited.

But does this not simply lead us back to Kant, who, as the author reminds us, had the courage to write, "I will that there be a God?" Practical reason would lead to God, even if theoretical reason is unable to do so. In another context, while discussing Leibniz'

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principle of sufficient reason, the author provides us with the elements of a proof based neither on feelings, nor on practical reason, but on our intellect. It is a proof that some theists are using nowadays.

Let us suppose that a contingent being A derives from B, which derives from C, and so on, in a chain without any first link, an infinite chain.

> But this latter chain? It, too, will require a cause. And so we could go from chain to chain, and so on and so forth. . . . Let us then imagine an infinite number of infinite chains. Where do we now stand? We are left with our original mystery. . . . We can say there is no reason. But if we choose this alternative, we cannot do so in the style of the cavalier or superficial atheist who does not pause for a moment at the enormity he is accepting. For it is an enormity . . . We can affirm that there is a reason or cause. . . . But if we make this choice, we have to step outside of the realm of contingent beings (p. 30).

The author continues to hesitate. The argument does not *force* his mind to assent. A free decision, an option is required: "if we make this choice" (p. 30). Later on in the book we notice that he will not make it. Or rather, that he will make the option for "an enormity." "*De facto* there is no proof of the existence of God" (p. 83). What makes him so certain here? "If there were, there would be far fewer unbelievers walking around today" (p. 30). What the author seems to expect is a proof that requires no option, that *forces* the mind to assent. A *scientific* proof. Or at least a proof such as logic may provide. He definitely asserts the existence of a conscious Ego, although many of his colleagues, who are as unable to "live" such a denial as he is himself, continue to deny it. But, although he seems to find it difficult to "live" the denial of, or even the doubt about, the existence of God, he makes the option for the "enormity." He has not entirely shaken off his positivistic leanings. Not the least interesting aspect of this remarkable work is that it shows us a great philosopher struggling intellectually with himself.

Fordham University *Joseph Donceel, S.J.*

Poverty and Wealth: The Christian Debate Over Capitalism. By Ronald H. Nash. Westchester, Illinois: Crossway Books, 1986. Pp. 223, $9.95 pbk.

Liberation theology has in recent years attracted much attention. To what extent the movement's advocates have enlisted under the banner of Marxism is a greatly disputed issue; but there can be little doubt that the 'preferential option for the poor' is interpreted as an option against capitalism. Professor Nash launches a vigorous counterattack in this volume against what he regards as a distorted view of the market system. Though in the course of his discussion he subjects the work of several liberation theologians to sharply adverse scrutiny, Nash devotes most of his attention to his own exposition of basic economic principles.

As our author makes clear, economics is the science of choice. People's desires far exceed the goods that can be produced to fulfill them: hence the imperative need for a method of allocation of these resources among competing uses. Nash argues that all such methods fall under one of two basic categories: that of peaceful cooperation and trade or that of violent expropriation of goods produced by others. Such a bold thesis may at first arouse the reader's skepticism, but it is evident that Nash is correct. To secure a desired good, one must either produce it oneself or obtain it from its producer, either peacefully, by gift or exchange, or by the use of force.

This antithesis, once grasped, allows little room for doubt as to which alternative anyone at all concerned for morality must elect. Yet the ethical choice, seemingly simple, involves a consequence that one suspects proponents of liberation theology will find surprising.

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What is the method of peaceful cooperation? As Nash abundantly shows, it is the much-maligned capitalist market. Within a structure of individual property rights, people living in a regime of competitive enterprise may advance their interests as they see fit, rather than at the behest of planners who presume to know better than the individuals directly concerned what is best for them. One point which Nash might have mentioned is that people are, under a capitalist market, free to establish any other social arrangement they wish as long as they do so without the use of coercion. A system of workers' cooperatives, e.g., in the unlikely event that most people preferred it on their own volition to a system of firms controlled by a specialized class of entrepreneurs, would still fall within capitalism if freely established.

Liberation theologians, among other critics of capitalism, often charge that system with exalting selfishness and greed. Nash meets this accusation head on: beyond the ban on coercion, the market imposes no restrictions on the goals an individual may pursue: "Some people regard many things as more important than money. Some people give a higher priority to serving others than serving themselves. Their economic choices will reflect these priorities" (p. 25).

In his emphasis on the importance of choice, Nash makes extensive use of the writings of the Austrian school of economics. This group of economists, whose eminent members include Carl Menger and Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk in the last century and Ludwig von Mises, Friedrich Hayek and Murray Rothbard in our own, has again and again emphasized that choice lies at the heart of economic science. And choice is a subjective affair: the cost to an individual of making a decision is neither money nor (as the Marxists and neo-Ricardians of our day maintain) an objective measure of labor. Rather, it is the value to the individual concerned of the highest ranking alternative he must forego in order to attain his most desired preference.

The nature of value is no mere abstract conundrum which those not wishing to become enmeshed in the intricate web of economic theory may freely ignore. The point has decisive practical significance, as Nash demonstrates in Chapter 8, 'Socialism.' Because true cost is subjective, known only to the actors concerned in each transaction, no scheme of centralized planning can form an accurate idea of cost. Only a price system, which emerges from the preferences of individuals and reflects those preferences, can carry out the Herculean task of economic calculation. Put more simply, Nash argues that a socialist system cannot work. Socialism, in the words of von Mises, on whose argument our author here relies, is "planned chaos."

Defenders of the theology of liberation of course take a very different view of the merits of capitalism, and Professor Nash assails some of their number with great rhetorical force. One can only say, after perusal of the citations from Andrew Kirk, José Míguez Bonino *et hoc genus omne* which Nash has assembled, that these gentlemen would be better occupied in the study at an elementary level of the realities of economics than in futile attempts to discover Christian roots for Marxism. José Miranda has gone so far as to see in the atheist Marx himself a defender of the primitive Christian church. Such amazing theses and 'results' are fit subjects for the satirical treatment they receive at Nash's hands.

Nash's interest in liberation theology is not limited to an indictment of this movement for failing the test of economic literacy. He directly, albeit briefly, challenges the theology of the group. (The author writes as a Protestant of traditional views.) Though it is hardly the province of this reviewer to express an opinion on what constitutes true Christian doctrine, it seems difficult to quarrel with two tests Nash suggests for writers professing a Christian view of economics. First, whatever political implications one draws from Christian teaching, that religion is not *primarily* a teaching about politics. Second, the citation of biblical proof texts, however extensive, is insufficient. One must not only have proper goals, e.g., the relief of poverty, but also possess the knowledge of how those goals may be efficiently attained. And this only economics can tell us.

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Many readers will at this point object. Even if Nash is correct that a full-fledged socialism is not a rational option, the opinions of liberation theologians to the contrary notwithstanding, does not ethics demand that the capitalist market be subject to close governmental regulation?

Nash once more dissents. Again following von Mises, he argues that no viable third system exists intermediate between capitalism and socialism. Efforts at regulation will fail of their intended purpose: the measures must then either be abandoned or be reinforced by further regulatory measures. If the latter course is adopted, the dilemma recurs, and eventually interventionism will pass into socialism. Nash of course is not content with the mere assertion of so controversial a thesis. He illustrates it in a very convincing way with succinct analyses of rent control, minimum wage legislation, and farm price supports.

Nash thinks that a reason weighing heavily in the minds of many people against the adoption of capitalism is a false view of the Great Depression of the 1930's. Do not the tragic events of that era demonstrate the folly of capitalism unsubject to governmental tutelage? Not at all, our author concludes. Making very effective use of Murray Rothbard's brilliantly argued study, *America's Great Depression*, Nash contends that a normal process of business readjustment to an inflationary expansion of the money supply in the 1920's was rudely interrupted and frustrated for a decade by the highly interventionist policies of Herbert Hoover and his successor, Franklin Roosevelt.

Nash's argument is as convincing as it will be surprising to readers not heretofore familiar with the Austrian analysis of the business cycle. Only one point in Nash's treatment seems open to question. Like Milton Friedman and other members of the Chicago School, he criticizes the Federal Reserve Board for its deflationary policy during the period 1930–1932. But is this not at variance with the Austrian approach Nash favors, in which, as he himself makes clear elsewhere, it is *inflation*, not deflation, that produces the business cycle? If the Austrian position is correct, must not the government cease its expansionist policies?

Nash has managed, in a relatively brief book, to deal clearly and ably with an immense variety of topics. Particularly enlightening is Chapter 17, "Third World Poverty." Nash advances the bold thesis that association with the developed nations of the West has resulted, not in impoverishment of the Third World, but in economic growth and prosperity. Most governmental foreign aid fails to reach its supposed beneficiaries but instead finds its way into the bottomless pockets of bureaucrats of one country or another. The problem of poverty is internal, not external. Instead of blaming their economic woes upon an allegedly oppressive capitalism, Third World nations would be better advised to adopt just that system their leaders find demagogically useful to condemn.

Professor Nash's work contains a lesson of inestimable value for all philosophers interested in social and political theory. Too often philosophers excogitate detailed requirements for economic justice, without having considered their schemes in the light of economic analysis. Nash abundantly demonstrates that in social philosophy, sound aims are not enough: one must use means likely to achieve these aims. And this, once more, is a matter that only economics, not ethics or theology, can teach us.

Nash makes the reviewer's task difficult, in that there is so little in the book to which valid exception may be taken. A reader who has absorbed the lessons this important book has to teach will be tempted to apply to the theologians of liberation the well-known words of St. Remegius to Clovis: "Burn what you have read; read what you have burned."

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The Argument From Meaning to God In Buber's *I and Thou*

Steven G. Smith

MARTIN BUBER warned repeatedly against interpreting his thought as a rational demonstration of God's existence. Anyone who acknowledges Buber's central distinction between I-You and I-It relations will feel the force of the prohibition: whatever can be proven with certainty (and whatever "exists," if "existence" is a delimited factor in a system of knowledge) must be an It, while God may only be approached as You. If, on the other hand, Buber's writings are taken simply as testimony to an experience rather than as an argument, we let ourselves off too easily, and more easily than Buber intended. For an experience is an individual, perhaps eccentric and unrepeatable affair, while an argument solicits the agreement of all rational subjects and requires to be credited or discredited. There has been no lack of critical attention paid to the adequacy or inadequacy of Buber's conceptualization of God and God's relations with humanity and the world, but the issue of how *I and Thou*,[1] his most complete articulation of a philosophy of God, functions as an argument to God—that is, as a discourse meant to bring its audience to affirmation of the reality of God—has been neglected, no doubt largely because of Buber's disavowal of the intention to prove.[2] My aim here is to show that *I and Thou* contains all the elements of an argument to the reality of God, if we understand Buber's statements on the I-You relation to provide the foundations of a theory of reality and intrinsic meaning; and that the importance of the argument is considerable. If we respectfully sidestep Buber's warnings and formulate his argument in a more conventionally argumentative fashion, we will be better able not only to evaluate Buber's thought, but also to illuminate by comparison other God-arguments.

I will begin by assembling the chief claims about God and the I-You relation that Buber makes in *I and Thou*, attending also to the presuppositions as to the nature and possibilities of argument which must be made in order to construe Buber's claims as an argument. I will then set forth one possible sequence of

[1]Trans. W. Kaufmann (New York: Scribner's, 1970). Page references in the text are to this edition. Although the book is still in print with the title *I and Thou*, I will follow Kaufmann's translation of "*Du*" as "You." I wish to thank Steven Esthimer for his comments on this essay.

[2]Roger Moser provides a rather full construction of Buber's argument under the rubric of "*der Weg der Gotteserfahrung*" in his theological study, *Gotteserfahrung bei Martin Buber* (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1979), pp. 308–18. The most important difference between his interpretation and mine is discussed in note 18 below. See also Bernhard Casper, *Das dialogische Denken* (Freiburg, 1967), pp. 302–11; Raphael Bielander, *Martin Bubers Rede von Gott* (Frankfurt-am-Main: P. Lang, 1975), pp. 158–60; and Michael Theunissen, *Der Andere*, 2nd ed. (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1977), pp. 330–46.

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Buberian premises which lead to the conclusion that God is real. After explaining these premises and discussing some objections to them, including a Buberian one, I will offer some suggestions concerning the place of the "argument from meaning" in the tradition of arguments to God.

I

God, in the terminology of *I and Thou,* is "the eternal You" (123). "You" is not one kind of object differentiated from others by certain characteristics. "You" figures to us as that which is *met* or *encountered* in an I-You relation, in contrast with the "It" of I-It relation, which is *apprehended* or *had,* as one "has" an experience. Buber holds that to understand either "I" or "You" one must begin with the relation, not try to compose relations out of pre-understood "selves" or "beings." It is relation that is humanly real and concrete; we are unable to know what beings are in themselves apart from how they are realized in relation. The I-You relation is more real than the I-It relation because, as Buber says, "The basic word I-You can only be spoken with one's whole being [while the] basic word I-It can never be spoken with one's whole being . . . . Being I and saying I are the same" (54). Thus human existence is fully actualized only when standing in relation to something which is met as You. It is an essential dimension of a human being's existence, which Buber calls the "inborn You," to stand in relation with a You; the human being who does not stand in such relation is, therefore, incomplete.

The I-You relation is not a paranormal occurrence. It happens all the time, if not constantly or on demand. Nor does Buber mean by "I-You relation" something that would only happen between human beings, as his tree examples show (57–59).[3] In fact, Buber's account of the I-You and I-It relations is nothing less than an analysis of the general phenomenon of *meaning,* the "meaning" in the I-You relation—the "mattering" of that which matters, that which has import of itself, that which offers itself as having its own point distinct from anything one adds to it. Meaning in this sense may be termed "intrinsic" or "non-referential." Although Buber does not develop the theory of meaning as such very far,[4] still it is the strongest claim in his thought, the point of greatest leverage. Since this theory is the key to the God-argument, we must examine it.

A good text for our purpose is the passage in which Buber introduces the tree (57–59). There he observes that the primary word I-It may be spoken toward a tree in a number of different ways. I can see it as a scenic element or as a point of departure for poetic fancy. I can see it taxonomically, anatomically, chemically, even mathematically. These are all ways of having it, assigning it various positions in the world of object-things which I, as knowing subject, possess and manage. "But it can also happen, if will and grace are joined, that as I contemplate

[3]Cf. the author's preface to *Daniel,* trans. M. Friedman (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1964), p. 47; and Maurice Friedman, *Martin Buber's Life and Work: The Early Years 1878–1923* (New York: Dutton, 1981), pp. 159–60.

[4]The points of departure in *I and Thou* for a theory of meaning are the threefold classification of spheres of relation (with nature, with fellow humans, and with spiritual beings) and the mode of linguisticality assigned to each (56–57). It is not necessary for the present study to pursue these distinctions, important though they are.

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the tree I am drawn into a relation, and the tree ceases to be an It. The power of exclusiveness has seized me (58)." This power of exclusiveness is the bindingness of meaning.

Why must "will" and "grace" be joined in You-saying? In the I-You relation the being of the I is always correlated with the being of the You, but the two are involved in the relation in different ways. The will of the I is challenged and engaged, for the You concerns, even commands, the I (hence its power of excluding other things from the I's attention), and provides it with a mission (108–110). The grace of the You is essential because the ground of the You is not comprehended; it has no place in a system and, therefore, no systematic necessity; one can only wonder at it and be thankful for it. Yet it is not a random happening. It "makes sense" because it concerns the I. "Freedom and fate embrace each other to form meaning" (102).

Another feature of the I-You relation, or meaning-event, is the wholeness in it of both I and You. Only in the I of the I-You relation does the self realize its whole being.[5] When the tree is encountered as You, everything about it is "included and inseparably fused" (58). We might say that the tree commands the attention of the I precisely by making itself known as a unique this-and-not-otherwise (to whatever extent it is manifest) which is violated when its properties are detached and manipulated for any end other than itself. Analyzing and manipulating things are, however, necessary tactics of human living, so that every You, except the eternal You, returns to It-hood. It is the fate of Buber's tree to become a mere means to ends that are extraneous to it, such as the vacationer's enjoyment, the logger's profit, or the scientist's analysis. But insofar as the tree *means* something—not just instrumentally, which would only postpone the question of meaning until we arrive at the end to which the instrumentally meaningful thing is subordinated, but finally—it addresses us as a reality outside of ourselves with which it is possible to be in relation.

To reject relational conditions for meaning or true finality, one would have to make meaning relative to an ego, a mere function of the order of thoughts and feelings over which the I of I-It relations presides. Buber describes the existence of such an ego *(Eigenwesen)* as "prey to inactuality," "debased" (115), and "not human" (85). Those who are committed to understanding themselves as "egos" do not, of course, share Buber's criteria of actuality, and will ignore his epithets. Only if he is correct in claiming that the I of I-You relation, the "person," continues to exist alongside the ego—albeit in a "subterranean, hidden, as it were invalid" way (115), so long as the ego determines the rules of meaning—will his argument find response, summoning the I who senses that inactuality. If the issue of the meaning of life were finally settled or banished by those self-understood egos, they would be beyond the reach of such an argument.

Even if relational rather than egological conditions of meaning are accepted in principle, it is, of course, another question whether the specific relational condi-

[5]In answering one of the many variations on the question, "How do you *know* you are encountering a You?," Buber says that the self senses and verifies its own wholeness by overcoming and becoming liberated from inner conflict—*Philosophical Interrogations*, ed. S. & B. Rome (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1964), p. 52.

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tions offered by Buber are correct and to be accepted. There are good reasons for thinking that they are.

1. The supposition that we have something real to talk and think about rests on the presupposition that something real corresponds to grammatical subjects (or metaphysical substances). But if any subjects (or substances) are understood to be realities, rather than fictions of grammatical/metaphysical convenience, they must on some occasion be present to us in their "integrity," i.e. as *necessarily* what they are, with their constituent elements (at least the ones we see which constitute the appearing being as an individual) inseparably fused, "belonging together." If the possibility of this "presence" were excluded, we would, then, in speaking descriptively, only play a peculiar syntactical game, free (or bereft) of any conviction of extralinguistic reality. I suspect that this alternative is only practicable by those for whom linguistic structures themselves have the sense of real wholes. Ironically, then, the philosopher of relation rescues substance, the "core" which embraces all of a being's qualities (81). This is a prime warrant for his talk of the undivided wholeness of the "You." Without wholeness there are no things, only bundles of qualities.

2. Grace is an inescapable category in the analysis of meaning because of the way in which meanings of all sorts must anchor in final meaning with no further discernible ground. What, for instance, does it mean when a billiard ball moves? The ball's motion "means" (refers to the fact) that a shooter stroked it. The stroke "means" that the shooter hopes to carry through a game plan that will produce victory. The victory "means" that the shooter will win a sum of money. The money "means" that the shooter will feel triumphant and will be able to purchase the means of more good feelings. When asked what the meaning of these "good feelings" is, the shooter must reply that they are meaningful of themselves—here the chain of meaning comes to ground. The good feelings are not *for* something further: they constitute a true, if not unconditional, end. But since they need not be endowed with meaning by something beyond them, or some system of which they form a part, they cannot themselves be accounted for. They just are, unnecessarily and thus graciously. The appropriate corresponding attitude is the grateful welcoming by the self of the meaning. One reads the meaningfulness of the meaning backward into its unknown ground by naming that ground "grace" instead of "chance"; to call that ground "chance" would be to place the meaning within an alien horizon of meaninglessness and thus to contradict it, to call it a meaning-which-has-no-meaning—something its integrity will not permit.

3. The graciousness of the meaningful You requires the free self-commitment of the I and never totally excludes the possibility that the I will fail to respond to it. The reasons are two. First, a meaningful being meets the self as something to which attention may be directed. An involuntary natural condition to meaningfulness, such as the physiological constitution of my palate, only culminates in an encounter with meaning when I attend to a taste and find it good or bad. How I "find" or what I "make of" an experience, no matter how that experience comes to be delivered to my attention, is always my act. Second, the lack of further teleological determination of true ends means at the same time that the self's will is not coerced. *If* the billiards player wants to have certain feelings, he or she must win a certain amount of money, employing certain means on the pool table.

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Hypothetical imperatives are constraining to the extent that the end is commanding; the end itself issues a take-it-if-you-will command.[6] The self must commit itself to the end in order for that end to be its end; it cannot fall back to the predetermined choice of means necessary to attain given ends. In doing that, the self is actualized as the kind of self which commits itself to such ends and to such vocations.

Turning now to Buber's analysis of the meaningfulness of the You, let us look more closely at what his terms "presence," "exclusiveness," and "actuality" signify.

A clue to "presence" is offered by Wittgenstein's remark that meaning something is like going up to someone.[7] To say "The tree is tall" is in one way to go up to one's human listeners with this message, and in another way to go up to the tree, offering it one's perception shaped by judgment. Conversely, to encounter something that is meaningful is to have a thing go (come) up to one, signifying nothing other than itself. This "going-up" which occurs in encounter, Buber calls *Gegenwart* or *Gegenwärtigkeit*, "presence" (57 and *passim*). My word "tree" means the tree, but what does the tree mean by itself? Nothing, unless the tree goes up to me. Buber claims that things do this, that this is their "presence," which, as such, is not to be confused with having "consciousness" (58–59). He also claims that the relation to the You is not mediated by any concept or prior experience (62). That is, however concepts or experience might prepare one for an encounter and enable one to discuss it afterwards, they do not intrude on the encounter itself. Otherwise the "presence" and "exclusiveness" of which Buber speaks would not be real. Insofar as a thing is mediated to us by a concept, it is measured and bounded by that concept, becomes an object, and inhabits the past of all "had" things. There is no present without presence (63–64).[8]

No You is a thing among things. Every You "fills the firmament" (59–60, 126); instead of occupying a niche within a larger framework, it becomes the framework giving the light in which everything else is seen. "Only as things cease to be our You and become our It do they become subject to coordination. The You knows

[6]By the phrase "take it if you will" I do not mean that the will is granted the liberty of indifference; Buber denies this at great length (100–10). Neither, however, does the meaning or mission discovered by the will *necessarily* constrain it. At issue is the difference between what Buber calls *Schicksal*, "fate," and *Verhängnis*, "doom."

[7]*Philosophical Investigations*, section 455. The archaic meaning from which the German *Sinn* as well as the English "send" and (from Latin *sentire*) "sense" derive is "to head for, go." See *sent-* in Julius Pokorny's *Indogermanisches Etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Bern, 1959), item 908, and in the "Indo-European Roots" appendix to the *American Heritage Dictionary* (New York, 1973).

[8]"[O]bjects consist in having been" (64); this must be true according to Buber's understanding of actuality, since the only possible relation an object (It) can have to actuality is to stand as an object-world token for what was once present. This does not mean that every object is so related.

In spite of its superficial resemblance to a Cartesian or Husserlian view of meaning as intuitive fulfillment, Buber's view differs decisively by promising no privileged epistemological vantage point where certainty is obtainable. On the contrary, the "present," where actuality is encountered, is a place of "holy insecurity" where one runs the supremely worthwhile, but serious, risk of committing oneself to what one takes to be real—*Philosophical Interrogations*, pp. 54, 58.

The I-You relation does not deliver a unique and incorrigible cognitive content surpassing I-It cognition. It is rather the outbreak of "something about" what is knowable as It, by virtue of which the It is raised to You-hood or actuality. If one could say *what* this "something" is, it would no longer serve as one's reality reference. See note 16 below.

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no system of coordination" (81), because it gives the orders, it commands the attention of the I. The *eternal* You is the one You which never becomes an It, and which, therefore, either commands the I's attention or is missed by the I altogether.[9] (A conceptually mediated God is utterly divorced from God, to whom no It-appearances belong, whereas the conceptualized tree does still bear some relation to the tree that one meets). The I-You relation with the eternal You is, according to Buber, the one perfect relation, both because the eternal You is completely actual (having no It-potentiality, or "latency"—148)[10] and because relation with the eternal You includes all other relations, its exclusiveness excluding nothing (127). Even though no You's are seen in the light of other finite beings, all You's are included in the relation with the Eternal You. This is what Buber means by saying that the lines of relation, though they are parallel, meet in the eternal You (84). God, being strictly You, the presence of finite You's is not infringed when they are seen in God's light.

Since the meeting with the eternal You is not separate from encounters with finite You's, we can contemplate arguing from the latter to the former.

> Through every single You the basic word addresses the eternal You. The mediatorship of the You of all beings accounts for the fullness of our relationships to them—and for the lack of fulfillment. The innate You is actualized each time without ever being perfected. It attains perfection solely in the immediate relationship to the You that in accordance with its nature cannot become an It (123).

> The You-sense that cannot be satiated until it finds the infinite You sensed its presence from the beginning; this presence merely had to become wholly actual for it out of the actuality of the consecrated life of the world (128).

The import of these difficult passages is that the potentiality of the I to become wholly actual is in constant touch with the wholly actual You through the finite You's of the world, even before an immediate relationship with the infinite You is realized. And it is because the presence of a tree is in some way at the same time the presence of God—because I see all in the tree's light, but the tree in God's light—that an encounter with a tree can be "full," a *bona fide* entry into the You-world, even while imperfect, due to the tree's exclusion of other individuals and

[9]Michael Theunissen finds that the eternal You is distinguished above all by the fact that unlike anything else it is a You "*seinem Wesen nach*," according to its nature (123, 148, 160), so that strictly speaking God is the only being who *is* You—*Der Andere*, p. 340–41. But this interpretation seems to me to encourage, if it does not commit, two errors from Buber's point of view: first, "lifting more than we can" (124) by making ontological assertions about the "natures" of things (but here it is Buber himself who made the first move by announcing an "ontology" of the realm of encounter); and second, implying that the You-hood of a tree is something that the tree must borrow from God, i.e. that God is the actuality in the tree when the tree is encountered as actual. See note 17 below.

[10]One must ask at this point whether the pure "actuality" of Buber's God has anything in common with the pure "actuality" of Aristotle's God in book Lambda of the *Metaphysics*—the "God of the philosophers" *par excellence*. Indeed it does, partly because Buber trades on the Aristotelian tradition in his general usage of the concepts of "actuality" and "latency," and especially because of Aristotle's claim that the purely actual being moves the world as a final cause, through being loved (1072a). Aristotle's conceptions of knowledge and intelligibility are also not as alien to Buber's beholding of the Other as is the latter-day scientific cognition on which the I-It relation is modelled. Further, it should be observed that Buber carries on a long tradition running through Hegel which identifies *Geist* with *Wirklichkeit*.

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its inevitable lapse into the It-world. But now a great question arises. Is God to be conceived simply as the actuality in things? Is God in the tree insofar as the tree is actual? Or does the actuality of the tree belong to the tree alone and remain distinct from God's actuality? Buber would reject this distinction as "It-talk"; God is neither identical with, nor separate from, the actuality in the tree (127). He "embraces" it (143).

It is easier to understand "embracing" if we recall that the actuality of a thing is just that thing's being itself in an encounter. "Actuality" is neither a reality in its own right distributed among things which are actual (like water among things that are wet), nor a property, separately conceivable as a universal, instanced among things which are actual (like squareness among things that are square). It is no more a predicate than "existence"—indeed, one might say that "existence" excludes predicate status precisely to the extent that it coincides with Buber's "actuality." The relationship between God's actuality and the tree's actuality is, therefore, nothing other than the relationship between the I-tree relation and the I-God relation. If the tree is encountered as a gift and God as its giver, then their actualities may be inseparably bound in something like the way in which a poem is bound to a poet.[11] The tree both means itself and is meant by God to mean both itself and God.

The relationship just described is not a relationship within a system, the parts of which would condition each other and thus defeat the exclusiveness of You's. If it were that sort of relationship, one could infer God from the tree. But God is not to be inferred from a "given"; God "confronts us immediately, first, and always, and legitimately . . . can only be addressed, not asserted" (129).

This pronouncement seems to dim the prospects for an argument.

But could not an argument lead to an encounter, rather than to an inference? And in so leading, could it not remain more an argument than a simple testimony? Let an argument be defined as the offering of a claim, together with reasons which are intended to be a sufficient basis of agreement with the claim. By "reasons" I mean specifications of patterns or connections among things which lead the mind from one affirmation to another, leaving out nothing that the mind might need to make the transition—in other words, keeping explanatory good faith. By prescribing a "sufficient basis" I mean that the audience must have all that it needs to agree, not that this agreement is necessitated.

Consider the following example of an argument which uses inference to bring about a meeting, and which fails, if this meeting is not brought about:

> (H)e hath disgrac'd me . . . and what's his reason? I am a Jew. Hath not a Jew eyes? hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions? fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same winter and summer as a Christian is?[12]

Shylock is trying to obtain acknowledgement of his humanity. There is no sure way to succeed in this, but surely his reasoning from similarities between Jews

[11]Buber makes the comparison between God-world and poet-poems in his essay "Dialogue," but with reserve, calling it "*gauche*"—*Between Man and Man*, trans. R. Gregor Smith (New York: Macmillan, 1965), p. 15.

[12]William Shakespeare, *The Merchant of Venice*, III, i. 48–58.

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and Christians promotes such acknowledgement and makes giving it more reasonable than withholding it. His argument does not produce a meeting, but it leads to one.

So also with Buber's argument. It is important to remember not only what Buber says he is not trying to accomplish in his philosophy, but also what he *is* trying to accomplish, and what makes it a philosophy. Toward the end of his life, he wrote:

> I witnessed for experience and appealed to experience. The experience for which I witnessed is, naturally, a limited one. But it is not to be understood as a "subjective" one. I have tested it through my appeal and test it ever anew. I say to him who listens to me: "It is your experience. Recollect it, and what you cannot recollect, dare to attain it as experience." But he who seriously declines to do it, I take him seriously. His declining is my problem.[13]

Buber's argument is, then, a claim about a pattern in experience—whether or not the audience now recollects that pattern, or will dare to attain it—which, on the present interpretation, *ought* to lead his audience from affirming his characterization of the phenomenon of meaning to affirming the eternal You.[14] This latter affirmation, he says, can only take the form of an addressing, not an asserting; so the argument can only succeed by placing its audience in relation with God, not by establishing the existence of God in detachment from relation.

With this understanding of what the Buberian argument can and cannot do, let us study a formulation of it in which the necessity proper to the pattern in experience to which Buber witnesses is exhibited as unambiguously as possible.

II

I will present an overview of the argument in five steps and then discuss the assumptions and reasoning on which each relies.

(1) Anything encounterable is real.
(2) If anything is encountered, God is encounterable.
(3) Something is encountered.
(4) Therefore, God is encounterable.
(5) Therefore, God is real.

1. The standpoint of the argument is that of the ones to whom Buber's "encounter" occurs. Only that which it is reasonable for them to affirm, or

[13] "Replies to my Critics," in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, edd. P. A. Schilpp and M. Friedman (La Salle: Open Court, 1967), p. 693.

[14] His statement that he means to "indicate," not "prescribe" (126), should not be given implications that are inconsistent with his call to the reader to "dare to attain" the encounter he indicates. Buber expresses himself somewhat dialectically on the subject of his philosophy's pretensions. In *Philosophical Interrogations*, for example, he says that he wants to "show," not "exhort" (18), but later says: "the easiest manner of evading the demand of the dialogic is to accept it as discussable but unbinding theory. I can only repeat in opposition to this what I wrote in 1923 . . . 'The way is there in order that one may walk on it.' " So there is a "demand" and a binding. But the demand is not his, Buber's (96); it belongs to the way itself. And it is better construed as an enabling than as a constraining: "I beg you to notice that I do not demand . . . I simply record. And how could the life of dialogue be demanded? There is no ordering of dialogue. It is not that you *are* to answer, but that you *are able [Antworten wird nicht gesollt, aber es wird gekonnt]*"—"Dialogue," p. 35.

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unreasonable for them to deny, will be established. The question is whether the characteristics of "encounter" do indeed contain or imply the characteristics which relation with the real would have to have, if we were able to speak at all of relation with the real.

Buber would not allow the "real" to be set up independently of the subject, since that would be to abstract from relation, the true *concretissimum*, which is the matrix even of God's reality (130–131). But the "real" must be, at a minimum, in some sense outside and distinct from the one who is aware of it; its way of being may not be completely determined by the one who is aware of it, but must be in some measure determining of that awareness; and other subjects must, in principle, be able to encounter it also. Real being "makes a difference," is effective, though not necessarily in an obvious way (72). The encounter with reality is an actualization of the self, which recognizes its relatedness to reality in its own unification as well as in the reciprocal acting-upon-each-other of self and other. Still, might not unsuspected forces be acting within subjects, producing illusions about exterior being? Descartes could only lay this doubt to rest in his third *Meditation* by finding an experience whose non-contained "content," infinite substance, could not conceivably be produced by his own finite power. Buber finds a comparable transcendence in any You—in his tree, for example. The tree is present in an uncomprehended, ungroundable way, imposing itself graciously upon one and thus evoking the sort of wonder that Descartes reserved for God. It is as much unlike anything that the subject could produce from itself as anything in experience could be. But while Descartes' criterion of reality was the exclusion of doubt, Buber's is the exclusion of indifference. The real is that which concerns and challenges the self as fully as anything in experience could.

If subjects *were* aware of something real, they *would* have to venture outside of the realm where they are *chez soi* in order to be under the guidance of the real, and prevented from cutting the real entirely to their own measure. Yet subjects must somehow actualize their own true being in this venturing in order not to lose themselves in leaving their own domain. The real *would not* be controlled by theoretical and practical frameworks produced by subjects; its meeting us or leaving us *would not* be entirely manageable; its effect on us *would* go beyond what we can see and understand; and in being aware of the real's possession of these characteristics, we *would* be provoked and challenged by it. *I and Thou* can be read as a prescriptive sketch of the conditions for experience of the real, just as it can be read as Buber's description of actual encounters. These alleged encounters give us the reality that we wanted all along—though, to be sure, at the considerable price of leaving the theoretico-technical realm and the guarantees proper to that realm. "I have never concealed the fact that he who wishes to live securely would do better to stay far from the way which I have indicated."[15]

Now the notion in the first premise of something that *may be* encountered, as opposed to something actually encountered, is suspicious, for it speaks of a You-reality which is given solely in relation as existing outside that relation (even though destined for it). But the arguer must make this concession to those who do not quite, or yet, encounter God; indeed, the concession must be made at any

[15] *Philosophical Interrogations*, p. 58.

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moment in which one is not encountering God—as, for instance, when one is thinking about God.

2. Buber claims to see that "through all presences shines the one presence" (150), and he calls on us to "dare to attain" this perception. If the demand is reasonable, at least these steps seem to be necessary to arrive at the second premise:

(a) I always say "You" to that which I encounter, which is to say that whenever I am aware of the real, I mean myself as the counterpart of the real (the I of the I-You relation) at the same time that the real presents itself as real (the You of the I-You relation).

(b) My capacity to say You exceeds the You-saying of my encounters with finite individual You's—a tree, a person, a cultural ideal—for none of these "satiates" me (128).

(c) I should mean, i.e. say "You" to, all I can.

(d) I can mean an infinite You including all the world.

(e) Therefore, I should mean the infinite or "eternal" You.

(f) I become aware of the reality of anything I mean.

(g) Therefore, I can expect to become aware of the reality of the eternal You, if I have not already.

(h) The eternal You is no other than God.

This construction stresses the two related principles, namely, that it is up to me whether and how far I rise to the occasion of meaning, and that exercising my capacity to say "You"—in contrast to my capacity to feel, or my power of conceptualization—leads me infallibly to reality, if not to infallible knowledge about reality.[16] The *responsible* subject, as opposed to the sensitive, scheming, or projecting subject, is strictly correlated with the real. And this correlation is confirmed by everyday events in which those beings which manifest themselves as real invariably command my attention.

In this case, the You-sense of those who do not affirm God promises the presence of what they are not (quite) aware of as present. Would it do this if the apparently absent were not, in fact, present? It could not. The You-sense is the reality-sense and not a faculty of postulation. Buber claims that any failure of presence must be ascribed to ourselves, since it is God's very nature to be present (147). God is not only all-embracing at a given moment but temporally unlimited, "eternal." If I do not encounter God, it is not because God is not there for me but because I have not fully actualized my own capacity to mean, and thereby to meet, God. Insofar as I am a human being, however, my You-sense cannot be simply inactive (85), and so I go up to finite You's going up to the infinite You in

[16]The I-You relation "fools" one only when one mistakes it for objective cognition, as in Philip Wheelwright's counterexample to Buber's claim that I-You relation can occur in momentary glances between strangers: "I presume I am not alone in having had the disillusioning experience of observing a student in a classroom who looks bright, attentive, and responsive, nodding in apparent understanding and agreement whenever the lecturer happens to catch his eye while making some point, and yet who is unable to show, either orally or in writing, that he has achieved any comprehension of what is being spoken about"—"Buber's Philosophical Anthropology," in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, pp. 92–93. The *kind* of mutuality one thought was there turned out not to be; but does that mean the student who caught one's attention was not *present* at all? See also the more nuanced discussion by Ronald Hepburn in Chapters 3 and 4 of *Christianity and Paradox* (London: Watts, 1958).

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the same act, even though I may not realize the extent of what confronts me—like people who go to see the Eiffel Tower without realizing they are going to France.

An assumption which must be stated, although it can hardly be argued for, is that one should mean all one can. One is non-indifferent to meaning to the precise extent that one says You; one's commitment to meaning is felt also in melancholy disappointment when finite You's return to It-hood. Without an illimitable commitment to meaning, comparable to the infinite interest in happiness of Pascal and Kierkegaard, the argument cannot encourage one's meaning-act to grow.

The melancholy one feels when a tree that has been You becomes It again might prompt one to think of an eternal You.[17] So might the feeling of gratitude with which one receives the "gift" of the tree lead one to affirm a great Giver of it.[18] But a more important reason which leads one's attention beyond the tree or any finite You is the obvious fact—obvious both to It-cognition and the You-sense—that there *is* more than the tree or any particular You. I have said You to a tree, but there is also a tree standing by it to which I have not yet said You. I have said You to a tree and to a friend and to a Doric column, each excluding the others in meeting me as You, but not, I know, *really* excluding the others. My purely dialectical power of conceiving of a world-totality and the inner demand of my You-sense to redeem all I meet by saying You to it conspire to point toward God as the Meaner of the All. By no dialectical power can I encounter the All as God going up to me. But the mere raising of this conceptual possibility, that the whole world is *meant* and that all the things in it are words signifying both of themselves and as members of an enormous sentence, has an effect on one's attention. It does not promise a You, but it reminds one that there is that in one which does.

A final assumption which could be challenged is the identification of the eternal You with God. Clearly nothing *else* could be God for one who addresses the

[17]Theunissen (*Der Andere*, pp. 341–46) argues that this melancholy is the prime reason for speaking of God, because when one ceases saying You to a tree, the tree is still there; it is something *else* which has departed, namely that which is You according to its nature. I object that this interpretation would make God the only one who is ever met—never a tree, but only God via a tree. While it is true that God encompasses and includes everything, so that really to encounter God is really to encounter everything (in one sense), this encompassing would become hollow if there were not beings encounterable in their own right which might then, in the God-encounter, be encompassed. In short, Buber means (and if I am wrong about what he thinks, at least this is what I think) that the tree *is* a You, though in a limited way when compared with the way in which God *is* a You, and that Theunissen's strategy of ascribing You-being only to God prevents the recognition of this. Cf. Jochanan Bloch's claim that "presence" is never the presence of this or that thing, but the "sacral" dimension of relation *per se—Die Aporie des Du* (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1977), p. 308. Both Theunissen and Bloch appear to do violence to what Bielander rightly stresses as the two-leveled character of encounter—*Martin Bubers Rede von Gott*, p. 158.

[18]Moser writes: "Those who take what is given to them without experiencing the giving of the giver do not *receive*, and the gift is turned into a theft. If, however, we experience the giving, then we experience the fact that there is [divine] revelation" (*Gotteserfahrung bei Martin Buber*, p. 314; my translation). The phenomenon of meaning, seen as a giving, thus implies God as the giver; to deny this is to deny that the gift is a gift, to snub it. But this is another version of Theunissen's move of making the meaning of the tree dependent on God, which reduces the tree to less than a You. It is strictly the infinitizing of the You-sense, not any deficiency in the meaning of finite You's, that leads to the encounter with God.

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eternal You, for the exclusiveness with which the eternal You commands one's attention is all-inclusive. "God" is, in the first place, just the name one speaks in unlimited You-saying. But it could be objected that the eternal You is neither a person nor an almighty creator in the senses requisite to "God," as that name is used by those who would be interested in the argument.

The eternal You is no more self-evidently personal, from the mere concept of You-hood, than a tree is. Buber claims, not from the concept but from the encounter, that "this ground and meaning of our existence establishes each time a mutuality of the kind that can obtain only between persons" (181). Apart from the encounter, it seems that the only reason for thinking that the eternal You would be personal is that it encompasses all finite You's, including personal ones. It would acquire personhood in the way the God of the ontological argument might acquire it, by lacking no perfection—that is, by lacking no meaning. At any rate, it at least does not seem impossible that the eternal You would be, as Buber puts it, *also* a person (181). Beyond this, those who are unaware of God and are addressed by the argument cannot expect the argument to tell them everything about what they will encounter when the encounter occurs.

Buber's God is a God from whom all meanings flow, and who underwrites all "actuality"; but this God seems to be confined to the role of conferring meaning on events that are causally produced outside of divine control, whereas it seems that a true God would be the first power in all dimensions of the world. Buber has two distinct answers to make to this objection. One is to deny the reality of everything that supposedly lies outside the jurisdiction of the eternal You; the human inescapability of the It-world should not be confused with the true reality we attain in saying You. The more important answer is to point out that no argument can do all the work of faith; and the prime work of faith is to hold to the vision that the world will come, after all, to actualization. As long as this result is not inconceivable it would not seem appropriate to disqualify Buber's conception of God for failing to guarantee God's effective omnipotence. There certainly are difficulties in coordinating this conception with our experience in the world. Yet I think a sure way for a philosophical theology to impeach itself would be to clear up all these difficulties in advance.

3. The third step of the main argument is established if Buber's account of meaning is correct.

4. and 5. The last two steps of the argument raise no new issues, but here at the last we might look back and ask: Is the term "encounter" equivocated in applying it to finite You's, on the one hand, and to God, on the other, in step (2), and did step (1) gloss over this illegitimately? If so, steps (1) and (4) will not lead to the conclusion.

It would seem that the eternal You is not met in the same way in which other beings are; Buber calls attention to the difference by denying to the eternal You alone any It-potentiality. All beings other than God are sense-perceivable and thus ostensible in nature and "experience." "Spiritual beings" are a partial exception, since they are encountered in their creators' imaginations before they exist, but they too take sensible and public form. There is thus in principle an objective referent for every ordinary encounter, but not for the eternal You—who, we might therefore suspect, is only a fanciful superimposition upon ordinary experience, a phantom projected in the shock of the occurrence of meaning.

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Buber says in many places, however, that God, even though not encountered ordinarily, is not encountered elsewhere than in the ordinary.

> "World here, God there"—that is It-talk; and "God in the world"—that, too, is It-talk; but leaving out nothing, leaving nothing behind, to comprehend all—all the world—in comprehending the You, giving the world its due and truth, to have nothing besides God but to grasp everything in him, that is the perfect relationship.
>
> One does not find God if one remains in the world; one does not find God if one leaves the world (127).

Everything and anything in the world is an objective referent for the God-encounter. Although the divine dimension of the world is a non-objective surplus over what can be "experienced," so is the meaner of any meaning; so is the tree. The tree is fully as outrageous with respect to any control one would like to place on meaning as God is. One would think otherwise only by mistaking the experienced thing called "tree" for the actual tree; but we no more have the actual tree in our experienced tree than we have God in the tree or in the world. There is, to be sure, a fixed connection between the experienced tree and the actual tree; the actual tree is not encountered elsewhere than where the experienceable tree is. The actual tree is a limited individual, whereas God "embraces" everything, which is an important difference. But that difference just means that God is to be encountered everywhere.

To sum up, this God-argument relies on a certain conception of meaning, that is, on the assumption that this meaning is a universal occurrence which so determines the nature of our life as to make it unreasonable on our part either to deny that there could be encounter with an "eternal You" or to hold back from committing ourselves to the fullest actualization of meaning possible. It also relies on the perception that every occurrence of meaning is in fact somehow bound to encounter with pure presence or "full meaning." Like the cosmological arguments for God's existence, this argument moves from events of ordinary experience to God, but the association between the ordinary events and God is of a different sort. God is not invoked here to explain the tree's meaning or existence. To acknowledge the tree's own meaning is to abandon the demand for any further explanation of it. The tree's meaning is associated with God's meaning strictly because of God's actual presence in and with the tree, together with the correlated human capacity to mean the infinite You. One can say that God means the tree, and that this meaning of the tree by God does not violate its exclusiveness because God as pure You contains nothing that would limit the tree. God, one could say, occupies a position in the You-world comparable to that of a principle or first cause in the It-world. But the You-world's ways are not the It-world's ways. We should not let the comparison between the "first meaning" and "first cause" arguments encourage us to falsify the You-world with analogies from the It-world. God's presence in and with the tree is not deducible from it; but God is graciously there, as a consummation of presence itself.

Even with this qualification, my attempt to formulate a Buberian argument might seem to clash with the outlook of *I and Thou*. Buber might object that I have not been nearly circumspect enough in my treatment of You's and the eternal You. The very enterprise of constructing an "argument to the reality of God" is the symptom of a perennial but illegitimate human quest:

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> Man desires to have God; he desires to have God continually in space and time. He is loath to be satisfied with the inexpressible confirmation of the meaning; he wants to see it spread out as something that one can take out and handle again and again—a continuum unbroken in space and time that assures life for him at every point and moment (162).

Anything one succeeds in thus handling is but a dead "It," and the one who handles it is the merely partial I of the I-It relation. Where argument enters, actuality departs.

But I answer that argument is more than a tool of I-It relations. An argument is both a speaking between human beings and at the same time—no less than a work of art, for example, the Doric column which Buber celebrates in his Afterword (175)—a "spiritual being," which considered as a pure form "lacks but creates language" (57) and which, even though it has its place in the It-world, can meet the receptive beholder (61). An argument can thus be involved in the entry into the You-world in three ways: through encounter with what it is concerned, through encounter with whoever speaks it, and through encounter with its form as a work of culture. Anselm's *Proslogion* is not less pregnant with meaning than a Romanesque church.

The It-world is not sealed off from the You-world as neatly as the fundamental dichotomy of *I and Thou* suggests. Buber points out that the two worlds are "intricately entangled" and "tortuously dual" (69).[19] The I-You/I-It dichotomy leads one to think that God and the tree are simply absent when one talks "about" or "asserts" them. No doubt this is often the case, but it need not be. For in speaking about a thing, that thing may be summoned; the asserting may hold an addressing. Asserting is not an addressing, but it does not exclude addressing. Something may be encountered as actual while asserting it, and perhaps in a sense *because* of asserting it (if the asserting was a helpful directing of attention of the sort discussed above), but not *in* asserting it. Thus argument is not necessarily the bane of actuality.

Buber insisted that he had no metaphysical theses to offer and that metaphysical arguments played no part in bringing him to the encounter with God.[20] Granting the truth of the latter claim—though one may have one's doubts as to whether a person could arrive at the reality attested in *I and Thou* with a completely uninstructed attention—it still seems to do no violence to Buber's position, and to make much better sense of his attempt to present it cogently in a book, to allow for a metaphysical scaffolding, if not a foundation, for the encounter with God.

The test for whether an argument concludes to an It or to a You is provided by *I and Thou:* Is that which is argued for a graciously appearing being to be wondered at? In confronting this being, is one actualized and called to commitment? Any conceptually rigorous and maximally explanatory discourse which helps one to this point is a rational argument.

[19]A helpful treatment of this issue is W. Taylor Stevenson's "I-Thou and I-It: An Attempted Clarification of Their Relationship," *Journal of Religion*, 43 (July 1963), 193–209.

[20]See "Replies to My Critics," p. 84, and *Philosophical Interrogations*, pp. 46–47.

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III

The "argument from meaning" is more than an addition to the ranks of the classical arguments in philosophical theology. It is also an exhibition of what one might call the active ingredient in the other arguments. By directing attention to one or another of the ultimacies inherent in the concept of God—*perfect* being, *first* cause, *unsurpassable* designing intelligence, giver of *unconditional* commands, bestower of *infinite* blessedness, and so forth—these arguments in effect issue instructions not to limit one's You-saying. The argument from meaning does this more aptly and lucidly, as can be shown here in outline.

The ontological arguments, like the argument from meaning, ascribe a unique way of being to God. God's "existence" is essential, on the one side; God's "presence" or You-hood is essential, on the other. In each case the perfection that is held to be conceptually essential to God is interpreted to preclude a lack of actuality. But Buber's argument reverses the other by claiming, not that one must be able to encounter God beause one *conceives* God as unlimited in actuality, but rather that one in fact encounters God insofar as one encounters the unlimited actuality of the eternal You whose language the world is. That is, it assumes that the name "God" is reserved for the encounter with unlimited actuality, and it takes on the assignment of showing how that actuality is met: in the greatest possible human act of *meaning*, which surpasses *conceiving*. The ontological argument, on the other hand, illegitimately assumes that the actuality is already met in the mere concept of it. The protest of its proponents, that the being they conceive forbids them to allow that it might not exist, can be interpreted as their unlimited You-saying to the unlimited You, which here assumes the guise of "conceiving" unlimited substance.

The cosmological arguments depend on the demand that the world-totality be rendered intelligible. But the concept of causation which they employ in the pursuit of intelligibility—for which direction of attention, or "wonder," is required in addition to "grasp"—is a two-edged sword. As the ordinary person's theoretical revulsion from determinism shows, a causal order is not *ipso facto* an intelligible order. The deterministic universe turns out to be as offensive to the seeker of meaning as a random one when it expels wonder and leaves the mind without a final claim upon it. The argument from meaning also appeals to the demand that the world make sense as a whole, but it substitutes the order of the You-world for the ultimately unintelligible (because inactual) order of the It-world. The coherence of the You-world, triumphant over the melancholy induced by the departure of finite You's, is dependent upon the "first meaning," as we have seen, in a way that is not entirely disanalogous to the dependence of the world of existents on the necessary being or "first cause." But the "first meaning" is encountered *as God*, i.e. as infinite actuality, whereas the "first cause" can only be rendered God-like (as opposed to "Nature"-like) by reflecting appreciatively on everything that depends on it—thus, in effect, reading "first cause" as "first meaning."

Like the cosmological arguments, the design arguments premise the intelligibility of the world and conceive the scheme of intelligibility imperfectly; only it is harder to show how purposiveness as such falls short of intelligibility than to show how causality falls short. Briefly, to demonstrate that an event happened

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for a purpose no more answers the question of the event's ultimate meaning—"So what?"—than a demonstration of the event's efficient cause. For the purpose itself might be meaningless. If purpose-talk refers strictly to the adaptation of means to ends, without consideration of what makes the ends worthy ends, then it can be translated into talk about compossibility in systems of events. For example, the fact that I am marvelously adapted for life on earth only proves that my kind of being grew up here (i.e. that the events constituting the existence of *homo sapiens* happen to be compossible with everything else occurring on the planet, with which they form a system). Only when I see human existence on this planet as something wonderful in itself am I motivated to give the credit for it to some Artificer so as not to undercut its meaningfulness by believing that it "just happened." But there is no "artificer" of meaning, whether or not there is one of the natural order; and since it is really intrinsic meaning rather than purposive order *per se* that matters to me, it is only by interpreting the Artificer as *the one who acts for the sake of the "first meaning"* that the design argument functions as an argument to God. Normally, of course, purposive orders are instituted by intelligent agents for the sake of meanings, which is assumed by the traditional design argument; but Buber approaches the dimension of meaning more directly.

The practical arguments to God proceed from a necessary human interest in the existence of God or of states of affairs which only God could bring about, such as infinite individual blessedness or a coincidence between virtue and happiness. The commitment to belief in God takes its force from that of these interests rather than from conceptual or perceptual evidence. Buber also appeals to our interest in "actualizing" ourselves, where "actualizing" is an extremely general, but, therefore, more adequate, notion that takes in both moral zeal and existential pathos. The notion of worthwhile risk, as applied to belief in God by Pascal and James, also has its place in Buber's argument, but with a twist: only by entering the risky You-world is it possible to gain so much as the meaning of a tree, while once one is in the You-world the greatest certainty available is that of the God-encounter. (This should be compared with Descartes' conviction that once the true order of intelligibility is entered, with careful attention replacing casual perception, God is known more clearly and distinctly than anything else.[21]) Buber's advance over the practical arguments is implicit in his conception of encounter. The subjectivism of the practical arguments, even if it be an *a priori* subjectivism, makes them exercises in thinking and acting "as if" God were real. But the eternal You, though reachable only by a venture, is the supremely real being and no postulate.[22] Buber's I-You/I-It dichotomy should not, despite its resemblance to the starting assumptions of the practical arguments, be taken to assert a theoretical aporia from which subjects are thrown back onto concern for

[21]Cf. pp. 166–67 in the third *Meditation—The Philosophical Works of Descartes*, trans. E. S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross (Cambridge U., 1911).

[22]Buber's answer to Nathan Rotenstreich, who found a "postulative element" in his philosophy ("The Right and the Limitations of Buber's Dialogical Thought," in *The Philosophy of Martin Buber*, pp. 128–32), was this: "My 'postulizing,' which I in no way contest, is essentially of another kind [than Feuerbach's and Nietzsche's]; it is one corresponding to the situation and actual. In a time in which the I-Thou relationship is so obscured, so disdained as it is today, I postulate its new dawn" ("Replies to My Critics," p. 704).

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the character of their own existence. In his argument, the concern for the well-being of subjectivity is wedded to the quest for the intelligibility of the real world.

Whether Buber succeeds in overcoming the split between the theoretical and practical approaches to God or only in furnishing important resources for the attempt, the fact that his achievement has the form of a reasonable argument is, I think, momentous for the history of reason.

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The Prisons of Man: An Introduction to Foucault's Negative Theology

James Bernauer, S.J.

What we should ask of our theologians is not a theology of the Death of God . . . but a theology of the death of self . . . the ego who has "got religion" because he thinks he has found or even has found the "true" self. (R. C. Zaehner)

It is comforting, however, and a source of profound relief to think that man is only a recent invention, a figure not yet two centuries old, a new wrinkle in our knowledge, and that he will disappear again as soon as that knowledge has discovered a new form.
Michel Foucault[1]

WHEN MICHEL FOUCAULT died suddenly at the age of fifty-seven on June 25, 1984, he was among the most widely read and analyzed contemporary philosophers.[2] His written works testify to his enormous range of interests, as well as to the always unpredictable trajectory of his thought. These characteristics continued to the end. Within days of his death, two studies on Greek and Roman ethics were published and there had been hope that a posthumous volume would follow. Unfortunately, it has been decided that this last book, which would have presented his analysis of Christianity's relation to the formation of western

[1]R. C. Zaehner, *Concordant Discord* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1970), p. 208; Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Random House, 1970), p. xxiii.

[2]The English speaking world has quite unexpectedly become the major force in scholarly work on Foucault. The following book-length studies on Foucault have appeared: Alan Sheridan, *Michel Foucault: The Will to Truth* (New York: Methuen, 1980); Barry Cooper, *Michel Foucault: An Introduction to the Study of His Thought* (New York: Edwin Mellen, 1981); Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, with an afterword by Foucault (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Charles Lemert and Garth Gillan, *Michel Foucault: Social Theory as Transgression* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1982); Pamela Major-Poetzl, *Michel Foucault's Archaeology of Western Culture: Toward a New Science of History* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1983); Karlis Racevskis, *Michel Foucault and the Subversion of Intellect* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983); Barry Smart, *Foucault, Marxism and Critique* (Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983); Mark Cousins and Athar Hussain, *Michel Foucault* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984). I have examined most of this literature in two articles: "Foucault's Political Analysis," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 22 (March, 1982), pp. 87–95, and "America's Foucault," *Man and World* 16 (1983), pp. 389–405.

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subjectivity, will not be released.[3] For most of his commentators, these works, representing a totally new field of research for him, were as unexpected as his death, and reiterated the personal style he proclaimed in 1969 when he replied to the criticism that he was always shifting his interests and positions:

> I am no doubt not the only one who writes in order to have no face. Do not ask who I am and do not ask me to remain the same: leave it to our bureaucrats and our police to see that our papers are in order. At least spare us their morality when we write.[4]

The statement is vintage Foucault: an experience of thinking which is identified with an act—and an art—of escaping the demands of what others consider thought-worthy; a sense of the danger posed to the intellectual life by its relations with power and by the allure of subordination to an intellectual bureaucracy; and, finally, a personal pleasure in being different, in not appearing with the face his commentators predicted on the basis of his earlier writings. As Foucault put it: "No, no. I'm not where you are lying in wait for me, but over here, laughing at you."[5] Death has now given to his work a definitiveness which allows us to take a comprehensive viewpoint, to give his work a face. The work and not the man will be our focus for that was his concern, not who he was, but who we are, how modernity has fashioned us as knowable for ourselves, what he called an "historical ontology of ourselves."[6]

The purpose of this essay is to characterize Foucault's project as a whole, to identify the major steps in his development of it, and to indicate its relevance for a religious reflection which wishes to free itself from anthropological frameworks. I shall maintain that Foucault's perspective is related to a religious model of both thought and practice, and it is my hope that a clarification of this perspective will invite interest in his achievement from thinkers who are working within the

[3]Born in 1926, Foucault took degrees in psychology and philosophy and, after various teaching posts in Europe and abroad, he was elected to the Collège de France in 1970. His book-length publications indicate the range of his interests: *Maladie mentale et personnalité* (Paris: PUF, 1954) which, in a radically revised version has been translated by Alan Sheridan as *Mental Illness and Psychology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1976); *Folie et déraison: Histoire de la folie à l'âge classique* (Paris: Plon, 1961) which, in a radically abridged version, was translated by Richard Howard as *Madness and Civilization* (New York: Mentor, 1967); *The Birth of the Clinic: An Archaeology of Medical Perception*, translated by Alan Sheridan Smith (New York: Pantheon, 1973, original French 1963); *Raymond Roussel* (Paris: Gallimard, 1963); *The Order of Things* (original French 1966); *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, translated by A. Sheridan Smith (New York: Harper Colophon, 1976, original French 1969); *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison*, translated by Alan Sheridan (New York: Pantheon, 1977, original French 1975); *The History of Sexuality I: An Introduction*, trans. by Robert Hurley, (New York: Pantheon, 1978; original French, 1976); *The Use of Pleasure*, trans. by Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1985); *The Care of the Self*, trans. by R. Hurley (New York: Pantheon, 1986). Fragments of his study of Christianity are available. Cf. note #34 below. Two major collections of his countless essays have also appeared: *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice*, edited by Donald Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); *Power/Knowledge*, edited by Colin Gordon (New York: Pantheon, 1980). Some new material is contained in *The Foucault Reader*, edited by Paul Rabinow (New York: Pantheon, 1984). A comprehensive annotated bibliography of Foucault's writings and a vast listing of the secondary literature was issued by Michael Clark as *Michel Foucault: An Annotated Bibliography* (New York: Garland Publishing, 1983). Also, see the complete bibliography in *Philosophy and Social Criticism* 12 (1987).

[4]*The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 17.

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 17.

[6]"What Is Enlightenment?" in *The Foucault Reader*, p. 46.

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context of explicit religious and theological traditions. Up until very recently, this group has not given to Foucault's writings the attention which they so richly deserve.[7] I have used the title "The Prisons of Man" in order to identify the central experience which worried Foucault's thought: the incarceration of human beings within a specifically modern system of thought and practice which has become so intimately a part of them that it is no longer experienced as a series of confinements, but is embraced as the very substance of being human. The prison from which Foucault seeks escape is nothing other than the modern identity of man himself, the historically constituted figure in that humanism which is both a particular understanding of human reality and a technology for human development: a truth which is power and a power which presents itself as truth.[8] Foucault's individual studies join in a relentless campaign against modern humanism and the notion of man which stands at its center. Foucault's work may properly be characterized as an anti-humanism, even if the term provides for many the "most scandalous aspect" of contemporary French thought.[9] There is no word in our vocabulary which can be compared with "humanism" for the nearly universal approbation which its mere incantation wins for it. It is the lynch-pin for those societies which regard themselves as liberal, thus permitting a unification of their rationality, viewed as a dogmatic-free commitment to the life of reason. Their political projects are justified in terms of their foundation in a conviction of human dignity. Humanitarianism is defined as the "only possible faith" for an open society, and that society's intellectual enterprises are put in the context of advancing a "humanistic conception of man."[10]

Although the anti-humanistic claims of Foucault's thought may always offend sensibilities, it is important to recognize that modern humanism represents for him an extraordinary falsification and diminishment of the human being. Philosophically, his work is a critique of modern thought's egocentric illusion, the paramount significance which human subjectivity and individuality have taken on as standards for reflection and action. Ethically, Foucault's writings are attempts to demystify the self-professed benevolence of a humanism which, in putting forward its programs for human progress and institutional development, has actually created personal and social conducts of awesome destructiveness. It is my thesis that the nature of Foucault's thought is best captured by considering it

[7]There are but a few signs that this state of affairs may be on the verge of changing. Although he is treated in the context of a broader movement, Foucault has been considered in three recent works: Mark Taylor, *De-constructing Theology* (New York: Crossroad, 1982), and his *Erring: A Postmodern A/Theology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), and *De-construction and Theology*, edited by Thomas Altizer (New York: Crossroad, 1982). Also, see David Chidester, "Michel Foucault and the Study of Religion," *Religious Studies Review* 12 (January, 1986), 1–9. In addition, there is a 1982 dissertation in religious studies from Vanderbilt University: Sharon Diane Welch's *The Battle for Truth: Foucault, Liberation Theology and the Insurrection of Subjugated Knowledges* (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms).

[8]Following Foucault, this essay will employ the term "man" to designate the specifically modern concept of the person, originating philosophically in Descartes and articulated most fully in Kant. The term "human being" is meant to be a broader notion, transcending modernity's image and fabrication of "man."

[9]Frederic Jameson, *The Prison House of Language* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), p. 139.

[10]Cf. Karl Popper, *The Open Society and its Enemies I* (New York: Harper, 1963) 183; and Noam Chomsky, *Problems of Knowledge and Freedom* (New York: Pantheon, 1971), p. 51.

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a contemporary form of negative theology, his effort to overcome that figure of man whom modernity fashioned as a substitute for the Absolute, and whose divinization entailed a flight from humanity. The promise of this effort is not a novel philosophical anthropology but a new invitation to think through our relationship to modern humanism and the view of man and his freedom which it enunciates. In recent decades, that thinking has been performed under the shadow of Nietzsche's proclamation of God's death, a demise which was heralded as the indispensable precondition for human liberation. In the light of Foucault's work, authentic human freedom can only appear in the space opened by the "death of man." To avoid the danger of this expression becoming a mere shocking slogan, as it often has in reactions to Foucault, we must grasp the movement of his thought, its journey from anthropology to archaeology.

FROM ANTHROPOLOGY TO AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF MAN

Foucault's journey of thought began in relative tranquility. Its field was psychology and his objective was to endow it with the intellectual clarity which would enable psychology to become a genuine science. For Foucault, such a scientific psychology had to be rooted in a reflection on concrete existing men and women. In their probing of that concrete existence, Foucault's first two published studies attempted to unify a phenomenological analysis, disclosing a human being's subjective dimensions, and a Marxist analysis, exhibiting the social conditions in which health was achieved or mental illness suffered.[11] The Foucault of 1954 shared the assumptions common to his intellectual milieu. The search for man and his authenticity dominated the horizon of post-war French philosophy. Whether the specific statement of it be that of the atheist Sartre or the Christian Marcel, existential philosophy was defined as anthropology, and man functioned as the starting point for thought. The humanistic temper of existentialism was matched in Marxist circles, assisted by the appearance in France of Marx's 1844 manuscripts and the weight they gave to the image of Marx as a philosopher concerned with man and his alienation.[12] Foucault abandoned his original anthropological project as a result of the research which was published in 1961 as a history of madness. His history showed that madness and, thus reason, were not unchanging objects, but constantly shifting relationships, manifesting Western culture's evaluation of those powers within human experience, thought and dream, which called into question the security of any prevailing comprehension of human nature. Foucault's study followed the changing relationship between reason and madness in the period from the Renaissance to the birth of modern scientific psychology. He argued that the cosmic or tragic experience of madness, enshrined, theologically in the madness of the Cross and, literarily in the works of Shakespeare and Cervantes (an experience thoroughly subversive of the

[11]Cf. *Maladie mentale et personnalité* and his lengthy introduction to the French translation of Ludwig Binswanger's *Le rêve et l'existence* (Paris: Desclée De Brouwer, 1954), pp. 9–128. An English translation, by Forrest Williams, of this introduction has been published as "Dream, Imagination and Existence" in the *Review of Existential Psychology and Psychiatry*, 19 (1987), 31–78.

[12]On this humanistic period in French thought, cf. Vincent Descombes, *Modern French Philosophy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980) and Mark Poster, *Existential Marxism in Postwar France* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975).

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arrogance of reason in any particular period) came to be trivialized and ultimately conquered by the category of mental illness. That conquest authorized the development of modern psychology, but impoverished the human reality which it claimed to study. The human being's capacity for transcendence and for dialogue with its profound incomprehensibility was exiled into the silence of merely psychological disturbance, the absence of a rational speech that ought to be present.[13]

Foucault's account of modern psychology's delineation of its subject involved him in a detailed analysis of nonapparent structures organizing how we know and how that knowledge is related to specific ways of exercising power, e.g., how psychology gives rise to the institution of the asylum.[14] Foucault's project for the analysis of these structures found a name: "archaeology," which he borrowed from Kant to designate the investigation of that which renders necessary a form of thought.[15] It attempts to overcome our culture's failure to appreciate how and why it constructed and embraced the specific forms of knowledge which have become dominant in the modern age. The goal of an archaeological excavation of that cultural history is to effect a catharsis of those intellectual and political assumptions which predetermine our analysis of contemporary experience. For the last twenty years, Foucault's archaeology has been directed at one concern: man and his prisons, that is, the way in which the figure of man has been fabricated as a knowable and governable reality for the modern period. First, I will take up the production of man as an object for the human sciences, traced by Foucault in his 1966 work, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences*.[16]

MAN AS CREATURE OF KNOWLEDGE

The anthropological turn of Kant and, thus, of modernity is tied to the production in knowledge of a new portrayal of human being: Man. For Foucault, he is but a "recent invention," a fashion that did not exist before the end of the eighteenth century. "Renaissance 'humanism' and Classical 'rationalism' were indeed able to allot human beings a privileged position in the order of the world but they were not able to conceive of man."[17] In claiming man's recent invention, Foucault is pointing to his modern epistemological identity as the "being such that knowledge will be attained in him of what renders all knowledge possible." Man is, thus, both the difficult object of knowledge as well as the sovereign subject of knowing, a being whose nature is to know "nature and itself, in consequence, as a natural

[13]Cf. *Madness and Civilization* and *Mental Illness and Psychology*, especially pp. 60–88.

[14]The importance of these structures was reinforced for Foucault by his study of the emergence of clinical medicine, *The Birth of the Clinic*. His examination showed that clinical medicine cannot be understood as a progressive development of scientific expertise. Instead, it appeared after a fundamental transformation in the structures of what would count as knowledge and in the health concerns of the society that developed the clinic as an institution.

[15]Cf. Foucault's exchange with George Steiner, "Monstrosities in Criticism," *Diacritics* 1 (1971), 60. In more recent years Foucault spoke of his method as both archaeology and genealogy. A consideration of the complex question of their relationship is not relevant here. I have discussed the issue in "Foucault's Political Analysis," p. 92, and in "America's Foucault," pp. 396–399.

[16]Cf. *The Order of Things*, especially pp. 250–343.

[17]*Ibid.*, pp. xxiii, 318.

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being."[18] The birth of this new figure of man and his natural identity is determined by his modern constitution as the being who, in his essence, is describable as one who produces, who lives and who speaks. This fabrication of his identity results from the three modes of knowledge which modernity was privileged in giving access to him: economics, biology, philology. With the appearance of these three forms of knowing and their corresponding empirical domains, modernity has launched into the order of time.

It was discovered that there existed histories proper to labor, nature, and language. The modes of development in economic production, the various ways of life's adaptation to an environment, the modifications of language—all have their own "internal laws of functioning" whose "chronology unfolds in accordance with a time that refers in the first place to their own particular coherence."[19] With production, life, and language possessing their own historicities, temporality was attached to human existence as a defining feature of itself. Thus, we have the modern figure of man exhibiting his essential but derivative finitude: condemned to exist by the sweat of his brow, an organism living under the sentence of death, a process of thinking forced to lodge its thought in the density of language. His finite nature is proclaimed through those very spheres of knowledge in which he has sought enlightenment. The experience of human reality as man is to be a living body, an appetite in relation to which value emerges, and a user of language. The knowledges of biology, economics and philology are in a state of interminable cross-reference with man's finite nature itself. Kant's philosophy articulates in the epistemological domain man's strange character as an "empirico-transcendental" doublet. As transcendental, he is constructor of the world, director of the life process, transparent thinker of his own unthought. As empirical, he is like any other object: subject to prediction, to alien forces, to a history which antedates him.

This strange delineation of man is a troubling one for Foucault because the traits of his identity are invitations for his transformation. Man is always a sedimented being, a figure articulated on the already-begun of labor, life and language. Not contemporaneous with those regions in which his being appears, existing within histories that have a calendar in which he is peripheral, man discovers himself as time, dispersed within alien chronologies and yet who hopes for the dawn that will harmonize his reality with those of production, life and language. In other words, his finitude is sketched within the context of an endlessness: changes in production and the processes of labor will be vehicles for diminishing self-estrangement; man's evolution as a species has perhaps not yet terminated; the complex reality of language may yet yield to systematicization. Within this configuration of knowledge, the human sciences paradoxically unite positivistic tendencies, where the object is sole source of knowledge, and eschatological inclinations, where the reality of man is to be searched for in the still to be achieved harmony of his being. As a consequence, they take on a preeminent position for modern thought and action: the human sciences are distinguished by both an ideal of value-neutrality and a task of social redemption.[20] That knowl-

[18] *Ibid.*, pp. 318, 310.
[19] *Ibid.*, pp. 367–368.
[20] *Ibid.*, pp. 319–320.

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edges, defined as objective, have a special political mission in the modern era was not a new position for Foucault. In his earlier works, he had shown how certain features of modern identity defined a human fragility which required the unique care responded to by the rise of such institutions as the asylum and clinic. Psychology as both a knowledge and a practice is rooted in the modern articulation of human reason within the confines of a silent, continuously threatening mental illness. The birth of the clinic and its massive program for health care is linked to the formation of the odd notion of a "pathological life," that is, the perception of death not as a foreign invader but, rather, as an intrinsic dimension of human existence itself. This definition of man as a dying life accounts for the unique significance given to the autopsy in modern medical knowledge, which comes to comprehend life by reading the text of the human body's self-destruction. The promise of this knowledge is the source of the power which accrues to medical institutions, whose responsibility becomes nothing less than the management of death and human finitude.[21] Since *The Order of Things*, Foucault continued to explore his insights into the human sciences as knowledges, whose discrimination of truth was always also a technology for human development.

MAN AS CREATURE OF KNOWLEDGE-POWER

In his recent investigations of modernity's creation of man's true identity and, thus of the programs of conduct suitable for him, Foucault has analyzed two major cultural practices: the prison and sexuality.[22] His selection of these areas has a double purpose. First, by approaching modern identity in terms of relationships between spheres which appear quite foreign to one another. Foucault is seeking to undermine the normal separation made between issues recognized as political and matters regarded as personal. In modernity, the two are intimately related. Secondly, his claim regarding the contribution of penal technology to the production of man as a comprehensible object and regarding sexology's fashioning of man as a meaningful subject permits him to account for the arrival and appeal of those two major contemporary forms of studying human being, from both of which he wishes to disassociate himself: the objective analysis of structuralism and the subjective interpretation of phenomenology.[23] His archaeology aims at a different form of understanding.

Foucault's study of the prison and sexuality aims to portray a very particular form of power and the way it operates and is exercised. In place of understanding it as a negative force, manifesting itself primarily in prohibition and law, Foucault chooses to see it as a positive technology, united with knowledges and committed to the production of a certain type of reality. As an alternative to the juridical model which he feels has governed thinking on power, Foucault substitutes a

[21]Cf. *Madness and Civilization* and *The Birth of the Clinic*.

[22]These practices are treated respectively in *Discipline and Punish* and *The History of Sexuality I*. By practices Foucault means networks of specific relations within and among formations of knowledge and exercises of power. It is from these practices that the style of and the objects for both thought and action are produced. Cf. Foucault's "Questions of Method." *Ideology and Consciousness* 8 (Spring, 1981), 3–14.

[23]It is the relationship of Foucault's work to structuralism and hermeneutics which provides the principal interest of the excellent study by Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*.

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strategic model: the attention to law and sovereignty is replaced by a concern with the objectives served by productive power and by an interest in the specific tactical efficacy of concrete alliances within history between power and knowledge.[24] For Foucault, this positive viewpoint on power has two principal advantages. First, it breaks with modernity's anthropological subjectivism in which power is imagined in terms of an absolute Subject proclaiming Law or in which, when analyzing power, one is led to focus upon a personal reaction to power, to a question of when one supposedly said yes or no to its compulsions.[25] Secondly, the strategic, positive model is essential to comprehending how power actually does operate in the prison and sexuality and, thus, for the modern period in general.

The elaborate arsenal of punitive and reformative techniques which have characterized the prison from the moment of its historical appearance in the late eighteenth century argues that its objective was not just the deprivation of liberty but the constitution of a particular form of human reality. The daily life of the imprisoned was distributed and charted on a carefully defined spatial-temporal field, the various segments of which were attached to precise values and levels of progress or regression. The prisoner's rehabilitation was synchronized with a minute regimentation of his time and activity, and with his willing subordination to a constant surveillance and discipline. It is not surprising for Foucault that the prison technology which actually appeared had few relations with those plans of reformers which justified widespread institutionalization of prisoners. While on the theoretical level, the reformers saw rehabilitation in terms of restoring the criminal as a juridical subject, the prisons developed a different goal: the production of an individual who was made predictable and useful. In addition to the intentions of jurists and philosophers, there were the dreams of military technologists who grasped the potential in the modern age for the formation of a docile, social body through methods very different from the social contracts and general wills in terms of which they were theoretically justified.[26] Prison practice was but part of a much more extensive program and technology for the disciplining of large populations in the modern concern to promote greater utility and docility. The inmates of schools, hospitals, and factories found themselves subject to a technology similar to that operating in the prison. They were placed in a field of objective visibility and hierarchial comparison; they were subjected to an intricate system of rules and types of training according to which judgments of normalcy and deviance could be made: they were describable in written case histories in terms of a complex structure of values and capabilities, documents not intended as monuments for future memory, but as instruments for present management. For Foucault, the specific identity of the man who became objectively knowable for modern thought in the human sciences is, to a large extent, the object-effect of these productive forms of disciplinary power.[27] If philosophers wrote the intellectual chapters in the modern book of objective man, no less important, but far less studied, are the authors of the "technico-political" chapters of that same

[24]Cf. *Discipline and Punish*, pp. 23–31; *The History of Sexuality I*, pp. 98–102; *Power Knowledge*, pp 109–133.

[25]Cf. *Power/Knowledge*, p. 140.

[26]*Ibid.*, p. 169.

[27]*Ibid.*, pp. 141, 191, 304–305.

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volume. While man as an isolated, objectivizable individual is "no doubt the fictitious atom of an 'ideological' representation of society," he is "also a reality fabricated by this specific technology of power."[28]

The intelligibility of modern sexuality is also tied to this operation of productive power. Foucault's study of the historical record led him to dissent from the common story of sexuality being subject to ever intensifying restriction in recent centuries, a repression culminating in, and symbolized by, the Victorian Age. In fact, according to Foucault, modernity witnesses a proliferation of domains regarded as sexual and of institutions dedicated to the analytic discrimination of sexuality's seemingly inexhaustible nuance. In place of that unified deliberation on sex and its sins which medieval Christianity had conducted, the modern age has scattered its discourses and its experts on sexuality: they seem to be everywhere, in "demography, biology, medicine, psychiatry, psychology, ethics, pedagogy and political criticism."[29] Never having been in the shadows, modernity nevertheless announces sexuality as man's secret dimension, which must be brought to speech and truth by a vast, cooperative will to knowledge on the part of society. "What is peculiar to modern societies in fact, is not that they consigned sex to a shadow existence, but that they dedicated themselves to speaking of it *ad infinitum*, while exploiting it as *the* secret."[30] The science of sexuality, or sexology, to which this dedication gave rise, became the site for a new and terrifying power-knowledge formation, namely, the capability of conferring a human being's sexual identity. This power was graphically illustrated for Foucault in the memoirs of a nineteenth-century woman which he edited and published.[31] Suddenly subject to new precise medical categories of sexual traits, Herculine Barbin found herself, at the age of twenty-two, declared a man by a decree of a civil court.

When Foucault released the first volume to his history of sexuality in 1976, subtitled *The Will to Knowledge*, it was presented as the introduction to a series of works in which he planned to probe the major sexual objectifications which the modern technology of sexuality produced: the definition of children as preliminary sexual beings and their enlistment within a program of sexual pedagogy (*The Children's Crusade*); the articulation of women's bodies as essentially sexual and objects for medical practice due to their intrinsic pathology (*Woman, Mother and Hysteric*); the isolation of sexuality as a biological and psychical instinct, prone to abnormality and perversion (*Perverts*); finally, the delineation of the social responsibility of procreation in the spheres of economics, politics, and medicine (*Populations and Races*). These four studies were to be preceded by a volume (*Flesh and Body*) in which Foucault intended to discriminate the modern concept of the "body" from the early Christian era's notion of the "flesh." As a result of his immersion in the Christian and classical texts to which this project led, the focus of his history shifted from an analysis of how sexuality became an object for knowledge to how it functions in the self-understanding which a subject creates about himself. He saw that the power which objective knowledges exer-

[28] *Ibid.*, p. 194.
[29] *The History of Sexuality I*, p. 33.
[30] *Ibid.*, p. 35.
[31] *Herculine Barbin*, introduced by Michel Foucault and trans. by Richard McDougall (New York: Pantheon, 1980).

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cised in the sexual realm was rooted in a more fundamental commitment by the human subject to recognize sexual desires and acts as the privileged signs of an essential, "true" self. He referred to this last stage of his project as a genealogy of ethics. Foucault's genealogy of ethics is a history neither of ethical codes nor of actual moral conduct. It is, rather, an examination of how an individual forms a relationship with himself specifically as a moral subject: the dimensions of the self recognized as involving moral obligation as well as the nature and purposes of the practices to which the self commits itself in achieving moral personhood. If sexual desires and deeds have become the seismographic signs of our true identity, revealing our deepest selves, it is because, long before modernity, we were created as ethical subjects in a special relation to both truth and sex. Foucault's last volumes explore the first three moments in Western culture's formation of this unique kinship.

On the terrain of Greek culture, it is Plato who looms largest.[32] For Foucault, he resolved the pressing difficulty posed by the most troubling and significant sexual relationship for the Greek ethic of the use of pleasures: the love relation between men and boys. Inasmuch as there was an isomorphism between social relations and sexual relations in that culture, the boy, as a future citizen, destined to active self-governance, could not permit himself to be reduced to the level of a passive object of pleasure. The moral dilemmas generated by that relationship found themselves transformed by Plato's *Symposium* in a manner which was to have profound consequence for the relationship between sex and truth. In Plato, the earlier Greek question of proper sexual conduct is replaced by the question of the being of love itself: the issue of how the honor of the boy is to be preserved in sexual love is changed into the question of one's love for the truth: the dissymmetry of the partners is overcome by a mutual love of the truth; the central concern about boys and their virtue is replaced by the need to love the master of love, Socrates, whose mastery results from his virtue.

While Plato brought into our culture the obligation to question desire and its object in the context of truth, Roman thought of the Imperial period put "care of the self" at the center of moral preoccupation.[33] The Roman citizen was under a pressing obligation to clarify his relationship to himself, for that self was challenged by an unparalleled multiplicity of potential identities and conflicts created by offices held, powers exercised and responsibilities shouldered. This new "fragility of the individual" led thinkers such as Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, to develop new programs for the examination and articulation of consciousness, exercises that promoted not only a more detailed knowledge of the self, but also a novel intense pleasure in the self as such.

Although Greek and Roman experience fashioned a culture of the self and its mastery, only Christianity, with its practices of confession and examination of conscience, constituted the self as a hermeneutical reality whose truth must be uncovered by a permanent process of self-interpretation and diagnosis of the truths and illusions operating within oneself.[34] Christian monasticism introduces

[32]Cf. *The Use of Pleasure*, especially pp. 185–246.

[33]Cf. *The Care of the Self*.

[34]Although his study of Christian subjectivity will not be released, the issues he was exploring in this area have been available in various ways. I was privileged to attend his first course on the topic in 1980 in Paris as well as his closely related summer course at the University of Toronto in 1982, "The

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the program of discovering one's truth not just in terms of one's acts but also one's thoughts and desires, which must be manifested to another by means of a verbal process.[35] The Christian obligation to decipher the truth of the self results from the conviction that the person is engaged in an internal as well as external struggle with Evil and, thus, becomes an obscure text, requiring vigilant deciphering and the asceticism of self-denial.

The legacy of this cultural history is the modern project of binding sex, truth, and personal identity into a unity. In the modern era, however, sexual acts and desires are no longer mere vehicles for approaching a self, but are forged into a positive identity with that self. Freud solidifies this development by having sexuality become the truth of the self which permeates all the other dimensions of human identity; his conscious reason, his speech, his finitude and death. Whatever its other accomplishments, Freudian thought is the last lock in the prison of man. The search for the self and its intelligibility is reduced to an acceptance both of the positive elements articulated in the human sciences as identifying the nature of human being and of the norms they propose for man's fulfillment.[36]

THE DEATH OF MAN AND FOUCAULT'S NEGATIVE THEOLOGY

The single idea for which Foucault's philosophy is best known is its announcement of the "imminence of the death of man," the doom which he has pronounced for the culture of modern humanism: "you may have killed God beneath the weight of all that you have said; but don't imagine that, with all that you are saying, you will make a man that will live longer than he."[37] For many, it is Foucault's most infamous statement, betraying his thought as yet another product of a new European pessimism which derives decadent pleasure in a nihilistic destruction of ideas once considered central to Western civilization. Foucault's proclamation and welcoming of man's death is interpreted as another sign of the

Discourse of Self-Disclosure." In addition, there were two important lectures he gave at Dartmouth College in November, 1980: "Subjectivity and Truth" and "Christianity and Confession." There have also been several published articles: "Omnes et Singulatim: Towards a Criticism of 'Political Reason'" in *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* II, ed. R. Aron (Salt Lake City: Univ. of Utah Press, 1981), pp. 225–254; "Sexuality and Solitude" *London Review of Books* (May 21–June 3, 1981), 3–6; "The Battle for Chastity," *Western Sexuality: Practice and Precept in Past and Present*, ed. P. Ariès (Oxford: Blackwell, 1985), pp. 14–25; "L'écriture de soi," *Corps écrit*, 5 (1983), 3–23. In addition, there are two important discussions: "On the Genealogy of Ethics: An Overview of Work in Progress," an interview conducted by H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow which appears in the 1983 edition of their *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, pp. 229–252; "The Regard for Truth," an interview conducted by Francois Ewald in *Art and Text*, 16 (Summer, 1984), 20–31.

[35]Foucault maintains that this Christian obligation to decipher one's truth is quite distinct from those earlier Greek and Roman techniques which had as their aim not a reading of the self as an obscure text but, rather, the recall of truths and standards of conduct which had been forgotten by the subject and which needed to be reactivated by attentive listening to the true discourse of a master.

[36]I explore the archaeological foundation for psychoanalysis in a forthcoming article, "Foucault and the Question of Psychosis: Fragments of an Archaeology of Psychoanalysis" to be published in the collection edited by David M. Levin, *Pathologies of the Modern Self: Challenges to the Orthodoxy*.

[37]*The Order of Things*, p. 342; *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 211.

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profound perversity into which our age has fallen.[38] Such an interpretation would be an extraordinary misperception of the temper and meaning of Foucault's announcement. The declaration of man's death must be understood on several interrelated levels. First, it identifies his own assessment of his work as a negative theology, a term which is not an arbitrary imposition on my part. Although Foucault never developed the analogy, negative theology is one of the few styles with which he has explicitly compared his own thought.[39] His choice of the comparison is illuminating. It points first of all to Foucault's own experience of a fundamental personal conflict in his intellectual interests as a "religious problem."[40] On the one hand, he was passionately involved in the new literary work of such writers as Georges Bataille and Maurice Blanchot which displaced interest for him from a narrative of man to the being of the language within which images of the human are fashioned. On the other hand, Foucault says he was attracted to the structuralist analysis carried out by anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss and the historian of religion, Georges Dumezil, both of whom dispersed human reality among cultural structures. That Foucault considers the religious problem as the common denominator for both interests indicates that all four thinkers, although in very different ways, unleashed styles of reflection and forms of experience which overturned for him the accepted natural identity of man.

Foucault's negative theology is a critique not of the conceptualizations employed for God but of that modern figure of finite man whose identity was put forward as capturing the essence of human being. Nevertheless, Foucault's archaeology is best described as a negative theology, rather than a negative anthropology, for its flight from modern man is an escape from yet another conceptualization of God. The project of modernity was a divinization of man, the passion to be, as Sartre saw, the "*Ens causa sui,* which religions call God."[41] Although Descartes' roots in Scholastic thought and vocabulary enabled him to avoid drawing the implication of his meditations, the discovery of the *cogito* was actually the transference to man of God's function in medieval metaphysics as source of the world's reality and intelligibility: " 'I think' was to become the divine 'I am.' "[42] After Kant and Hegel had completed the transference and Nietzsche had declared it a cultural fact, it was Foucault who saw that the death of God necessarily entailed the death of the figure who had taken on his role as the Absolute. Recognizing archaeology as a negative theology permits us to appreciate its strategy, most especially, its choice of history as a privileged mode of reflection and its functioning as criticism of that theology of man which humanism is. Parallel to the death of God was a divinization of man. Claiming a firm knowledge of this figure humanism made humanity's happiness its ultimate

[38]As examples of such misinterpretation, cf. Hayden White, "Michel Foucault," *Structuralism and Since,* ed. John Sturrock (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979), 113–114, and Jacques Ellul, *The Betrayal of the West* (New York: Seabury, 1978), p. 37.

[39]Cf. "La pensée du dehors" *Critique,* 229 (June, 1966), 526–27. The analogy was employed again in a lecture at the Collège de France on January 30, 1980.

[40]In a 1967 interview with P. Caruso published in Caruso's *Conversazione con Lévi-Strauss, Foucault, Lacan* (Milano: U. Musia and Co., 1969), p. 120.

[41]Jean-Paul Sartre, *Being and Nothingness* (New York: Washington Square Press, 1966), p. 784.

[42]Hiram Caton, "Toward a Diagnosis of Progress" *Independent Journal of Philosophy,* 4 (1983), 11. Cf. Alexander von Schoenborn's "The Cartesian *Cogito* and the Death of God" in *God Knowable and Unknowable,* ed. Robert Roth (New York: Fordham Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 73–84.

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goal and human perfection its permanent project. The place for humanism's actualization, however, was not the order of the supernatural but rather of the historical. In history purpose and progress could be found and man's victory and beatitude achieved. Uniting the development of modern thought and practice, the order of time became the Sacred History of Man. The religion of the God Humanity, with its priesthood of scientific experts as advanced in Comte's positivist philosophy, is not only an integral element of that philosophy but of the logic of the modern age itself.[43] Faced with a sacred history constituted by man's revelation to himself of his ever advancing perfection, Foucault has attempted to demythologize the historical reality in which the modern identity of man and the sources of his humanistic knowledges are lodged.

It would be wrong to conclude, as many critics do, that Foucault's thought is not only an identification of man's prisons but also a celebration of them, that the result of his writings is to produce a sense of entrapment within ways of acting and thinking which leaves no scope for escape. It is true that he has no post-humanist or post-modern philosophy to offer his readers. Rather, his project is *anti*-modern and *anti*-humanist. The difference is important for it reflects Foucault's acute awareness of where he himself stood in relation to the humanistic epoch. Humanism is far from vanquished and it is its capacity for resourcefulness which prevented him from drawing the lines for a post-modern philosophy.[44] Foucault's anti-humanism is tied to the present epoch as much as medieval negative theology echoed an age of rational belief. Foucault's enterprise is intended to be an effective resistance to humanism, not its replacement. This resistance is a matter of both thought and practice.

On the level of thought, Foucault's claim of man's death points to a deeper development. It recognizes the fact that the place which man and subjectivity have occupied as the central focus for modern thought has been subverted by a profound change in the direction of our contemporary knowledge. While the inadequacy of the category of man can already be glimpsed in the structural analysis of Marx or the genealogical investigations of Neitzsche, Foucault indicates that it is the very development of the human sciences which promises that the man of modern humanism is not only finite but also temporary—a figure who will vanish "like a face drawn in sand at the edge of the sea."[45] The appearance of psychoanalysis, ethnology, and linguistics, to which the human sciences have led, actually sabotage the investigation of man, for they explore the individual and cultural unconsciousness which unveil the fundamental conditions for knowledge about man, for any anthropology. They are, thus, "counter-sciences" in that they return the human sciences to their epistemological foundations and, thus, they "dissolve man" and "ceaselessly 'unmake' that very man who is creating and re-creating his positivity in the human sciences."[46] Foucault defined

[43]Cf. Eric Voegelin's collection of essays, *From Enlightenment to Revolution*, ed. John Hallowell (Durham, N.C.: Duke Univ. Press, 1975), especially "The Apocalypse of Man: Comte," pp. 136–59.

[44]Cf. his dicussion with Noam Chomsky, "Human Nature: Justice versus Power" in *Reflexive Water: The Basic Concerns of Mankind*, ed. Fons Elders (London: Souvenir Press, 1974), pp. 134–97.

[45]*The Order of Things*, p. 387. For Foucault's consideration of Marx and Nietzsche in this context, cf. *The Archaeology of Knowledge*, pp. 12–13, and "Nietzsche, Genealogy and History" in *Language, Counter-Memory and Practice*, pp. 139–164.

[46]*The Order of Things*, p. 379.

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his own methodological work as an attempt at "historical analysis freed from the anthropological theme."[47] In looking beyond man to the cultural crisis from which his specific modern positivity emerged, Foucault restores us to a consciousness of the systems of knowledge and power, whose dominant role in shaping our culture needs to be examined. Victim of this recognition is modernity's false sense of human autonomy and the equally false approach to history which saw it as a passive reality simply to be construed in the pattern of some ideological vision. In renewing a respect for historical events as more than servants of some imaginary human sovereign will, Foucault returns to our sense of history the attitude which Karl Barth saw as precluded by Enlightenment thought: the attitude that the "historian should take history seriously as a force outside himself, which had it in its power to contradict him and which spoke to him with authority."[48] The aim of that renewal is not to imprison us within history but, rather, to show how contingent an epoch's order of things actually is, so as to "show up, transform and reverse the systems which quietly order us about."[49] This entails a combat with those human sciences whose truth-claims are only defensible in terms of a blind faith in modern humanistic assumptions. The ensemble of truths in the human sciences currently determine which alternatives for a society's conduct will be articulated and which opportunities will be conceded to human intervention and political action. Because, for Foucault, "truth is of the world," today's intellectual is summoned to the fundamental task of uncovering how truth operates in our culture, of grasping the uncriticized operation of the "rules according to which true and false are separated and specific effects of power attached to the true."[50] In displacing the anthropological focus, Foucault undermines approaches which seek merely to discover patterns of historical continuity, an interest correlative to the presumption that there is a natural, trans-cultural, ever-identical man. The emphasis of Foucault's thought is on discontinuity, on the question, for example, of how cultures and, thus, human beings in other historical epochs, are fundamentally different from the reality fabricated in the modern age. For Foucault, the effect of humanistically-inspired histories was to justify the modern age as the culmination of a continuous march of progress: it reduced history to a "place of rest, certainty, reconciliation, a place of tranquillized sleep" which has made it possible for us to "avoid the differences of our present."[51]

On the level of action, Foucault's declaration of man's death is intended as the starting point for a radical politics of our-selves, the challenge to our current culture's power to determine our self-identity and lay down a program for our liberation. For Foucault, the many campaigns for liberation from repression (for example, sexual repression) which modernity has been so fertile in generating, are often mere diversions from an authentic quest for freedom. For Foucault, that quest begins in the recognition of the human being as an "agonism," a "permanent provocation" to the knowledge and power which are allowed to operate on

[47]*The Archaeology of Knowledge*, p. 16.

[48]Karl Barth, *Protestant Theology in the Nineteenth Century* (London: SCM Press, 1972), p. 58.

[49]"A Conversation with Michel Foucault," conducted by John Simon in *Partisan Review* 38 (1971), 192–201.

[50]*Power/Knowledge*, p. 132.

[51]*The Archaeology of Knowledge*, pp. 14, 204.

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our selves.[52] Although it captures the central insight of his entire work, the specific description of human being as an agonism was owed to his examination of the ancient and Christian texts of his last period.[53] It was meant to engender a new taste of the self, a taste which would be estranged from modern identity. Although Foucault's work has no vision of a religious faith, it did arrive at a stage of religious struggle. At the beginning of this paper, I quoted Zaehner's call for a "theology of the death of the self" because Foucault has provided the philosophical prelude to such a theology. It is a theology which wishes to pass to an experience of God's transcendence by renewing an awareness of that of the human being.

As a result of his study of Christian monastic practice, Foucault came to grasp a crucial moment in the religious formation of the self, a moment which sharply differentiated it from the modern. The aim of modern knowledges and practices is to foster the emergence of a positive self in which one recognizes and binds himself to the self-knowledge defined through the categories of the anthropological sciences. Modern self-appropriation is the discovery of and attachment to that truth, as the firm basis for encounter with the world. Foucault contrasted the modern vision with that of Christian practices which invited a renunciation of the self who was articulated as true. In his view, the key to the Christian's experience of self-discovery and subjectivity was located in the model of martyrdom.[54] One shows who one is by the preference for physical death over spiritual death. The struggle for self-knowledge entails a continual mortification, an "everyday death" which is a kind of "relation from oneself to oneself," a relation which becomes a "constitutive part of the Christian self-identity."[55] This strategy of renunciation enabled Christian experience to avoid the danger of the spiritual death of modern positivist self-identity. For the Christian, the truths of the self were always precarious, for they always related to the soul's continual conflict with the evil within itself. There could be no firm allegiance to a positive self, for there was no truth about the self that could not be utilized by the Evil One as a device for ensnaring the soul. The effect of this continuing self-renunciation was to open the subject's existence to a field of indefinite interpretation, relativizing any particular anthropology.

At the close of his life, Foucault's depiction of the self's struggle with modernity echoes the "great richness" of this Christian ascetical moment.[56] Foucault counseled modernity to embrace the "refusal of this kind of individuality which has been imposed on us for several centuries," and to acknowledge the need to sacrifice the identity of the man it had come to know and trust.[57] Foucault's negative theology possesses theological significance for its effort to dismantle man's prison is also a celebration of the human being's transcendence. His

[52]Foucault, "The Subject and Power" in H. Dreyfus and P. Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, p. 222.

[53]Cf. *The Use of Pleasure*, pp. 65–67.

[54]Foucault, "Christianity and Confession," lecture delivered at Dartmouth College, November, 1980.

[55]"Omnes et Singulatim," p. 239.

[56]"Christianity and Confession," lecture delivered at Dartmouth College, November, 1980.

[57]"The Subject and Power," in Dreyfus and Rabinow, *Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics*, p. 222.

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archaeological investigations shatter the silence which the chatter of the trivially knowable has too often forced upon experiences which are signals of transcendence: those passionate questions and states of mind which exceed judgments of mental health and illness; the encounter with a sickness unto death that is irreducible to the history of one's body; the self-interrogations which remember Socratic ignorance and are restless with confinements in processes of life, labor, language; the possession of a sexual dynamism which is not a mere product of biology and culture but of life's and love's mysteries. It is a tragedy that Foucault's death will not allow him to show how his last theme of care of the self would have provided a home for those voices of transcendence which his works encouraged his readers to hear, often for the first time. That unfinished business is an invitation for others. And Foucault did much. In restoring us to a recognition of the need for dialogue with the human otherness subversive of modern self-definition, he has helped to renew the possibility of encounter with the Other in whose image we may yet see ourselves.

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Wilson Coll.

Divinity As A Given

David Platt

HEIDEGGER maintains that ours is a time in which the "gods have fled." Among other things he means to refer to the dominant secularism of our modern technological society. A strong sense of divine presence suffused Buddhist and Hindu cultures of the past and, indeed, our own culture in medieval times, but the post-enlightenment world in the west has turned increasingly towards naturalism and technology and the same trends seem to be extending into the rest of the world at a rapid rate. The fact that some modern societies are democratic, while an increasing number are totalitarian may not be as significant in the long run as the absence of the divine dimension in human experience. It may well be that the absence of a sense of divine presence may account for the increase in the rise of totalitarian regimes of both the right and the left. When the gods of religion have fled, the gods of the state and the party come in to fill the vacuum.

As world cultures become dominated by technology, the possibilities of self-indulgence and self-gratification opened up by that technology become more alluring. It seems a worthwhile task in the midst of these times to ask if the "still small voice" of divine presence still manifests itself in human experience. Perhaps the departure of the divine dimension in human experience from mankind's notice, is not as obvious as at first appears. Can God still appear in the whirlwind or in the burning bush? It is in this context that I wish to explore the possibility that what I call divinity may still manifest itself in human experience; that, in short, some kind of divine presence or givenness may occur.

It may seem strange in this day and age to have an article appear dealing with "givenness," let alone divine "givenness." Most readers are aware of the attack against foundationalism in epistemology and of the destruction of the myth of the given. Any talk of givenness seems strangely out of fashion and recalls echoes of old philosophical debates of the Thirties, Forties, and Fifties. It is apparent that all knowledge-claims involve an interpretive matrix. There is no basic bedrock from which everything starts and on which everything else can be built. Nevertheless, in the contemporary haste to do away with foundationalism, we may tend to forget that humans do confront a world even while they are interpreting it. We may indeed build worlds, as Goodman has maintained, but we do not build them out of thin air alone. While all knowledge involves interpretive frameworks, and while there are no frameworks having the particularly favored status of showing us how "things really are," it does not follow that the worlds of our concern are pure fabrications.

We are in the worlds of our concern and, interpret how you will, *impingement* on consciousness by something outside of consciousness does occur, and this

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impingement can reasonably be referred to as the *given* aspect in experience—not the pure given, to be sure, but an interpreted given nonetheless. Peirce recognized this with his category of Secondness. Peirce was quite aware that there is no uninterpreted given but givenness of some kind does occur. What I mean by something given is something that confronts us in our experience which we do not think we imagine or invent and which we take to be external to the self. In a perfectly ordinary way we take such things as chairs, automobiles, houses, and trees to be given, and on reflection we do not take hallucinations and dreams to be given in *this* sense, because they are not thought to be part of the external world. Dreams are given in a more restricted sense. Dreams make a strong impingement on consciousness, but they have no public character—they are not shared by others.

In this paper I will be using the term "divinity" as a generic term to designate those experiences where an aspect of givenness occurs to which one could attach some religious significance. These experiences are most often noticed within the context of some kind of religious community, but as we shall see, they may include experiences which occur outside the context of any religious tradition. This is a fairly wide spectrum of experiences, to be sure, but most experiences do not involve divine givenness in any remarkably noteworthy sense, hence we are speaking about a restricted set of human experiences.

The nearest thing to a common denominator for what I am calling experiences of divine givenness would be impingement on consciousness from outside the self by aspects of the world which enhance human value and/or indicate that the universe is supportive of human efforts at enhancing value. This is admittedly vague, but as we will see later, we will be talking about intimation of divinity, and intimations are vague. Usage of the term "divinity" also precludes describing religious experiences in terms of a particular religious tradition to the exclusion of other traditions. We will occasionally talk about the "existence of God" or the "givenness of God," but such language puts you within the narrower framework of theistic religions. As long as one keeps the distinction between "divinity" and "God" in mind, no harm is done. Talk about "God" also implies that some kind of religious "object" is given. In our discussion we do not want to presuppose this; hence, the vaguer term, "divinity," seems preferable. No matter what kind of philosophical perspective you embrace, divinity poses problems for philosophers in a sense in which the existence of chairs and persons poses no such problem. In discussing experiences of divine givenness I want to take as my base of departure the existence of things and persons, which are characterized predominantly by some kind of givenness in the public domain.

It is patently obvious that if divinity appears, such appearance does not fall under the model of the appearance of existent objects. From a naturalistic perspective there is no divinity, because divinity lacks the requisites for existence in the sense of givenness we have been talking about so far. While fully recognizing that divinity is radically different from things and persons, religious believers nevertheless insist that divine presence occurs too. It will be a main thesis of this paper that while the presence of divinity is bound to be radically different from the presence of things and persons, if one is seriously to support the idea of divine presence in any religiously significant sense, then such divinity must be

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partially *given*, though this givenness, too, will be different from that of our base paradigm.

Usual ways of dealing with divinity either assume the divine is real because this is taken to be the case by revelation, or faith, and/or one uses various traditional proofs to establish the existence of God. To accept divinity on the basis of faith alone is *prima facie* to put oneself outside the realm of philosophical argument on this particular point. As to proving God's existence, most such attempts seem to be intellectual exercises, intrinsically unconvincing and irrelevant for the involved religious believer.

Confrontation and impingement on consciousness is an essential factor of givenness. Interpret it how you will, I confront a thing or a person as something or someone with which I have to deal, or, at least, which I have to acknowledge. The other crucial aspect is that things and persons are given publicly. They appear, and one can point to them. The crucial aspect of existence for our purposes lies in the idea of direct givenness in experience. We might say that to establish the existence of anything or anybody empirically is to maintain that such things are given in the strong sense indicated.

Unless you are going to fall back on revelation or proof, the religious believer is going to have to opt for some kind of divine givenness. Clearly, such givenness will be different from what we have so far called "givenness." Whether the notion makes sense as applied to divinity may be highly questionable, but I would like to explore the possibility that it does make sense. The most persuasive reason for taking divine givenness seriously comes from surveying the vast amount of data concerning religious and mystical experiences. The accumulated data in this area are massive. The outstanding characteristic of mystical reports seems to be an impingement on consciousness of some kind of larger consciousness, as James cautiously puts it. There would be no point in taking the epistemic claims of religion seriously if it were not for the reports of religious experiences. Most religious people are not mystics, but without reports of religious experiences, religion could be adequately dealt with in reductionist sociological terms. Even so, it is still possible to interpret these experiences in terms of social conditioning, wish fulfillment and father image projection. Although to do so would be, in my opinion, to take too cavalier an attitude towards the data, clearly this is a live option.

What makes religious experiences noteworthy is the aspect of givenness in the reports of mystics. There is, however, reason to be cautious. Many have overemphasized the similarities in the reports of the mystics and have not paid sufficient attention to the differences. One is tempted to over-stress the similarities in the reports, for to do so seems to give the requisite public character to reports of the divine givenness. To put it bluntly, if all mystics report the same thing in their experiences, then the divine givenness seems closer to the givenness of things and persons. But, as anyone reading the literature can discover for themselves, there are significant differences in the reports as well as similarities. We are dealing here with the obvious fact that any kind of givenness is also an interpreted givenness. Buddhist, Hindu and Christian categories and theologies are quite diverse. It is not at all clear, given the reports of the mystics, that there always is necessarily a divine "object" that impinges on consciousness. Impingement on consciousness there seems to be, but impingement of what? The Jew and the

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Christian will talk about the impingement of God—a discrete theistic entity of some kind, characterized as Person. For a Hindu, Buddhist, or nature mystic, nothing like this may be reported at all. For many, religious experience is a particular way of experiencing the rest of the world. As John Smith has said, religious experiences seem to be experiences of something else at the same time. If we wish to speak of the existence of a personal *God,* based on the givenness of divinity, it looks as though we will have to restrict ourselves to those who interpret these experiences in theistic terms. If there is divine givenness of some kind, it is epistemically far weaker in crucial respects than the presentation of things and persons. One could make a strong argument that religious experiences are simply a rather fine and exalted way of looking at the rest of the world, the world of things and persons that *are* given. The theist might respond that the diversity in the reports of the mystics is not damaging, for even in reporting the objects of everyday life, radically different conceptual schemes have been used. For example, certain languages have no noun forms, and thus in such languages we cannot talk about "things," but such a fact does not indicate there are no things and persons in the external world. So, the theist might respond, diversity of conceptual schemes, when it comes to describing the divine, does not rule out there being an element of divine givenness, describe it how you will.

While certain cultures possess no noun forms and thus would not speak of "things," still, if one visits such cultures, things in some form make themselves apparent—the givenness of things and persons, regardless of what you call them, remain cases of givenness in the strong sense. For large numbers of persons throughout the world, including many who would call themselves religious, there is no divine givenness in any sense or under any linguistic description. For many Christians and Jews, God is believed in on the basis of *faith,* and to think that he might be given to the believer would be considered blasphemous and false. For many, it is precisely the *absence* of divine givenness that makes faith crucial—now we see through a glass darkly, but only later face to face.

The diversity of description, the element of faith, and the unimportance of givenness for many believers would seem to doom our attempt to deal with divine givenness. Nevertheless, there are promising possibilities, even though the difficulties just mentioned are real. If religious faith were based totally on revealed doctrine and on church dogma alone, religion could be written off as childlike superstition which mature, twentieth-century adults should have out-grown. With all its diversity, the richness and wealth found in mystical literature precludes such a simple dismissal. While far from universal, the widespread actuality of religious and mystical experience indicates a reasonable probability of some kind of divine givenness. How to characterize it, given the relativity of interpretations, is what is most difficult. I have argued elsewhere that *phenomenologically* divine givenness occurs,[1] but to draw strong metaphysical conclusions from this is something else again, and is epistemically quite risky. Another feature of the givenness of things and persons, lacking in our experience of the divine, is the strong lawlike character involved in our experience of things and persons ex-

[1]See my "Things, Persons, and God: A Phenomenological Contrast," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion,* 36 (December, 1968) and "God: From Experience to Inference: A Phenomenological Study," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 10 (December, 1970).

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pressed in the Peircean category of Thirdness. A thing or a person exhibits all three of Peirce's categories, but experience of God, if there is such a thing, is characterized mainly by Firstness and Secondness with a minimal amount of Thirdness. Even in phenomenal terms the difference is brought out by Mill's contention that a table represents a "permanent possibility of sensation." Whatever experience of God is, it is scarcely a permanent possibility. As an important sidelight, if experience of divinity could be produced on demand as can the experience of a table, the character of religious life and devotion would be radically different from what it is.

A happy way to characterize divine givenness is to speak of it in terms of what we might call intimations of divinity. Peter Berger is making the same point in the title of his book *A Rumor of Angels*.[2] What is indicated by rumors and intimations is the weak epistemic force of divine givenness as compared with that of things and persons, but, though weak, the epistemic force is not nil. Granted the element of subjective interpretation, some common phenomenological features of divine givenness can be indicated. What James calls a sense of continuity with some kind of benevolent consciousness larger than our own seems to be a striking feature of divine givenness. Direct encounter with a personal God of the Western theistic tradition, however, does not seem to be a common feature, and this is a major stumbling block to establishing the existence of a personal God through divine givenness. Hindus, Buddhists, and various kinds of nature mystics do not necessarily characterize their religious experiences in Western theistic categories. What does seem to be common to both Eastern and Western mysticism is the sense of some kind of union with a larger source of *value* which can be spoken of either in terms of a larger consciousness or in terms of a feeling that the universe is in some sense receptive to the enhancement of human value-experiences. It is felt that the universe is in some sense basically good, rather than evil or value-neutral. This is admittedly vague and imprecise, but when one is dealing with intimations, precision is simply not to be had.

Our concern is with features presented in the experience which one simply confronts, no matter how else the experience gets interpreted. A sense of value-support is a strong feature of such experiences. Augustine, as a Christian, speaks of it in theistic categories, that is, as support coming from the "everlasting arms of God." Various other descriptions, inside and outside the Christian tradition, will speak of an enhanced sense of joy and well-being even in the face of great adversity. The intensity and beauty of everyday things in experience is often reported. Similarly remarked is a sense or "feel for" the unity of all things together. I hasten to add that what I am talking about here is a "feel for" the givenness of the unity of all things in some kind of value-complex, and not primarily an intellectual belief. Such "raw feels" manifest qualitatively, to use Peirce's category, divine Firstness. An intellectual belief-system may be inferred from this "raw feel," but I am not concerned with the belief but only with the given feeling of unity within the world and of value-enhancement. At times the sense of the impingement of a larger source of value is so strong that the self feels that its own center of ego consciousness dissolves or is absorbed in the larger consciousness. This is givenness in a very strong sense, but it still lacks the public

[2]Peter L. Berger, *A Rumor of Angels* (New York: Doubleday-Anchor, 1970.

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aspect of givenness, and hence a dramatic religious experience, with maximum impact on an individual, could still be interpreted as an hallucination.

Public character is precisely the problem at the heart of divine givenness. The impact of such givenness on many is obvious, but its apparently private character makes it quite reasonable for one to interpret such experiences as hallucinatory. Phenomenologically there is clearly an impact which seems to come from outside the self, but whether or not one should attach any ontological weight to this is debatable. One can interpret divine givenness as a real impact of a larger consciousness on our own, but one can also give a reasonable interpretation for regarding divine givenness as hallucinatory in nature, indicating something interesting about human psychology, but implying nothing about a larger consciousness outside the self. As is increasingly recognized, there is no *absolute* conceptual framework in philosophy which would tell us which interpretation *must be* chosen. Experience always remains ambiguous and open for multiple interpretations.

Let us assume for purposes of this paper that divine givenness, as reported by mystics in different cultures, has some epistemic force, and let us suppose that one is inclined to entertain the possibility of some kind of divine consciousness larger than our own presenting itself to persons. What does this tell us about the existence of *God?* When we talk about God, we are usually talking about the object of belief in Western theism, and more specifically, we are talking about a *personal* God. It is quite a jump from divine givenness of some kind or other to a personal God. First of all, in any reasonably sophisticated religious viewpoint, God is not conceived to be *a* person with all the limitations and finitude which that entails. Theists speak of God as personal, meaning primarily that personhood in some sense is included in the nature of God. The believer has faith that any experience which he undergoes is one which is understood and accepted by God—that God can relate on a personal level to the believer or to anybody else. God may be much more than person, but God must be able to relate to any aspect of a person. In Buber's terms the relation between man and God is an I-Thou encounter. To believe in a personal God is to believe that no human experience is such that it would be unintelligible to God or beyond God's comprehension. The whole context of Western prayer and devotion would make no sense whatsoever if God were not conceived as personal. While we have indicated that many reports of divine givenness do not seem to involve a personal God, clearly, many other reports *do* involve what is taken to be a relation to a personal God. Thus within the range of reports of divine givenness, there is a subclass of such reports that indicates the divine givenness in terms of relation to a personal God.

It is this subclass of reports which serves as our basic data when it comes to talking about the existence of *God*. It must be fully recognized that reports of experience of God clearly reflect the theistic categories of interpretation of Western theism. The culturally conditioned interpretive categories are always operative in any experience, but it does not necessarily follow from this that there is no personalistic given-component external to the self to be interpreted. Granted the private character of divine givenness, it still does not necessarily follow that all such experiences must be classified as hallucinatory. Nevertheless, reports of experiences of God are epistemically suspect for quite good reasons.

Though there are reports of direct presentation of God, there is a strong

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historical tradition that one cannot see God and live, as well as many references to the *hiddenness* of God. Leaving dramatic accounts of experience of God aside, John Smith rightly remarks that experience of God is generally also experience of something else at the same time.[3] If God is hidden, or if God is disclosed only in events and things of the world, then does not this imply that God can be reached only by a process of *inference* from empirical data, and thus the thesis that God can be given would be refuted? In answering we must keep some important distinctions in mind. I have argued that some kind of divine impact or givenness can be recognized, granting that the interpretation of such givenness is culturally conditioned and thus relative. John Smith makes a distinction by saying that God is revealed through a historical medium *directly* but not *immediately*.[4] By means of this distinction, he seeks to differentiate his view from that which derives God by a process of inference, and from one which receives God immediately. Thus one could avoid total divine *immediacy*, on the one hand, and avoid God as the end of a process of rational inference, on the other hand.

In explicating this notion of direct, but not immediate, experience, Smith takes our knowledge of the *self* to be the paradigm case with which to work. Persons are both disclosed and hidden at the same time. I know you directly without a process of inference being necessary, but I do not have immediate access to you, for much is hidden from me. Nevertheless impingment of you on my consciousness does occur. Smith suggests that our awareness of God would be something like our awareness of other persons. Unfortunately for the analogy, other persons possess bodies which are publicly observable and physical in the strongest sense. God may indeed be revealed or disclosed in physical things and events, but he is not disclosed unambiguously as a person is disclosed in his or her own body. It is because of embodiment that we can say, "See that person sitting over there?" or point directly to other persons. One may want to say, "Can't you see God in this situation?", but to point directly to him will not work because of the highly ambiguous way in which God appears. One of the main difficulties is that God, unlike people and things, generally is not apprehended outside the context of a prior faith. It is widely held that God is not to be approached objectively or from a spectator view of knowledge, but approached with a faith and belief that is present to the believer *prior* to apprehension of God. This often is the case, but it is one of the main difficulties when dealing with divine givenness, and it considerably weakens the epistemic force of religious knowledge-claims. Still, one might want to argue that *within* a given faith context, one believer may say to another that he can see the disclosure of God in a particular event or situation. Unfortunately, it is also the case that people often have strong disagreements as to where God is disclosing himself, even though they share the same faith context. Divine embodiment, like human embodiment, would make things much easier, but, even though we grant that God is disclosed in things and events, a basic ambiguity always remains as to where and when God is disclosed. Smith suggests that divine disclosure occurs mainly through *holy persons, historical occasions* and *the order and arrangement of nature*. At least he sees these as crucial aspects of divine disclosure in the Hebraic tradition. The Christian tradition adds another, and for

[3]John E. Smith, *Experience and God*, (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1968), p. 52.
[4]Smith, *Experience*, p. 83.

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Christians the most important, disclosure—that through the God-person of the Christ. For them, it seems, you could at least have an unambiguous divine embodiment.

From within a given faith context this seems to be an accurate portrayal of the situation, but viewed philosophically and outside the faith context, ambiguity abounds. In one sense holy persons, historical occasions, the order of nature, and Jesus have been given in a more or less straightforward way, but to see these as cases of divine disclosure involves a strong interpretive element based on faith. When I say interpretive element, I do not mean that divinity is necessarily inferred from these presentations. Smith is right about the directness of the disclosure—for the believer, there is a direct, but not immediate, disclosure of God. But though direct and disclosed, an interpretive element surely is involved. But each of these phenomena can be read in different ways. For the non-Christian, Jesus is just another man, though admittedly a very unusual one. The most that philosophy can do is to admit the possibility of divine disclosure, while insisting on the intrinsic ambiguity involved in such disclosure.

Let us look at some possibilities of divine disclosure which might occur in *ordinary* experiences, and which do not involve entering the faith commitment of a particular religious tradition. While most instances of divine disclosure occur within the circle of a given faith-community, it would seem that such events should also occur outside a given faith-community. If divinity can appear in the world at all, it would seem that such appearance would not be restricted to particular religious communities. It has been said that God does not disclose himself to persons who have not prepared themselves for such disclosure by discipline, prayer, fasting and meditation, preferably within the context of some religious community. While true in the more apparent cases of divine disclosure, it does not follow that all disclosures must occur within conventionally established religious contexts. Also, within a religious community, where theistic categories are part of the factors conditioning the believer, the reports of divine encounter may be more epistemically suspect than where such reports occur outside of the conditioning factors of a faith-community. If what I am calling "intimations of divinity" occurred *only* within religious communities, one might suspect that all such reports are simply the product of strong social conditioning. Reports which occur *outside* of religious communities are possibly more noteworthy than reports within religious communities when it comes to examining divine givenness. Further, if we can uncover experiences which are common to most people, not just to mystics, and which could reasonably be taken as examples of divine disclosure, this would be even more striking. We would be looking for experiences which could be described as *direct*, but not immediate, encounter with divinity, where what we mean by "direct" is that divinity is not derived by a process of inference.

One of the most promising investigations in this area is, as we have said, Berger's fascinating book, *A Rumor of Angels*. Therein he coins the happy phrase *signals of transcendence*, which I would take to be similar to what I am calling "intimations of divinity." These signals manifest themselves in experiences common to everyone, in or outside or religious traditions, which can be taken as signals of transcendence or intimations of divine disclosure. One example is a sense of *trust* in the universe expressed in such statements as "everything will be

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all right" which we tell each other in times of stress, tragedy and need. Berger makes the interesting observation that if we treated such remarks as ordinary empirical statements of fact, or as predictions, they would be patently false in many instances. But that is not their primary intent, nor does the logic of such statements operate in the ordinary way. When we comfort another person in such terms, we are expressing a deep-level trust in the goodness of the universe. Without such a deep-level trust, life could scarcely be lived.

Berger's point is that this phenomenon can be taken as a signal of transcendance, and by a signal, he does not mean that it provides any kind of proof for God or any reasonably strong *inference* to divinity. The epistemic force of such a signal is weak, but Berger feels that it can be taken as a signal of a transcendent source of value—that a direct but not immediate disclosure of divinity occurs. It is a suggestive idea. Admittedly the signal, if it is one, is extremely weak. It would never occur in most of us to take our trust in the universe, expressed in comforting others, as a signal of a direct encounter with God or a signal of transcendence. Even when this possibility has been pointed out to us, it may seem to be "clutching at straws" to take such trust as a signal of transcendence, let alone presentation of a personal God. One might well argue, at this point, that there is considerable difference between a signal of transcendence or an intimation of divinity and the givenness of God, even if direct experience of God is also experience of something else as well. After all, smoke is a signal or sign of fire, but seeing smoke does not entail that one also sees the fire at the same time. Much hinges here on the notion of what one means by *direct* apprehension. It makes perfectly good sense to say, "I see there is a fire over there" when all I actually see is the smoke. In the examples given by both John Smith and Peter Berger, one can make a case that the examples they mention may be taken as signals of transcendence if one chooses to take them. John Smith also argues that his examples can also be taken as direct experiences of divinity, at least by those within the Jewish and Christian traditions.

It is one thing to *infer* the designer God of the teleological argument from the order and arrangement of nature. It is something else again to "see" God directly in the order and arrangement of nature. The latter is a feature of much religious life and experience, the former is a rational procedure engaged in by theologians and philosophers. The impingement on consciousness of the order and arrangement of nature can also be taken as the direct impingement of God on consciousness. This is perfectly compatible with the fact that, for many others, the order and arrangement of nature is *not* taken as an impingement of the divine on consciousness. When we tell somebody that "everything will be all right," we certainly do not have to interpret this in any religious way whatsoever. But in the act of trust and faith, the sensitive and acute observer could also maintain that God or divinity impinges on consciousness.

Plato may be helpful in our discussion at this point. I am not concerned here with the metaphysics which Plato constructs to explain signals of transcendence. I am interested that he noticed such signals in human experience and stressed them more than most other thinkers. Plato noticed, and made much of, the fact that human beings are ill-adapted for everyday life in the empirical world. It is notorious that we are proverbially discontent. Provide us with the necessities of

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life and we become bored and restless—we develop neuroses, we search for meaningful careers, and we ask about the meaning of life. Not all of us do this in an obvious way and the degree of unrest varies widely. Still, a human being who enjoys nothing but eating, drinking, and sex—who has no hobbies, no career interest or concerns outside his own self-gratification—will be continually restless and unhappy. He will find life continually stupid and pointless, and will try to escape through various forms of self-indulgence. There is no question that without the necessities of life, most of us are in bad shape, but what is interesting is that there is no evidence that those with wealth and power are intrinsically happier than the rest of us, if all they have is wealth and power. If humans were geared for this life alone, these situations should not occur. As far as we know, animals when surfeited with food and sex do not lapse into boredom. They do not question the nature of their existence or worry about the meaning of life or look for something important to do. As far as we can tell, they *are* geared to this world, and the world is geared to satisfying their needs. Not so with humans. Perhaps it is no accident that this human discontent has sometimes been called divine discontent.

Plato was sensitive to the signals of transcendence when he referred to the body as the prison house of the soul. Kant too was aware of them when he suggested that since the world was so ill-suited to fulfill human happiness, that perhaps the universe had other purposes in mind for man, such as developing the morally good will. It is on the basis of such data that Plato and others have constructed their metaphysical systems. Since humans confront a given world that is so unsatisfactory, this deficiency could be taken as an intimation, not only of immortality, but of divinity as well. Another noteworthy aspect is the urge of various people to set projects and goals for themselves which they may never achieve, and which may involve considerable sacrifice, including illness and death. These goals are often not required of them by others and others may even regard their pursuit as absurd. Such human behavior is by no means rare and is considerably more common than mystical experience. The urge to transcend what this world offers or demands, may also be taken as a signal of transcendence. It should be kept in mind that the urge to transcendence does not necessarily mean a denial of this world, though often the pursuit of transcendence does involve the denial of the world in varying degrees.

There is no logical necessity to regard the body as the *prison house* of the soul. Happily the best of both worlds is often pursued. Part of the *given* of the human condition is the inadequacy of food, drink, and shelter *alone* to provide a significant life. The givenness here is a *lack* or deficiency rather than a presence, but the givenness of the deficiency of the world is widespread enough to be noteworthy. And this lack occurs inside and outside the contexts of organized religion. The felt lack varies among human beings and many would report no consciousness of such a lack, but it seems likely that at best, where the lack is not felt, or if felt, not responded to, life will tend to sink into routine boredom.

It is in the area of moral experience more than anywhere else that the givenness of signals of transcendence may point towards divinity. Plato was vividly aware that humans do seem to apprehend standards of moral perfection, goodness, and justice which never were, and never will be, empirically exemplified. These can be explained in naturalistic terms as simple projections from the self, but, since

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naturalism is no more a privileged stance than any other, one can also opt to take the conscious possession of such moral standards as direct intimations of divinity. Given a purely reductionistic view of ethics, one wonders how to account for the fact that cultures have been found radically morally deficient, and that individuals have spoken out against cultural conventions. If morality is simply a product of social conditioning, how is it that time and again in history, individuals have brought society into question and have judged society morally deficient? One is at liberty to wonder if the rejection of human slavery, the growing rejection of racism, sexism, and war does not represent the gentle impingement of divinity on the groping human consciousness. Again one is not forced to this conclusion by logic or experience, but the gentle proddings of experience may be worth more notice than has generally been the case. Moral outrage against acts which fall beyond the pale is, as Berger points out, another of the signals of transcendence.

Moral sensitivity and moral outrage are experiences common to persons, inside and outside religious traditions, and thus may be taken as transcendent signals. These signals, often gentle, but by no means always so, confront us with our moral deficiencies and lure us to be better than we are.

Let us combine the notions of a signal, sign, or intimation to that of direct givenness. To do so, one would have to say that "I see there is a fire over there" makes sense when all I immediately perceive is the smoke which I take as a sign of fire. One would also have to think that it is not straining things too much to say that fire in such a case is directly given. If it is legitimate in this case, it should be legitimate for a person to say, "I see God in the order and arrangement of nature." The main difference is that the epistemic force of the fire example is much stronger than the God example. In the case of fire, we do not speak of intimations of fire but simply of seeing the fire. While we do speak of intimations of divinity, we can also describe it as direct awareness of divinity.

Assuming a difference of degree rather than of kind in our apprehension of fire and of divinity, the *degree* is still wide and the epistemic force is weak in the case of the divine. I have spoken of epistemic force before, but something more must be said explicitly about it. The existence of things and persons has reasonably strong epistemic force. We do not have to construct ingenious arguments to establish the existence of things and persons the way we do when we deal with God or with theoretical entities in science. I am aware that the existence of the external world has been a persistent philosophical problem for centuries, but that is just the point—it has been a philosopher's problem, while the existence of God has been an existential and religious problem for many ordinary people, as well as for philosophers. As Hume was only too painfully aware, outside the academic halls, the impingement of the external world is obvious enough, even to philosophers. This is increasingly recognized even within the halls of academic philosophy with the general rejection of the spectator theory of knowledge along with the rejection of the Cartesian assumption that we are imprisoned within self-consciousness. Most schools of contemporary philosophy take it for granted that we are already "in the world." Thus, the so-called problem of the external world seems increasingly to be a relic of past philosophical presuppositions. The problem of divinity, however, remains significant for both the philosophical community and for much of the general public.

Within communities with strong religious and mystical orientation, or in ages

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of great faith it may seem strange to speak of divinity in such epistemically weak terms. But in our age this seems to be precisely the appropriate stance. Heidegger has maintained that ours is an age in which "the gods have fled." In wide segments of contemporary culture the divine dimension of experience is eclipsed or absent altogether. Only the strong in faith, or those deeply committed to a particular revelation, will escape the ambiguities mentioned here, and then only through an act of will. In such an atmosphere it is very important to show that, granted the epistemic weakness of the intimations of divinity, the signals of transcendence are there. It is important to emphasize that, while in the case of things and persons we are talking about "evidence and proof." In dealing with divinity, such terms are inappropriate. Here we must speak of "faith," "intimation," and remote "symbols."

To sum up: impingement of the divine on consciousness is a distinct possibility and in Western theistic terms, we may refer to this as the givenness of God. This much at least seems required unless one is going to throw out all reports of mystical and religious experience as delusory. Dramatic and important as the reports of the mystics are, even more important are the signals of transcendence mentioned by Berger, for these refer to the common experiences of us all. If divinity is given at all, it would seem peculiar if such experiences were had only by mystics. While all the data taken together make a reasonable case for divine impingement, religious empiricists may have paid too much attention to dramatic mystical encounters and not enough to the "still small voice" which may ever so gently impinge on consciousness.

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Toward a Transformation of Neoclassical Theism

Robert S. Corrington

ONLY THE MOST insensitive observer would miss the fact that philosophical theology has taken several steps forward with the writings of Whitehead and Hartshorne. By rethinking the traditional traits of the divine nature, both thinkers have shown that any serious account of God must include those elements which are finite. For both Whitehead and Hartshorne, this finite dimension of the divine is most manifest in the relationality or relativity of God vis-à-vis the objects and events which constitute the world. God cannot be seen to stand outside of genuine and sympathetic relationality to those realities which are otherwise outside of the divine scope. Hartshorne's doctrine of panentheism stresses that every feeling-event is both related to and individuated from God. The life history of each event is retained forever in the divine memory. Hence, no event is beyond the reach of the divine sympathy. This powerful vision of the finite and relative dimension of God has taken philosophical theology beyond the limitations of classical theology and its commitments to a non-sympathetic *actus purus* which stands outside of any meaningful relation to the world.

This forward advance in our apprehension of the divine nature should not, however, blind us to certain difficulties attendant upon any attempt to overcome classical theism. Hartshorne's neo-classical theism creates a number of knotty problems when it attempts to reframe our understanding of those dimensions of God which relate directly to the world. Our concern in this essay is to highlight several of these difficulties and to recommend ways in which they can be overcome by a more adequate understanding of both God and nature.

No philosophical theology can succeed which fails to delineate those traits which are constitutive of nature as a whole. The reason for this will become clear as we proceed. Yet we can say at the outset that a complete doctrine of God requires that some light be shed on the transaction between God and nature. If this transaction is to be rendered without categorial confusion, then the fundamental traits of nature must be secured for conceptual apprehension. Further, no doctrine of God can fail to derive much of its structure from the "prior" understanding of those realities which are not divine. If one has failed to present a judicious account of nature, then the account of God will be thereby weakened.

Hartshorne has written a great deal about the reality of nature and has attempted to present something like a general ontology of all events. In the process he has shown how a new understanding of nature can affect our understanding of God.

In talking about nature we are attempting to make statements about "whatever

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is in whatever way,"[1] such that no reality is left unaccounted for. We can assign one or more traits to the sum total of all realities in the hope that these traits will be exhibited in each and every instance. We can, in addition, hope to derive all "secondary" traits from the initial trait designation which stands at the foundation of our ontological probing. For Hartshorne, the traits of feeling and awareness are constitutive of nature as a whole and hence can be seen to function as the categorial primitives in his ontology.[2] Feeling is not, however, a static endurance of that which is apprehended (with whatever degree of consciousness). To be is to have a feeling-toned awareness of past events in the world in such a way as to allow those prior events to become constitutive of the self-evolution of the contemporary event. Perception is itself a subset of the class of memory events and has only the past, however recent, as its intentional object. Feeling, which 'uses' perceptual memory as its mode of access to other feelings, need not be highly differentiated nor conscious in order to be efficacious in bringing about a new creative synthesis for the evolving individual.

Yet underlying the traits of feeling and awareness (as expressed in the doctrine of psychicalism) is the one fundamental trait of creativity which is also held to be constitutive of all complexes, no matter how primitive. Hartshorne's psychicalism could not function in a static ontology which would deny the reality of self-transcendence for each event. Creativity functions as a transcendent category. All other categories derive their conceptual location from their relation to the pre-eminent category of creativity.

> A theistic philosophy must take 'create' or 'creator' as a universal category, rather than as applicable to God alone. It must distinguish supreme creativity from lesser forms and attribute some degree of creativity to all actuality. It must make of creativity a 'transcendental', the very essence of reality as self-surpassing process.[3]

Reality thus has one eternal and ubiquitous trait, that of self-surpassing creativity. Feeling functions to provide the "material" for the enhancement of this process. There can be no reality which is neither a feeling nor a process. Whatever an event must be, it must be to some degree an open ended telic process which has as its highest goal the overcoming of its previous states. God exhibits creativity in the highest degree yet the categorial scheme demands that we read this trait backward, as it were, into all of the feeling-events of nature. Hartshorne states, "Individuals (not alone human individuals) must in some degree be self-managed, agents acting to some extent on their own, or they are not individuals, concrete units of reality."[4] Primitive complexes exhibit muted and rudimentary forms of creative self-overcoming in ways which are analogous to the divine creator.

The doctrine of psychicalism converges with the transcendental category of

[1]Justus Buchler, *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), p. 1. In much of what follows, Buchler's ordinal metaphysics forms one of the perspectives which serve to illuminate the strengths and weaknesses of Hartshorne's neo-classical theism.

[2]Charles Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection* (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1962), p. 140.

[3]Charles Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time* (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1967), p. 26.

[4]Charles Hartshorne, *Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method* (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1970), p. 30.

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creativity to show that all reality is mental and emergent into some form of novelty. Unlike the perspective of Leibniz, which combines psychicalism with determinism, Hartshorne insists that mind and novelty entail each other. The co-entailment of mentality and novelty can, of course, be traced back to the writings of both Whitehead and Peirce for whom the Leibnizian equation proved to be a deadening of the realities of both God and nature. Yet Hartshorne allows for efficient causality to be a part of both nature and the divine. At the same time, he denies that anything can be exhaustively understood purely in terms of antecedent material conditions. Even laws and the divine nature stand under the category of creativity. Like Peirce, Hartshorne rejects the notion that physical and mental laws have an eternal and static structure. If laws function like cosmic habits then they are amenable to both internal and external transformation.

Objects are thus emergent centers of feeling and telic striving. External antecendent conditions certainly help to determine the form that an emergent reality will take. Yet an internal drive toward some type of novel and rich convergence is found in each and every event of nature. While the realities of creativity, feeling, and psychic awareness are most manifest in the divine nature, they are also manifest in any reality no matter what its ontological location. The categories applicable to the divine are applicable to that which is not divine. Yet it is important for Hartshorne that we recognize just how differently the categories might be applied depending upon whether we are speaking of God or of non-divine events.

> If the idea of God is to have a rational place among our ideas, four conditions must be satisfied. (1) There must be rules or principles valid for all individuals, not excluding God, rules definitive of the individuality purely in general, or as a 'transcendental'. (2) There must be rules valid for all individuals except God, rules definitive of 'non-Divine individual', or of individuality as a secular or non-transcendental category. (3) There must be a criterion for the distinction between the two sets of rules. (4) There must be reasons why the distinction needs to be made.[5]

The rules which are applicable to anything whatsoever are generic principles for metaphysics per se. Their unique application to a given reality requires that metaphysics have internal or subaltern disciplines of lesser scope. Talk which is specifically about God is thus of lesser scope than talk about "whatever is in whatever way." The 'translation' from talk of non-divine events to that of the divine nature is made possible by a set of rules which, as we shall see, depend upon the motor force of analogy.

Hartshorne allows that talk about God requires that we use "eminent" categories.[6] Thus we can say that God, like all events, has feelings of an eminent nature, or that God is a society (rather than a Whiteheadian actual occasion) but of an eminent nature.[7] Yet these "eminent" categories do not violate the spirit of their

[5]Charles Hartshorne, *A Natural Theology for Our Time*, p. 37.

[6]Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948), p. 77.

[7]Lewis Ford, ed., *Two Process Philosophers: Hartshorne's Encounter with Whitehead* (Missoula, Montana: American Academy of Religion, 1973), p. 36. In the article entitled, "Hartshorne's Differences from Whitehead," David R. Griffin shows how Hartshorne goes beyond Whitehead by establishing that God is a society of occasions rather than a single bi-polar occasion. From our perspective, this represents a real advance beyond Whitehead.

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normative and non-eminent use. They function to take reflection beyond the alleged limitations of the *via negativa* which would deny categorial insight into the divine nature. Categories applicable to the non-divine can be transformed into eminent categories applicable to the divine without losing their logical or systematic validity.

Yet there are traits found in God but not in non-divine events. The right use of categorial insight requires that these traits be delineated and rendered available to systematic apprehension. It is obviously as important to show the ways in which God and nature differ as to show the ways in which they share important traits. The problem always becomes: just which traits delimit nature as the non-divine and which traits can only be exhibited in the divine nature?

If nature can here be defined as that which is not the divine, then the problem becomes difficult. Hartshorne insists that God is related to each event as its telic lure, moving each event by Divine persuasion.[8] At the same time, God eternally remembers the life history of each event and preserves this memory in such a way as to render personal immortality unnecessary.[9] No event in nature can prevail outside of the divine awareness and sympathetic response. Hence it follows that no event can be fully defined without reference to the divine. For if God is relative to all events then all events acquire part of their internal reality from God. Hartshorne defines an internal relation as one that does something to the relata.[10] An external relation is one which does not involve a transformation in the being of the relata. God as bi-polar is both internally and externally related to the events of nature. As Absolute and abstract God has external relations to all events. As concrete God is all inclusive and has internal relations to all events:

> We must combine the following assertions: the idea of the supreme being connotes absoluteness; it connotes, therefore, external relations; it also connotes relativity, internal relations, and all inclusiveness.[11]

Since an internal relation must transform the being or trait contour of the relata it follows that God, as lure, must be part of the internal constitution of every event in nature. God includes the events of nature but the events of nature cannot include God. The relation must be asymmetrical. God functions as both lure and divine memory for the events of the natural orders. The lure helps to determine the scope and richness of the subjective trajectory of each event. The divine memory includes the accomplishments of the varied events of nature.

Whatever nature is, it cannot be understood apart from the divine nature. It follows that the categories applicable to the non-divine must include reference to the divine. For if each event receives part of its telic meaning from its relation to the relative dimension of God, then an adequate definition of that event must entail a full definition of God. The separation between divine and non-divine rules (or categories) can at best be a tactical distinction which functions only in a specific context of discourse or assertion. Complete apprehension requires that

[8]Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity*, p. 142.

[9]Charles Hartshorne, *Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes* (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1984), p. 34.

[10]Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity*, p. 66.

[11]*Ibid*, p. 94.

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divine and non-divine rules be used simultaneously. The notion of "eminent" categories, e.g., more aware, more loving, more just, etc., can only enhance the categorial articulation found on the level of nature. The application of such eminent categories to God does little more than stretch categories which function properly to describe "whatever is in whatever way." The process of 'stretching' these general categories is facilitated, as noted above, by a specific conception of the nature and role of analogy.

Hartshorne takes pains to distinguish between several types of discourse in human reflection upon nature and the divine. Key categorical terms are seen to function in one of three ways. They can function either symbolically, analogically, or literally.

> God is symbolically ruler, but analogically conscious and loving, and literally both absolute (or necessary) in existence and relative (or contingent) in actuality—that is, in the concrete modes of His existence. True, His relativity is not the same in scope as ours, for He is relative to all things, and we are relative only to some. But the point is, that "all" and "some" have here their literal logical sense; whereas who can say literally how divine love differs qualitatively from ours?[12]

In other contexts, Hartshorne further differentiates between symbolic terms such as "ruler" and metaphorical terms such as "shepherd."[13] This distinction can be seen to represent a subaltern class within the symbolic in the more general sense. Needless to say, the role of analogy is the most crucial in determining the scope of a positive doctrine of God. As Schubert Ogden and others have shown, a number of textual and internal difficulties remain to plague Hartshorne's use of analogy.[14] Our concern is with the larger categorial role of analogy in the extension of predicates from human nature to the divine nature.

Hartshorne insists that analogy can function to generalize traits which are found within human awareness to the divine reality which is both like and unlike human awareness. This position is, of course, not unlike that of Aquinas and the medieval tradition in general. What is unique to Hartshorne and other process thinkers is the analogical extension of terms and traits derived from a particular conception of feeling. We start with our own awareness and push 'upward' and 'downward' through the use of analogy:

> What is at least analogical in the scheme is the idea of prehension as dependence of an actuality on other actualities, or of participation, feeling of feeling, experience of

[12]Charles Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection*, p. 140.

[13]Cobb & Camwell, eds., *Existence and Actuality: Conversations With Charles Hartshorne* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 41. This distinction appears in Hartshorne's reply to Schubert M. Ogden's paper entitled, "The Experience of God: Critical Reflections on Hartshorne's Theory of Analogy."

[14]Schubert M. Ogden, "The Experience of God: Critical Reflections on Hartshorne's Theory of Analogy," anthologized in *Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne*. This essay shows a number of "internal" problems in Hartshorne's attempt to use analogy as a tool for understanding the divine nature. Ogden makes an important point when he states, "And just as significant, I think, he nowhere seems to explain, as he clearly has to explain if "conscious" and "knowing" are analogical, how not only the greatest but even the least possible individual must in some sense be said to be conscious and to know, as well as to be aware and to feel." p. 27. As we shall see, an ordinal analysis will cast doubts on such a procedure.

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> experience, together with the sense of futurity. Also the idea of creative novelty. These apply from atom to God. Moreover, all of them are directly intuited in our immediate memories of our own past, and in our experience of our own bodies.[15]

The burden carried by our immediate intuitions is great. From their initial and later refined articulation must come the full analogical structure which will apply to everything "from atom to God." Prehension is the universal trait which is best characterized as the feeling of feeling. The object of a given feeling is not a material state-of-affairs but another feeling. All relations are relations of feeling. Since the traits of human awareness are constitutive, in at least a derived sense, of all events, it follows that the starting point for metaphysical query is in a detailed report of the recurrent traits of that awareness. Hartshorne attempts to build a theory of analogy which will enable him to both generalize from out of human awareness while avoiding the charge of anthropomorphism which such a strategy brings.

Analogical statements are both qualitative and admit of degrees. Literal statements cannot admit of more or less. Hence, analogical statements appear to have a greater degree of flexibility when it comes to an articulation of the divine nature. Terms such as "feeling" can be pushed downward into nature by reducing the "degree" or intensity of their meaning. By the same token, such terms can be pushed upward toward God by increasing the "degree" or intensity of their meaning. The most important categories in the system are those which function analogously. On the other side, it is unclear what a truly "literal" function would be. If we say that God is relative we are using a term which is not univocal in meaning. To be relative is to admit of degrees of relativity, to admit of qualitative differences between the relata and their attendant relations. Univocity is an ideal for discourse rather than a resource of metaphysical generalization.

When we move beyond Hartshorne's theory of analogy to the specific conception of God which such a theory attempts to sustain, we see how far the analogical use of categories takes us. Hartshorne repeatedly rejects the notion that the use of *via negativa* can advance our apprehension of the divine nature.[16] Rather, the use of eminent and analogical categories gives us access to the overall positive contour of God. The literal assertions of God's relativity (actuality) and absoluteness (existence) serve to provide the general framework which sustains and locates the perhaps more important analogical statements.

Methodologically, a careful modal analysis of contingency and necessity establishes the necessary existence of God. In his reworking of Anselm's ontological argument, taking account of Kant's critique of existence predication, Hartshorne attempts to show that God is the only unconditionally necessary existent. All predication, even that of existence, must be predication of God:

> Any realized predicate whatever must be describable as a predicate of deity, in the form: God knowing that S is P. God is thus the universally presupposed subject of all predication, and his own nonexistence is therefore an impossible predication, or if you

[15] *Ibid*, from Hartshorne's reply to Ogden, p. 39.
[16] Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity*, pp. 77–78.

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prefer, an impossible state of affairs. His mere existence is the essential element in all existence (and nonexistence) whatever. Hence his existence is not possibly unreal.[17]

God must exist as the ground for all predication no matter what its subject. God, as the subject of subjects, is the end point for all ascription of traits, including that of existence. The necessity of deity is, however, to be seen as derived from its unsurpassability.[18] God is that being than which no greater can be conceived. Yet God can at the same time be self-surpassing. God is unsurpassable by anything but itself. Hartshorne's reworking of the unsurpassability thesis allows him to include the actuality and relativity of God within a conception of God's existence and absoluteness.[19] This positive inclusion of God's self-development within a conception of God's perfection enables Hartshorne to advance beyond classical conceptions of God which stress the immutability and non-locatedness of God.

Yet this advance beyond classical theism leaves a number of conceptual problems in its wake. Hartshorne's categorial scheme needs to be reworked in such a way as to deepen the notions of relation and divine relativity. Further, a more radical understanding of both nature and the transactions between the divine and the non-divine need to be developed. From this radicalization must emerge a conception of the divine natures which will do justice to the locatedness of God in nature and the Encompassing.[20]

As noted, Hartshorne ascribes the traits of feeling and awareness to all events of nature. Our initial access to these traits is in an intuitive appraisal of our own form of consciousness and its intentional objects. Once these positive intuitions have been secured, they are extended through the use of analogy to the rest of nature. Further, the analogical extension of these traits is held to have phenomenological warrant.[21] Hence, the intuitive grasp of the traits of human apprehension functions to secure our categorial insight into nature as a whole. The phenomenological analysis is grafted onto a modal analysis to generate a full-blown positive doctrine of both God and nature. Analogy serves as the linguistic and conceptual cement for the categorial scheme.

The starting point for the foundational traits of the framework is in the order of nature funded with mind. Hartshorne assumes that the emergence of mental traits in the higher primates is indicative of a fundamental tendency within nature as a

[17]Charles Hartshorne, *Anselm's Discovery* (Lasalle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing, 1965), p. 85.

[18]*Ibid*,, p. 180.

[19]In his book, *Charles Hartshorne and the Existence of God* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), Donald Wayne Viney persuasively argues that Hartshorne uses a variety of arguments to establish the existence of God. While the ontological argument, modified to include God's self-surpassibility, assumes priority, it functions in consort with five other arguments—the cosmological, the argument from design, an aesthetic argument, an ethical argument, and an epistemic argument. Together these constitute what Viney calls a "Global Argument." All of them point to God's necessary existence and serve as what Viney calls non-empirical cumulative arguments.

[20]The concept of the Encompassing to be utilized later in this essay derives from the work of Karl Jaspers. It can be traced to two works from the 1930's: *Reason and Existenz*, trans. by William Earle (New York: Noonday Press, 1955) and *Philosophy of Existence*, trans. Richard F. Grabau (Philadelphia: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1971). The concept of the Encompassing will be related to our fourth dimension of the divine nature.

[21]Conversation with Charles Hartshorne at The Pennsylvania State University during the summer of 1984.

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whole. The existence of mind in persons provides phylogenetic evidence for something like mental traits in the rest of nature and the world. Feeling and awareness, no matter how primitive in operation or expression, prevail in all complexes of nature. This ascription of psychic traits to all of reality evidences a form of privileging which itself attests to a lingering foundationalism in Hartshorne's framework. A specific, and highly idiosyncratic, order of nature is selected as the foundation for metaphysical insight into all of the orders of nature. The "function" of evolution, if it can be understood functionally, is to make manifest those traits which prevail on the so-called "lower" levels of reality.

If we look at another evolutionary perspective, that of John Dewey, we see how a post-Darwinian analysis of nature can avoid the psychicalism which emerges from Hartshorne's account of reality. For Dewey, the existence of mind or mental traits is itself possible only because of certain pervasive yet unstable natural conditions. These conditions do not themselves evidence the existence of the traits of feeling or awareness but serve to support, however briefly, the existence of these traits in a small class of beings. No one order of nature is privileged as to its trait constitution. Each order, whether organic or not, has order–specific traits which cannot be extended to the rest of nature. Analogy can function as a guide for inquiry but it cannot serve as a tool for overcoming real differences between and among the orders of nature. Analogy must be used with great circumspection when moving from one order (ordinal location) to another. Metaphysical query is most sensitive when it seeks out genuine diremption between orders which may have only a small number of traits in common.[22]

Traits are rarely universal. In so far as a general category is unlimited in scope, it is never a category pertaining to the "whatness" of the world. Traits such as "feeling" and "awareness," as used by Hartshorne, are terms denoting a fundamental essence for all complexes of nature. While a term like "complex" is universal, as a designation for whatever is, a term like "feeling" is far more limited in scope. On the highest level of generality metaphysics is not concerned with delineating the fundamental "whatness" of reality. Any concern with essentiality or *quidditas* is limited to one or more ordinal locations. Hence essentiality is of and for limited orders.

Hartshorne makes two mistakes when he makes the claims for psychicalism. The first is in violating the ordinal nature of the world by taking order–specific traits (which are themselves contingent) and extending them to all orders of nature. The second is to envision the evolutionary perspective in such a way as to see teleological and mental traits in terms of a phylogenetic emergence which discounts genuine diremption and radical emergence. The existence of precarious mental traits is evidence only for their unique status in the orders of nature.

A deeper problem lies in his attempts to show the concrete and relative actuality of God and its relation to all complexes of nature. The differences between so-called ordinary and divine relativity is expressed as follows:

[22]This insistence on genuine diremption can be found throughout Buchler's general understanding of natural complexes. An ordinal metaphysics is cautious about removing order-specific traits from their given complexes. For an account of Buchler's use of ordinality, cf. Beth J. Singer, *Ordinal Naturalism: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Justus Buchler* (Lewisburg: Bucknell Univ. Press, 1983), and my "Ordinal Metaphysics and the Eclipse of Foundationalism," *International Philosophical Quarterly*, 25 (September, 1985), 289–98.

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> . . . God is relative, but what we may call the extent of his relativity is wholly independent of circumstances, wholly nonrelative. Regardless of circumstances, of what happens anywhere or when, God will enjoy unrestricted cognitive relativity to all that coexists with him. By contrast, the extent of our human relativity is itself a relative matter, varying with circumstances. It varies all the way from the minimal cognitive relatedness of a man in deep sleep, or the zero cognitive relatedness of a dead man, to the maximal reflection of objects in full waking consciousness of a man in perfect condition and mental development.[23]

One can have no objection to Hartshorne's understanding of human relativity. The human process is fully finite if by finite is understood the fundamental locatedness of mind in orders larger in scope than itself. While the human process has a direction and occupies several domains,[24] it is clear that persons find themselves located in innumerable orders which themselves may thwart or hinder the directionality of the self. Of course, an adequate view of the self does not rely solely on mentalistic categories but must include the full articulation of the forms of human embeddedness.

When we come to the problem of divine relativity we are forced to point out some problems in Hartshorne's general theory of relations. It is clear that to be is to be related to more than internal self-identical traits. Other complexes and orders are part of the relational structure of any given complex. Relations may be of several kinds. In more traditional language, language utilized by Hartshorne, we can speak of internal and external relations as well as of symmetrical and a-symmetrical relations. These distinctions are fairly straightforward in intent and function. No understanding of relation is adequate which is not prepared to give full scope to fundamental forms of asymmetry. Hartshorne's understanding of the actuality of God, i.e., God in its relativity, requires that God be part of an asymmetrical relation to the world. The world is included in God's actuality but God is not included in the world. God is thus dependent on the world but this doesn't limit God's supremacy over the world. Donald Wayne Viney puts it as follows:

> Dependent is not always a defect. Therefore, Hartshorne believes in a God who is influenced by, and thus in a sense, dependent on the world. Furthermore, if God is, in some aspect dependent, then the idea of serving God makes sense. If God were in no way dependent on the world then it seems there would be no glory.[25]

On the surface, this perspective appears to be valid and useful. Yet a different way of framing the problem of relations shows that two other dimensions of God's nature need to be introduced.

A different account of relations is sounded by Justus Buchler when he analyzes the structure of complexes, whether these complexes be divine or non-divine.

[23]Charles Hartshorne, *The Divine Relativity*, p. 82.

[24]This understanding of the human process as having both direction and several domains derives from Buchler's *Toward a General Theory of Human Judgment*, 2nd revised edition (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1979). In this work Buchler develops his theory of "proception" which is a generic term designed to describe the full reality of human life."

[25]David Wayne Viney, *Charles Hartshorne and the Existence of God*, p. 29.

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> Any complex is related to others, though not to all others; and its traits are related to one another, though not necessarily each to every other. Whatever is, is in some relation: a given complex may be unrelated to another complex, but not unrelated to any other.[26]

Buchler rejects the distinction between internal and external relations, especially that understanding of internal relations which, when allied to psychicalism, entails that a given complex be related to all other complexes. Relations, rather, are ordinal and have specific limitations in scope. The actual tracing of relations is, of course, a matter of great complexity and entails that relations reach out in a variety of ways. But it does not follow that each complex is related to all others.

Buchler replaces the distinction between internal and external relations with a distinction between weak and strong relevance. A few words about this conceptual shift are in order before we can rework Hartshorne's theory of the divine nature.[27]

Complexes can be understood to have two dimensions or aspects: their scope and their integrity. The scope of a complex is its "comprehensiveness and pervasiveness." Any given complex will have some scope no matter how extended or contracted. A person, for example, will have greater or lesser scope depending on the richness and variety of relations he or she will sustain during a lifetime. Of course, the scope of the life of an important person will extend far beyond his or her actual finite life history. To prevail at all is to have some scope in some respect. The integrity of a complex is its trait configuration for a specific ordinal location. A complex will prevail in more than one order and thus have an integrity for each order. A person, as a multi-located complex, will have many integrities. For example, a given individual may have an integrity as a political being, a religious being, as a father or mother, as an educator, as a citizen, and as a friend. Each of these orders will have order–specific traits—an integrity. The "sum" of these integrities is termed the gross integrity, or the contour. Thus a person will have many integrities and a scope. The richer the life the more complex the integration of these integrities. When we focus on the problem of the divine nature, or better, divine natures, we will see the importance of these distinctions.

Returning to the theory of relation or relevance, we can now see how the distinction between scope and integrity helps us toward a new understanding of interaction. When a complex in any way modifies the scope of another complex, it is held to be weakly relevant to that complex. Thus, for example, when a new sandbar appears in the shore line of an ocean, that sandbar, as a natural complex, will affect the scope of the ocean. In this case the ocean will have slightly less surface spatial fullness than before. The integrity of the ocean will not be changed. When a complex in any way modifies the integrity of another complex, it is held to be strongly relevant to that complex. Thus, for example, if a toxic chemical were introduced into a lake, that lake would be changed in its integrity. The toxic chemical would be strongly relevant to the lake. It should be noted that the distinction between weak and strong relevance is not parallel to the more tradi-

[26]Justus Buchler, *Metaphysics of Natural Complexes*, p. 24.

[27]For Hartshorne's criticisms, of Buchler's metaphysics, see his *Creativity in American Philosophy* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1984). For a forceful analysis of these criticisms, see Marjorie Miller's review of this book in *Transactions of the C. S. Perice Society*, 21 (Summer, 1985).

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tional distinction between internal and external relations. The principle of asymmetry is, however, preserved.

We can apply this new understanding of relevance to the complex interactions between God and the orders of nature. In working through these distinctions we will be compelled to delineate four dimensions of the divine. The second and third of these dimensions will roughly parallel Hartshorne's neoclassical account while the first and fourth dimensions will move us in a very different direction.

Of initial import is the realization that God cannot be simple in its nature. In so far as God is related to complexes other than itself, God has relation–specific traits which are not simple. The presence of the relative dimension of the divine evidences God's embeddedness in other natural complexes. Hence God is relevant to other complexes and receives part of its divine contour from these complexes. As itself a natural complex, God is an order of traits and relations which are unlimited in number. God is both weakly and strongly relevant to other complexes but expresses this relevance in more than one way. Only by rejecting the traditional notion of divine simplicity will we be able to begin to trace the full complexity of these forms of relevance.

The first dimension of God's reality is God's locatedness within the innumerable complexes of nature. In this dimension the divine is plurally located in orders and domains of the world which partially distort the emergent power of its nature. God is located and fragmented in orders of history, imagination, art, human striving, sacred texts, sacramental structures and events, language, gesture, human categorial structures, and communities. In each case, the divine is located in orders which have traits outside of the divine scope. God is strongly relevant to some of the subaltern orders within each order and weakly relevant to other subaltern orders. For example, God is strongly relevant to the integrity of certain works of art within the larger order of aesthetic query. The divine may be strongly present in the sacred music of Bach in such a way as to determine the evolving musical structure. Yet God may be weakly relevant to works of art which show an abiding opacity to ultimate import. Further, the divine may be unrelated to subaltern orders within any larger order. By being unrelated to the trait structures of a suborder, God does not express full presence within that order. If God is present in some forms of language God is not present in all forms. This "presence" is not, of course, an actual spatio-temporal availability but a trace of a highly elusive quality within the language itself. God may or may not affect the scope of language itself, but God does affect the integrity and scope of some linguistic structures. This is another way of saying that God is both relevant and non-relevant to the orders of the world. In so far as God is relevant to orders and their subalterns, God is either weakly or strongly so.

God's locatedness in the world entails that God is not equally relevant to all of the traits of the world. Some traits stand in a strongly relevant way to God while others may have either a weak relevance or none at all. This perspective strikes at the heart of Hartshorne's expressed belief that God is related to all aspects of the world. As we shall see in the third dimension of God, there is a sense in which God is relevant to all natural complexes but not in such a way as to affect their trait structures. God's locatedness in the world establishes that the world is of greater scope than the divine in its first dimension.

It is an impenetrable mystery as to why God is strongly relevant to some traits

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and not to others. In the orders of history this impenetrability is the wall standing before our sense of the tragic. In the human moral orders this impenetrability is best expressed in the lament of Job. In each case human query comes up against a fragmented and partially absent God. The mystery of this absence is as much a source of religious query as is the felt presence of the divine majesty. One senses that unless God has other dimensions, we are left with a tragi-comic chiaroscuro without color or depth.

This sense of the fragmented and located reality of the divine is partially overcome in the second dimension of its nature. This second dimension, perhaps best expressed in eschatological language, is that of God in its role as the lure toward justice. If the first dimension is the broken God of the cross, the second dimension is that of hope and expectation. Hartshorne's understanding of the divine lure comes close to this understanding. For both Whitehead and Hartshorne, the divine lure functions to generate and sustain novelty and richness in the events of nature. The metaphor or image appropriate to these thinkers is that of adventure. God lures actual occasions toward novel and fruitful prehensions in such a way as to insure that the universe becomes more ramified and complex than before. This complexity requires a certain harmonic intensity if cosmic evolution is to be successful.

In this second dimension God is the gathering power of the world in such a way as to lure both history and nature (in the more traditional sense of nature as that which is not human) toward wholeness. This wholeness is not that of a fully enclosed and completed totality but that of a rich and open tension between elements.[28] Our sense of resurrection comes from this gathering power which lures us beyond the brokenness of history and nature. In the orders of history the divine lure functions as the drive toward radical justice for all persons and communities. Thus the divine lure attempts to move us beyond closure and demonic forms of injustice. In the orders of nature this wholeness appears whenever things show their transparency to the opening lure of divine fulfillment.[29] This fulfillment is never guaranteed but stands as a possibility and hope. The eschatological understanding of the second dimension of God does not entail anything like a myth of uniform progress or historical consummation. Such views represent a distortion of God's relation to history and nature.

As in the first dimension of the divine, the second dimension can prevail as weakly or strongly relevant to the orders of the world. God is strongly relevant to a person or society whenever radical justice functions to break the power of closure. This power is never operative in a causal way but stands as both a judgment and a lure over and against the orders of history and nature. While the

[28]For a rich and detailed account of the concept of wholeness and its contrast to mere completeness, cf., Carl G. Vaught, *The Quest for Wholeness* (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1982). On page 154 of this work Vaught states, "From the outset, we have attempted to distinguish wholeness from completeness and have suggested that the quest for wholeness stands in between the fragmentation with which it begins and the completeness it might be tempted to affirm. Wholeness always displays a dimension of mystery and power that can never be included in a larger unity, but must simply be placed alongside the demand for intelligibility as an irreducible element." While it is clear that this quest for wholeness can be understood from the side of human finitude, it is one of the claims of my perspective that this quest can be seen to be part of God's self-evolution.

[29]For insight into the correlation between the things of nature and their transparency to the divine, Cf. my "The Christhood of Things," *The Drew Gateway*, 52 (Fall, 1981), 41–47.

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first dimension of God is seen in terms of God's availability, of God as fragmented origin, the second dimension is seen in terms of God's call for justice and wholeness, of God as fragmented goal. In neither case can we ignore or go beyond the fragmented and finite reality of the divine. To attempt to secure these two dimensions of God in an imperial notion of presence or in a triumphal eschatology is to fall prey to idolatry.

In agreement with Hartshorne, we can say that analogy can function as a means for presenting the traits of the first two dimensions of God. It is quite appropriate to use analogical and eminent language when describing the role of the divine origin and goal in nature and history. Thus we can say that God's role as fragmented origin is analogous to the presence and absence of light over the contour of a landscape. Of course, the 'presence' of the divine is an eminent presence of a non-luminescent sort. A much more circumscribed use of analogy will be appropriate for the third dimension of God while a stringent use of via negativa will be necessary for our understanding of the fourth dimension.

God is not relevant to each complex of nature in this second dimension. The divine lure toward wholeness and justice is itself fragmented and limited in scope. There are complexes of both history and nature which do not experience this lure. Thus we must both insist on the finitude of God's scope in this dimension and insist that the reality of grace must be found elsewhere in the divine natures. The divine lure is the promise of fulfillment but cannot prevail as the grace which is granted to all the complexes of the world. To understand the meaning of grace we must probe into another dimension of God.

Buchler utilizes a distinction derived from Spinoza which sets the tone for our understanding of the third dimension of the divine:

> The conceptions of nature as providingness and as ordinality are continuous with one another and with the conception of nature as "orders." This continuity can be conveyed by utilizing both members of the twin *natura naturans and natura naturata*. Nature as ordinality is *natura naturans;* it is the providing, the engendering condition. Nature as "orders" is *natura naturata;* it is the provided, the ordinal manifestation, the World's complexes.[30]

In the first two dimensions of the divine we have dealt with how God is related to the orders of the world. The analysis of fragmented origins and ends has been allied to this understanding of natura naturata; of nature as that which is manifest as innumerable natural complexes. In this sense of nature God must be related to some but not all complexes. The divine can only be relevant to the traits of some complexes but not all. When we now shift to the other sense of nature; to nature as natura naturans, we move toward the third dimension of God.

God is manifest as the providing condition for all natural complexes in this third dimension. Yet God is not strongly relevant to the traits of any complex in this dimension. Rather, the divine is weakly relevant to all complexes no matter what their trait constitution. God stands as the power which sustains the preva-

[30]Justus Buchler, "Probing the Idea of Nature," *Process Studies*, 3 (Fall, 1978), 157–68. The importance of this essay has also been attested by Prof. John Ryder. For another, and somewhat divergent, account of an ordinal theology, cf. Peter H. Hare and John Ryder, "Buchler's Ordinal Metaphysics and Process Theology," *Process Studies*, 10 (Fall/Winter, 1980), 120–29.

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lence of each complex without "interfering" with any ordering of traits. In one sense, God is least efficacious in this dimension. In another sense, God is most available as the power which enables prevalences to stand over against oblivion. If, from our perspective, the first dimension is seen as that of the cross while the second is seen as the resurrection then the third dimension is seen as the constant availability of grace. God as the providingness of all complexes is the ever "present" gift of grace which in no way alters the trait constitutions of the "objects" of that grace.

If we wish to retain the notion of "origin" in dealing with this dimension of the divine, we must insist that it is a non-fragmented origin which is present as sustaining grace. Yet the concept of origin often retains some lingering neo-Platonic connotations which would be inappropriate at this point in the analysis. Rather than speak of origin it is perhaps more suitable to speak of sheer providingness. The analogical extension of the notion of providingness must be used with great circumspection. While there are certain family resemblances with the Greek notion of *physis*, these parallels should be delineated with care. We can say that God's providingness is more than the "summed" total of all providings between and among the innumerable complexes of nature. God remains contrasted to the "sum" of the world's complexes while yet standing as their providing "source." But God should not be seen as something akin to "The force that through the green fuse drives the flower . . . ,"[31] where this force is understood to be the sheer presence of energy and life enhancing power. Such an extension of the notion of providingness brings us too close to certain animistic connotations which still cling to the notion of *physis*.

The God of grace stands in what can best be described as a "quiet" relation to the complexes of the world. In this third dimension the divine nature functions as neither origin nor lure but abides as the still availability of the providential grace which never forsakes complexes. In so far as we wish to retain mathematical analogies we can say that God is infinite in this mode of its being. Put another way, God has sufficient scope to stand as the providingness for all complexes. It must be remembered, however, that God does not alter the trait constitution of a single complex in this mode of sheer providingness. Only in the first two dimensions, dimensions related to nature as natured, does God alter trait constitutions in either a strong or weak fashion. If we wish to make a refinement on the concept of relevance, we can say that God as providingness is neither weakly nor strongly relevant to complexes. Rather, the divine is relevant in such a way as to sustain the sheer prevalence of traits. Neither the integrity nor the scope of any complex is thereby altered.

Thus far we have been speaking of the relations which obtain between God and the world. Following Buchler, we have maintained the importance of the distinction between nature natured and nature naturing. God in its first two dimensions has been related to nature natured while God in its third dimension has been related to nature naturing. We have not spoken of a possible relation between God and something other than the innumerable complexes of the world and their

[31]Dylan Thomas, *The Collected Poems of Dylan Thomas* (New York: New Directions Books, 1938), p. 10. This is the first line in the poem of the same title.

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ordinality. By speaking of this "something else" we will have moved into a discussion of the fourth and last dimension of the divine.

Earlier in this essay we made reference to the concept of the Encompassing. Initially we can say that the Encompassing is that which stands 'beyond' both God and the world as their final measure. In this measureless measure God finds its own lure. Our understanding of the relation between God and the Encompassing must reject the use of analogy and affirm the necessity of via negativa. Analogy is appropriate whenever we are comparing or contrasting natural complexes. The Encompassing, as the measureless measure, is not a natural complex and cannot be rendered available through the use of analogy or metaphor. We can only advance our apprehension of this elusive reality by a careful series of statements as to what it is not.

Karl Jaspers, who did the pioneering work on the concept of the Encompassing, was not always clear as to the separation between the reality of the Encompassing and that of Transcendence. To advance toward our understanding of the fourth dimension of the divine it becomes necessary to make this distinction sharp and total. God is itself encompassed and cannot be equated with the measureless measure which stands as the lure for its evolving life. The Encompassing encompasses both the world and the divine in its several natures. At the same time, the Encompassing is that which lures God toward growth and transformation. We can say that the Encompassing stands as the resurrection from God's standpoint. The divine is lured beyond its own incompletion toward an 'internal' resurrection which enables God to be eternally self-surpassable.[32] What Hartshorne has failed to realize is that the divine becomes self-surpassing through its relation to the Encompassing. The growth which is manifest in the first three dimensions of the divine is itself rooted in this fourth dimension which insures that God will be lured toward eternal self-overcoming.

God receives its measure, its locatedness, by its inclusion in nature and history (first and second dimensions) and by its relation to the Encompassing. Nature locates the divine by fragmenting its power. The Encompassing locates the divine by showing it a measure which cannot be filled in or overcome. The Encompassing is ever receding from the divine. The one trait which can be ascribed to the Encompassing is the relational trait of luring.

The Encompassing cannot be envisioned through the analogy of a horizon of horizons or order of orders. Horizons and orders, even when enumerated and "summed" (itself an impossible notion) would not fill in the Encompassing and give it a positive contour. Neither the world nor the Encompassing has a real or knowable contour. We can say that nature stands as the Encompassing for given natural complexes while the Encompassing itself stands as the measureless measure for nature and the divine. God is a natural complex while the Encompassing is not. This is the one exception to the ordinal framework which insists that whatever is, is a natural complex.

The relation between God and the Encompassing is one which involves the divine's sense of its own incompletion—its own need for resurrection. God has

[32]A psychological account of God's need for its own internal resurrection can be seen in Carl Jurg's brilliant "Answer to Job," in *Psychology and Religion: West and East*, 2nd ed., trans. R. F. C. Hull, Vol. II, *Collected Works of C. G. Jung* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).

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its other in the Encompassing lure which provides the power of the Open through which the divine can grow. Without this positive and eternal clearing the divine would not have the scope within which to enhance its life. This clearing is both measure and lure. Even though God has unlimited scope in its third dimension as the providingness of all complexes, it stands within the Open region granted to it by the Encompassing lure. In so far as we wish to retain some elements of the neoclassical and processive understanding of the divine, we must subsume these under the "larger" sense of the Encompassing lure which gives the divine the "space" for its own processive evolution.

Of course, these four dimensions of the divine do not appear separately in our ramified experiences of God. Something akin to C. S. Peirce's notion of "prescinding" has been necessary for our analysis. Peirce insisted that his fundamental categories (firstness, secondness, and thirdness) must all appear in any phenomenon. They may prevail in varying degrees of intensity or instantiation in a given case, but they must all be present to some extent. This insight carries over to our understanding of the dimensions of the divine. We can separate them out for analysis and articulation, but it must always be remembered that they occur together in the divine life itself. God does experience diremptions in its embeddedness in nature and history but does not experience any fundamental diremption between its four natures. The final word must always be given to divine unity and wholeness. God does not prevail as a closed totality but as a complex whole which allows for internal growth and self-surpassing. The lure of the Encompassing exerts a loving pressure which keeps God's several natures from risking bifurcation and decay. God moves toward ever richer forms of wholeness as it struggles with the recalcitrance and opacity of the world. In this movement, both eternal and pervasive, the divine finds that measureless measure which governs its life.

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God and Modern Science: New Life for the Teleological Argument

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with Bruce Cordell

IN THE LATE eighteenth century Napoleon asked Laplace if it were true that his treatise on the universe had not mentioned God, and the great scientist replied, "I had no need of that hypothesis." Laplace was one of the earliest scientific spokesmen for a mechanistic, deterministic, and, above all, self-sufficient universe. After Laplace the world gradually came to be seen by scientists not as "the purposeful divine drama of the Middle Ages or even as the continuing object of providential supervision, as for Newton, but as a set of interacting natural forces."[1] Even those scientists who kept faith in God kept Him out of their scientific work. Science became wholly secularized.

There have, however, always been exceptions. Einstein, Eddington, Lecomte du Nouy, and, more recently, Sir Fred Hoyle, Paul Davies, and Charles Thaxton declared that they *did* have need of the hypothesis that Laplace rejected. Yet, with the exception of Lecomte, it was not the Christian God they affirmed. Einstein told a rabbi in 1921, "I believe in Spinoza's God, who reveals himself in the orderly harmony of what exists."[2] For Hoyle, God is the supreme intelligence of the universe, the inventor of all laws governing physical processes, but not a universal Father who loves his creatures.

Why did these six eminent scientists, and, of course, many more besides (though still a small minority of the scientific community), feel that they needed a designing super-intelligence to account for reality as we know it? This essay examines the pertinent evidence. More generally stated, it looks at the reasons why *any informed person* might feel constrained to affirm an intelligence as the best way of accounting for the orderly features of our cosmos.

The Teleological Argument (*telos* in the Greek means "purpose," "end," or "design") presented here is akin to, yet somewhat different from the "wider teleological argument" of F. R. Tennant.[3] Tennant did not think that his arguments were conclusive; taken together they only *suggested* "an intelligent Designer."[4] The present argument, however, is largely based on mathematics and physics, and these yield probabilities. Quite a few neo-teleologists in the scientific community hold that the orthodox model of randomly evolving complexity and order in the universe is *overwhelmingly improbable*, for, they argue, the mathematics

[1]Ian G. Barbour, *Issues in Science and Religion* (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 58.
[2]Robert Jastrow, *God and the Astronomers* (New York: W. W. Norton and Co., 1978), p. 28.
[3]F. R. Tennant, *Philosophical Theology*, 2 volumes (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1969).
[4]Barbour, p. 392.

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of the case makes it so. An intelligent designer, they say, is, by a very wide margin, the best available explanation of the universe. Yet, as we will see, most scientists feel a revulsion for anything like a creator and simply dismiss the notion.

This paper will present, under four headings, the most important evidences which, we believe, point to an intelligent designer as the best explanation of our orderly universe. These headings are the following: (a) intuitive factors, (b) cosmology, (c) the fossil record, and (d) biochemical complexity.

A. INTUITIVE FACTORS

Scientists are in a uniquely privileged position to appreciate the order, immensity, and beauty of the universe. Some have a hunch, Darwinism notwithstanding, that the universe is simply too stupendous to be accounted for by non-viable, unintelligent, random interactions. If not exactly agreeing with the ancient Hebrew sage who said, "The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God" (Psalms 14:1), they have a certain sympathy with him. They are inclined to agree with John Hick, a leading philosopher of religion, who claims that "when we take account of a sufficiently comprehensive range of data — not only the teleological character of biological evolution but also man's religious, moral, aesthetic, and cognitive experience — it becomes cumulatively more probable that there is a God than that there is not."[5] But they have not approached the question mathematically, and, therefore, their belief is derived from a *feeling* of probability rather than from probability scientifically established. They have felt their way to their position in much the same way a pre-season forecaster predicts which baseball teams will have winning, and which losing, records in the season ahead. They are not proceeding blindly, for there is much evidence to support their position; nevertheless, they could easily be wrong, and they know it.

The definition and perception of beauty is certainly highly variable among the human race. Nevertheless, a broad consensus on what can rightly be considered beautiful, elegant, or awe-inspiring is often achievable. Who has not been impressed by sensual experiences such as a calm ocean sunset, snow-capped mountains immersed in a blue sky, a blazing starry night, a near-mystical solar eclipse, or the thousands of sun-like stars of the Milky Way strewn across a summer sky resembling (and sometimes mistaken for) a cloud?

The physical universe is not chaotic. Rather it is an elegant, orderly, extremely durable system which evolves and responds to physical perturbations apparently according to universal physical laws (e.g., physics, chemistry). Why do the physical laws apparently operate identically throughout the universe? Why are these laws so simple and orderly that they can be elegantly expressed by mathematics — the invention of a far-from-omniscient species on a small planet? Why are there physical laws and order *at all?* Why not an unfathomable, barren chaos? It is not surprising that many who have been exposed to humankind's best description of nature (i.e., science) intuit the existence of a cosmic designer.

The Psalmist says, "The Heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament shows His handiwork" (19:1). But he knew only of an occasional thunderstorm,

[5]John H. Hick, *Philosophy of Religion*, 3rd edition (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 26–27.

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the dependable daily arcs of the brilliant sun and point-like stars across the sky, and the wandering moon and naked-eye planets. Today the "Glory of the Heavens" includes Saturn's icy rings, our 300-billion sun galaxy, ultra-energetic quasars, explosive supermassive stars termed "supernovas," space-time rifts called "black holes," and many other incredible inhabitants of the heavens.

Modern astronomical techniques have revealed a glorious universe that is immense in scale and history. A million Earths could easily snuggle inside the sun — and the sun is but an average star. Light — roaring through space at 186,000 miles per second — requires over four years to arrive from the nearest star. Light-time to span the galaxy itself is 100,000 years. On a cosmic scale the Earth is nondescript and negligible; it is separated from the stars by inconceivably vast cosmic voids. Yet we ourselves are utterly dwarfed by our planet.

This brings us to ourselves. Clearly, we are being signaled by the universe that the *physical* aspect of our existence is of submicroscopic significance. Yet, for all that, we are far from unimportant. Our abilities to perceive, assess, and appreciate the universe give us more ontological significance, more value, than a whole galaxy of insentient suns. Knowledge of the universe's scale not only suggests to many the existence of an everlasting, immensely intelligent supermind, but also the fundamental significance of ourselves. Perhaps, as the great religions have ever taught, we will even outlive the universe.

These "arguments" based on the universe's beauty, order, and scale by themselves prove nothing. But they do hint at, they prefigure, a force vastly superior both to ourselves and to anything we have yet encountered on our most sensitive instruments. Intuitive though they are, they are a logical place to start.

B. COSMOLOGY

In this section we will consider three arguments for the existence of a cosmic orderer. They are based on (1) the Big Bang, (2) the so-called "large-number" hypothesis, and (3) the anthropic principle.

(1) *The Big Bang*. The first of these, the argument based on the Big Bang, is in many ways the most impressive. But it does not lend itself to mathematical analysis, and hence to a probability calculus (with odds computed for or against the argument), as readily as the other two arguments. Thus, we will treat it first and regard it as the weakest, i.e., the most "intuitive" of the arguments.

Most scientists and philosophers stop well short of reasoning backward from the cosmos as it exists today to the necessary existence of an ultimate mind and will behind the primeval explosion. But at least one, Hannes Alfven, concluded that the Big Bang "necessarily presupposes a divine creation,"[6] while another, the British physicist Edmund Whitaker, maintained that there "is no ground for supposing that matter and energy existed before [the Big Bang] and was suddenly galvanized into action . . . It is simpler to postulate creation *ex nihilo*—Divine will constituting Nature from nothingness."[7] Whatever one's particular view of the ultimate cause of the Big Bang, it is certainly the case that a universe with a beginning in time—anywhere from thirteen to twenty billion years ago, according

[6]Hannes Alfven in Wolfgang Yourgrau and Allen D. Breck, eds., *Cosmology, History, and Theology* (New York: Plenum Press, 1977), p. 7.

[7]Jastrow, pp. 111–112.

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to latest estimates—is more likely to arouse speculation about a Creator than a steady-state, apparently beginningless universe of infinite duration.

This is reasonable because the Big Bang refers, according to latest refinements of the theory, to a time when matter-energy arose out of a condition which is mysterious to us, and will probably always be. Even if the Big Bang is the result of a "zero-point fluctuation," as some physicists have recently speculated, it would be necessary to ask what caused this fluctuation. At best this theory only moves back the unexplainable one step; the order, immensity, complexity, and beauty of our present universe remains anchored in an irresistible surd.

At this point we must ask ourselves what is easier to imagine and thus to believe: that the cosmos' entire history should have arisen from this self-creating and self-explaining surd; or that a pre-existing mind and power of vast magnitude should have created the ingredients of the universe and triggered it at the Big Bang? This second alternative seems to us somewhat more likely. It is certainly no more preposterous.

It is important to point out that the Big Bang is only a theory. Yet it is, far and away, the leading contender among those available today, largely for two reasons. (1) In the late 1920's Edwin Hubble and Milton Humason discovered that the light emitted from distant galaxies was red-shifted on the color spectrum compared to light emitted from non-moving objects. Although there have been other explanations for this phenomenon, the preferred one is that the galaxies photographed are receding from us. This is exactly what one would expect in a universe which, at some precise instant in the past, convulsively and rapidly began to expand. (2) Theoretical studies had predicted that if the universe had an explosive origin, heat radiation should have been produced which, although cooled by the expansion of space-time, should still be observable. In 1964–65 two radioastronomers, Arno Penzias and Robert Wilson, detected what was found to be this radiation pervading all space in every direction. They won the Nobel Prize for their discovery. Since then, it has been almost always interpreted as "the fading glow of the ultrahot expansion that brought into being space and time, matter and energy [at the Big Bang]."[8]

Although only the preferred theory—it is not as certain as the popular press and television usually make it out to be—it has given rise to far-reaching "predictions into the past" from many quarters. For example, University of Texas Nobelist Steven Weinberg's *The First Three Minutes*[9] is an elaborate description of what may have happened from a time virtually identical to the precise instant of the Big Bang, to three minutes later, when the early universe had cooled enough so that simple nuclei could form. Weinberg presents the hypothesis that all the ingredients of our immense universe grew out of a "singularity," a point occupying no space whatever and having infinite density. Some scientists now speculate about what the universe was like, for instance, between 10^{-35} and 10^{-43} second after the Big Bang, a time of such minuscule duration that it is utterly beyond human imagination. James Trefil tells of "a

[8]Rick Gore, "The Once and Future Universe," *National Geographic* (June, 1983), 710.

[9]Steven Weinberg, *The First Three Minutes: A Modern View of the Origin of the Universe* (New York: Basic Books, 1977).

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Universe becoming increasingly simple and beautiful as we move back in time."[10] He shows how the four fundamental forces that govern everything in the universe might have evolved in those tiny fractions of a second after the Big Bang, and extrapolates back to the time when all four were "identical in nature," and "one kind of force" governed the behavior of matter. He looks forward to the time when "theory meets the experimental tests to which it will inevitably be subjected [and] we will have discovered that during its first 10^{-43} second of existence the Universe was as simple as it could possibly be."[11]

Many scientists hold that it is impossible to extrapolate as far back into the past as has Trefil. The distinguished MIT physicist Victor Weisskopf is one of these. "It is very difficult," he says, "to know what happened at periods earlier than about 10^{-6} sec . . . but scientists like to speculate and to construct hypotheses."[12] And they do. One speculation that has enjoyed wide currency is called the grand unification theory (GUT), so called because it postulates a time when all forces of nature, apart from gravity, were reduced to a single force.

GUT yields a universe which not only boggles the imagination, but which is utterly spectacular in its elegantly simple unfolding. Could such a universe have unfurled by chance alone? Or was there a mind of indescribable magnitude behind the whole thing? Mike Corwin, a physicist who has studied and written about the universe's beginning according to the GUT scenario, is "filled with a sense of wonder and mystery" at "the natural miracle of our existence."[13] Corwin is, of course, speaking poetically, but that is exactly the point. A study of the universe's beginning leaves some people speechless or stammering; or inclined to write poetry; or, in a few cases, to believe.

Potentially more revolutionary than GUT—or supersymmetry, or the electro-weak theory, or quantum chromodynamics (QCD), which are alternative attempts to reduce the universe to a sublime primeval simplicity—is superstrings. "Superstrings," writes Gary Taubes in *Discover*, "is a theory of the universe, a ten-dimensional one, in which the fundamental building blocks of matter and energy aren't infinitesimal points but infinitesimal strings."[14] So comprehensive is superstrings—it neatly and elegantly accommodates all four of the fundamental forces of the universe—that physicists are calling it the Theory of Everything (T.O.E.). Not even taken seriously by the huge majority of physicists until 1984, today it is considered to be the theory with the best chance of reducing the universe, including gravity, to a single fundamental force. "It's beautiful, wonderful, majestic—and strange, if you like,"[15] says mathematician Edward Witten of Princeton. It still remains to reduce superstrings' ivory-tower ten-dimensional universe to the common-sense four-dimensional one in which we live, but many physicists and mathematicians are confident that this will be done. If so, then "all matter and energy, all forces, all people, planets, stars, cats and dogs, quasars, atoms, automobiles and everything else, from the instant of the Big Bang to the

[10]James Trefil, "Closing in on Creation," *The Smithsonian* (May, 1983), 42.

[11]Trefil, p. 39.

[12]Victor Weisskopf, "The Origin of the Universe," *American Scientist* (September–October, 1983), 478, 479.

[13]Mike Corwin, "From Chaos to Consciousness," *Astronomy* (February, 1983), 22.

[14]Gary Taubes, "Everything's Now Tied to Strings," *Discover* (November, 1986), 34.

[15]*Ibid.*

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end of time,"[16] will be shown to be the result of the twitchings, vibrations, and interactions of these infinitesimal strings.

Again the question arises: How likely is it that our spectacularly complex, orderly universe should have arisen from the *chance* twitchings and interactions of these strings? Is it not more likely that there is an ordering, creating intelligence attached (if you'll forgive us) to the strings?

(2) *The Large-Number Hypothesis*. Since 1919, when the great mathematician and physicist Hermann Weyl first pointed them out, certain odd numerical "coincidences" have been studied by physicists. Arguments for the existence of an ordering super-intelligence could be, and have been, constructed around these coincidences. One of the arguments centers on Dirac's so-called "large-number hypothesis."

In 1932 Paul Dirac, a Nobel Prize winner, published his thesis that the number 10^{40} approximately defines many of the universe's crucial ratios. (Sir Arthur Eddington had published a similar thesis a year earlier.) For example, the electric force of attraction between the lone electron of a hydrogen atom and the central proton of that atom—a force determined by the charge on the electron (a critically important constant)—is approximately 10^{40} times stronger than the pull of gravity between them. Furthermore, the observable universe is about 10^{40} times the size of an elementary particle like an electron, and $(10^{40})^2$, or 10^{80}, times heavier than a hydrogen atom. The list goes on and on and becomes more complex. Always the figure 10^{40} is front and center.

Dirac believed that the appearance of 10^{40} in so many crucial ratios could not be due to chance alone. Science writer John Gliedman puts it this way:

> Suppose for simplicity's sake that any one of these ratios could have taken at random any value from 1 to 10^{100}—a leviathan of a number known as the googol. If chance were the only determining factor, the odds of all these googol-size roulette wheels landing on 10^{40} would be minuscule. . . .[17]

Dirac's analysis was not well received when it first appeared, and even today, while still discussed, it is often dismissed as a provocative oddity. Yet the ratios described by Dirac still stand. How then do scientists account for the utterly unexpected frequency of the number 10^{40}? It is worth noting that Dirac was not in any way trying to make a case for a Supreme Mathematician behind the scenes. He proposed merely that the numerical coincidences resulted from some unknown causal connection. Others, noting that the square in the denominator (d^2) of the Law of Universal Gravitation is explained by a simple geometric principle which at first might seem wholly unrelated, have speculated that some as-yet-unrecognized feature of the geometry of the universe might explain the "coincidences."[18] Yet today, fifty years after Dirac's discovery, science, despite exponential advances in astronomy and physics, appears to be no closer to understanding Dirac's "hypothesis" than it was in his own day. That fact, however, does not

[16]*Ibid.*

[17]John Gliedman, "Amazing Numerical Coincidences," *Science Digest* (May, 1981), 58.

[18]Martin Rees, Remo Ruffini, John Archibald Wheeler, *Black Holes, Gravitational Waves and Cosmology: An Introduction to Current Research* (New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1974), p. 285.

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rule out the possibility that the key will someday be found. In the meantime, a few scientists still wonder if that magic number, 10^{40}, is evidence that "some orderly, logical scheme (is) governing the universe."[19] If it is, we are one logical step away from a cosmic orderer.

(3) *The Anthropic Principle*. One scientist who did take Dirac's principle seriously was Robert H. Dicke of Princeton. Influenced by Dirac's reasoning, Dicke in 1961 introduced the scientific world to the "anthropic principle." Like Dirac's large-number hypothesis, the anthropic principle derives its force from certain "coincidences" in the values of the basic physical constants. Dicke was specifically concerned to show that the Hubble constant, which governs the rate of expansion of the universe, could not have been much different from what it in fact is, or otherwise life could not have evolved. Cambridge University physicist Brandon Carter, whose name is more often associated with the anthropic principle, applied Dicke's reasoning to all of the initial conditions of the universe (temperature, chemical environment, etc.). According to Carter, if the initial conditions at the Big Bang had been any different from what they were, life as we know it could not have evolved. Paraphrasing Descartes, Carter writes, *"Cogito ergo mundus talis est"* (I think, therefore, the world is as it is).[20]

According to Dewey Schwartzenburg, the anthropic principle (*anthropos*, Greek for "man") boils down to this: " . . . if the universe were in fact different in any significant way from the way it is, we wouldn't be here to wonder why it is the way it is."[21] B. J. Carr and M. J. Rees, whose 1979 article in *Nature* is perhaps the most impressive scientific statement of the principle yet to appear, explain that the "possibility of life as we know it evolving in the Universe depends on the values of a few basic physical constants—and is in some respects remarkably sensitive to their numerical values."[22]

What are those constants? Physicists speak of "coupling constants," but these in turn depend on such basic constants as the charge of the proton, the mass of the proton, the speed of light, the gravitational constant G in Newton's law of universal gravitation, and Planck's constant, h, which allows us to determine a quantum of energy emitted by an electron radiating at a particular frequency. In mathematical notation, h is equal to 6.625×10^{-34} J. sec, and "Big G," the gravitational constant, is equal to 6.67×10^{-11} newton-m^2/kg^2.

What is remarkable—and it is this that forms the basis of the anthropic principle—is that if, for instance, Planck's constant had a different value, say 6.626×10^{-33} instead of 10^{-34}, the whole universe would be different from the way it is. More importantly, intelligent life could not have evolved in a substantially altered universe. For example, if gravity were significantly stronger than it is, stars would exhaust their hydrogen fuels must faster, and humanoid life (as we know it) could not appear in a universe where stars "died young." Or if the "strong force," which binds the nuclei of atoms together, were stronger, helium nuclei would dominate the universe, and no hydrogen would be left over; without hydrogen there would be no water, and without water there could not be life as

[19]Gliedman, p. 58.

[20]Quoted in Corwin, p. 20.

[21]Dewey Schwartzenburg, "Does Cosmology Have a Future?" *Astronomy* (July, 1979), 37.

[22]B. J. Carr and M. J. Rees, "The Anthropic Principle and the Structure of the Physical World," *Nature* 12 (April, 1979), 612.

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we know it. This list of examples could go on indefinitely. The point is that, as far as we can tell, intelligent humanoid life could have evolved in only one narrowly select set of universes: the set including the universe we find ourselves in, a universe whose physical processes are governed by the precise basic constants that it possesses. Corwin states the case well:

> Life as we conceive it demands severe constraints on the initial conditions of the universe. Life and consciousness are not only the direct result of the initial conditions, but could only have resulted from a narrow range of initial conditions (i.e., the constants had to be precisely as they are). It is not that changes in the initial conditions would have changed the character of life, but rather that any significant change in the initial conditions would have ruled out the possibility of life evolving later . . . the universe would have evolved as a lifeless, unconscious entity.[23]

It is no wonder that today a few scientists who are aware of the anthropic principle are asking the question, "Does all this mean that cosmology has come to the point of having to postulate a 'Creator'?"[24] The answer would seem, at first glance, to be Yes. For how else can we explain all these "coincidences"? Let us use an analogy: Imagine nine jars, each containing ten slips of paper with one number from 0 to 9, one number to a slip, with each number represented, placed side by side. Suppose now that a mechanical device drew at random one slip from each jar, and that the numbers drawn in sequence happened to correspond *exactly* to your nine-numbered Social Security Number. What are the chances of a random drawing giving such a result? They are exactly one in a billion. Now suppose, unlike a legitimate, genuinely random lottery drawing, there was no special reason dictating that the drawing had to be random, even though the mechanical device *suggested* randomness. If your number were drawn, would it not be far more reasonable to assume that the drawing was *not* random, that it was instead being superintended by some intelligence behind the scenes who was in some way invisibly manipulating the mechanical device? Would it not, in other words, be reasonable to conclude that the drawing was fixed—fixed in your favor?

Don N. Page of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, N.J., recently calculated the odds against the formation of our universe, and the figure was a good deal more than one in a billion.[25] His exact computation was in fact one in $10{,}000{,}000{,}000^{124}$, a number so large that to call it "astronomical" would be to engage in a wild understatement. But are the odds *against a Cosmic Designer* so high? If we must make a forced choice between an unintelligent random process and an invisible Intelligence behind the scenes, as it appears we must, and if, furthermore, the chance against a random process accounting for the precise values of the basic constants of physics is well in excess of a billion to one, then a designer may be considered highly probable. In other words, the anthropic principle looks as if it might succeed, after careful analysis, in making highly probable the existence of a universal designer-creator.

There are three reasons, however, to think that it might not. Though they may

[23]Corwin, p. 19.

[24]Schwartzenburg, p. 37.

[25]Dietrick E. Thomsen, "The Quantum Universe: A Zero-Point Fluctuation?" *Science News*, 128 (Aug. 3, 1985), 73.

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seem like quibbles to some, they have been thought by others to tip the balance back in the opposite direction, or if not in the opposite direction, then in a new direction leading to a destination that altogether baffles the human mind.

First, as Carr and Rees point out, the anthropic principle

> is based on what may be an unduly anthropocentric concept of an observer. The arguments invoked here assume that life requires elements heavier than hydrogen and helium, water, galaxies, and special types of stars and planets. It is conceivable [however] that some form of intelligence could exist without all of these features. . . .[26]

In other words, intelligent life might have evolved out of a very different kind of universe, and not just the one we know, with its particular governing constants. Of course, this "life" would have almost nothing in common (at least physically) with the biological life forms to which our universe has given rise. But what, except our own narrow experience, is guiding us when we limit life to conditions such as our universe provides?

Second, it is possible that an infinite number of universes coexist alongside our own or have existed sequentially in the beginningless past prior to our own. University of Texas physicist John Archibald Wheeler, who helped develop the many-worlds theory of coexisting universes first proposed in 1957 by Princeton physicist Hugh Everett, championed the "Everett Hypothesis" as a way of explaining the anthropic coincidences. He reasoned that, given enough universes, it is not unlikely that one would come along which had the right ingredients for life; and our universe is it. As for the others, "nothing 'interesting' would ever happen—there would be universes without stars, and others without atoms, and still others without even matter."[27] Wheeler's view has found few supporters, largely for the reason that such universes have never been observed and, moreover, are in principle unobservable. Even Wheeler himself is now looking elsewhere for the clue to our universe's existence, namely, to the "magic central idea"[28] which will at last make intelligible quantum theory, and with it our seemingly improbable universe. In any case, there is nothing intrinsically absurd about this many-worlds hypothesis.

The third refutation is very much the brainchild of Wheeler. Though it might at first sound fantastic because incompatible with our commonsense realism, it is in fact consistent with quantum mechanics, which describes the activity of tiny particles (electrons, for example) on an atomic or molecular scale. Wheeler predicted that an experimenter would be able to observe either the particle's diffraction pattern (single slit) or its interference pattern (double slit), whichever one he chose, *even though the particle had already moved* and, as it were, "committed itself" to one, and *only* one, of these patterns. Wheeler writes: "After the quantum of energy has *already* gone through the doubly slit screen, a last-instant free choice on our part—we have found—gives at will a double-slit-

[26]Carr and Rees, p. 612.

[27]Schwartzenburg, p. 38.

[28]John Archibald Wheeler, "Hermann Weyl and the Unity of Knowledge," *American Scientist* (July–August, 1986), 371.

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interference record or a one-slit-beam count."[29] On the basis of this extraordinary prediction, scientists in France, West Germany, and at the University of Maryland recently set up "delayed choice" experiments to test the prediction. All of the findings seemed to support Wheeler: ". . . whether you make the choice before or after the event occurs, the effect of the choice [is] the same."[30] As Corwin puts it, "observership becomes the mechanism of genesis. . . . What we choose to measure, argues Wheeler, is really an inseparable part of a phenomenon that in earlier thinking one would have said has 'already happened.' "[31]

How is this way of thinking—"observership becomes the mechanism of genesis"—a threat to the thesis that our universe was created by a supermind ("God")? In this way: if we are capable of creating the experimental outcome that we desire, the next logical step is to suggest that scientists in some way create (imagine?) the basic constants of physics that our argument is based on. In that case there would be nothing special about the constants, and the only mind proven by them would be our own. One could not say of them that they were "true"; nor could one say that the "universe" they described really existed. A cosmic creator would become an unnecessary hypothesis.

What defense can we give against these three arguments? We admit that the theory of life's emergence from conditions greatly dissimilar to what we know on Earth, however unlikely this scenario may be, and the theory of an infinite number of universes, however farfetched it may seem, are at least not intrinsically absurd; but with this last hypothesis just sketched, although it is seemingly more plausible, there are grave philosophical difficulties. Indeed such a position can be regarded as self-refuting. Wheeler states that the experimenter would have ended up with a "different story for the doings of the electron if he had done different measurements in a different sequence."[32] In other words, there is not "a world sitting 'out there' "[33] for us to discover, measure, and describe. But if this is so, we would argue, then human observation is intrinsically suspect, and truth ceases to have any meaning. In such a solipsistic universe, or what Wheeler calls a "participatory universe,"[34] where we in some sense create what we set out to find, science is turned into a creative art; elegance and beauty, rather than correspondence to reality, might conceivably become the ultimate meaningful measures of "good science."

Philosophy aside, Wheeler's controversial views are rejected by physicists who call themselves realists, such as Fritz Rohrlich. Although the apparatus "plays a much more important role in measurements of the quantum world than in measurements of the classical world," as Rohrlich says, that does not mean "that reality is created by the observer. . . . The world of electrons, protons, and all the rest does exist out there even if we do not observe it."[35] Three physicists

[29]John Archibald Wheeler, "The 'Past' and the 'Delayed-Choice' Double-Slit Experiment," *Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Theory*, ed. A. R. Marlow (New York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 41.

[30]Dietrick E. Thomsen, "Changing Your Mind in a Hurry," *Science News* (March 1, 1986), 137.

[31]Corwin, p. 22.

[32]Wheeler, "The 'Past,' " p. 42.

[33]*Ibid.*, p. 41.

[34]*Ibid.*

[35]Fritz Rohrlich, "Facing Quantum Mechanical Reality," *Science* (23 September, 1983), 1253, 1255.

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working in England—David Bohm, C. Dewdney, and B. H. Hiley—would agree. They recently published a paper in which they claim to give "a simple and intelligible account of a typical delayed-choice experiment."[36] If their account holds up, they will have succeeded to a degree in demystifying the quantum, and Wheeler's hypothesis that a quantum phenomenon does not exist until we observe it, will be discardable, and with it the threat to our present thesis.

To summarize, the anthropic principle presents us with a potentially powerful argument for the existence of a universal creating intelligence. Although three refutations can be brought forth, each has its problems. Nevertheless, there is nothing intrinsically implausible about the first two, and it is too early to dispose of the third. We must look elsewhere—to biology—for a more compelling argument.

C. THE FOSSIL RECORD

In 1859 Charles Darwin turned the scientific world upside down with his publication of *The Origin of Species*. Since the 1940s Neo-Darwinism—also referred to as the "Neo-Darwinian Synthesis" or simply the "Synthetic Theory"—has ruled the roost; it is nearly synonymous today with evolution in the minds of many people. But it means something much more specific to scientists. Neo-Darwinism means, first, that the hundreds of thousands of species on our planet were not separately created, and, second, that random variations (accidental miscopyings of the genetic code) and gradualism (the theory that a sequence of random miscopyings can *gradually* add up to a major beneficial alteration in a species, in effect creating a new species) were, and are, the chief agents of evolution. According to Stephen Jay Gould, the pioneering, dissenting Harvard paleontologist, gradualism is what separates orthodox Neo-Darwinism, still accepted by a majority of biologists today, from other, "expanded" theories of evolution.[37] In other words, Neo-Darwinism is distinguished from other theories by the *mechanism* of evolution. And that mechanism is random genetic mutation leading to gradual change—a process which operates without conscious design on the part of anyone or anything and fortuitously gives rise, through the weeding-out process of natural selection ("survival of the fittest"), to all the Earth's species, culminating in the human being.

Today orthodox Neo-Darwinism is under attack by top-notch scientists who are putting forth a variety of alternative theories to explain evolution. (We do not include "creation scientists" from the Christian right in this group of challengers.) Their ranks are becoming so numerous that some scientists are talking about an emerging new orthodoxy—one that accounts for the evolution of species not by a gradual process of accumulating genetic mutations but by something altogether different. What precisely this "something different" is, has given rise to a great deal of speculation over the last fifteen years. While it would be impossible to summarize in this short space the theories put forward, it is possible to make two general statements about this latter-day phenomenon: first, the major cause of the

[36]D. J. Bohm, C. Dewdney and B. H. Hiley, "A quantum potential approach to the Wheeler delayed-choice experiment," *Nature*, 315 (23 May, 1985), 297.

[37]See Stephen Jay Gould, "Darwinism and the Expansion of Evolutionary Theory," *Science* (23 April 1982), 380–87.

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reassessment has been a fossil record which does not square with the conventional Neo-Darwinian theory, and second, the alternative theories, whatever their individual differences, hold in common that evolution moves not by continuous, gradual transitions but by bold, dramatic, relatively infrequent leaps forward—in keeping with what the fossil record suggests. Where these theories differ is in the way they explain these sudden jumps.

Before spelling out what all this has to do with our updating of the teleological argument, we must pause to look at the fossil record, for it is at the heart of our critique.

For the layman, there is probably no better introduction to this fascinating subject than Francis Hitching's *The Neck of the Giraffe*.[38] On the whole very well reviewed by scientists and non-scientists alike, the book makes abundantly clear the problem with Neo-Darwinism. In the first section Hitching, a British science writer, presents case after case of a "missing link." How did highly complex multi-cellular creatures evolve from single-celled creatures half a billion years ago? How did fish become amphibians, or mammals evolve their jaw, or giraffes their long neck? With help from top scientists, he reviews conundrum after conundrum, showing how implausible are the conventional explanations of these things. He says of BBC-TV host David Attenborough's attempt to account for the evolution of fish along conventional Neo-Darwinian lines that it is "not much more helpful than a line of plausible patter before a conjurer says abracadabra and produces a rabbit (or in the above case, a fish) from his hat."[39] The truth, according to Hitching (and authorities whom he quotes), is that "groups of well-defined, easily classifiable, fish jump into the fossil record seemingly from nowhere: mysteriously, suddenly, full-formed, and in a most un-Darwinian way."[40]

The conventional defense against this charge is that the fossil record is not complete, but there is a growing consensus among many scientists that this answer is evasive, if not dishonest. Paleontologist N. Heribert-Nilsson of Lund University, Sweden, speaks for many of his colleagues when he writes, "The fossil record is now so complete that the lack of transitional series cannot be explained by the scarcity of the material. The deficiencies are real, they will never be filled."[41] World-famous astronomer Fred Hoyle deserted the Neo-Darwinian synthesis because of the fossil record. He puts it this way: "The fossil record is highly imperfect from a Darwinian point of view, not because of the inadequacies of geologists, but because the slow evolutionary connections required by the theory never happened."[42] According to Arthur Koestler, the distinguished science writer and philosopher, the only reason that the Neo-Darwinian account of evolution has had such a long life in spite of its collision with the fossil record is that "a bad theory is better than no theory."[43]

It should be apparent that there is a large-scale revolt against the facile answers

[38]Francis Hitching, *The Neck of the Giraffe* (New York: Ticknor and Fields, 1982).
[39]*Ibid.*, p. 24.
[40]*Ibid.*, p. 20.
[41]*Ibid.*, p. 22.
[42]Sir Fred Hoyle and N. C. Wickramasinghe, *Evolution from Space* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), p. 147.
[43]Quoted in Jeremy Rifkin, *Algeny* (New York: The Viking Press, 1983), p. 155.

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of Neo-Darwinians, and that there are now several well-developed theories available to do battle with the "bad" one. We are convinced by the array of evidence against Neo-Darwinism. The question is not whether the Neo-Darwinian account is inadequate, but *which* of the alternative explanations is to be preferred, and, still more interestingly, where the present debate may be leading.

We are particularly impressed by the tendency in most of the alternative models to explain evolution by some kind of "self-organization." The distinguished biologist Conrad Waddington (died in 1975) believed that a growing organism is channeled by its genetic makeup down certain developmental pathways. For him evolution was not exclusively random, as Neo-Darwinism requires, but was guided. He would agree with Koestler, who spoke of "certain built-in rules that permit a great amount of variation, but only in limited directions on a limited number of themes."[44] In other words, a giraffe's neck did not evolve merely as a response to a "need to survive by reaching ever higher for food,"[45] but according to some built-in evolutionary blueprint with a momentum all its own.

A variation on this theme comes from Nobelist Ilya Prigogine, Professor of Chemistry and Theoretical Physics at the Free University of Brussels. Prigogine and his colleagues begin their quest for an alternative theory to Neo-Darwinism by asking the question: "How and why does life, in a universe of every-increasing disorder, evolve in the opposite direction?"[46] In other words, what enables organisms to defy a fundamental principle of physics, the law of entropy, which says that the universe is running down, becoming increasingly chaotic, and will eventually exist in a state of listless equilibrium sometimes referred to as "heat death."

Prigogine, like Waddington, points out that each organism has a capacity for self-organization and self-renewal. Hitching uses a helpful analogy to clarify what Prigogine has in mind: "Put your hand in a water jet, and you can easily disturb its form. At the same time, like all open systems, it is self-organizing. Take your hand away, and the fountain regains its original shape."[47] Every organism is like that water jet: if injured on its buttocks in a fight, a wolf will not renew itself by growing tail feathers. What is more to the point here, Prigogine makes use of this universal tendency in organisms to explain evolutionary jumps. Organisms, he believes he has demonstrated, "are continually poised to evolve into something more complex"[48]—not *anything* more complex, but the very things that they in fact evolve into. It is as if the genetic code contains the blueprint not only of the organism's present coordinates, but of its future ones as well. Some environmental circumstance is all that is required to call forth the higher form out of the lower. Nor must we expect only a minuscule difference between the higher and the lower once environmental conditions are right. In fact, the difference may be quite abrupt and dramatic. Hitching uses another analogy to illustrate the quantum-like jump from lower to higher species: "No matter how gently you open up a tap of water, at a certain point the flow alters surprisingly from a smooth

[44]Hitching, p. 180.
[45]*Ibid.*, p. 179.
[46]*Ibid.*, p. 186.
[47]*Ibid.*, p. 190.
[48]*Ibid.*

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in fossil remains or the spider appears simultaneously with its prey and with its faculty of weaving fully developed, such facts can be welcomed with smiles instead of puzzled brows.

As for the variant forms which Darwinists must use to construct their largely hypothetical bridges between species, from the metaphysical perspective these appear as variations which the species in question allow. It is as if nature, always more prolific and life-loving than we had supposed, first staked out distinct species and then decided to ring changes on these by having each reflect the forms of the others insofar as it could do so without transgressing its own essential limits. Seen in this light, variations are not generative links between species—it has yet to be shown what the dolphin, say, is a link to or from. They are, rather, mimics; they show species imitating the ways and forms of species that in essence are foreign to them. Not solely for utilitarian reasons of adaptation and survival, we may add; in part—larger part—for *lila*, the divine play: sheer protean exuberance. *Esse qua esse si bonum est* (being as being is so good) that God cannot resist any of its possibilities. Wishing with part of herself to be a mother, a child dons apron and suckles her doll. Dolphins and whales are the archetypal mammal wondering what it would be like to be a fish; armadillos the result of its thinking, "Wouldn't it be interesting to dress up in scales and play reptile?" Pressing the image a bit, we might say that hummingbirds in their mode of feeding and flight and their iridescent coloring are birds fancying themselves as butterflies. It is like Indra's Net, each jewel reflecting the others and being reflected in them.[55]

What are we to make of this? First let us remind the reader that Smith does not intend his account to be taken literally. He is quick to point out that he is "speaking in the mode of Platonic myth, one consequence of which is that the reader will not be able to determine how literally we intend such statements because we are not sure ourselves. All we feel confident of is that they contain more truth than the alternatives they intend to counter."[56] Second, he has dared to go to the heart of the issue and explore *ultimate* origins. The problem with virtually all contemporary accounts of a supposedly self-organizing universe is that they are penultimate—they do not go far enough, they pull up short just before they get to the finish line—whereas the answers that we are looking for are ultimate. Scientists often reply that they have no business going across a finish line which their discipline forbids. We regard this answer as disingenuous. Scientists, if they would be fully human, would be wise not to compartmentalize their disciplines (or their lives) in such a way as to exclude automatically the insights and methodologies of other disciplines. Whatever the weaknesses of Smith's speculative account of the origin of species, no one can accuse him of a failure of nerve. He boldly gives the credit to a designing, creating, nurturing, ever-existing *intelligence*—take it or leave it. Moreover, he does so in a way which fits neatly into the seams of the fossil record.

"Vertical genesis," however, is not the only way of accounting for the evolution of species through intelligent design and direction. Instead of regarding Earth's superintending intelligence as extrinsic to the planet, the intelligence can be seen as intrinsic. Instead of visualizing the essential forms of species as "dropping to the terrestrial plane," they can be visualized as effusing upward and outward from the interior of the planet; and the planet itself can be imagined as an

[55]Huston Smith, *Forgotten Truth* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pp. 139–41.
[56]*Ibid.*, p. 141, note.

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immense, highly intelligent organism with the ability to regulate the evolution of species on its surface. A few years ago the maverick scientist J. E. Lovelock proposed something like this with his Gaia hypothesis, but he did not go far enough. According to him "the Earth's living matter, air, oceans, and land surface form a complex system which can be seen as a single organism and which has the capacity to keep our planet a fit place for life."[57] But he declines to give Earth self-conscious intelligence and allows at most a rudimentary intelligence analogous to that of a tree which "knows" it must shed its leaves before winter in order to avoid damage from frost.[58] As for anything like teleology or purpose, he calls it a "blight."[59] We feel that Lovelock's insight about the nurturing capacities of Mother Earth may prove to be prophetic, but that his failure to speak out for a self-conscious, directing intelligence in her shows a disappointing lack of courage (or imagination). We think that the model of a super-intelligent Mother Earth that consciously superintends the evolution of species on its surface is an exciting and plausible alternative to Smith's more masculine model.

There is a very important footnote to all this. It reminds us that we have no right to be smug in our belief that evolution is intelligently orchestrated. Today many traditional biologists are reluctantly deserting straightforward Neo-Darwinism for a modified version of it known as "punctuated equilibria," a theory first proposed in 1972 by Stephen Jay Gould and Niles Eldredge. Eldredge, the Chairman and Curator of the Department of Invertebrates at the American Museum of Natural History, summarizes the theory this way: "The pattern of change is one of long periods of stability, 'punctuated' by what seem to be *relatively* brief spurts of . . . anatomical change."[60] So far this looks like nothing more than what we have already looked at: a more honest way of coming to grips with the fossil record. But it turns out to be something quite different. Eschewing any suggestion of self-organization, Eldredge links "punctuated equilibria" to another theory known as "allopatric (or geographic) speciation," which was originally proposed by the great Harvard biologist Ernst Mayr. Eldredge describes the theory in the following way: "Speciation is the formation of two or more reproductive communities from a single ancestor. In allopatric speciation, populations of a species geographically isolated from one another fragment into two."[61] According to this theory one of the populations would develop, under the constraints of a novel environment (the other side of a mountain range, for example), in a way that it would not have if it had remained in its original environment (the "safe" side). Most importantly, it would develop very fast—into a new species.

Allopatric speciation is a way of accounting for the missing links in the fossil record, not by saying that the links never occurred, but by saying that they were so short-lived that the chances of finding the fossil record of them is remote. This theory should make Neo-Darwinists very happy, for it serves as nothing more than a "friendly amendment" to one of their cardinal beliefs: that the process of evolution is, in the words of Jacques Monod, "the product of an enormous lottery

[57]J. E. Lovelock, *Gaia: A New Look at Life on Earth* (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press, 1979), p. vii.
[58]See *ibid.*, pp. 146–147.
[59]*Ibid.*, p. ix.
[60]Niles Eldredge, "Progress in Evolution?" *New Scientist* (5 June 1986), 55.
[61]*Ibid.*, p. 56.

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presided over by natural selection, blindly picking the rare winners from among numbers drawn at utter random."[62] Indeed Eldredge himself sees this clearly: "Allopatric speciation," he writes, "is no wild-eyed, radical theory, and its application to the fossil record is likewise hardly a cause for alarm among adherents to the evolutionary synthesis [Neo-Darwinism]."[63] The title of a 1986 article in *Science*, "Punctuated Equilibrium Is Now Old Hat,"[64] would seem to support Eldredge's claim. We suspect that within ten years "punctuated equilibria" in tandem with "allopatric speciation" will emerge as the new orthodoxy among conservative biologists.

There are, however, serious difficulties with this emerging new orthodoxy. The main one is that experiments in selective breeding—Mayr himself conducted a famous experiment using fruit flies—so far favor genetic homeostasis (loosely, "staying put"). As Hitching puts it,

> the prime function of the genetic system would seem to be to resist change: to perpetuate the species in a minimally adapted form in response to altered conditions, and if at all possible to get things back to normal. The role of natural selection is usually a negative one: to destroy the few mutant individuals that threaten the stability of species.[65]

Nevertheless, the various backers of an "enlarged" or "corrected" theory of Neo-Darwinism are at least dealing honestly with the fossil record. And in so doing they are forging a theory which demands respect from philosophers looking for an ultimate explanation of the origin of species. Gould, Eldredge, and company have steered clear of that no-man's land called "self-organization"; they do not stop short of the finish line. They give us a clear choice based not on the old Neo-Darwinian dogmatism which ignores the "central empirical observation"[66] of a transitionless fossil record, but on good, honest science. The battle line is drawn: either there is Mind behind the jump-by-jump evolution of species, or there is blind, utterly random luck. Let us see if the next, and last, section can give us a better sense of which scenario is the more likely.

D. BIOCHEMICAL COMPLEXITY

So far we have concentrated on the fossil record and restricted our investigation to the last six hundred million years of Earth's 4.6 billion year history; we have said nothing about the evolution of life itself during the first billion or so years of Earth's history. What do we find when we try to account for the earliest, simplest life forms on Earth? How did the first protein, the first enzyme, the first DNA or RNA molecule come to be? Does the Neo-Darwinian Synthesis, with its dependence on exclusively random processes, give a plausible account of the appearance of these early biomolecules? Does it adequately account for the jump from non-life to life? Or are we forced to look elsewhere for a more plausible explanation? These are the questions that this last section will address.

Charles-Eugene Guye, a Swiss physicist who died in 1942, was the first to apply

[62]Quoted in Huston Smith, p. 130.
[63]Eldredge, p. 56.
[64]Roger Lewin, "Punctuated Equilibrium Is Now Old Hat," *Science*, 231 (4 Feb. 86), 672–73.
[65]Hitching, p. 59.
[66]Eldredge, p. 55.

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the probability calculus to the question of life's origin. He calculated the mathematical odds against the random formation of a single protein molecule (protein is an essential ingredient in every organism) at $1:2.02 \times 10^{321}$. Pierre Lecomte du Nouy, who in 1947 published a celebrated book, *Human Destiny*, and made use of Guye's calculations as the basis of his anti-Darwinian thesis, explained the significance of this figure:

> The volume of substance necessary for such a probability to take place is beyond all imagination. It would be that of a sphere with a radius so great that light would take 10^{82} years to cover the distance. The volume is incomparably greater than that of the whole universe including the farthest galaxies. . . .[67]

Lecomte thought that he had built an insuperable case against the random shuffling of atoms and molecules as the mechanism of evolution. His book created a great stir when it came out, and he was hailed by many as the savior of religion. But most scientists took a dim view of it. One reviewer wrote: ". . . he proceeds to draw conclusions which are, to speak softly, shocking."[68] And he did. In the second half of his book he deserted the disciplined methodology of science and urged on the reader a Christian theism—what the above cited reviewer called a "kind of Higher Irrationality."[69] In spite of Lecomte's mistake, Guye's mathematical calculations were never, to our knowledge, overturned. Lecomte's conclusion that an "explanation of the evolution of life by chance alone is untenable,"[70] and that "it is *totally impossible* to account scientifically for all phenomena pertaining to Life, its development and progressive evolution . . . unless the foundations of modern science are overthrown,"[71] was not challenged by any alternative calculus. But because the book was so out of favor with scientists—and justifiably so for the most part—it was very easy to overlook what value it might have contained. Science simply ignored Guye's computations.

Thirty-four years later another book appeared which created a similar revulsion in most scientists who read it (not many, actually). This was Fred Hoyle's and N. C. Wickramasinghe's *Evolution from Space*.[72] Reasoning and calculating in much the same way as Guye, they tried to show that mathematical probability is stacked against Neo-Darwinism. Far more likely is it, they believe, that some kind of Super-Intelligence is behind the evolution of life on our planet.

Hoyle, one of the great astronomers of our century, and Wickramasinghe, currently (1987) Head of the Department of Applied Mathematics and Astronomy at University College in Cardiff, Wales, base their argument on the molecular structure of enzymes, which are complex macromolecules essential for the

[67]Pierre Lecomte du Nouy, *Human Destiny* (New York: Longman's Green and Co., 1947), p. 34.

[68]James R. Newman, "Between the Devil" (review of Lecomte du Nouy's *Human Destiny*), *The New Republic* (July 28, 1947), p. 25.

[69]*Ibid.*

[70]Lecomte du Nouy, p. 43.

[71]*Ibid.*, p. 42.

[72]Sir Fred Hoyle and N. C. Wickramasinghe, *Evolution from Space: A Theory of Cosmic Creationism* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981). An earlier work, *Mathematical Challenges to the Neo-Darwinian Interpretation of Evolution*, P. Moorhead and M. Kaplan (Philadelphia: Wiser Institute Press, 1967), showed the inadequacy of the "randomness postulate" but advanced no alternative hypothesis.

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evolution of life. The two scientists hold that the "usual theory of mutation and natural selection cannot produce complex biomolecules from a random association of atoms,"[73] and, therefore, that the essential building blocks of even the most rudimentary forms of life could not have formed in the way in which Neo-Darwinists say they did.

Hoyle and Wickramasinghe are especially interested in refuting the "organic soup myth." This is the theory that the primeval stew of water (H_2O), ammonia (NH_3), methane (CH_4), and other simple compounds which made up our planet in its infancy, *randomly* generated, when subjected to lightning flashes or other energy sources, the enzymes so critical to life. After pointing out that there are "some ten to twenty distinct amino acids which determine the basic backbone of the enzyme" and that these "simply must be in the correct position in the polypeptide structure,"[74] Hoyle and Wickramasinghe calculate the chance of one enzyme forming anywhere on earth through the random ordering of amino acids at one in 10^{20}. The brunt of their argument follows:

> By itself, this small probability could be faced, because one must contemplate not just a single shot at obtaining the enzyme, but a very large number of trials such as are supposed to have occurred in an organic soup early in the history of the Earth. The trouble is that there are about two thousand enzymes, and the chance of obtaining them all in a random trial is only one part in $(10^{20})^{2000} = 10^{40,000}$, an outrageously small probability that could not be faced even if the whole universe consisted of organic soup.[75]

This immense figure is only the beginning. They continue:

> Nothing has been said of the origin of DNA itself, nothing of DNA transcription to RNA, nothing of the origin of the program whereby cells organize themselves, nothing of mitosis or meiosis. These issues are too complex to set numbers to.[76]

The two scientists go on to say that the chance of these biochemical systems being formed "through random shufflings of simple organic molecules is exceedingly minute, to a point where it is insensibly different from zero."[77]

Hoyle and Wickramasinghe are now poised for the strike. If Neo-Darwinism cannot account for the biochemical complexity necessary for the origin of life, what can? They answer:

> Any theory with a probability of being correct that is larger than one part in $10^{40,000}$ must be judged superior to random shuffling. The theory that life was assembled by an intelligence has, we believe, a probability vastly higher than one part in $10^{40,000}$ of being the correct explanation. . . . Indeed, such a theory is so obvious that one wonders why it is not widely accepted as being self-evident.[78]

These are exceedingly strange words out of the mouths of scientists. And the

[73] Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, p. 23.
[74] *Ibid.*, p. 24.
[75] *Ibid.*
[76] *Ibid.*, p. 30.
[77] *Ibid.*, p. 3.
[78] *Ibid.*, p. 130.

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scientific community has reacted to them, in large part, as you might expect. One reviewer wrote that the two scientists "have managed to produce a theory which does not have a single convincing argument or fact in its favor," yet this same reviewer admitted that the pivotal figure $10^{40,000}$ is "probably not overexaggerated" and that scientists "cannot give a convincing Darwinian account."[79] He dismissed the view of an intelligent designer and "assembler" as "philosophically absurd" on the grounds that "it is obviously necessary to explain the origin of the Intelligence,"[80] which, of course, the two scientists cannot do. Another reviewer, reacting to Hoyle's 1983 book, *The Intelligent Universe*,[81] which makes the same arguments as the earlier one, referred to Hoyle's probabilities as "simplistic calculations," although admitting that the Neo-Darwinian account "is very weak."[82]

Are these calculations in fact simplistic? Is $10^{40,000}$ a grossly inflated figure? Before we go any further, we must try to answer this question, for the plausibility of Hoyle and Wickramasinghe's theory of a creative, organizing intelligence is directly proportionate to the implausibility of the rival Neo-Darwinian account of emerging life. What do other scientists say?

Hoyle, notorious for his twitting of establishment scientists, is prone to make statements that shock and astound. While universally recognized as a brilliantly creative scientist, he is snubbed by most of his colleagues for his eccentric views, which he defends with a style which his fellows find annoying, often outrageous, sometimes exaggerated and simplistic. No one, however, accuses Nobelist Francis Crick, the co-developer of the double-helical model of DNA (in 1953), of having such a profile. Crick, while writing with much greater caution than Hoyle, substantially agrees with Hoyle on the question of biochemical evolution. In 1981 he wrote:

> We are thus in a most tantalizing situation. On the one hand, we believe that there may have been a fairly adequate supply of organic molecules, amino acids in particular, on the earth's surface, even though their concentration in most places may have been somewhat low. In addition, the double helix of RNA and DNA certainly suggests that it could form a good basis for a primitive replication system. On the other hand, it is difficult to see how an accurate system could have arisen easily from such a complex mixture, and even more difficult to figure out the exact components needed and the exact steps followed.[83]

Although declining to assign a numerical value to the probability of life's arising according to the Neo-Darwinian scenario, he concludes:

> An honest man, armed with all the knowledge available to us now, could only state that in some sense, the origin of life appears at the moment to be almost a miracle, so many are the conditions which would have had to have been satisfied to get it going.[84]

[79]Mark Ridley (review of Hoyle and Wickramasinghe's *Evolution from Space*), *New Scientist* (15 October 1981), p. 188.

[80]*Ibid.*

[81]Fred Hoyle, *The Intelligent Universe* (London: Michael Joseph, 1983).

[82]John Durant, "Upwards with the Bacteria," *Times Literary Supplement* (Dec. 9, 1983), 1366.

[83]Francis Crick, *Life Itself* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981), p. 86.

[84]*Ibid.*, p. 88.

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A trio of scientists headed by chemist Charles Thaxton, Director of Curriculum Research for the Foundation for Thought and Ethics in Dallas, provide another angle of vision on the problem of life's origin; and their conclusions are just as vexatious for traditional Neo-Darwinists as were the above. Their 1984 book *The Mystery of Life's Origin* is especially valuable for its summary of experiments—thousands of them—undertaken all over the world to show how life might have arisen on earth. All these experiments try to simulate earth's primitive geological condition ("the prebiotic soup") and atmosphere. In some experiments ultraviolet light is directed through the system, in others heat, in others special chemical reactants, and so forth. Many energy sources have been tried, and just as many varieties and conditions of "soup." Has anything like proteins, enzymes, RNA, or DNA ever turned up? Thaxton offers this summary: "The uniform failure in literally thousands of experimental attempts to synthesize protein or DNA under even questionable prebiotic conditions is a monument to [its] difficulty . . ."[85] By "questionable" Thaxton and his colleagues mean "illegitimate." In their survey of the kinds of experiments being carried out, they show that most investigators, in an effort to achieve the hoped for results, more or less fudge; in other words, they create conditions that were not likely to have existed on the primitive earth. Thaxton and his colleagues find that the less fudging there is, the less satisfactory are the results.

The conclusion of their study is that chemical evolution along the lines of the Neo-Darwinian synthesis "is highly implausible."[86] It is noteworthy that the esteemed biologist Sidney W. Fox, one of the leading proponents and a veteran of early-earth simulation experiments, agrees. Fox views amino acids as "self-ordering," not at all the lucky result of random processes. He is convinced that "matter organizes itself"[87] and that "all evolutionary processes are highly non-random."[88] Many biologists, chemists, and philosophers of science agree with Fox. While declining to say what it is which might account for the self-ordering—or more precisely, what it is which might account for the fortuitous morphology of amino acids that results in "molecular selection"[89]—they nevertheless acknowledge that self-ordering, as opposed to random interaction, is a fact of pre-life.

Thaxton and his colleagues, however, do not decline to say what they think is behind the "self-ordering." Risking certain censure by fellow scientists, they conclude, in agreement with Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, that an ordering intelligence is the most plausible way of accounting for the evolution of proteins, RNA, and DNA on early earth. They do not regard this conclusion as "religious," but as solidly scientific:

> We have observational evidence in the present that intelligent investigators can (and do) build ways to bring about some complex chemical synthesis, even gene building. May

[85]Charles B. Thaxton, Walter L. Bradley, Roger L. Olsen, *The Mystery of Life's Origin: Reassessing Current Theories* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1984), p. 164.

[86]*Ibid.*, p. 186.

[87]Sidney W. Fox, "The Evolutionary Sequence: Origin and Emergences," *The American Biology Teacher*, 43 (March, 1986), 147.

[88]*Ibid.*, p. 148.

[89]*Ibid.*, p. 143.

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not the principle of uniformity then be used in a broader frame of consideration to suggest that DNA had an intelligent cause at the beginning?[90]

Besides, what is the alternative? It is the very theory—random molecular interaction resulting in extraordinarily complex, self-replicating macromolecules—which is contradicted by both experiment and mathematics. Thaxton and his colleagues do not, of course, pretend to be able to say how the intelligence went about ordering prebiotic conditions on earth so that life would eventually evolve; that process, if only by reason of its unrepeatability, must always remain mysterious. But they are more comfortable, and by a wide margin, with mystery than with contradiction, with the plausible than with the implausible; in other words, they are more comfortable with an intelligent orderer behind the scenes than with a blind process of random natural selection which unaccountably produces a living earth of awe-inspiring complexity.

Where does this leave us? The reaction of the scientific community to the above authors' positions has been telltale. All four—Hoyle, Crick, Fox, and Thaxton—agree that it is exceedingly unlikely that life evolved on earth through random processes alone. Yet two, Crick and Fox, have remained within the pale of scientific respectability, while the other two, Hoyle and Thaxton along with their respective colleagues, have been scoffed at and, for the most part, dismissed. The reason for this is not hard to find. To invoke an intelligence behind the scenes to account for the evolution of life on earth is, for most scientists, the ultimate taboo. Why is this? We will come back to this question below, but for now let us ponder what Hoyle has to say on the subject: ". . . the issue [of life's origin] is dominated more by sociology and religion than by science. More precisely, dominated by anti-religion."[91]

Before trying to assess the biochemical argument for intelligent direction of the evolutionary process, we must weigh four objections to it.

The first was well-stated by a reviewer of Lecomte's book in 1947: "The plain truth is that we do not know enough about life to say that it could not have originated by chance in the evolution of inanimate matter."[92] This view is undoubtedly held by a large majority of scientists today.

But is this "truth" really so "plain" nowadays? The scientists whom we surveyed above, wrote their books primarily to destroy this notion. Hoyle and Wickramasinghe did it, they felt, with the figure of $10^{40,000}$, just as Lecomte and Guye felt they had done it earlier with the figure 2.02×10^{321}. These figures were designed to show that it is *completely impossible* to account for the evolution of life by random shuffling. Until someone accommodates random association of mindless atoms and molecules to these gargantuan numbers or, alternatively, shows the mathematical analysis to be radically flawed, these scientists have good reason to "rub it in" at the expense of their not-so-scientific colleagues. As Hoyle and Wickramasinghe put it:

[90]Thaxton, p. 211.

[91]Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, p. 2.

[92]Waldemar Kaempffert, "Lecomte du Nouy, Scientist, States the Case for Faith" (review of *Human Destiny*), *The New York Times* (February 23, 1947), Section VII, 28.

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> The usual biological theory, a terrestrial organic soup plus a miraculous assembly of complex biochemicals leading to the origin of life, is an attempt to maintain an essentially pre-Copernican position with the Earth as the biological centre of the universe.[93]

As Hoyle says elsewhere, the chance of the orthodox theory being correct can be compared to the probability that "a tornado sweeping through a junkyard might assemble a Boeing 747."[94]

The second challenge is related to the first. Many biologists, impatient with the orthodox theory, which they view as little better than an outmoded, unhelpful dogma, invoke the principle of an "automatic self-ordering" of the biochemicals necessary for life. In fact, we now know that amino acids in some sense do "order themselves." They do so stereochemically, that is, because their shapes allow for only a certain limited number of sequences. As Sidney Fox says, "Amino acids contain their own instructions for their own sequences."[95] Fox believes that "evolutionary direction is rooted in the shapes of molecules, in stereochemistry,"[96] and that "evolutionary processes at all stages are nonrandom."[97]

It might look, at first, as if stereochemistry superseded the hypothesis of a creative intelligence as a way of accounting for evolution. One might advance the notion that, since amino acids *organize themselves* into the all-important enzymes, then we need not postulate an organizer external to, or in any way transcendent of, the amino acids. This is essentially what one philosopher of science, John A. Schumacher of Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute, has done. Taking his cue from physicist David Bohm's notion of "unbroken and undivided totality,"[98] Schumacher believes that "matter is in some way self-organizing, although there is no reference here, nor need there be, to a being who wills it—it is undesigned."[99] But Schumacher's thesis has, we believe, a fatal flaw. Note his use of the phrase "in some way." This little phrase crops up frequently in his work. Does he assume that amino acids are intelligent and *group themselves together by design* in order to give rise to enzymes? We seriously doubt that he believes this. But then what *does* account for the nonrandom "self-ordering" of these basic building blocks? What has given them the shapes which so fortuitously bring about this ordering? Fox gives us no hint. Neither does Schumacher. We believe, with Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, both of whom are well aware of the serendipitous surface shapes of enzymes, that the ultimate explanation lies in an ordering intelligence. It is this which set up the physical laws and made the adjustments necessary for an evolving universe.

The third challenge claims, as a reviewer of Lecomte's book put it, that the theory of a universal creative intelligence is "swallowing a greater mystery so as to force down and not choke on a lesser one" (this lesser one being evolution by

[93]Hoyle and Wickramasinghe, p. 138.

[94]Quoted in Rifkin, p. 152.

[95]Sidney W. Fox, "From Inanimate Matter to Living Systems," *The American Biology Teacher* (March, 1981), 133.

[96]*Ibid.*, pp. 134–35.

[97]*Ibid.*, p. 134.

[98]D. Bohm, "Quantum Theory as an Indication of a New Order. Part B. Implicate and Explicate Order in Physical Law," *Foundations of Physics* (1973), p. 149.

[99]John A. Schumacher, "Prolegomena to Any Future Inquiry: The Paradigm of Undivided Wholeness," *International Philosophical Quarterly* (December, 1981), 449.

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random shuffling).[100] But this claim is dogmatic and rather mindless. What is so outlandishly farfetched about the notion of a master-mind designing and overseeing the universe? This possibility strikes us as eminently plausible. Nor is it in the least surprising that we would be unable to see, or in any other way directly sense, this being, since it would be most unlikely, given the size of the universe, that he or she would live Right Next Door (or even, for that matter, "in" the universe).

The last challenge is, strange to say, psychological in nature. It is also, we feel, the root cause of modern science's rejection of a creative, ordering superintelligence. Fifty years ago, the great science writer J.W.N. Sullivan wrote that the reason why this theory is rejected out of hand is that it "introduces an unaccountable break in the chain of causation, and therefore cannot be admitted as part of science unless it is quite impossible to reject it."[101] In other words, an ordering intelligence would be a discontinuity, and the idea of nature as a "seamless web of causal connections,"[102] all of which are in principle discoverable and understandable, would have to be given up.

Even though scientists have recently had to make peace with two other enormous discontinuities, namely, the Big Bang and the quantum, they are extremely loath to do so with respect to a creative intelligence. But note how illogical they are. In their own way they are being as "religious" as those they scorn. What *reason* do they have to reject a universe which has been designed, created, and guided? They have none that holds up. What they have instead is a fervent *desire, preference, passion* for a universal seamless causation. This desire is certainly no more scientific than the opposite desire to worship "God the Father, the Creator of heaven and earth." Moreover, we have very good reasons for believing that DNA could not have evolved from "the accidental collocation of atoms," as Bertrand Russell once put it, whereas there is no good reason *not* to believe that intelligence is behind the evolution of DNA.

All in all, the biochemical argument, with an assist from the probability calculus, is a most imposing argument for the existence of a universal creative intelligence. In conjunction with the arguments centering on the physical constants (see the second argument, considered earlier) and on the inadequacy of Neo-Darwinism's doctrine of gradualism (our third argument), this last acquires even stronger force; just as three sticks held together in a bunch are harder to break as a module than each by itself. We can liken the argument to the reasoning process of an archaeologist. He sees no designer, no maker, no orderer physically laid out alongside the chard that he uncovers. If he finds only one chard, dirty and worn, he might wonder if it is after all merely a strangely shaped rock, an anomaly. But if he finds two others alongside the first, he confidently infers a designer, though the designer is never seen. Why should we not do this with respect to the earth (and, by extension, the universe)?

We are struck by the way that the old notion of a "God of the gaps"—a God needed to explain a diminishing number of mysteries, until at some time in the future He Himself fades away when the last mystery is unfolded—has been stood

[100]Newman, p. 26.
[101]Quoted in Thaxton, p. 201.
[102]Thaxton, p. 201.

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on its head. The gaps are proving to be more and more resistant to conventional scientific theory. It is as if they are fighting back, resisting closure, frustrating every attempt to bridge them, and widening in the process. If anything, science nowadays is creating new gaps, not closing old ones. We find ourselves wondering if the term "God of the gaps" may someday be used not by atheists to make fun of theists but by theists to remind atheists of the facts. In the meantime, we have on our hands a formidable teleological argument for the existence of a creative supermind.

With that, we come to the last question that we must treat.

WHAT GOD MIGHT BE

If our argument is sound, if we are justified in concluding that a supermind exists, can we say anything about what He, She, or It might be? Might It be something so impersonal that, besides its consciousness and computational skills, there is nothing else at all to which we can relate? Or might She be a Cosmic Mother who loves her creatures, especially her more intelligent species, analogously to the way we love our children, and who is as perfect in goodness as She is immense and unfathomable in her intelligence? Or is He a Cosmic Scientist experimenting with life forms in his laboratory, which we call the universe—a God neither loving nor callous by nature, but exceedingly curious? Does this God pre-exist the universe and create it out of nothing, or coexist everlastingly alongside it? Does this God suffuse our beings, and can we experience Her within, as the mystics of all the great religions have proclaimed? Is this God essentially spiritual, and does He have a body, perhaps the universe itself, as the Hindu theologian Ramanuja supposed?[103] Or is God an all-comprehending Absolute that specifies Itself in conscious persons, only to draw them back into unity with It in some ineffable perfection, as the modern philosopher J. N. Findlay thinks?[104] Does our argument help us answer such questions as these?

Strictly speaking, it doesn't. All it can do is point to the existence of a supermind behind nature's orderly, evolving processes. But there is a certain logic that we have been using throughout which, if applied to the question now before us, allows us to say more, if at great risk. We have seen in our investigation of biomolecular processes that there is good reason to believe that the significantly greater does not *randomly* come forth out of the significantly less. Simple amino acids, to be sure, are randomly generated, not surprisingly, by inorganic compounds; but the *significantly* greater (because vastly more complex) enzymes have never revealed how they might be randomly generated by the amino acids. Indeed it seems there is no way they *could* have been generated without the help of intelligent orchestration.

In order to learn more about the *nature* of the proposed supermind, let's indulge in a little speculation and see where it takes us. We have just seen that there is good reason to think that the significantly greater cannot evolve unaided from the significantly less. Now let's postulate that it is a *universal law* that the

[103]See Ramanuja, *The Vedanta-Sutra with the Commentary of Ramanuja*, 2nd ed., trans. George Thibaut (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1966).

[104]See Especially J. N. Findlay, *Ascent to the Absolute* (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1970), Chapters I–III.

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significantly greater cannot be generated by the significantly less, and then apply it to the supermind, which is exponentially, perhaps even infinitely greater than we are. Would it not be a violation of this law if so much moral goodness as appears in this world were to exceed the goodness of the supermind? Consider for a moment the world we live in. We occasionally meet Mahatmas, more frequently little old ladies who unfailingly greet us with cheerful smiles in spite of severe arthritis. Not only is there much nobility and goodness in our own species; there is also a reverence for truth and a love of beauty. Beauty, truth, and goodness: those three fundamental values of the Greeks. Do large numbers of human beings significantly surpass the supermind in these "constants of the spirit?" This would have to be so if the supermind were merely a mind. We, its creations, would significantly surpass it in the area of values. It would have succeeded in creating a good that it knows nothing of, and the law that the significantly greater cannot come from the significantly less would have been violated.

This universal law—if it in fact is a law, as I tentatively propose—has enormously important implications for our discussion of the supermind's nature. If such a law holds, then it would follow that the supermind must be superior to us, not only with respect to intelligence (which seems obvious), but in every other important way as well. That mind must be characterized by knowledge, power, beauty, goodness, and love to a degree not known to us mortals. If so, it must in some sense be personal (perhaps "superpersonal" is a better way of putting it), for such traits as goodness and love would seem to adhere only in that which is at least analogous to persons. Whether or not the supermind has these perfections to an *infinite* degree—whatever that might involve—cannot be predicted by our argument. Nonetheless, it is clear that we are not too far away from a God whom we can at least admire. And if admiration should grow to love—a not unnatural progression—then the God of the great theistic religions is not far away. Religion and science will have joined hands.

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ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of Philosophy of the University of Hawaii at Manoa and the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy are pleased to announce that under their sponsorship, and in cooperation with the East-West Center, a SIXTH EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHER'S CONFERENCE will be held in Honolulu July 30–August 12, 1989. The general theme of the Conference will be "Culture and Modernity." It will undertake to examine philosophically the principles of cultural change and the meaning of "modernity" (and "post-modernity") in both Western and Asian contexts within such areas as religion and art, law and ethics, science and technology. Approximately 100 philosophers will be invited to attend the Conference from countries in Asia, Europe, North and South America.

An International Committee under the chairmanship of Tu Wei-ming (Harvard) and a Local Committee to be chaired by Roger T. Ames (Hawaii) and a Steering Committee will assist Eliot Deutsch (Hawaii) who will be Director of the Conference.

For further information, write:
Director
Sixth East-West Philosopher's Conference
Department of Philosophy
2530 Dole Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822

Swedenborg Symposium '88. "Swedenborg and His Influence." From February 7–9, 1988, the Academy of the New Church will host an international symposium on Swedenborg and his influence. The seven sessions and banquet will include presentations by speakers from Australia, England, Germany, Sweden and the United States of America, on the following topics: Swedenborg & European Literature; Swedenborg & Science; Philosophy & Social Sciences; Swedenborg & The American Enlightenment; History; Religion; and the Arts. Write to: Dr. Jane K. Williams Hogan, Academy of the New Church College, Box 278, Bryn Athyn, PA 19009, USA.

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FEATURE BOOK REVIEW

The Anthropic Cosmological Principle. By John D. Barrow and Frank J. Tipler. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1986; New York: Oxford University Press, 1986, 706 pp. $29.95.

William Lane Craig

The authors of this breath-takingly rich and comprehensive study characterize it as a challenge to the twentieth century dogma, usually called the Copernican Principle, that man occupies no special place in the universe (pp. xi, 600–01). Against this dogma they oppose the so-called Anthropic Principle, which holds that our observations of the universe are conditioned by our own existence such that the universe cannot be observed to possess properties incompatible with our past evolution and present being. In order to demonstrate this conviction, the authors carefully delineate various versions of the Anthropic Principle, review the historical development of the teleological argument, out of which they believe the Principle developed, and survey the range of modern science, including the fields of physics and astrophysics, classical cosmology, quantum mechanics, and biochemistry, in order to illustrate the operation of the Principle, applying it finally to questions of extra-terrestrial intelligence and physical eschatology.

The project they set themselves is monumental, and one cannot but stand in awe of the breadth and depth of their inquiry. Indeed, I find it difficult to believe that two physicists could produce so wide-ranging a volume as this. Not only do they expound at length the complex conditions necessary for human life as revealed in the above various branches of science, but we also find learned disquisitions on economics, historiography, theology, philosophy, and artificial intelligence. One would naturally expect physicists to be thoroughly acquainted with the literature in their own field, but it is quite an eye-opener to find them citing sources so diverse as James Barr's *Biblical Words for Time*, S. E. Morison's *Portuguese Voyages to America in the Fifteenth Century*, and Friedrich Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealilsm!* (Interestingly, they advise the reader to *avoid* Nozick's *Philosophical Investigations*.) This is an admirable study and undoubtedly the most comprehensive yet produced on the controversial Anthropic Principle.

Divided into ten chapters which are in turn subdivided into sections, the book provides a neatly organized presentation of its wealth of material. One of the light-hearted features that make the book fun to read is the epigram which heads each section. For example, philosophers will appreciate the remark of an anonymous university president, "Why is it that you physicists always require so much expensive equipment? Now the Department of Mathematics requires nothing but money for paper, pencils, and wastepaper baskets, and the Department of Philosophy is better still. It doesn't even ask for wastepaper baskets" (p. 185). Or there is Steven Hawking's gem on quantum mechanics: "When I hear of Schrödinger's cat, I reach for my gun" (p. 458).

More fundamentally, however, the book falls naturally into two parts: the first three non-mathematical chapters are philosophical reflections on the role of teleology or final causes in science, coupled with a formulation and exposition of the importance of the Anthropic Principle. The remaining seven chapters marshall the data from the various fields of science in support of the authors' contention that the universe is uniquely suited

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for the evolution and existence of *homo sapiens* at this epoch in cosmic history. The book is thus structured much like William Paley's classic *Natural Theology*, which the authors hold in high esteem (pp. 76–82). Great portions of the second half of their work are so heavily mathematical in character that they will be impenetrable to anyone who is not trained in mathematical science. The book badly wants a concluding chapter, especially since there seems to be some confusion in the authors' development of their views, particularly on the implications of the Anthropic Principle for the argument for divine design. I found it useful to re-read the first three chapters after finishing the book, since this is where the authors' conclusions, along with the philosophical justification of those conclusions, really lie.

Before looking at the book's argument more closely, I cannot resist making one general point. The authors observe (quite correctly) that "scientists rarely take philosophers seriously" (p. 29), and I am afraid that Barrow and Tipler have not altogether freed themselves from this prejudice. Claiming to be cosmologists, not philosophers, the authors remark,

> Whereas philosophers and theologians appear to possess an emotional attachment to their theories and ideas which requires them to believe them, scientists tend to regard their ideas differently. They are interested in formulating many logically consistent possibilities, leaving any judgment regarding their truth to observation. Scientists feel no qualms about suggesting different but mutually exclusive explanations for the same phenomenon. The authors are no exception to this rule . . . (p. 15).

This naive dichotomy is simply untenable. One need not be a Kuhnian to recognize the role which subjective factors play in scientific theorizing. One has only to think of German physicists' rejection of Einstein's "Jewish" science, or the scientific community's black-balling of Immanuel Velikovsky for his (admittedly false) theories of catastrophism, or even the emotional reactions against Big Bang cosmology, which supplied the principal motivation behind development of steady state models, to realize that scientists are not the disinterested observers portrayed above. Perhaps the appearance of greater passion on the part of philosophers and theologians is due to the fact that they tend to deal with more ultimate questions than does the working scientist; but when scientists treat ultimate questions, they, too, become emotionally attached to their theories, and when philosophers and theologians discuss subordinate issues, they display the same openness to alternatives on which Barrow and Tipler pride themselves.

Before turning to an examination of the central thesis of the book, I wish to point out what seems to me the weakest section of the authors' treatment, viz., sec. 2.9 on the cosmological and ontological arguments. I was chagrined to learn that "There is a temporal version of the cosmological argument, . . . but as this version is easily demolished, no major theologian in the past thousand years has defended it" (p. 104). But this is to overlook al-Ghazali, St. Bonaventure, Locke, Kant (in his first antinomy), Bentley, Cantor (believe it or not!),[1] and in our own day Whitrow, not to mention more humble proponents. Similarly, one is surprised to hear that Antony Flew ranks as "the most profound of the contemporary critics of theism" (p. 104). The authors are impressed by Flew's attack on the Principle of Sufficient Reason; but neither they nor Flew ever consider whether the series of reasons might not terminate in a being whose existence is self-explained, as Leibniz held. Their discussion of the ontological argument knows nothing of the work of Alvin Plantinga, and their argument that the proposition "Something exists" may be necessarily true is based on a woefully defunct verificationist understanding of "to exist." Most disturbing, however, is their claim (p. 121) that most modern, philosophically-minded

[1]Georg Cantor, letter of 1887, cited in H. Meschkowski, *Probleme des Unendichen: Werk und Leben Georg Cantors* (Braunschweig: Friedrick Vieweg und Sohn, 1967), pp. 125–26.

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theologians are panentheists! Indeed, they assert that it is difficult to find a philosopher or theologian who really believes in theism anymore (p. 122). I wonder to whom they have been talking. What about Plantinga, Mavrodes, Adams, Alston, Swinburne, Stump, Flint, Morris, Freddoso, Davis, Yandell, and so forth? Certainly, process theology has grown; but the majority of philosophers of religion are theists.

These matters aside, we come to the heart of Barrow and Tipler's concern: to formulate and draw out the implications of the Anthropic Principle. They distinguish at least three versions of this principle:

> Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP): The observed values of all physical and cosmological quantities are not equally probable, but they take on values restricted by the requirement that there exist sites where carbon-based life can evolve and by the requirement that the Universe be old enough for it to have already done so (p. 15).
>
> Strong Anthropic Principle (SAP): The Universe must have those properties which allow life to develop within it at some stage in its history (p. 21).
>
> Final Anthropic Principle (FAP): Intelligent information-processing must come into existence in the Universe, and, once it comes into existence, it will never die out (p. 23).

Barrow and Tipler regard WAP are incontrovertibly true, while SAP and FAP are "quite speculative" and, therefore, should not be regarded as well-established principles of science (p. 23).

According to their analysis, the Anthropic Principle evolved out of the traditional design argument for God's existence, particularly one version of that argument. They distinguish between teleological arguments and eutaxiological arguments for design (p. 29). Teleological versions of the design argument tried to show that nature was adapted to fulfill an anthropocentric purpose, but eutaxiological versions were based on the presence of discernable order and mutual harmony in nature in abstraction from any anthropocentric purpose being in view (p. 44). Barrow and Tipler contend that while Darwinian evolution undermined the teleological version of the design argument, the eutaxiological version grew into the Anthropic Principle, the WAP most resembling it and the FAP being most similar to the teleological version.

Now while I think such a distinction within the design argument could be drawn, it seems to me to be in the end untenable. The teleology of the classic design argument was not the anthropocentric type ridiculed by Voltaire, e.g., that noses were located beneath the eyes so as to support spectacles. Rather, it held simply that nature evinces adaptation of means to ends, e.g., that the eye is constructed for the purpose of sight, and that adaptation transcends the productive capacity of natural causes. Hence, a supernatural cause is required. One of the greatest contributions of Barrow and Tipler's book is their demonstration that despite the "violent hostility" of modern science to teleology and final causes in nature (p. 123), this sort of teleological reasoning has led to correct predictions and sometimes obtained results which non-teleological methods could not obtain, e.g., Harvey's discovery of the human circulatory system (pp. 52–3), Maupertuis's variational principles of mechanics (p. 65), and a number of discoveries in embryology on the part of the remarkable school of nineteenth-century German biologists known as teleomechanists (pp. 74–5). In fact, Barrow and Tipler show that even contemporary biology cannot really get along with teleological language, but that teleology is simply reinterpreted in terms of *natural* teleology, i.e., structures serve a purpose, but they were not constructed for this purpose under the guidance of a complex nervous system, being rather the indeterminate or fortuitous result of natural selection acting on mutations (pp. 134–5, 140). Thus, teleology has been abandoned, but teleological language retained. Barrow and Tipler, despite their defense of the value of teleological reasoning in the past, seem content to let it go by the board so long as they can retain eutaxiology. For, by means of such reasoning

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we can inquire into the complex set of conditions necessary for the evolution and existence of human observers.

But the problem with this approach is that anthropic eutaxiology seems every bit as teleological and even more anthropocentric than the old teleology. For the whole project of the Anthropic Principle is to account in some way for the fact that the universe appears to be incredibly fine-tuned for the existence of human life on earth at this point in cosmic history. Thus, for example, the authors endorse the conclusion of Lawrence Henderson, whose work still forms the foundation for the application of the Anthropic Principle to biochemistry, that the properties of matter are in a teleological sense a preparation for life in the universe (p. 147; cf. pp. 143–4). That Henderson remained agnostic about a Designer does not annul the fact that eutaxiology is anthropocentric in character (we are not, after all, concerned to explain the properties the universe must possess to produce, say, the structure of a crystal) and teleological (the complex nexus of necessary conditions make it appear that the universe was prepared for man). That is why teleology and eutaxiology were never distinguished in the classic design arguments. What happened, historically, is that the biological examples of teleology were undermined by Darwinian evolution, leaving the non-biological examples of teleology from astronomy and physics standing on their own. These, then, served as the basis for what F. R. Tennant called "wider teleology," and the Anthropic Principle represents an attempt to come to grips with this wider teleology.

Not that Barrow and Tipler are endorsing a design argument; on the contrary, although scientists hostile to teleology are apt to interpret this book as sympathetic to theism, and although I have already seen this book cited by two prominent philosophers of religion in support of the teleological argument, I am convinced that the thrust of the book is fundamentally anti-theistic. The Anthropic Principle is essentially an attempt to complete the job, begun by Darwinian evolution, of dismantling the teleological argument by showing that the appearance of design in the physical and cosmological quantities of the universe is just that: an *appearance* due to the self-selection factor imposed on our observations by our own existence. If Barrow and Tipler are correct, then the wider teleological argument of Tennant proves no more effective than the narrow teleological argument of his predecessors.

That leads to a consideration of WAP itself. As the authors state it, there is an imprecision in the first clause, and I think that they really mean to say, "The observed quantities of not all physical and cosmological quantities are equally probable," since one of the uses of WAP is to help distinguish those quantities which depend on anthropocentric selection from those which do not (p. 4), whereas their present statement requires *all* quantities take on values restricted by such selection.

Now Barrow and Tipler regard WAP as "in no way speculative or controversial" (p. 16), since it is "just a restatement . . . of one of the most important and well-established principles of science: that it is essential to take into account the limitations of one's measuring apparatus when interpreting one's observations" (p. 23). For example, if we were calculating the fraction of galaxies that lie within certain ranges of brightness, our observation would be biased toward the brighter ones, since we cannot see the dim ones so easily. Or again, a ratcatcher may say that all rats are bigger than six inches because that is the size of his traps. Similarly, any observed properties of the universe which may initially appear astonishingly improbable can only be seen in their true perspective after we have accounted for the fact that certain properties could not be observed by us, were they to obtain, because we can only observe those compatible with our own existence. "The basic features of the Universe, including such properties as its shape, size, age, and laws of change must be *observed* to be of a type that allows the evolution of observers, for if intelligent life did not evolve in an otherwise possible universe, it is obvious that no one would be asking the reason for the observed shape, size, age, and so forth of the universe"

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(pp. 1–2). Thus, our own existence acts as a selection effect in assessing the various properties of the universe. For example, a life form which evolved on an earthlike planet "must necessarily see the Universe to be at least several billion years old and . . . several billion light years across," for this is the time necessary for production of the elements essential to life and so forth (p. 3).

Now, we might ask, why is the "*observed*" in the quotation in the previous paragraph italicized? Why not omit the word altogether? The answer is that the resulting statement

1. The basic features of the universe must be of a type that allows the evolution of observers

is undoubtedly false; for it is not logically or nomologically necessary that the universe embrace intelligent life. Rather what seems to be necessarily true is

2. If the universe is observed by observers which have evolved within it, then its basic features must be of a type that allows the evolution of observers within it.

But (2) seems quite trivial; it does nothing to explain why the universe in fact has the basic features it does.

But Barrow and Tipler contend that while (2) appears true, but trivial, it has "far-reaching implications" (p. 2). For the implication of WAP, which they seem to interpret along the lines of (2), is that no explanation of the basic features of the universe need be sought. This contention seems to be intimately connected with what is appropriate to be *surprised at*. The implication of WAP is that we ought not to be surprised at observing the universe to be as it is, for if it were not as it is, we could not observe it. For example, "No one should be surprised to find the Universe to be as large as it is" (p. 18). ". . . on Anthropic grounds, we should expect to observe a world possessing precisely three spatial dimensions" (p. 247). Or again,

> We should emphasize once again that the enormous improbability of the evolution of intelligent life in general and *Homo sapiens* in particular does *not* mean we should be amazed we exist at all. This would make as much sense as Elizabeth II being amazed she is Queen of England. Even though the probability of a given Briton being monarch is about 10^{-8}, *someone* must be. Only if there *is* a monarch is it possible for the monarch to calculate the improbability of her particular existence. Similarly, only if an intelligent species does evolve is it possible for its members to ask how probable it is for an intelligent species to evolve. Both are examples of WAP self-selection in action.[110]

[110]F. B. Salisbury, *Nature* 224, 342 (1969), argued that the enormous improbability of a given gene, which we computed in the text, means that a gene is too unique to come into being by natural selection acting on chance mutations. WAP self-selection refutes this argument, as R. F. Doolittle in *Scientists confront creationism*, L. R. Godfrey (Norton, NY, 1983) has also pointed out (pp. 566, 575).

Here we have a far-reaching implication that goes considerably beyond the apparently trivial WAP. Accordingly, although the authors conflate WAP and the implications thought to follow from it, I want to distinguish these sharply and shall refer to these broader implications as the Anthropic Philosophy. It is this philosophical viewpoint, rather than WAP itself, that, I believe, despite initial impressions, stands diametrically opposed to the teleological argument and constitutes scientific naturalism's most recent answer to that argument. According to the Anthropic Philosophy, an attitude of surprise at the delicately balanced features of the universe essential to life is inappropriate; we should expect the universe to look this way. While this does not explain the origin of those features, it shows that no explanation is necessary. Hence, to posit a divine Designer is gratuitous.

Now it needs to be emphasized that what the Anthropic Philosophy does *not* hold,

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despite the sloppy statements on this head often made by scientists, is that our existence as observers explains the basic features of the Universe. The answer to the question "Why is the universe isotropic?" given by Collins and Hawking, ". . . the isotropy of the Universe is a consequence of our existence" (p. 419) is simply irresponsible and brings the Anthropic Philosophy into undeserved disrepute, for literally taken, such an answer would require some form of backward causation whereby the conditions of the early universe were brought about by us acting as efficient causes merely by our observing the heavens. Unfortunately, Barrow and Tipler, though generally careful to avoid this way of speaking, do sometimes lapse: "The Anthropic Principle in each of its various forms attempts to restrict the structure of the Universe by asserting that intelligent life . . . in some way selects out the actual Universe from among the different imaginable Universes . . ." (p. 510). But WAP neither asserts nor implies this; rather WAP holds that we must *observe* the universe to possess certain features (not that the universe must possess certain features) and the Anthropic Philosophy says that, therefore, these features ought not to surprise us or cry out for explanation. The self-selection effect affects our observations, not the basic features of the universe itself. If the Anthropic Philosophy held that the basic features of the universe were themselves brought about by our observations, then it could be rightly dismissed as fanciful. But the Anthropic Philosophy is much more subtle: it does not try to explain *why* the universe has the basic features it does, but contends that no explanation is *needed*, since we should not be surprised at observing what we do, our observations of those basic features being restricted by our own existence as observers.

But does the Anthropic Philosophy follow from the Anthropic Principle, as Barrow and Tipler claim? Let us concede that it follows from WAP that

3. We should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our own existence.

For, if the features of the universe were incompatible with our existence, we should not be here to notice it. Hence, it is not surprising that we do not observe such features. Letting *S*: serve as an operator expressing "we should be surprised that," we may schematize (3) as

$3'.\sim S\colon (x)\,[(Fx\cdot\sim Cx)\supset\sim O_x]$

where *F* is "is a feature of the universe," *C* is "is compatible with our existence," and *O* is "is observed by us." But the question arises, does it also follow from WAP or (3) that

4. We should not be surprised that we observe only features of the universe which are compatible with our own existence.

It might be argued that (4) does not follow from WAP or (3). Consider the following situation (borrowed from John Leslie): you are dragged before a firing squad of 100 trained marksmen, all of them with rifles aimed at your heart, to be executed. The command is given; you hear the deafening sound of the guns. *And you observe that you are still alive*, that all of the 100 marksmen missed! Now it might well be maintained that while it is true that

5. You should not be surprised that you do not observe that you are dead,

nonetheless it is equally true that

6. You should be surprised that you do observe that you are alive.

Since the firing squad's missing you altogether is extremely improbable, the surprise

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expressed in (6) is wholly appropriate, though you are not surprised that you do not observe that you are dead, since if you were dead you could not observe it. Similarly, while we should not be surprised that we do not observe features of the universe which are incompatible with our existence, it is nevertheless true that

7. We should be surprised that we do observe only features of the universe which are compatible with our existence,

in view of the enormous improbability, demonstrated repeatedly by Barrow and Tipler, that the universe should possess such features.

But the defender of the Anthropic Philosophy has a possible rejoinder. We may schematize (7) as

7′. S: (x) [(Fx·Ox)⊃Cx]

But by contraposition, we see that the proposition at which we should not be surprised in (3′) is logically equivalent to the proposition at which we should be surprised in (7′):

3″. ~S: (x) [(Fx·Ox)⊃Cx]

Since (7′) and (3″) are thus contradictory, one cannot accept the truth of (3′) without also rejecting (7′) in favor of

8.~S: (x)[(Fx·Ox)⊃Cx]

One difficulty with this response is that doxastic contexts such as that expressed by S are notoriously difficult to analyze. For example, I may believe some proposition p, and p may entail q, but I may not believe q. In the present case, is it obvious that if I should not be surprised at p, and p entails q, that I should not be surprised at q? The illustration above might well lead us to deny this.

In fact, however, no such gambit need be played. For what does the falsity of (7) really mean? As (8) reveals more clearly, all the denial of (7) is saying is that we should not be surprised that *if* we observe features of the universe, then they are compatible with our own existence. But this hypothetical proposition is, indeed, not surprising and not what we meant to express as the object of our surprise. Rather what we are surprised at is that *there are* the basic features of the universe, which we observe, that is to say,

9. We should be surprised that we do observe features of the universe which are compatible with our existence.

We may schematize (9) as

9′·S: (∃ x) (Fx·Cx·Ox)

But the truth of (3) does not imply the falsity of (9), since subimplication does not hold in first order predicate logic. Since (3) and (9) are logically compatible, the attempt of the Anthropic Philosophy to stave off our surprise at the basic features of the universe fails. It does not after all follow from WAP that our surprise at the basic features of the universe is unwarranted or inappropriate and that they do not, therefore, cry out for explanation. But which features of the universe should thus surprise us?—those which are necessary conditions of our existence and which seem extremely improbable or whose coincidence seems extremely improbable. Thus, we should amend (9) to read

9*. We should be surprised that we do observe basic features of the universe which individually or collectively are excessively improbable and are necessary conditions of our own existence.

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Against (9*), both the WAP and the Anthropic Philosophy are impotent. But which features are these specifically? Read Barrow and Tipler's book. Once this central fallacy is removed, their volume becomes for the design argument in the twentieth century what Paley's *Natural Theology* was in the nineteenth, viz., a compendium of the data of contemporary science which point to a design in nature inexplicable in natural terms and, therefore, pointing to the Divine Designer.

But one can go farther than this. For while (2) seems necessarily true, WAP may not be true at all. For WAP assumes uncritically that *homo sapiens* has in fact evolved through a lineage traceable all the way back to the origin of life in the pre-biotic soup and that this macro-evolutionary process proceeded without divine superintendence solely in terms of the action of natural selection upon random mutations and that the universe is old enough to have permitted this to happen. But this assumption seems questionable, to say the least. Barrow and Tipler themselves calculate in a remarkable section (8.7) that the expected time which it would take for intelligent life to evolve is longer than the time in which the sun remains a main sequence star (pp. 558–9). But *homo sapiens* has had less time to evolve than the sun's main sequence lifetime. Listing ten unique and very improbable steps necessary for the evolution of an intelligent species, Barrow and Tipler conclude, ". . .there has developed a general consensus among evolutionists that the evolution of intelligent life, comparable in information-processing ability to that of *Homo sapiens*, is so improbable that it is unlikely to have occurred on any other planet in the entire visible universe"(p. 133). But if this is the case, the suspicion must arise, how can we be so sure that we did so evolve here? Although Barrow and Tipler never answer that question, two things may be safely said: (i) there is no incontrovertible evidence that such macro-evolution did occur on earth, and (ii) the suggested mechanisms of natural selection and random mutation have not been proved capable of providing the driving force responsible for macro-evolution. It is difficult to avoid the feeling that naturalistic macro-evolution is the presupposition rather than the conclusion of current evolutionary biology. Thus, the WAP may well be false when it asserts that the age of the universe is such as to be compatible with the evolution of intelligent observers; the evidence suggests the opposite. So while the universe is delicately balanced so as to sustain intelligent life at this epoch, it may well lack conditions necessary for its naturalistic evolution. This means that the traditional teleological argument may be much more robust than Barrow and Tipler are willing to concede. For we not only have the so-called anthropic evidence for design, but also the less certain, but as yet unrefuted, biological evidence for design.

Barrow and Tipler contend, however, that "careful thinkers" would not today "jump so readily" to a Designer, for (i) the modern viewpoint stresses time's role in nature; but since an unfinished watch does not work, arguments based on omnipresent harmony have been abandoned for arguments based on co-present coincidences; and (ii) scientific models aim to be realistic, but are in fact only approximations of reality; so we hesitate to draw far-reaching conclusions about the nature of ultimate reality from models that are at some level inaccurate (p. 30). But Barrow and Tipler seem unduly diffident here. A careful thinker will not readily jump to any conclusion, but why may he not infer a Divine Designer after a careful consideration of the evidence? Point (i) is misleading, since the operations of nature always work; at an earlier time (on the evolutionary view) nature is not like an *unfinished* watch, rather it is just a *less complex* watch. In any case, the most powerful design argument will appeal to *both* present adaptedness *and* co-present coincidences. Point (ii) loses much of its force in light of two considerations: (a) this is a condition that affects virtually all our knowledge, which is to say that it affects none of it in particular, so that our only recourse is simply to draw conclusions based on what we determine most accurately to reflect reality; fortunately, the evidence at issue here is rather concrete and so possesses a high degree of objectivity; (b) Barrow and Tipler do not feel compelled to exercise such restraint when proposing metaphysically speculative, but naturalistic, ac-

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counts of the universe's basic features, e.g., their defense of the "many worlds" interpretation of quantum physics or scenarios for the origin of the universe *ex nihilo*, which leads one to suspect that a double standard is being employed. Hence, I see no reason why a careful thinker may not, on the basis of the teleological argument, today infer the existence of a supernatural intelligence which designed the universe.

This leads me to some final, brief comments on Barrow and Tipler's further metaphysical speculations. As one reads this book, it eventually becomes clear that the Anthropic Philosophy is more than just an attempt to turn back the renewed force of the teleological argument. Rather it is an attempt to erect an alternative naturalistic metaphysic in the place of the classical theistic metaphysic. This judgment may sound needlessly unsympathetic, but it is hard to deny that this is the thrust of the book as a whole. Take *creatio ex nihilo*, for example, the paradigm case of an exclusively divine act in traditional metaphysics. In their section on this subject (6.14), Barrow and Tipler endorse the Hartle-Hawking model according to which the universe came into being uncaused out of nothing by a quantum transition from non-being into being (pp. 443–4). But whatever other scientific problems might be raised with this model, such a theory is surely metaphysically absurd. In the case of the Hartle-Hawking model, one has only to deny the analogy between the standard quantum mechanical analysis of a particle's going from the event (x, t) to the event (x', t') and their analysis of the universe's going from nothing to its present state of being. (If the model means only to describe the transition from the point of singularity to points within spacetime, as Tipler seems to suggest in personal correspondence, then this is not a case of *creatio ex nihilo* after all, since the singularity is something.) Nor is such a denial arbitrary; as Aquinas rightly saw, creation is neither a motion nor even a substantial change, since there is nothing which endures from the first state to the second state (*Summa contra gentiles*, 2.17). Hence, there can be no question of the universe's "going" from a state of nothingness to a state of existence, on the analogy of a particle's going from one spatial point to another. But once this analogy is denied, the model is vitiated.

Or take Barrow and Tipler's enthusiasm for Everett's "many worlds" interpretation of quantum physics. They rightly reject the traditional Copenhagen Interpretation of Bohr as "dynamically ridiculous," (p. 496) but they do not go far enough in examining critically Bohr's philosophical presuppositions. For example, according our authors, "Adopting the empiricist principle that what cannot be measured, even in principle, cannot be said to exist, Bohr therefore denied reality to the notions of electron position and electron momentum prior to their measurement" (p. 461). But why concede such a counter-intuitive and positivistic principle as that? It is, no doubt, indefensible, and yet it is crucial to Bohr's interpretation. Now Einstein and others did challenge Bohr, of course, but Barrow and Tipler's report of Bell's work on the so-called EPR experiment proposed by Einstein is of too summary a nature to facilitate critical examination (but see this journal 18 [1978]). In any case, this leads to a discussion of the disquieting situation of Schrödinger's cat, which is neither dead nor alive until an observer observes it. Barrow and Tipler list five ways to avoid an infinite regress of observers of observers of observers: (i) solipsism, (ii) any being with consciousness can collapse quantum wave functions by observations, (iii) a community of such beings can collectively collapse wave functions, (iv) there is an Ultimate Observer who collapses wave functions, or (v) wave functions never collapse because a multiplicity of worlds exists in which all logically possible alternative quantum states are actualized. Barrow and Tipler opt for (v). But (if we play along this far) why not adopt (iv), the Ultimate Observer being God, who created and designed the universe? Barrow and Tipler, unfortunately, think of such an observer as existing at a final singularity in the future at which all wave functions finally collapse. But this does not follow. The Ultimate Observer could be a non-embodied Mind which transcends space, and which could exist timelessly or in a globally defined cosmic time (see pp. 627–8, 660), so that he "observes" at any t everything happening in the universe at t. Being immaterial, of himself

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He has no quantum states to observe. Thus, he could collapse wave functions successively indefinitely. Moreover, although the Copenhagen Interpretation assumes that present observations cannot collapse wave functions in the future (p. 471), God in virtue of His foreknowledge could do precisely that, so that a sequential collapse is unnecessary. In fact, in virtue of His omniscience, God as He existed without creation had already collapsed all wave functions in the history of the universe, so that this did not need to be done subsequent to creation.

If this sounds metaphysically extravagant, what about the "many worlds" interpretation defended by Barrow and Tipler? According to this view, observations somehow "split" the observer, or the measuring apparatus, into alternative universes each equally real, so that all possibilities are actualized. It is difficult to take such an idea seriously. Einstein said that he would not believe that a mouse could split the universe by observing it. Our authors retort that really only the mouse, not the universe, splits. Oh, well, in *that* case . . . ! (I cannot help but wonder what the causal mechanism is which produces such metaphysically schizoid mice, or where the material comes from to make up the duplicate rodents.) More seriously, a remarkably similar view of the ontological status of possible worlds for handling modal locutions has been proposed by David Lewis, but most philosophers have rejected it as science fiction. One of the serious deficiencies of such a view, exposed by Plantinga, is that it regards the duplicate observers in these various worlds, not as the identical individual, but as *counterparts* of an individual, with the disturbing result that all an individual's properties become essential to him, and this seems outrageous (see *Nature of Necessity*, ch. 6). The same modal defect seems to befall the many worlds interpretation of quantum physics.

Finally, consider our authors' views on eschatology. They explain that carbon-based life, and hence, *homo sapiens* must eventually become extinct. But there is comfort—for though we shall die out, the sophisticated, computerized, self-replicating probes humankind shall build for the purpose of instellar exploration shall live on. When Barrow and Tipler explain that such a probe would be "an intelligent being in its own right, only made of metal rather than flesh and blood" and assure us that "the machine descendants of the naturally evolved species need not ever become extinct," but "could continue indefinitely (p. 595)," this is merely repugnant. But when they go on to say that "though our species is doomed, our civilization and indeed *the values we care about* may not be" because "from the behavioral point of view intelligent *machines* can be regarded as people. These machines may be our ultimate heirs, our ultimate descendants, because under certain circumstances they could survive forever (p. 616)," then this conclusion is pathetic. It represents the desperate effort of scientific naturalism to preserve some vestige of human dignity in the context of a world-view which finally spells the destruction of the ultimate meaning, value, and purpose of human life. And it is singularly unconvincing: one need only deny "the behavioral point of view" and its definition of what it means to be a person, and the rest of the structure collapses.

Hence, I think it is clear that the Anthropic Philosophy is a world-view which goes far beyond the Anthropic Principle, and from which it incorrectly claims to be implied. It is essentially a scientific naturalism which seeks to supplant the theistic metaphysic with an anthropocentric metaphysic. This fact is clearly illustrated from this book's beginning and ending. In the Foreword John Wheeler repeatedly employs expressions traditionally used of God but substitutes for "God" the words "universe" or "nature," e.g., "what is man that the universe should be mindful of him?" (p. vii; cf. Psalm 8.4); ". . . we find our attention gripped by marvel number one, this strange universe, in which we live and move and have our being" (p. ix; cf. Acts 17.28). And at the book's conclusion, as Barrow and Tipler explain how the intelligent descendants of *homo sapiens* become co-extensive with the universe as it approaches final singularity (or as they call it, the Omega Point), the authors' final words of the book are: "A modern day theologian might wish to say that the

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totality of life at the Omega Point is omnipotent, omnipresent, and omniscient (p. 682)!" I can think of an epigram which Barrow and Tipler did not use, but which might have served well on the frontispiece of their book: the serpent's words to man in Genesis 3.5: "Ye shall be as gods."

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ANNOUNCEMENT

LUBBOCK—Planning has begun for the C. S. Peirce Sesquicentennial International Congress, to be held at Harvard University in early Fall 1989. Peirce (1839–1914) is widely regarded as the most original and versatile native American intellect, and the Congress will be a major intellectual event, focussing on many aspects of his career and contributions. The Congress will particularly consider the relevance of his works for contemporary issues.

The Convening Organization is the Charles S. Peirce Society (an international scholarly organization founded in 1946); Organizing Institutions are Harvard University and Texas Tech University. An organizing committee has been formed, consisting of the following members: Hanna Buczynska-Garewicz (USA), Gerard Deledalle (France), Umberto Eco (Italy), Susan Haack (United Kingdom), Jaakko Hintikka (USA), Christian J. W. Kloesel (USA), Dan Nesher (Israel), Klaus Oehler (Federal Republic of Germany), Nicholas Rescher (USA), David Savan (Canada), Israel Scheffler (USA), and Michael Shapiro (USA). The President of the Congress is Hilary Putnam (Harvard University).

The Congress will end on 10 September 1989 (the sesquicentennial of Peirce's birthdate) and will feature both invited speakers and contributed papers. These may be on any aspect of Peirce's diverse intellectual career. A formal call for papers is planned for the near future. Additional details are not available at present. Persons wishing to be placed on the mailing list for news and announcements about the Congress may write to: Kenneth L. Ketner, Chairperson, Peirce Sesquicentennial International Congress Organizing Committee, Institute for Studies in Pragmaticism, 304K Library, Texas Tech University, Lubbock, TX 79409 USA (telephone 806 742 3128).

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BRIEFER BOOK REVIEWS

Streams of Experience: Reflections on the History and Philosophy of American Culture. By John J. McDermott. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1986. Pp. 260, plus index.

The context or setting of this insightful volume of essays is indeed a "fat" one, offering pre-theoretical, theoretical, and meta-theoretical perspectives. These are not neatly layered, nor is a reductionism possible, for McDermott proceeds simultaneously on all three fronts—talking about how people affectively *have* their experiences; conceptualizing these, using the works of Dewey and James; and finally, relating the specific context of American philosophy to a global context. Like its predecessor volume, *The Culture of Experience: Philosophical Essays in the American Grain*, this text celebrates what Emerson termed the "uniqueness of the commonplace." For McDermott, there is no final solution to life's problematic; the nectar, rather, is in the journey itself. Even further, "the pursuit of absolutes generates moral self-righteousness, fanaticism, violence, and, today, global terrorism" (p. 95). Differently stated, McDermott opts for context over foundationalism, suggesting that Emerson, later Royce, Dewey, and especially James "were committed to pluralism, a positive form of provincialism, tolerance, meliorism, a pragmatic epistemology and ethics, the necessity of mediation, and a skepticism about any form of ultimate salvation external to the human effort" (p. 96). In a contextual philosophy, reality, as relational rather than substantive, is ultimately not completely intelligible. Or, in phenomenological terms, "nothing, nothing is ever totally bracketed, for leaks are everywhere" (p. 142). Neither a complete optimism nor a complete pessimism is called for as a result of this realization (p. 103), but rather a meliorism which focuses on the recognizing, making, and nurturing of relations. We are, as Americans, "people for whom life is basically a journey, transient and worthy of meaning for its own sake" (p. 60). The human self is constantly projecting, interacting with its context(s), selecting, forging relations, sometimes successfully, sometimes not; "the active self is hydra-headed and brimming with sensorial capacities" (p. 57). It is these "relatings" which are constitutive of substances rather than vice-versa.

The text itself consists of some fourteen essays, having two major prongs of development. First, several essays focus on what is of distinctive importance in the *conceptualization* of experience undergone or had—as this conceptualization is found in the works of James, Dewey, and other thinkers in the classical American tradition. Second, several of the essays focus on the contemporary or future use, or the "pragmatic upshot" (p. 127) of these philosophic conceptualizations. More specifically, the American relational pluralistic, melioristic metaphysic is applied to: our experience of things—as affairs (p. 137); the education of our children—the task of pedagogy being to help others to make relations (p. 195); our experience of death—as the recognition and celebration of, but not merely the acceptance of, our temporality (p. 164 ff.); the significance of being handicapped—the latter being a condition which we as continuous with nature are all under to some degree (p. 212 ff.); and to the quality of our cities—as allowing and nurturing the development and seizing of city space and city time (p. 201 ff.).

In general, the message is clear, convincing, and exciting. We exist, as human beings, as probes, interacting with specific and multi-dimensional contexts; these change disjunctively and conjunctively, and such changes must be noted and adapted to. The forging of

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relationships is all important and life's meaning is in the forging. Two points remain to be noted. First, on a meta-theoretical level, McDermott clearly recognizes that, in a sense, our context is global; however he argues that "[w]orld culture is not a seamless garment knit together from a single bolt of cloth. It is plaid in fabric, with often frayed ends, missed stitches, and clashing colors" (p. 101). More important, McDermott does not advocate merely expanding the specific *content* of American philosophy to other contexts, but rather that the importance of context, as highlighted in James and Dewey for example, be employed as a model. "With creative and seminal philosophers, their own cultural setting accounts for the origin of their work. It does not however, account for its extensive influence. That influence is due rather to their ability to understand and transform their situation in a way which has distinctive meaning for world culture" (p. 224).

Second, on a personal level, McDermott does not shrink from applying his temporal outlook to himself. Each of us, as transient, *is* our weaving and interacting, is our making and contexting with the world—in short our relations. "The ancients," McDermott says, "had it right, bury the things with the person. We should do that again. Bury me with a copy of the *New York Times*, a Willie Mays baseball card, a bottle of Jameson, my William James book, a pipe, some matches, and a package of Seven-Seas tobacco" (p. 137). And, one might appreciatively add, with a copy of the present text, *Streams of Experience*. For here is truly a work which forges new relationships, while nurturing, streamlining and projecting old ones. If philosophy is a way of life and not only conceptual system-building, here is philosophy at its best.

University of Southern Maine *William J. Gavin*

Did Jesus Rise from the Dead? The Resurrection Debate. By Gary R. Habermas and Anthony G. N. Flew. Ed. by T. L. Miethe. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987. Pp. 190. $14.95.

This book contains the text of an actual debate between the two authors on May 2–3, 1985 with two judging panels. Habermas, a very conservative exegete, defended the historicity of the bodily resurrection of Jesus. Flew, a distinguished British philosopher, was agnostic about the resurrection and argued that, while the occurrence of a miracle is perhaps impossible to establish in general, the evidence for the resurrection of Jesus in particular is quite inadequate. The panel of philosophers voted 4 for Habermas and 1 for Flew; the panel of debate judges went 3 to 2 for Habermas. The editor asked for scholarly commentators (I have a vague memory that I received such a request), and three of them are included in the volume: Wolfhart Pannenberg, Charles Hartshorne, James I. Packer.

In my judgment Habermas clearly won the debate, but then I accept the bodily resurrection of Jesus. Having read this debate I am glad that I did not commit myself to a chapter of comment. A brief review is enough, for (without meaning to disparage the participants) it is a poor debate. It is not adequately edited: both participants repeat themselves over and over, and much should have been pruned.

Setting the tone, the introduction by the editor presents in a quotation the Christian claim that the Easter event demonstrated Jesus' divinity. I had the average Roman Catholic priest's apologetic course in the seminary; and in a very conservative context we were taught that miracles and the resurrection did not prove the divinity of Jesus, but only the reasonableness of accepting his claims and of believing in his divinity. My first and enduring impression, then, was and is of a lack of subtlety in this debate. On the same page of the introduction (xi) the editor seems to approve Flew's statement of the question: "Resurrection, or rising from the dead, in a thoroughly literal and physical way." Only much later in the volume is it made clear that the only eyewitness to the resurrection of

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Jesus who wrote about it and whose work we have preserved, namely Paul, understood resurrection not of a physical *(psychikos)* body but of a spiritual one.

As for the participants, Flew is weak on several scores. He showed little precise biblical knowledge, making both wrong and simplistic observations. For example, the authenticity of the message of the prophets, he asserts (8), was "endorsed by the conspicuous working of miracles"—an affirmation wrong in the cases of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and the minor prophets. He finds mutually contradictory the davidic genealogies of Matthew and Luke and the virgin birth—he seems not to know that in Judaism the father's recognition of the child constituted paternity. On the same page (9) he thinks that the idea of Jesus being the Messiah was enough to explain davidic descent and birth at Bethlehem—my *Birth of the Messiah* shows those issues to have been far more complicated. Philosophically, Flew's approach to miracles is a development of the objection of Hume, an approach that gives Habermas a chance to exploit the fairly obvious weaknesses of the Hume position. Nevertheless, both debaters are willing to work with miracle as an exception to the laws of nature, an understanding that has been rejected in most modern treatises on Gospel miracles. (Eventually Habermas does seek to relate the resurrection to the total person and work of Jesus, and thus moves closer to the ordinary modern exegetical view.)

Habermas knows the standard arguments for the historicity of corporeal resurrection and uses them effectively. I agree with 75% of what he has to say, even if much of what follows in this review is by way of criticism. In my judgment Habermas's presentation is marred by a combination of extreme literalism and a failure to provide primary evidence. Often he makes a point simply by listing the number of scholars who hold an opinion. I found disconcerting, even granted this tendency, that some of the citation was by indirection. Twice he mentions the important work of Keim (21, 46) but the reference he gives is not to Keim's works but to someone who quotes Keim. For his assertion that "Some early Jewish commentaries do indicate that Jews often understood the Servant of Isaiah 53 to be the Messiah" (41) no ancient Jewish work is listed but only a book of F. Aston, *The Challenge of the Ages*. In fact, I know no early Jewish work contemporary with or anterior to the New Testament that does identify the Servant and the Messiah. He cites my commentary on *The Gospel of John* to show that the apostle John is the chief contributor to the historical tradition behind the Gospel (55). Surely he knows that for the last ten years I have consistently said that this opinion of mine was wrong (Schnackenburg made a similar turnabout) and have written two books to the contrary. Flew unhappily appeals to the infancy narratives as offering evidence comparable in value to that supplied by the resurrection narratives. Habermas answers by saying (40) that Sherwin-White, an eminent Roman historian, defended (the Lucan version of) the Palestinian census. Yet he does not mention, and Flew does not point out, that an equally eminent Roman historian, R. Syme, for far better reasons, challenged the historicity of the Lucan account of the census.

I would judge that Flew overstates the lack of trustworthy evidence for Jesus' resurrection; yet the response of Habermas (43) that within 100–150 years after the birth of Christ 18 non-Christian sources mention Christ and early Christendom has nothing to do with the issue—thank heaven Flew (76) catches that fallacy. Those sources are evidence only of Christian existence and belief but no evidence whatsoever about the resurrection. Habermas (68–69) alludes to the archaeological evidence of the crucified man of Giv' at ha-Mivtar, but his description contains elements that for almost a decade have been publicly proved to be wrong. Because there is *some* eyewitness evidence preserved in the Gospels, Habermas assumes the accuracy of a physical description of the risen Jesus such as found in Luke 24:39–42. For him this first-level evidence shows that the appearance to Paul, who thinks of a nonphysical body, must be of another kind—a view that rightly distresses Pannenberg (131). The overall certitude of the presence of eyewitness evidence does not establish the historicity of individual facts so simply; each detail must be examined. My

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frustration with the argumentation came to a head when I saw that D. W. Beck's assumption that I John 1:1–4 had something to do with the resurrection issue (81) went unchallenged by Flew.

In sum, the debate described in this book is strangely *à coté*. No mention was made of the current objection to the corporeal resurrection of Jesus implicit in the works of D. Crossan, J. M. Robinson, H. Koester, R. Cameron and others, drawing heavily on the noncanonical gospels, especially the *Gospel of Peter*. It occurred to me that if one wanted to play *advocatus diaboli*, one might have asked Habermas how his reduction of the key resurrection arguments to four (facts about the death, conviction of the disciples as to literal appearances, the transformation of their lives, and Paul's conversion—see p. 25) could refute the Mormon claims understood *mutatis mutandis*. Without checking the exact details, if I remember correctly, men testified that they had lifted the tablets translated by Joseph Smith; their lives were transformed; Joseph Smith died for his claims; and (like Paul) the convert Brigham Young became the apostle par excellence of the claims of Smith. Indeed, 150 years later there are more Mormons than there were Christians 150 years after Jesus. Nevertheless, most of us believe the testimony of the NT to Jesus' corporeal resurrection and do not believe the Mormon interpretation of Joseph Smith's miraculous experience. The complexities of why such a diversity exists suggests that the good idea of holding a debate about the resurrection should the next time bring together an agnostic or nonbeliever who knows the biblical weaknesses more acutely and a believer who is a nonliteralist and does not overstate the evidence. Both the extent and the limitations of proof, along with the necessity of belief, might emerge more clearly from such a debate.

Union Theological Seminary (NYC) *Raymond E. Brown, S.S.*

Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality. Selected and translated with an Introduction by Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M. Washington, D.C. Catholic University of America Press, 1986. Pp. x + 543.

This book includes three main sections: Wolter's introductory essay defending the coherence and validity of Scotus' doctrine on the will and morality (3–29); introductory comments, explaining the points at issue and outlining the argument of the texts presented (31–123); and the Latin texts faced with their translations, which admittedly are not literal but provide a quasi-commentary (126–533). Thus Wolter's argument meets the reader four times. Most of the texts have not yet appeared in a modern, critical edition; they derive from the Wadding edition, some preliminary versions prepared by the Scotist Commission, and manuscripts consulted by Wolter. The texts are arranged in eight main sections: the will and intellect, the will and its inclinations, moral goodness, God and the moral law, the moral law in general, the intellectual and moral virtues, the love of God, self, and neighbor, and, finally, sin.

Wolter defends Scotus against accusations of an arbitrary voluntarism in morality. Actually Scotus consistently grounded moral judgments in right reason. God's existence can be proven by reason, and this infinite Being, *ordinatissime volens*, never acts contrary to right reason. The contingency of creation argues to God's perfect freedom as a power to cause opposites, but not simultaneously. Divine freedom possesses what is perfect in human freedom. As human freedom involves both a natural inclination, or affection, for what perfects its nature *(affectio commodi)* and an affection for justice proper to rational beings which allows man to love the good object for itself, Scotus saw this *libertas innata* as an essential component of the will and one which provides the ultimate specific difference that elevates a "rational appetite" and transforms it into a "free appetite." This liberty is an inclination, before an elicited act, that frees man from nature. Liberty comes to full perfection when the will determines itself according to this higher perfection, freely

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choosing a good for its intrinsic value. The first act of a well—ordered will is in accord with this affection for justice. Yet by God-given nature man is also called to perfection, i.e., to will what is to his advantage; so in ordered love *libertas innata* will include the *affectio commodi*, especially in the supernatural order where human perfection is attained in union with the Trinity and God wills that what He wills be loved by others; there *affectio commodi* will be perfected by infused hope, and the affection for justice by charity or sanctifying grace. Applied to God this means that He possesses the pure perfection of the will's affection for justice as well as the love of self implied in *affectio commodi*. In this sense there is a certain necessity in God's free love of Himself.

Dealing with creatures, Scotus saw that no limited goodness can act as the final case of God's creation; rather creation is a pure gift dependent on God's will for its existence and goodness. Just as creatures are intelligible because God knows them, so they are good because God loves them, not *vice versa*. Yet creation is not arbitrary. God is bound by His own affection for justice, if He creates, to create creatures fittingly according to their "essential goodness," giving them what their natures demand and ordering means to ends. For God to make things inordinately would be self-contradictory.

Besides natural goodness Scotus studied moral goodness where human freedom is liberated from the need to seek its own perfection by its affection for justice. This affection, guided by right reason, is bound to love God, the infinitely good object. But all other objects are to be chosen with regard for both their objective goodness and their attendant circumstances, including the actual intention of the moral subject. Thus an absolute obligation attaches itself to the first table of the decalogue, the first two commands by natural law, the third by divine positive law, explicitating how God is to be loved. Since the second table cannot be shown to be logically deducible from the basic obligation to love God nor absolutely connected with the attainment of man's supernatural end, these precepts represent only what is *valde consonans* with natural law. Right reason, if not misled by passion, can discover the moral laws. It need only know "the nature of the agent, the faculty by which he acts, and the essential notion of the act." Right reason can also allow dispensations from this law, when in less than ideal circumstances more harm than good would result from its rigorous observance. While thereby explaining certain Old Testament dispensations about divorce and bigamy, Scotus nonetheless recognized that God could not dispense from the entire second table at once lest human action lose all conformity to human nature. Clearly the font of moral obligation is not a nature striving for self-perfection but the will of a personal God.

Without doubt Scotus tried to preserve an inherent intelligibility in finite reality, that grounds a moral practice accessible to human reason, without constraining God to the limits of a finite reason. This delicate balance, however, was threatened when he distinguished the *affectio commodi*, a will rooted in nature's striving for self-perfection, from the *ingenita libertas* not bound by natural striving. If the latter is really directed by reason, this reason must likewise transcend nature or else it would lead freedom back into the bounds of nature. But if reason must transcend nature, to what is it bound and of what intellectual value are the universal concepts of nature? True, Scotus allowed for the intellectual grasp of *haeceitas*, but does not this permit individuality to be played off against the universal? If individuals have their own intelligibility beyond the universal, either the individual's intelligibility is to be understood in a series of relations among individuals, resulting in a *progressus ad infinitum* or an Hegelian Panlogism, or the individual does not let itself be subsumed under the universal and two types of reason emerge: one intuitive, the other conceptual. Scotus postulated a *natura absoluta* including individual and universal, but how does one get at it rationally? How might one rationally ground an exception to a universal moral law? If good and evil are recognized in the results of actions, how might one limit the results of any concrete action and how judge the good or the bad rationally unless by some formal, i.e., non-teleological, standard? For the

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absolute obligation of good intention before the infinite God does not allow itself to be transferred easily to finite objects of choice. Even more basically, what is the analogy between God's infinite reason, which must know universals and particulars in one intuition, with man's finite reason, that cannot grasp simultaneously both aspects of reality? Scotus' psychological and metaphysical subtlety certainly saw the impossibility of reducing reality to rational universals, but how can he synthesize the individual with the universal and provide a single grounding for morality? As nominalism was not far behind Scotus, so today situation ethics has already overtaken a type of fundamental option ethic that locates moral goodness in subjective intention guided principally by consequences. Scotus was admittedly far sharper and saner than most modern ethicians—he also allowed for divine positive law and ecclesiastical authority—but the problem which he left us persists. All in all, matching one's mind with the subtle Scot and following his arguments in the text can only improve the acuity of our own intelligence and teach humility, not a bad beginning for moral thought and life. Many thanks are due to Fr. Wolter for providing us with an excellent sampling of texts.

Fordham University, Bronx, N. Y. *John M. McDermott, S. J.*

Philosophy and Miracle: The Contemporary Debate, by David Basinger and Randall Basinger. Lewiston: The Edwin Mellon Press, 1986. Pp. 124. $39.95.

Some books plow virgin soil; others diligently hoe recurring weeds from old but productive fields. Both tasks are necessary, though they further our knowledge in quite different ways. This book belongs to the latter category and serves the general reader well in that respect. One could have hoped, however, that it would have undertaken the former task, since it is not evident that weeds have substantially overgrown Swinburne's *The Concept of Miracle*.

Miracles are actual only if they are possible, and their possibility depends on how they are defined. Hence the Basingers commence with the query whether miracles can be defined properly as violations of natural laws. They refute this Humean thesis by presenting more straightforwardly an argument promulgated by C. S. Lewis in *Miracles*. If natural laws only tell us what will happen given "a specific set of natural conditions and given that there are no other relevant forces present" (11), then should there be an intervention of an additional force (e.g. God), there is no reason not to expect a different (and possibly a non-repeated) effect. Only if there are no causes other than natural causes and if the relevant laws are definitely confirmed would a certain event constitute a violation of natural laws. In contrast to Hume, they define miracles as permanently, scientifically inexplicable events, events for which "the scientific enterprise will never formulate a natural covering law under which events of this type can be subsumed" (15).

The Basingers argue that Swinburne is mistaken in accepting Hume's definition of miracle as a violation of natural law. But perhaps the differences between them are more apparent than real. For Swinburne, an event is a violation when the laws either predicted that event's non-occurrence or rendered it highly improbable. If a law is violated, it is because either we have misstated the law or there exists an additional causal condition not subsumed under it, viz. a god. "One must thus distinguish between a formula being a law and a formula being (universally) true or being a law which holds without exception" (Swinburne, 28). Insofar as laws fail to apply when other, non-natural causal conditions obtain, this becomes simply a different way of putting the Basingers' point.

Both Swinburne and the Basingers face the question of coincidence miracles (miracles of timing), in which the event might be explained naturally, leaving as miraculous the timing of the event. The Basingers allow two kinds of miracles, miracles which are

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permanently inexplicable events and coincidence miracles. But they cannot allow the latter if they *define* miracles as permanently inexplicable events. Further, though they want to allow both, it is only the former with which they purport to deal (though the latter are introduced at a later, critical stage). Much, I think, could be said in a novel way about divine intervention if attention were paid equally to the latter.

Chapter Two takes up the issue of the possibility of miracles. Though Hume's argument is stated, the foil is Antony Flew. How can Flew permit nomologicals to be revised when he does not allow exceptional cases? The Basingers argue that Flew's attempt to rescue this by allowing only repeatable exceptional cases begs the question, for why should evidence supporting current nomologicals carry more weight than contrary, non-repeatable observations which might be supported by dependable, epistemological principles regarding the conditions of our experience?

Given the possibility of miracles, can we recognize them if they occur? Here the Basingers side, correctly, with Flew, who argues that there are no indisputable claims, that "it is always possible that new information will force us to revise our current set of nomologicals" (60) to account for the event. The Basingers, however, conclude to a stronger thesis against Swinburne and others, namely, that "it would always be more rational to acknowledge our limited understanding . . . and assume that a scientific explanation may be forthcoming" (67), that "miracles, if defined as permanently inexplicable events, could never justifiably be identified as such" (71). The "always" is based on the claim that science in the past has solved some such cases and future scientific explanation is always possible. But mere possibility of explanation and the fact that we are not "forced to identify it as a permanently inexplicable phenomenon" (63) are not enough to make it rational to withhold the belief that one has a counter-instance.

Where does that leave theists who want to be able to identify events as results of God's action? Contrary to expectation, the Basingers go on to affirm that a "theist may well be justified in maintaining [for that person] that the event in question is probably a direct act of God" (98). That is, theists can claim that from their worldview it is reasonable to claim that God has acted in a particular case, though they cannot expect others lacking their worldview necessarily to agree. But how does this square with the contention that we are never justified in identifying an event as a miracle? For the authors, miracles interpreted as permanently inexplicable events are only a sub-class of God's direct acts. Hence to maintain consistency they must be speaking here about direct acts of God of a different sort, i.e. either about what they said in the first chapter they would not deal with, viz. coincidence miracles, or about other, divine direct acts (which they have neither specified or clarified, but somehow would not be miracles). But first, this last category is unhelpful, for what would a direct act of God which was not a miracle be? Secondly, all the examples in the chapter are of events which would be properly classified as permanently inexplicable. Thirdly, even coincidence miracles, if direct acts of God, require at some point an act of God which would be scientifically inexplicable. Consequently, either the same considerations they raised against the rationality of identifying miracles as inexplicable events would apply to all direct acts of God (for in explaining these events we would not be forced to conclude that God was a causal agent at all) and theists are not justified in believing that *any* events are direct acts of God, or else the Basingers' argument that theists are justified in concluding that it is reasonable to believe that some events are direct acts of God is sound, in which case theists are justified in believing that at least some events are miracles (interpreted as permanently inexplicable events).

Finally, the Basingers see many theists limiting the miraculous intervention of God in order to resolve the problem of evil. If God can intervene miraculously, why does he not do so more often? The Basingers see the response that God created a world which operates according to natural laws as limiting God's power and entailing infrequent direct intervention. But this does not follow. All that follows is that one must correctly understand divine

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omnipotence in terms of God's self-limiting acts and deny that God *runs* the world by miracle. That God does not operate the world by miracle does not conflict with the contention that God is involved directly in the world in ways which are maximally consistent with human freedom and the regularity of natural laws which rational endeavors require and which promote human growth by allowing God to respond directly to petitionary prayer. And these, in God's case no less than in ours, leave it open for substantial, direct, agent action. Their concluding dilemma is conceptually flawed.

The reader is left with the impression that defining miracles as permanently inexplicable, divinely caused events creates a unidentifiable tin man without a heart. In objects created by us there are often tell-tale signs of our creative presence. These signs testify to their creator. Similarly, one might argue that in miracles there are often tell-tale signs of the Creator's presence. It might be the pattern, the timing, the unusualness, the direct response to prayer, the context, or something else. Yet for many believers there is something that signals that this event is a miracle. The event has religious significance. It is true that to accede to such a claim presupposes an acknowledgment of the possibility that there is an active God. Yet this acknowledgment is one which even an agnostic can entertain, for it need not be of an actual God, only of the possibility of his being. Where the event signals the reality of that being, apologetic value is not, as the Basingers claim, completely absent (see Swinburne, 71).

This suggests that the recognition of miracles might be possible, for there might be something in the event which signals, speaks of, refers to the agent. The Basingers are sceptical about discovering an independent criterion of religious significance, let alone a miracle. Yet it is unfortunate that they have not asked experiencers of miracles how they recognize that the event witnessed was a miracle. Perhaps we could gain significantly in our understanding by doing some empirical legwork, mingling (not incredulously) with miracle-experiencers to construct a phenomenology of miracle experience. With the ground again cleared of the miracles-are-impossible weeds, the cultivation of a phenomenological account might allow us to address in creative, new ways the questions whether miracles are actual and how they are recognized.

Finally and importantly, the book is unfortunately (and unforgivably) flawed by poor editing. Frequent misspellings and infelicitous grammatical constructions mar the text. There are also inaccuracies in the headings. For example, Chapter Two is entitled, "Can History Rule Out the Miraculous?" But the content of the chapter has nothing to do with what history rules out, but rather with what nomological considerations do and do not allow. Similarly, the title of Chapter Three asks whether science can identify the miraculous. But the issue is not what science can or cannot identify, but whether there are any events which can be ruled scientifically inexplicable, such that it would be unreasonable for us to suspend judgment or consider revising our natural laws to explain the event. If readers are expected to pay $40 to buy and then read the book, they deserve to see more care in editing and printing.

Augsburg College *Bruce R. Reichenbach*

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